Filed 8/5/26 In re K.G. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.G. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087792
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J305633 &
J305634)
v.
OPINION
K.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michelle Lauron,
Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant K.H. (Mother) is the mother of two daughters, K.G. (born
December 2024) and K.B. (born February 2014). Mother appeals the juvenile court’s
January 2026 jurisdictional and dispositional order adjudicating both children as
dependents of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 300, subd. (b)) and removing them from
parental custody.2
Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence of a nexus between Mother’s
conflicts with her neighbors and harm or substantial risk of harm to the children to
support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b) of section 300
and the order removing the children from Mother’s custody (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)). We
find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s orders and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 19, 2025, plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children
and Family Services (CFS) took protective custody of K.G. and K.B. after Mother was
arrested for disturbing the peace and violation of her probation. CFS filed petitions for
each child pursuant to section 300 on August 21, 2025. With respect to Mother, both
petitions alleged that the children were at risk of abuse and neglect based on Mother’s
issues with managing her anger (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)) and that Mother was incapable of
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
specified otherwise.
2 K.B.’s father, L.B. (Father), is not a party to this appeal. K.G.’s alleged father is
deceased.
2
providing care and provisions for the children because of her incarceration (§ 300, subds.
(b)(2) and (g)(3)).
A. MOTHER’S CFS HISTORY PRIOR TO THIS CASE
According to the jurisdiction and disposition report, prior to the instant action
Mother was the subject of multiple CFS investigations based on reports of her engaging
in prostitution and hitting K.B., which were deemed “inconclusive.” At least one of the
investigations, where K.B. was reported to have visible bruising on her face, was
explicitly deemed inconclusive because CFS was unable to locate Mother. The one CFS
investigation that was found to be “substantiated” was a neglect allegation in September
2021 when K.B. was found in the street barefoot and reported that she had no way of
contacting Mother.
In June 2025, CFS received a referral regarding K.B., who was at the police
station claiming that she was homeless and living on the street. She did not have any
shoes, her clothing was very dirty, and she claimed that her parents died in a car accident.
Mother reported K.B. as a runaway, and K.B. was returned to Mother. CFS made
multiple attempts via letters, calls, and text messages to schedule appointments with
Mother to speak with her, with no success.
When interviewed by CFS about the incident later, K.B. claimed that she did not
have shoes on when she encountered law enforcement because she was in a hurry to
leave. She said that she ran away from home “because the neighbors make her feel tired
and stressed out.” She reported that the neighbors record the family randomly, a
“perverted” neighbor took pictures of Mother, there were arguments between Mother and
3
the neighbors, and law enforcement was constantly being called to the home. She stated
that Mother wants her to be present during these incidents with the neighbors because the
neighbors would make up lies about the family. When questioned again later about
running away from home, K.B. said she did not want to go back home because the
neighbors are “weirdos.” She stated that Mother was mad at her for running away but
they talked about it and “the next day we were better.” The CFS report notes that K.B.
“made long pauses when answering these questions and appeared guarded and fidgety.”
In July 2025, CFS received another referral regarding K.B., who was seen
vandalizing people’s homes and taking people’s clothing out of the dryers in the laundry
room. It was reported to CFS that Mother would leave three to four times per week at
night and not return home until the morning, that Mother would get into verbal arguments
with her neighbors with K.B. present, and that she threatened another tenant with a knife.
In CFS interviews with K.B. after she was taken into protective custody in August
2025, she confirmed that she had been left home alone to care for her infant sister. K.B.
first claimed that it was only for about an hour. She later stated that she stays home alone
all the time when Mother “needs to do business,” that she babysits K.G. and “take[s]
really good care of [her] baby sister.” K.B. also disclosed that in 2023, before K.G. was
born, she would stay home asleep at night while Mother went to work. The children’s
caregiver noted concerns about K.B. feeling responsible to change diapers and make
bottles for K.G.
4
B. MOTHER’S INCIDENTS WITH NEIGHBORS AND OTHERS PRIOR
TO THIS CASE
During K.B.’s interviews with CFS after being taken into protective custody, she
stated that she and Mother had been residing in the apartment complex for six years and
“have been fighting the whole time, every neighbor tries to be mean to us.” K.B.
described multiple conflicts that had occurred between Mother and their neighbors in the
apartment complex. What follows is a summary of Mother’s troubling engagements with
neighbors and other third parties, much of the information for which came directly from
Mother during her interviews with CFS or her testimony at the January 2026 jurisdiction
and disposition hearing.
Mother claimed that in October 2022, the gardener at the apartment complex blew
dirt at her using his leaf blower, and he “was poking me with his finger, and then he
karate kicked me in my leg, I fought back because I was defending myself.” Although
Mother testified that K.B. was not present, K.B. was aware of this incident and described
to CFS that the gardener had been blowing leaves and dirt at Mother, that the gardener
pushed Mother, and that Mother and the gardener “were hitting each other.”
In November 2024, according to Mother, one of the neighbors was (for
unexplained reasons) angry at Mother, so they sent their children to lean against Mother’s
car. Mother pushed the alarm button on her vehicle. The police came and the neighbor
claimed Mother had brandished a gun at them, which Mother denied, although she did
admit to owning a gun. According to Mother, the charges were dropped due to lack of
evidence.
5
In May 2025, Mother noticed a man on her security camera who was looking at
her vehicle. She went to inspect her vehicle and discovered a long scratch on the driver’s
side, so she reported to the apartment property manager that the man had hit her vehicle
with his U-Haul truck. The police then arrived and arrested her, accusing Mother of
brandishing a knife at the man who allegedly hit her vehicle and threatening to kill him.
Mother denied brandishing a knife, although the police found a knife in her sports bra.
Mother claimed that she pleaded no contest to the charges so that she could “get out and
fight [her] case,” that she was suing the property manager “for lying and stating she was a
witness,” and that she had contacted the California Civil Rights Department. Mother
testified in January 2026 that she felt this situation was a “four against one, taking their
word, saying I was violent,” although she admitted she had never met the U-Haul driver
previously.
In June 2025, Mother sought a restraining order against her downstairs neighbor,
R.M., based on Mother’s claims that R.M. and her boyfriend were harassing her
whenever she was outside. Mother admitted that the restraining order request was denied
due to insufficient evidence. Mother’s sister served R.M. with the restraining order
paperwork. On the day R.M. was served, Mother was attempting to enter her apartment
with both children when R.M. came up the staircase and walked towards Mother with her
fists clenched. Mother felt threatened so she sprayed R.M. in the face with mace.
Mother testified that both children, including K.B., who was in a car seat, were
approximately four feet away from her when she sprayed the mace.
6
C. MOTHER’S ARRESTS IN AUGUST 2025
On August 19, 2025, the date on which CFS took the children into protective
custody, Mother called the police on the apartment manager and the neighbors living
below her alleging that they stole her security cameras. Mother claimed that the
neighbors called the police on her daily for noise complaints and that the San Bernadino
Police Department was harassing her. K.B. stated that she was home alone when the
property manager took down Mother’s cameras, so she contacted Mother to let her know
about it, and that when the police arrested Mother she did not know why but “the
neighbors are always messing with my mom.” Mother was charged with disturbing by
loud/unreasonable noise (Pen. Code § 415, subd. (2)), probation violation (Pen. Code §
1203.2, subd. (a)(4)), and assault with a deadly weapon likely to produce great bodily
injury (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(4)).
The August 19, 2025, police report reflects that police had previously been called
regarding Mother’s apartment more than five times for noise complaints dating back to
May 31, 2025. The report reflects observations by the police that there was an open case
with Code Enforcement about noise complaints, that Mother had refused requests from
the property manager to turn off the alarm noise on her security cameras, and that the
alarm could be heard from about 50 feet away and “mimicked the sound of a siren.”
Mother was in jail for three days following this incident.
On August 23, 2025, Mother was arrested again. Mother stated that based on
advice from her attorney, she refused to answer the door when police officers came to her
residence, resulting in the police kicking down her door to arrest her. Mother was
7
charged with disturbing by loud/unreasonable noise (Pen. Code § 415, subd. (2)),
probation violation (Pen. Code § 1203.2, subd. (a)(4)), assault with a deadly weapon
likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and obstruction of a
peace officer (Pen. Code § 148, subd. (a)(1)).
Mother later provided a minute order reflecting that at least one of her criminal
cases had been dismissed, although the copy in the record is unclear as to which case was
dismissed. Mother testified that both “unreasonable noise” charges had been dismissed.
On August 26, 2025, at the continued detention hearing, the juvenile court noted
that there had been a conference off the record and that following minor’s counsel
discussion with K.G., she would remain with the caregiver. Minor’s counsel confirmed
that K.B. “currently supports decompressing or de-stressing from the situation and that
she perceives Mom’s home unsafe due to ongoing issues with the neighbor in the other
residence.” The juvenile court originally ordered that K.B. would remain with the
caregiver and K.G. would be returned to Mother’s custody. It was then determined that
Mother was in jail at that time and could not take custody of K.G., so both children
continued to be in CFS’s custody. Mother was granted 8 hours of unsupervised visitation
per week with both children. Mother filed an appeal from the August 26, 2025 hearing
(case No. E086810); however, it was dismissed as no dispositional order had yet been
made.
D. MOTHER’S CONDUCT DURING VISITATION
Prior to Mother’s first visit with the children following their detention, Mother
sent text messages (it is unclear to whom) stating that if there was anything wrong with
8
the children when she saw them, she would not give them back to the caregiver. After a
CFS social worker spoke with Mother, Mother stated she would bring the children back
but would call the police if she had any concerns.
Mother was scheduled to have her first unsupervised visit with the children in
September 2025 at a McDonald’s. The children’s caretaker left the McDonald’s after 30
minutes when Mother did not show up. Mother sent multiple text messages to the CFS
social worker on her case wherein she claimed that another social worker gave her the
wrong address, claimed she filed a police report, threatened to sue both social workers,
demanded that the caretaker bring the children back to McDonald’s, and stated, “I’m not
leaving till I see my children” and “I want them removed from this foster lady as soon as
tomorrow comes as well.”
A week later, after Mother had her first unsupervised visit with the children, K.B.
reportedly told her caregiver that her visits with Father should be at the CFS office
because Father could “kidnap her, and the Court said the visits need to be at the office, so
they are breaking the law.” K.B. also laid out several rules for the caregiver and said it
was her (K.B.’s) responsibility to follow the rules and take care of her little sister. K.B.’s
caregiver reported that according to K.B., Mother told K.B. that “she is getting fat and
that her father will kidnap her and kill the baby,” and that K.B. is responsible for her baby
sister no matter what.
In September 2025, Father informed CFS during an interview that although his
initial supervised visit with K.B. went well overall, he was concerned about a comment
K.B. made about her sister going to jail. Father’s adult daughter was in jail at that time,
9
and Father did not ever talk to K.B. about his other family, so he was concerned that
Mother was coaching K.B. and involving her in adult matters.
Based on concerns that Mother may be coaching K.B., in September 2025 the
court ordered Mother’s visits to be supervised and reduced to twice per week for two
hours per visit.
In October 2025, the children’s caregiver reported that Mother approached her in
the lobby of the visitation center and was confrontational about not being informed of
K.B. having a doctor’s appointment. Mother was holding K.G.’s diaper bag and would
not provide it to the caregiver, and reportedly told the caregiver in front of K.B., “[i]f you
do not do what I say about my children then they could die in your care.” Mother denied
saying this to the caregiver or holding on to the diaper bag, claimed it was the caregiver
who was argumentative, and claimed that it was an emergency room visit, not a doctor’s
appointment, of which she should have been informed. The record does not contain any
information as to whether K.B. was taken to a doctor’s appointment or emergency room
visit.
In November 2025, Mother had a verbal altercation with the supervised visitation
monitor in the presence of the children. Mother was allowing K.G. to talk to her about
her caregiver, and refused to change the topic of the discussion when the monitor asked
her to do so. Mother reportedly told the monitor, “if my daughter wants to tell me what’s
going on where she’s living, I’m going to listen and allow her to tell me.” The monitor
therefore terminated the visit and asked Mother repeatedly to leave, but Mother refused.
While the children were still present, Mother made a phone call and told the monitor that
10
she wanted the monitor to hear what she was telling the social worker and her attorney.
Even after the children left with their caregiver, Mother refused to leave the supervised
visitation facility, and in front of the monitor left a message for somebody claiming that
the monitor had called her a bitch, which the monitor immediately denied. Mother only
left after the monitor told her that she would call the police. Mother’s version of events
was largely consistent with the monitor’s report, except that she felt the monitor was the
person who was being inappropriate.
E. JANUARY 2026 JURISDICTION AND DISPOSITION HEARING
On January 26, 2026, CFS filed an Additional Information to the Court form,
which reported that Mother had been referred to individual therapy, parenting education,
and anger management in September 2025. However, according to the report, when CFS
inquired of Mother’s progress regarding the services offered, she responded, “They are
not Court ordered, I do not need to comply with any classes, there is no evidence against
me, I know my rights and I do not need to do classes.”
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on January
29, 2026. The court struck the allegations associated with Mother being in custody but
otherwise found the allegations in the petitions to be true. The court declared both
children to be dependents of the court and ordered their removal from both parents. The
court also ordered Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation.
DISCUSSION
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted
11
or uncontradicted, supports them. ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
A. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides in relevant part that a child is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of… [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child.” The standard of proof for this finding is by a preponderance of the evidence.
(§ 355, subd. (a).)
“The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 159, 165 [disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1010-1012].)
Here, the record is replete with instances of Mother getting into angry
confrontations with third parties. On certain occasions, Mother’s confrontations with
others escalated to violence, including Mother’s run-in with the gardener where she states
she “fought back,” Mother’s threatening the U-Haul driver with a knife, for which she
was arrested and pled no contest, and Mother’s use of mace in the presence of, and a
short distance from, both children. Mother claims that only the mace incident took place
12
in front of the children, but K.B. was aware of Mother and the gardener “hitting each
other.”
Mother argues that there was no “causal link or sufficient nexus” established
between her aggressive conduct and the risk of harm to the children. However, the
juvenile court analogized Mother’s conduct to domestic violence, and we agree that there
is a meaningful similarity between Mother’s conduct and domestic violence for the
purposes of a jurisdictional finding. Irrespective of whether the violence in question was
taking place between Mother and a person with whom she has a domestic relationship,
versus any other third party like the neighbors, the children were exposed to risk of harm
by her actions. “Exposure to domestic violence may support jurisdiction under
subdivision (b)(1) of section 300…. Jurisdiction is appropriate since a minor can be ‘put
in a position of physical danger from this violence, since, for example, they could wander
into the room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist,
arm, foot or leg.’ ” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238.) The court may invoke
its jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), “even if a child has emerged
physically unscathed from an instance of domestic violence.” (L.O., at p. 239.)
Mother asserts that her conflicts were solely due to her neighbors’ behavior, such
that her moving to a new apartment alleviated all concerns.3 It is true that in order for
3 Mother also portrays her choice to move to a new apartment reflects protective
action on her part. However, Mother’s claim in this respect is somewhat diminished
by the fact that she was in the process of being evicted from her prior apartment when
she moved and planned to contest the eviction, suggesting it was not entirely a
voluntary choice by Mother.
13
domestic violence to serve as the basis for the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction
pursuant to section 300, subsection (b), there must be “evidence that the violence is
ongoing or likely to continue.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717,
disapproved on another ground by In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 278.) In this
instance, Mother had angry confrontations with not just her neighbors but also the
children’s caretaker and the supervised visitation monitor, both of which incidents took
place in front of the children. Mother’s aggressive conduct did not cease after moving to
a new apartment or while in the midst of a pending CFS investigation, thus there is
substantial evidence that the children remain at risk of harm.
Mother also flatly refused to participate in the services offered by CFS, which was
a point of concern for the juvenile court and is additional evidence of the continued risk
to the children. While it is true, as Mother argues, that such services are entirely
voluntary, Mother is wrong in claiming that a parent’s refusal to engage in voluntary
services may not be used against him or her. Mother does not cite to any legal authority
for this proposition but instead, in both her opening brief and reply brief, cites to the
clerk’s transcript. One of the cases that Mother does cite in her brief, In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, provides plainly: “A parent’s participation in services, whether
before jurisdiction and disposition or after, is always voluntary…. [¶] … [¶] That’s not
to say there are no consequences for failing to cooperate in the investigation or participate
in services. One consequence is that those failures ‘can be used later as evidence in a
review hearing or a hearing on a [section 300] petition.’ ” (Id. at p. 209.)
14
Mother’s failure to express remorse or show any insight regarding her conduct is
another indicator of a continued risk of harm. (In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p.
240.) “[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to
modify their behavior in the future without court supervision.” (In re A.F. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 283, 293.) Mother’s rejection of the services offered to her and insistence
that there was “no evidence against [her]” and statement that “I do not need to do classes”
reflects her denial that she has done anything wrong and shows a likelihood that she will
repeat the behavior. As the juvenile court remarked, if Mother had participated in any of
the services offered by CFS, “This could be a very different case.”
Mother argues that her case is most similar to In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
767 (J.N.). In J.N., the father was incarcerated and the child, J.N., was in the mother’s
care. (Id. at pp. 771-772.) A juvenile dependency petition was filed after the mother’s
newborn child, the half sibling of J.N., tested positive for marijuana. (Ibid.) The Court
of Appeal vacated the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding with respect to the father,
holding that the sole evidentiary basis for the finding was the father’s incarceration and
criminal record with no actual nexus shown between his criminal history and any
substantial current risk of harm to J.N. (Id. at 775.) The J.N. court noted there was
nothing to suggest that the father’s crimes involved children, that his crimes placed J.N.
in harm’s way, or that he exposed J.N. to his criminal activities. (Id. at pp. 775-776.)
We do not agree with Mother that J.N. is in any way applicable in this instance,
and the same is true of the recent, similar case of In re A.M. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 627,
633-634 (reversal of juvenile court’s removal of minor child from father based solely on
15
his criminal activity, which child was not present for or affected by). The juvenile court
here did not assert its jurisdiction merely because Mother has a criminal record. It is
apparent from the juvenile court’s oral statement of its ruling that it considered not just
Mother’s troubling actions—some of which have led to criminal prosecutions but some
of which have not—but specifically the risk of harm to the children as a result of those
actions. As noted ante, the court specifically likened Mother’s conduct to domestic
violence and the harm that may befall children who are exposed to violence. Unlike in
J.N., both K.B. and K.G. have been exposed to Mother’s aggressive conduct, including
the incident where Mother used mace in close proximity to the children. The impact on
K.B. was clear, as she stated through minor’s counsel that she felt unsafe in Mother’s
home due to the conflicts with the neighbors.
Further, the juvenile court identified other reasons for its ruling beyond Mother’s
conduct. The court noted that although Mother’s testimony did not address the issue,
K.B. had reported being left alone to care for K.G. at nighttime, and “that alone puts both
these children in great danger.” The court also noted that K.B. was previously found
alone and saying she was homeless, which, along with the prior CFS reports, suggested
she was being left alone for periods of time and could wander the streets without Mother
knowing where she was. Thus, Mother’s confrontations with various third parties were
not the sole basis for the juvenile court’s proper assertion of its jurisdiction over K.B. and
K.G.
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s section
300, subdivision (b), jurisdictional finding against Mother.
16
B. DISPOSITIONAL FINDINGS
Section 361, subdivision (c), provides that a child may be taken from the physical
custody of her parents where the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence that
there “is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being” of the child if returned home and “there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor” from her parent’s physical custody.
“[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing
evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with well-established principles
governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate
court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and
give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 995-996.)
As discussed ante, there was substantial evidence that Mother had a pattern of
becoming involved in aggressive altercations with third parties, sometimes in the
presence of the children, and leaving the children without supervision. The risks
presented by Mother’s conduct were not alleviated by her moving to a new apartment as
she continued to engage in aggressive confrontations with other third parties. We find
17
that there is substantial evidence adequate to meet the “highly probable” standard of
review set forth in O.B. to support the juvenile court’s removal order.
Mother likens her case to that of In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944. In M.V.,
there were incidents of domestic violence between the father and the mother, with the
mother being the primary aggressor, and the children were placed into protective custody.
(Id. at pp. 948-951.) Both parents enrolled in domestic violence classes and were
progressing well in the classes. (Id. at 952-953.) Of concern, however, was the father
recanting his statements of the mother’s abusive conduct. (Id. at p. 951, 961.) Despite
the social worker testifying without qualification that she could not think of any safety
risk of placing the children with the father, the juvenile court ordered removal of the
children from both parents, stating “there is no hope for a safety plan because neither
parent acknowledges that there are events and behaviors that need to be addressed and
changed.” (Id. at pp. 961-962.) Upon reversing the lower court’s order, the M.V. court
held that “[a]lthough troubling, the parents’ ‘lack of transparency’ or subsequent denial
of the events that led to dependency is not sufficient, by itself, to justify removal of the
Children from either parent’s custody.” (Id. at p. 962.)
Mother is unlike the parents in M.V. She did not engage in any services offered by
CFS, and there is no testimony from a CFS social worker professing a belief that the
children would be safe if returned to Mother. (Cf. In re M.V., supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 962-963.) Mother does not deny that most of the troubling incidents discussed herein
actually took place, and in fact many of the details of the incidents came directly from
her. Mother only denies any wrongdoing on her part. Moreover, unlike in M.V.,
18
Mother’s denial of wrongdoing is not the sole reason for the juvenile court’s removal
order; there is other substantial evidence to support the order.
Mother further argues that the removal order was erroneous because there were
other reasonable alternatives to removal such as protective orders, unannounced visits by
CFS, or a detailed safety plan. However, as noted above, Mother did not engage with any
of the services offered by CFS and in fact actively rejected them claiming she did not
need them. Mother also has a history of avoiding CFS social workers when the children
are in her custody. In the face of that conduct, there was substantial evidence to support
the order of removal. In addition, the one unsupervised visit that Mother had with the
children immediately led to K.B. making statements to her caregiver and Father
suggestive of Mother coaching K.B. and involving her in adult matters. During one of
Mother’s supervised visits, she engaged in an aggressive verbal altercation with the
monitor in front of the children. Mother’s suggestion that the children should be returned
to her custody with appropriate safeguards “ignores her inability to control her behavior
even during supervised visits.” (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 724.)
Finally, we reject Mother’s contention that the juvenile court’s comment regarding
a mental health evaluation being “helpful” was a legal error requiring reversal.4 Mother
4 After discussing several of the altercations between Mother and various third
parties, the court commented: “We don’t know the whole story. It was one person’s
word against the other. One person says there was a knife, one person says there wasn’t a
knife. But to really to look at all of these things in combination together really does look
like it was a massive conspiracy against Mom and that leads to the paranoia, that leads to
the concern that there may potentially be some mental health issues. [¶] Had there been
a mental health evaluation or something maybe beforehand, that might have been
something helpful.”
19
again does not cite to any legal authority in support of this proposition but instead cites to
the reporter’s transcript. Regardless, while Mother is correct that, as set forth in Laurie S.
v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 203, the court could not have ordered an
evaluation prior to its finding of jurisdiction, the court here was not attempting to make
such an order. The court’s comment is neither an order nor a finding, so there is nothing
to be reversed or vacated.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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