Filed 10/20/26 In re K.C. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re K.C. et al., B348561
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01885A-C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Juan Valles, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
C.C. (father) appeals jurisdiction findings and disposition orders
regarding his three children, H., R., and K. The juvenile court assumed
jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). It removed father’s
three children from his custody, placed them in the sole custody of their
mother, and ordered monitored visitation for father. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing a juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders,
“‘we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the
province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)2
Here, the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over the children under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), which states that jurisdiction is appropriate
when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of … [t]he failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect
the child.”
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background in detail
because our opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts
of the case and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of
trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Our discussion of the factual record reflects this standard of review.
2
This case came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) through a referral on May 4, 2025,
after police responded to a report of domestic violence. Mother reported to
police that father and mother had begun arguing over leftover pizza. Father
dragged mother by the shirt to a separate room and told her that he wished
she would die. Mother called for help and began pounding her hands on the
floor to get her neighbor’s attention. Father put both hands on mother’s neck
to stop her from screaming. When the police arrived, father pulled mother
away from the door and held her to prevent her from reaching the door.
Father only opened the door after the police began using breaching tools. A
neighbor also confirmed hearing mother screaming for help and heard loud
thumping noises coming from the home the night of the incident. Mother
initially reported the abuse to police, but the next day, she recanted her
statements.
On June 24, 2025, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). DCFS alleged that the children were at risk of
physical harm due to father’s violence against mother. At the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing on August 21, 2025, the juvenile court sustained the
petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and dismissed the count under
subdivision (a). The juvenile court found that the domestic violence described
in the petition had occurred, crediting mother’s initial report to the police and
the neighbor’s separate report. The juvenile court found mother’s subsequent
retraction not credible. The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a substantial risk of physical harm to the children if
they remained in father’s custody, and that there were no reasonable
alternatives to protect the children other than removal. The juvenile court
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therefore ordered the children removed from father and placed with mother,
with monitored visitation for father.
Father’s main argument is that there was insufficient evidence of
“substantial risk” of current or future harm to the children to support the
juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction. According to father, this case involves
only a single domestic violence incident directed at mother (not the children)
well before the jurisdiction hearing. Father argues that the evidence of that
single past incident was insufficient as a matter of law to show that the
children were at a substantial risk of harm at the time of the hearing.
Applying the substantial evidence standard of review, we disagree with
father on both the nature of the relevant evidence and the legal consequences
of that evidence.
There must be significant risk to the child at the time of the
jurisdiction hearing—not merely evidence of a past risk—to sustain a petition
under section 300. (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.) However,
evidence of past conduct may be probative of current or future conditions
when there is “‘some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged
conduct will recur.’” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)
Here, there was ample evidence reasonably suggesting that the
children remained at risk in father’s care. On June 7, 2025, mother called
the police regarding father’s presence at the home. A police report indicated
that father harassed mother one week later. These incidents occurred one
month after the inciting event on May 4 and approximately two months
before the jurisdiction hearing. Moreover, although father initially agreed to
a short-term safety plan on May 13, 2025, to reside separately from mother,
he failed to meet with the social worker in August ahead of the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing.
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As we noted, mother recanted her initial report to police, but the
juvenile court found the recantation not credible. In addition, mother’s
therapist reported to DCFS that mother “appeared to be highly protective of
the father and [was] minimizing her victimization.” Mother’s conduct was
significant. When—as the juvenile court concluded happened here—domestic
violence occurs and one parent denies it, there is an obviously elevated risk of
violence occurring again. (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156 [“A
parent’s denial of domestic violence increases the risk of it recurring”])
In general, a “‘cycle of violence between … parents constitute[s] a
failure to protect [a child] “from the substantial risk of encountering the
violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.”’” (In re V.L.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) Here, there was substantial evidence of an
ongoing abusive relationship, placing the children at risk of serious physical
harm. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that jurisdiction was appropriate under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1)(A) due to the inability of the parents to adequately protect the children.
Father also argues that substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s disposition order to remove the children from father. Again,
we disagree.
A dependent child may not be removed from the physical custody of a
parent with whom the child resides at the time the petition is initiated
“unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence … [¶](1)
[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor
parent’s … custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
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We review the juvenile court’s findings under section 361, subdivision
(c) for substantial evidence, taking into account the level of confidence that
the “clear and convincing evidence” standard demands. (In re Zoe H. (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 58, 71.)
In addition to the evidence of an ongoing abusive relationship between
father and mother, there was also evidence of father’s failure to cooperate
with DCFS by not making himself available to the social worker. Evidence of
a recurrent cycle of violence supports a finding that placement of children
with the perpetrating parent would pose a substantial risk of harm to the
children and that there are no reasonable alternatives to protect the children
other than removal. (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–157.) A
parent’s failure to cooperate with the social services agency or being less than
forthcoming during interviews can also support removal from that parent.
(In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212.) This evidence is more than
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that there was no reasonable
recourse to protect the children other than removal.
Finally, father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
ordering monitored visitation and denying his request for unmonitored
visitation. Once more, we disagree.
We review visitation orders pursuant to section 362 for abuse of
discretion. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.) “The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that
of the trial court.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319,
internal quotation marks omitted; see also In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
119, 134–135.) We will not disturb a lower court’s decision as an abuse of
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discretion unless the court exceeded the limits of legal jurisdiction by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re Stephanie
M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
Given the facts we have described above, the juvenile court could
reasonably conclude that the children would be at risk of serious physical
harm if left unmonitored with father. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion
for the juvenile court to conclude it was in the children’s best interests for
father to only have monitored visitation.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s August 21, 2025 orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
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