Filed 8/25/26 In re Jorge G. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re JORGE G. et al., Persons B350353
Coming Under Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02078)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JORGE G., SR.,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Dismissed.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In the proceedings below, the juvenile court sustained a
petition brought by respondent Los Angeles Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) on behalf of minors Jorge
G. (born December 2010) and Angelique G. (born March 2012)
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1 Appellant
father Jorge G., Sr., appeals from the court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders, contending they are unsupported by
substantial evidence. During the pendency of this appeal,
however, the court sustained subsequent petitions filed by DCFS
under sections 342 and 387. DCFS contends these events render
Father’s current appeal moot, and Father has failed to respond to
DCFS’s argument. We agree with DCFS and dismiss this appeal
as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. DCFS Files a Petition
In May 2025, DCFS received a referral that Angelique was
sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend, Alejandro. Angelique
and two of Mother’s nieces reported to police that Alejandro had
sexually abused all three. The police also spoke with Daphne
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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(Jorge and Angelique’s adult half sibling), who stated Alejandro
had been “sexually inappropriate to her since the age of 15.”
Father told a children’s social worker (CSW) that Anglique
had disclosed to him, “approximately 1-2 months ago,” that
Alejandro was sexually abusing her, but asked him not to say
anything until she graduated from elementary school. Father
acquiesced but had Angelique stay with him for the next two
weeks. Father also learned Alejandro had sexually abused
Daphne as well as two of Mother’s nieces.
After staying with Father for two weeks, Angelique
returned to Mother’s home to retrieve her cell phone “for
evidence.”2 Father instructed her to call him “if Alejandro did
anything to her or she felt uncomfortable,” and he would pick her
up. A day before Mother and Angelique went to the police,
Father received a text message from Daphne to pick Angelique
up immediately. After he did, Angelique disclosed Alejandro had
abused her again. The next day, Father informed Mother about
the abuse.
In 2009, Father “registered as a control[led] substance
offender.” The paternal grandmother reported Father drank
alcohol but had “no recent observations of him consuming alcohol
or being intoxicated.” The paternal grandfather confirmed that
“in the past, the father also consumed alcohol but not recently.”
The CSW subsequently asked Father to test for drugs and
alcohol. Father agreed but never tested.
In July 2025, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of Jorge and
Angelique under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j).
2 Angelique told Father Alejandro had sent her
“inappropriate text messages.”
3
Counts b-1, d-1, and j-1 alleged Mother’s companion Alejandro
sexually abused Angelique multiple times, and Father failed to
protect Angelique because he knew or should have known of the
abuse, but nevertheless let her live with Mother and Alejandro.3
At the detention hearing, the court found DCFS had made
a prima facie case, detained the children from Mother, and
released them to Father, on the condition that he reside with the
paternal grandparents (or at another DCFS-approved location)
and underwent weekly drug testing.
B. The Court Sustains the Petition
In the subsequent investigation, a dependency investigator
(DI) spoke with Father. As the DI was reading the allegations to
Father, he asked her to stop because “he did not want the details
of the abuse.” He explained he initially agreed to Angelique’s
request not to disclose the abuse because there were two more
weeks before school ended. When the DI asked why he waited a
month to report the abuse, however, Father responded: “Because
she asked me to wait. She didn’t want to feel awkward and get
bullied. I told mom, I told her, they were going to stay here with
me for 2 weeks. Then mother came to pick her up. I didn’t want
to, I asked Angie to tell mom. She said don’t worry[,] I’m going to
be fine. Don’t tell mom. Angelique put me in a situation, and I
want my daughter to trust me. I know her very good. Her
mother broke her trust so I didn’t want to break her trust.”
Father claimed he was scared Mother would “prevent the case to
3 Counts b-2, d-2, and j-2 alleged Mother knew Alejandro
sexually abused Daphne but still permitted Alejandro access to
Jorge and Angelique.
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move forward [sic]” and did not want Angelique “to retract her
story.” Despite the court’s order, Father did not drug test.
In August 2025, the court sustained the petition as
pleaded, removed the children from Mother, and placed them
with Father, again on the condition that he reside with the
paternal grandparents (or at another DCFS-approved location)
and underwent weekly drug testing. The court stated Father
could stop testing after four “clean consecutive tests.” The court
also ordered Father to participate in conjoint counseling with the
children, sex abuse awareness counseling, and family
preservation services. Father timely appealed.
C. The Court Sustains Additional Petitions
In June 2026, DCFS asked us to judicially notice: (1) a
section 342 petition DCFS filed in February 2026; (2) a section
387 petition DCFS filed in February 2026; (3) an amended section
342 petition DCFS filed in April 2026; (4) April 2026 minute
orders regarding the adjudication and disposition of the amended
section 342 petition; and (5) April 2026 minute orders regarding
the adjudication and disposition of the section 387 petition.
Father did not oppose this request, and we grant it.
The judicially noticed petitions and orders inform us that:
In February 2025, DCFS filed a supplemental petition
under section 387 alleging Father failed “to participate in sexual
abuse awareness counseling and conjoint counseling with the
children in violation of the Juvenile Court orders dated 08/27/25,”
“to regularly participate in Family Preservation services in
violation of the Juvenile Court orders, resulting in Family
Preservation services being terminated,” and to reside in the
paternal grandparents’ home, moving out in December 2025,
without providing DCFS with a current address.
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In April 2025, DCFS filed an amended subsequent petition
under section 342 alleging Father frequently left the children
with the paternal grandparents for “days at a time” without
making a plan for their care, and that he appeared under the
influence in front of the children on one occasion in December
2025 and refused to drug test that day.
In April 2026, the court sustained both the section 387 and
amended section 342 petitions as to Father. DCFS asserts
Father did not appeal these orders, and Father does not claim
otherwise.
DISCUSSION
DCFS contends Father’s appeal is moot because “the
juvenile court made subsequent jurisdictional findings against
him, which were unchallenged and are now final.” Father does
not contend otherwise, and we agree.
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a case-by-
case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency
matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect
the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “A case
becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible for [a] court, if
it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In a dependency case, “relief is
effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.)
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“In dependency proceedings, the basic pleading device to
assert a child falls within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is a
petition.” (In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364.) “ ‘It
may be an original petition (§ 332), a subsequent petition for
children who are already dependents when there are “new facts
or circumstances” that bring them within a category of section
300 “other than those under which the original petition was
sustained” (§ 342), or a supplemental petition when there are
facts which indicate that a previous disposition is not
appropriate. (§ 387.)’ ” (Ibid.)
In A.B., the mother asked us to “reverse the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction under the original petition.” (In re A.B.,
supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.) “DCFS concede[d] the
jurisdictional finding under the original petition was error but
argues it was rendered moot by the juvenile court’s finding of
jurisdiction under the subsequent petition.” (Id. at p. 1364.) We
agreed, concluding “no effective relief would be provided to
mother by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition
because jurisdiction was established independently under the
subsequent petition on entirely new and independent facts.”
(Ibid.)
Here, Father challenges only the orders made on the
original petition. The juvenile court sustained subsequent
petitions independently establishing jurisdiction on entirely new
and independent facts, and Father failed to appeal those findings,
rendering them final. Father’s current appeal is therefore moot.
While we have discretion to consider moot appeals (In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282), Father offers no reason for us to do
so here, and we decline to do so.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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