Filed 9/29/26 In re Julian C. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re Julian C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY A175063
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES, (Contra Costa County
Super Ct. No. J2500398)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In this child dependency case, Daniel J., the biological father of Julian
C., asks that we reverse the dependency court’s findings that the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply to this case because, he argues,
the Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family Services (Bureau)
did not make adequate initial inquiries of Julian’s relatives about his
possible American Indian ancestry. The Bureau agrees. In addition, Daniel
seeks a clerical correction of the court’s visitation order, to which the
Bureau also agrees.
We find error in both instances, and shall order the relief Daniel
seeks.
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I. BACKGROUND
We discuss only those facts relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
Julian was born prematurely to Alexis C. (Mother), who reportedly
has a history of chronic substance abuse, including during her pregnancy.
Soon after Julian’s birth, the Bureau, finding indications of Julian being at
risk of harm, removed him from Mother’s care. On July 21, 2025, the
Bureau petitioned under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300
regarding Julian in Contra Costa County Superior Court.
Prior to the filing, Mother identified Daniel J. as Julian’s possible
father. In the course of the proceedings, she also identified another man as
Julian’s potential father. On October 6, 2025, the court found, based on a
recently completed paternity test, that Daniel is Julian’s biological father.
On October 27, 2025, the court denied Daniel’s request to be elevated to
presumed father status.
As for the court’s rulings regarding Julian, at an August 15, 2025
jurisdiction hearing, the court sustained two allegations, dismissed two, and
asserted jurisdiction over Julian. At an October 27, 2025 disposition
hearing, the court removed Julian from Mother’s custody and placed him in
a foster home, ordered reunification services for Mother, and declined to
order reunification services for Daniel. It ordered that Daniel be allowed
supervised visitations at least twice a week for two hours.
As for the ICWA issues, early on, Mother and the maternal
grandmother each reported no known American Indian ancestry. Daniel
and his mother indicated the same. At a July 22, 2025 detention hearing,
the court inquired of the maternal grandmother, maternal great-
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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grandmother, and Daniel about Julian’s possible Indian ancestry, and all
reported no known ancestry. The court found there was no reason to believe
or know Julian was an Indian child and that ICWA did not apply.
At the August 15 jurisdiction hearing, Mother and maternal
grandmother each said she believed she might have Blackfeet ancestry.
The court ordered the Bureau to inquire further on this possibility and
provide whatever notice was appropriate.
In its subsequent disposition report, the Bureau reported that it had
sent a letter to the Blackfeet Tribe (Blackfeet Tribe or Tribe) inquiring
about Julian’s eligibility for membership. The Bureau reported receiving a
certified mail return slip indicating the Tribe had received the letter, but
that it had not received any response from the Tribe. Having heard nothing
from the Tribe, the Bureau reported that “Julian’s ICWA eligibility is still
outstanding.”
At a hearing on September 15, 2025, the court inquired about, among
other things, whether the maternal grandmother, maternal step-
grandfather, and a maternal great-aunt had any known Indian ancestry.
All denied knowledge of any such ancestry. The court stated that it had no
reason to believe or know that ICWA applied, and reserved the issue as to
whether ICWA applied to the case pending the receipt of information from
the Blackfeet Tribe.
In an update memo to the court signed on October 3rd, the Bureau did
not indicate that it had received any response from the Tribe or conducted
any further ICWA inquiries. At an October 6, 2025 hearing, Daniel’s
mother, upon the court’s inquiry, indicated she had no reason to think
Julian had any Indian ancestry. The court stated that it believed there was
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no outstanding ICWA information and found that it had no reason to
believe or know that ICWA applied to the case.
At the October 27, 2025 disposition hearing, the court again found
there was no reason to believe or know that Julian was an Indian child and
that ICWA did not apply to the case.
Besides these ICWA inquiries and findings, the record indicates the
Bureau knew of a number of other maternal and paternal relatives of
Julian, but does not indicate that it made initial inquiries to them about
Julian’s possible Indian ancestry.
Specifically, in a July 22, 2025 detention/jurisdiction report, the
Bureau reported that the maternal grandmother, asked if there were other
relatives’ homes where Julian could be placed, said that everyone lived at
her house.2 She also identified a maternal aunt who cared for the maternal
grandmother. A Bureau social worker reportedly talked by phone with a
maternal uncle on July 10, 2025.
In a September 15, 2025 disposition report, the Bureau indicated that
Mother said she had two brothers, one of whom she lived with in the
maternal grandmother’s home prior to the dependency case. In the same
report, the Bureau indicated that Daniel lived with the paternal
grandmother and paternal grandfather. Further, Daniel reportedly had two
older brothers with whom he was “very close.” He also had two adult
children, who, therefore, were Julian’s half-siblings.
2 The Department also reported that “[t]he family” had agreed to a
safety plan that included Mother being around Julian supervised by a safe,
sober adult, and identified the maternal grandmother, step-grandfather,
and five other individuals. The Department did not specify the five
individuals’ relationship to Julian, but the record suggests at least one, Ty
C., was Mother’s brother.
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Again, there is no indication in the record that the Bureau asked any
of these relatives about Julian’s possible Indian ancestry.
Daniel filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. ICWA
1. Legal Standards
ICWA was enacted in 1978. It reflects a congressional determination
to protect Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal standards a
state court must follow before removing an Indian child from his or her
family. (25 U.S.C. §§ 1902; In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128–1129
(Dezi C.).) Consistent with ICWA, our state’s analogue, the California
Indian Child Welfare Act (§ 224 et seq; Cal-ICWA), provides that “courts
and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’ in
dependency cases.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Dezi C., at p. 1124; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481.)
ICWA defines an “ ‘Indian child’ ” as “any unmarried person who is
under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b)
[adopting the federal definition].)
There are three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency
proceedings. “First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his
family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons
whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second,
if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child,
then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian
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status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id.,
subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to
know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to inquire at
the first appearance whether anyone ‘knows or has reason to know that the
child is an Indian child’]; id., subd. (d) [defining circumstances that
establish a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice
is required if there is a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child as defined
under § 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052.)
As explained by one appellate court, “[b]ecause it typically is not self-
evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law
mandate certain inquiries to be made in each case. These requirements are
sometimes collectively referred to as the duty of initial inquiry. [Citation.]
“The duty of initial inquiry arises, in part, from federal regulations
under ICWA stating that ‘[s]tate courts must ask each participant in an . . .
involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the participant knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child’ and that ‘[s]tate courts
must instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive
information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.’
(25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2021).) Thus, the federal regulation places a duty on
only ‘courts’ to inquire or instruct ‘participants’ and ‘parties’ to a case.
“State law, however, more broadly imposes on social services agencies
and juvenile courts (but not parents) an ‘affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire’ whether a child in the dependency proceeding ‘is or may be an
Indian child.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) When the agency takes the child into
temporary custody, its duty to inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
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members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting
child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’
(§ 224.2, subd. (b).) State law also expressly requires the juvenile court to
ask participants who appear before the court about the child’s potential
Indian status. (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 735, 741–742, disapproved in part on another ground in Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1150–1151.)
An extended family member, if not defined by the law or custom of the
child’s Indian tribe, includes “a person who has reached the age of eighteen
and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting same
definition].)
The duty of inquiry continues throughout the dependency
proceedings. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; see § 224.2, subd. (a).)
A juvenile dependency court may find ICWA does not apply to a child’s
proceeding if it finds the child welfare agency’s duty of inquiry has been
satisfied and there is no reason to know that child is an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A).) “ ‘The juvenile
court may find ICWA does not apply following “proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence” by [a child welfare department] because “there is
no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child” or because “the
court does not have sufficient evidence to determine that the child is or is
not an Indian child” ’ [citation], but the court may not find that ICWA does
not apply when the absence of evidence that a child is an Indian child
results from a DCFS inquiry that is not proper, adequate, or demonstrative
of due diligence.” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408.)
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In Dezi C., our Supreme Court resolved a split among our appellate
courts regarding the proper standard to apply in assessing the prejudicial
effect of a child welfare department’s failure to comply with its Cal-ICWA
inquiry duties. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.) The court held that
“error resulting in an inadequate initial . . . inquiry requires conditional
reversal” because “ ‘[u]ntil an agency conducts a proper initial inquiry and
makes that information known, it is impossible to know what the inquiry
might reveal.’ ” (Id. at p. 1136.) Remand should be accompanied by
“directions for the child welfare agency to comply with the inquiry
requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with
[California Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply
with the notice provision of section 224.3.” (Id. at p. 1136.) “If, upon review,
a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and
ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and
record documentation as required by California law [citation], there is no
error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency
did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the other
hand, if the inquiry is inadequate, conditional reversal is required so the
agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard the rights of tribes,
parents, and the child.” (Id. at p. 1141.)
A biological father whose paternity is established has standing to
raise ICWA inquiry issues on appeal. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275,
291.)
“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is
adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary
function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at 1141.)
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2. Analysis
Daniel argues that the Bureau failed to make a sufficient initial
inquiry into whether Julian may be an Indian child by not inquiring of a
number of the relatives whom the record indicates the Bureau knew about
prior to the disposition hearing and that, because of the Bureau’s failure,
the court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply because there was a lack
of substantial evidence to support that finding. He also argues that the
Bureau should have made a further inquiry of the Blackfeet Tribe when it
did not respond to the Bureau’s letter prior to the disposition hearing.
Citing Dezi C., he seeks a reversal of the court’s findings that ICWA does
not apply, and for this court to order that the Bureau and the court
undertake a new ICWA inquiry that is in compliance with ICWA and
related statutes.
The Bureau responds to this argument with a letter also citing Dezi
C., and states that it “concedes that a limited remand is warranted because
the record does not include information on attempts to conduct ICWA
inquiry with the paternal grandfather.” Upon this concession, “the Bureau
agrees to a conditional reversal of the Dispositional orders and a limited
remand for compliance with ICWA.”
We agree with the parties that we must reverse the court’s ICWA
findings because, even under a deferential standard of review, the court
erred in its ICWA findings. The Bureau plainly conducted an inadequate
initial inquiry of those relatives it was aware of but did not ask about
Indian heritage. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at 1141 [finding the same
under the deferential standard].) We see no reason to reverse the juvenile
court’s disposition order, however. In the introduction to his opening brief
(he has not filed a reply brief), Daniel states that he is also appealing from
the court’s denial of his request to elevate his status to presumed father and
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from the disposition order. But he neither requests relief from these orders
nor argues for their reversal; his citation to Dezi C. and other legal
authority referring to a conditional remand is for the sole purpose of
arguing for the reversal of the court’s ICWA findings. Thus, to the extent
Daniel may have intended by his appeal to seek reversal of the paternity
finding and disposition order, we treat those claims as waived. (In re A.C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 [“ ‘When an appellant . . . fails to support [a
point] with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point
as waived.’ ”].)3
B. Visitation
Daniel also asks that we order the juvenile court to correct its written
visitation order to indicate Daniel’s visitation with Julian must be
supervised twice a week for two hours, and also to clarify whether that is a
total of two hours per week, or two two-hour visits per week. The Bureau
agrees that we should order the juvenile court to correct its written order
because the Bureau “recognizes that it requested visitation for [Daniel] to
be a minimum of twice a week for two hours per week, and the court
3 Some courts have held that appeal from a finding such as that made
by the court here—at an early stage in a dependency proceeding in which
the court and the child welfare agency have a continuing obligation to
consider ICWA requirements and the court had not yet made a final ICWA
ruling upon termination of parental rights—is premature. (See, e.g., In re
S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 179 [rejecting claim of a failure to conduct
proper initial inquiry under ICWA on appeal from a
jurisdiction/dispositional order and affirming the order]; accord, In re T.R.
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1154 [“Because this case is ongoing and the
department and court are under a continuing duty to inquire whether [the
children] may be Indian children, [the] claim of inadequate inquiry isn’t
ripe”]. Because the Bureau does not raise the possible application of such
cases here, we do not further consider whether this appeal is premature.
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granted that request,” but that the written order states Daniel is “only
entitled to one hour of visitation per week.”
At the contested disposition hearing, the court stated, “As for the
father, I’m going to order the minimum of two times per week for two hours,
and, again, we’ll have that three-month hearing, and if things are going well
with father, I’d be inclined to adjust that order as well depending on how
the visits are going. Must be supervised by the Bureau for father as well.”
However, its written order states that Daniel’s visitation must be
supervised by the Bureau or its professional designee and may occur two
times a week for a total of one hour per week.
“Where there is a conflict between the juvenile court’s statements in
the reporter’s transcript and the recitals in the clerk’s transcript, we
presume the reporter’s transcript is more accurate.” (In re A.C. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799–800.) We may order the trial court to correct a
clerical error that does not accurately reflect the trial court’s order. (People
v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
We think the court’s order as stated orally at the hearing was
sufficiently clear and will order that on remand it correct its written
visitation order to show that Daniel is entitled to two supervised visits a
week for a total of two hours (not one hour), subject to change depending on
how the visits go. Of course, nothing prevents the court from changing this
order based on new information.
III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the court’s ICWA findings and remand this matter to the
juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements of
sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation provisions of California
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5), consistent with this opinion.
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We further order that on remand the juvenile court correct its written
disposition order to show that Daniel is entitled to two supervised visits a
week for a total of two hours, as the court ordered at the disposition
hearing. Nothing prevents the court from changing this order based on new
information.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
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