Filed 9/15/26 In re Jonathan R. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re JONATHAN R., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, D085819
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J245385)
v.
JONATHAN R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert J. Trentacosta, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General and Cobi S. Furdek, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Appellant Jonathan R. was with O.C. and E.A. on a college campus
when E.A. fired a gun at two other minors, striking one victim twice. The
juvenile court found true the allegations that Jonathan aided and abetted two
attempted murders with a firearm, unlawfully possessed ammunition and
firearms on a school campus, and was a minor in possession of a firearm and
ammunition. In a bifurcated hearing, the court found true a gang
enhancement. At disposition, Jonathan was committed to the secure track
for 39 years to life plus 25 years, four months, with a baseline of 3 years.
Jonathan contends that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile
court’s findings. He further contends that the juvenile court erred in
admitting gang evidence during the substantive phase of the bifurcated
hearing, and in committing him to the secure track Youth Development
Academy (YDA) rather than the less restrictive HOPE (Healing
Opportunities for Personal Empowerment) program.
We reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Shooting
The juvenile court received evidence that 17-year-old Jonathan, 16-
year-old E.A. and 14-year-old O.C. were members of a gang called East Side
San Diego (ESD). In May 2024, Jonathan posted videos on social media of
himself in the territories of multiple rival gangs, taunting the rival gang for
allowing him onto their turf without challenge. The rivals depicted in his
videos included the North Park Locos.
2
On the afternoon of on October 31, 2024, Jonathan, E.A., and O.C. were
in group totaling six or eight young people near a bus stop on the campus of a
San Diego college. O.C. pointed out two other minors who emerged from
MTS elevators and headed to another bus stop. The minors were later
identified as D.I. and J.L., members of North Park Locos, a rival gang to
ESD. After O.C. pointed them out, the group conferred together.
Jonathan walked in the direction of the two North Park minors,
followed by E.A. and O.C. At some point Jonathan made a gesture to the rest
of the group near the bus stop. The other members of the group, who had
started following, turned back toward the bus stop and remained there. A
female from the group got behind a pole and some bushes and looked in the
direction where Jonathan and the others were heading.
As they walked, Jonathan kept looking around. E.A. and O.C. followed
behind. Jonathan led the group towards the elevators near the North Park
minors.
D.I. and J.L. appeared to notice that Jonathan and the two others were
approaching. J.L. moved his backpack around to the front of his body, and
took a step backward, away from Jonathan. D.I. took a step toward Jonathan
and threw his hands out as if communicating something to Jonathan and his
group.
D.I. and J.L. began to make dodging motions and moved backwards.
J.L. got behind a metal container that was on the ground and pulled a silver
revolver from his backpack. D.I. moved backwards out of view of the
surveillance camera.
Jonathan and E.A. passed the MTS elevators then retreated back
behind the elevators. O.C., who had been a little behind the other two,
appeared to lift up his shirt as he joined them behind the elevators. E.A.
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turned towards O.C. and reached out with his hand. Jonathan, E.A., and
O.C. then gathered together momentarily.
Jonathan started slowly walking away from the group. O.C. walked
away next, at some point reaching out his arm toward E.A.
E.A. pointed a firearm in the direction of J.L. and D.I. Jonathan
turned his head and looked at E.A. E.A. made motions consistent with firing
a gun towards the victims. E.A. appeared to rack the weapon, fire it, clear a
jam, then fire again.
A police witness estimated from viewing the video that the shooter and
the victims were about 10 to 15 feet apart during the shooting.
Jonathan and O.C. began to run in opposite directions. Jonathan ran
to the group from the bus stop. E.A. joined them. The group walked away
with Jonathan in the lead.
Police found three expended .38-caliber casings and two unexpended
casings at the scene.
D.I. was hit in the abdomen and the right forearm. D.I. told officers he
did not want to say anything, and said words to the effect of, “You know how
the gang goes.” On the stand, D.I. testified that he was not going to say
anything about what happened. He acknowledged that he got shot but
claimed he had no recollection of how it occurred. He said he had no idea
what the North Park Locos were. On the stand, J.L. refused to answer any
questions about the incident.
A few days after the shooting, O.C. complained to Jonathan that a
member of the North Park gang was disrespecting ESD. Jonathan said he
did not care about the insults, “we up right now,” and told O.C. to stay home
because North Park could be trying to retaliate. He told O.C. “don’t do
anything stupid,” “stay inside and listen,” and “delete messages.”
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Jonathan asked E.A. to send to him photos E.A. had found on social
media of the victims of the shooting. The posts indicated that friends were
praying for the victims and sending love. E.A. wrote words to the effect of,
“they’re just sending prayers, his homie isn’t dead, just hit,” concerning D.I.
Jonathan tried to add D.I. as a “friend.”
On social media, E.A., the ESD shooter, and D.I., the North Park Locos
victim, exchanged taunts about the shooting. D.I. called East Side cowards.
D.I. said he called all three of them out and shouted “Fuck Eastside,” but
they were not brave enough to fight and shot him instead. D.I. called E.A. a
bad shot and referenced prior shootings of ESD gang members. E.A.
responded, “I almost send you to meet my homies,” and “fuck fighting.”
The Petition and Trial
On November 21, 2024, the District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship
petition (Petition) regarding 17-year-old Jonathan under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 602, subdivision (a). The Petition alleged
attempted murders of D.I. and J.L. with a firearm for the benefit of a gang
(Pen. Code, § 664/187, subds. (a), (e)(1); Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds.
(c)/(e)(1), (d)/(e)(1); Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b); counts 1 and 2); bringing a
loaded firearm on campus (Pen. Code, § 626.9, subd. (h); count 3); minor in
possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610; count 4); misdemeanor minor in
possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 29650; count 5); and misdemeanor
possession of ammunition on school property (Pen. Code, § 30310, subd. (a);
count 6).
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
5
The defense moved to bifurcate the gang allegations under Penal Code
section 1109 and the court granted the motion. The defense objected to the
introduction of gang evidence during the substantive phase of the trial, both
in pretrial motions and throughout trial.
The juvenile court agreed gang evidence was admissible to prove
motive, intent, identity, and Jonathan’s aiding and abetting of the shooter.
The court indicated it would be listening carefully to ensure the gang
evidence was relevant to the allegations in the Petition.
During the substantive phase, the People introduced the testimony of
San Diego Police Department Detective Doru Hansel, who testified that
Jonathan was an active member of ESD. Detective Hansel reached this
conclusion based on social media posts wherein Jonathan declared “glory to
ESD,” expressed his hatred of ESD rivals, showed gang signs, and appeared
with other ESD members. Detective Hansel also identified O.C. and E.A. as
ESD members. He further explained that D.I. and J.L. belonged to North
Park Locos, a rival gang of ESD.
Detective Hansel testified that ESD’s primary activities included
murder, assault with deadly weapons, robbery, carjacking, car theft, firearms
possession, narcotics sales, battery, felony battery, and tagging. He testified
that it was common for ESD members to possess weapons, and to share the
weapons among gang members. For example, if one gang member were on
probation, the gang would pass his gun to another gang member. Hansel
testified that gang members would typically know if another gang member
among them possesses weapons. He testified that gang members committed
crimes together to create loyalty, reduce the likelihood of somebody
“snitching,” and demonstrate strength as a gang. When a gang shooting took
place, the shooter was shooting to kill. This benefitted the gang by removing
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a rival and demonstrating that the gang did not tolerate rivals in its
territory.
Detective Hansel concluded that the shooting here was gang-motivated.
He testified it was a case of ESD finding and fighting their North Park rivals.
He emphasized that Jonathan and the others left behind the girls and the
youth who was on probation, and did not attempt to fight D.I. and J.L. but
opened fire directly. As soon as Jonathan and the other ESD members saw
D.I. and J.L., he testified, everyone knew what was going to happen. It made
no difference that Jonathan backed away when J.L. reached into his
backpack, was walking away when the shots were fired, and did not pull the
trigger. Detective Hansel admitted that he could not hear in the surveillance
video what, if anything, was said, and so he could not determine if Jonathan
encouraged the shooting or tried to deescalate the encounter. Detective
Hansel also admitted that a gang member can act on his own and did not
need to consult with anyone else before acting.
The defense called former San Diego gang member Reginald
Washington as an expert. He testified juvenile gang members act
impulsively and do not always consult each other before acting. A gang
member often does not let others know when he is carrying a firearm. But
Washington acknowledged that gang members often brought other gang
members as “backup” to violent crimes and testified that there is strength in
numbers.
Washington found significant that the surveillance videos showed that
Jonathan left before the shooting happened and that he did not have a gun.
Washington noted that Jonathan was not the one who pointed out the North
Park gang members, and testified Jonathan might have been in front of the
others because he walked faster, not because he was leading and they were
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following. He viewed the post-shooting text messages as Jonathan’s efforts to
deescalate the situation, by telling O.C. to ignore the taunts by North Park
and to stay home.
Court’s Adjudication
The court found that the People had proven the allegations in the
Petition. The court stated that the gang evidence “set the stage” for the court
to understand “why the events happened.” That evidence explained the
relationship between the two gangs, Eastside and North Park Locos, and
among the juveniles within the gang. The court found that the gang evidence
was relevant to motive and intent. But the court primarily relied on its own
review of the video evidence, which it found “compelling.”
The court in its review of the videos interpreted Jonathan’s wave
towards the group as him “motion[ing] the others to stay back.” The court
found that Jonathan and the others crossed the street with a “determination
to confront the victims.” The court saw a female previously identified to be
Jonathan’s girlfriend step away the group, position herself behind a pole with
some bushes, and look in the direction where Jonathan and O.C. and E.A.
were walking. The court interpreted the girlfriend’s behavior as “her being
aware that some confrontation with the victims is about to occur.”
The court interpreted a zoomed-in excerpt of the video footage as
depicting Jonathan, O.C. and E.A. “approaching the victims, then backing up,
huddling together, and conferring with one another for about three or four
seconds approximately.” The court saw Jonathan turn and start to leave, and
O.C. followed. The court saw Jonathan look briefly back at E.A., and then
the shooting began. “This all happens within a second or two,” and the three
juveniles were “within a few feet of each other until after the first shot.” The
court found that Jonathan “was very much involved and aided and abetted
8
the actual shooter.” The court disagreed with the defense expert’s
interpretation of the behavior depicted in the videos.
Turning to the bifurcated hearing on the gang enhancement, the People
presented evidence of predicate offenses committed by other ESD gang
members, and testimony by the same gang detective expressing the opinion
that an attempted murder by a street gang would benefit the entire gang.
The detective explained, “It’s one of the most brazen attacks we had in broad
daylight, with cameras, with hundreds of people around.” This shows, “when
you’re in a gang, you want to be feared. You want everybody to be scared of
you. . . . When you do an attack like that, that makes the media. In broad
light. That sends a message. Everybody is sending message to every other
rival gang, that if you mess with us, if you disrespect us, it doesn’t matter
when, but when we catch you, we hurt you.”
When presented a hypothetical mirroring the facts in this case, the
detective opined that the crime showed “They didn’t go there to fight them.
There was no attempt to fight. They went there with a purpose, to shoot
them. . . . That, for any ESD rival, that puts a second thought in somebody’s
mind to mess with ESD.” This helped ESD control its turf, collect “taxes” on
any crime that occurred in its territory, and recruit new members.
The court found that the People had substantiated the gang
enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Charges of Attempted Murder and
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review governing sufficiency of the evidence claims in
adult criminal cases is the same as in juvenile cases. We review “the whole
9
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether
substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 537, 540.) We presume every fact in support of the judgment
that could have reasonably been deduced from the evidence. (People v. Oyler
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820 (Oyler). If the circumstances reasonably justify
the findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.
(Ibid.)
B. Attempted Murder, Aiding and Abetting
“ ‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended
killing.’ ” (People v. Richee (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 281, 293; CALCRIM No.
600.)
Pursuant to Penal Code section 31, “ ‘[a]ll persons concerned in the
commission of a crime, . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting
the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, . . . are principals in any crime
so committed.’ Accordingly, an aider and abettor ‘shares the guilt of the
actual perpetrator.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122
(Mendoza).)
A person is guilty of aiding and abetting if they (1) “knew that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime,” (2) “intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime,” and (3) the person’s “words or conduct
did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”
(CALCRIM No. 401.)
An aider and abettor must “ ‘act with knowledge of the criminal
purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of
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committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’ ”
(Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) Aiding and abetting a crime
includes facilitating, promoting, encouraging, or instigating the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime. (CALCRIM No. 401.) Mere presence at the scene
of the crime, or knowledge of the crime and failure to prevent it does not
amount to aiding and abetting. (See People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 493
(Hin); CALCRIM No. 401.)
C. Possession of a Firearm
Possession of a weapon may be actual or constructive. (People v.
Peña (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083.) “A defendant has actual possession
when the weapon is in his immediate possession or control. He has
constructive possession when the weapon, while not in his actual possession,
is nonetheless under his dominion and control, either directly or through
others.” (Id. at pp. 1083–1084.) Possession may be established by
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Taylor (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 436.)
“ ‘Implicit in the crime of possession of a firearm is that a person is aware
both that the item is in his or her possession and that it is a firearm.’ ”
(People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 958.)
Mere proximity to a weapon is not sufficient evidence of possession.
(People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 225.) However, “ ‘the necessary
additional circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight.’ ”
(Ibid.)
D. Analysis
We consider together Jonathan’s challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence as to the attempted murder and the firearm and ammunition
charges, because the same underlying body of evidence was presented in
support of both sets of charges. We conclude that substantial evidence
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supported the court’s findings that Jonathan aided and abetted the
attempted murders of D.I. and J.L. and constructively possessed the firearm
and ammunition that E.A. used to shoot the victims.
The evidence consisted in large part of surveillance videos showing
various angles of the shooting. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s findings, those videos support the court’s interpretations of
Jonathan’s actions on the day of the shooting. The videos support the
juvenile court’s findings that Jonathan led E.A. and O.C. towards the rivals
and waved the rest of the group back. Based on testimony that there was
“strength in numbers,” Jonathan’s waving back the rest of the group allowed
a factfinder to conclude that Jonathan knew the confrontation ahead would
not require a large group, because one of the three was armed. The
subsequent exchange between D.I. and E.A. on social media further implied
that when a firearm was involved, fighting was unnecessary.
A fact finder could also find that later, after O.C. lifted up his shirt,
Jonathan “huddled” with O.C. and E.A. After that E.A. held out his hand as
if to take something from O.C. A factfinder could conclude that this series of
actions reflected O.C. displaying the firearm, Jonathan deciding E.A. would
take the shot, and O.C. duly handing the gun to E.A. As Jonathan turned to
leave, O.C. followed, then Jonathan looked briefly back at E.A., after which
E.A. started shooting. A factfinder could conclude that Jonathan’s glance
gave E.A. the encouragement, or direction, to start shooting. On the whole, a
factfinder could conclude that Jonathan’s conduct encouraged, instigated,
promoted, or facilitated E.A.’s shooting of D.I. and J.L., which occurred
seconds later. The court’s assessment of Jonathan’s proximity in location,
time, and assistance to the shooting was supported by the video evidence.
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In sum, substantial evidence in the record supported the juvenile
court’s findings that Jonathan knew that E.A. intended to shoot at the
victims, intended to aid E.A., and that his conduct actually aided E.A.’s
attempted murders. (CALCRIM No. 401.) The same substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s finding that Jonathan constructively possessed
the firearm and ammunition, through his control and direction over E.A.
As our colleague points out in dissenting from our affirmance of the
true findings on the firearms charges, the People contend Jonathan
constructively possessed the gun E.A. used to shoot at D.A. and J.L. because
he exercised “control and leadership over E.A. who had physical possession,”
and “because the gun was the shared property of the gang.”
There is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion
that Jonathan exercised constructive possession over the weapon through his
control over O.C. and E.A. As discussed above and as our colleague concedes,
ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s true findings that Jonathan
aided and abetted E.A. in two counts of attempted murder, with the firearm
enhancements that E.A., as a principal, personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm. Jonathan’s specific intent to aid and abet the
attempted murder shows he had knowledge of E.A.’s gun and the intent to
aid and abet E.A.’s use. Substantial evidence supports the inference that the
manner in which Jonathan aided and abetted E.A. was to lead O.C. and E.A.
toward a confrontation with the victims; wave back the rest of the group
because he anticipated a shooting, not a fistfight; confer with O.C. and E.A.
about how to proceed; and glance his approval to E.A. to start shooting.
These are the reasonable inferences the court could make from the evidence
to reach its conclusion that Jonathan aided and abetted E.A.’s shooting.
These same inferences support the conclusion that Jonathan exercised
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control over the firearm through his control over both E.A. and O.C., and that
the firearm was shared among the gang, as supported by Detective Hansel’s
testimony, and by the video of O.C. and E.A. appearing to conduct a handoff
before E.A. began shooting.
Because the juvenile court was tasked with weighing the evidence and
drawing any reasonable inferences, reversal is not appropriate if the
circumstances “reasonably justify” the trier of fact’s findings, even though
“the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.” (Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at 820.)
We therefore affirm both the attempted murder and the firearm and
ammunition findings.
II. Admission of Gang Evidence During Substantive Hearing
Jonathan further contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting
gang evidence during the substantive hearing. In particular, he complains
that the People used gang evidence to fill in evidentiary gaps in its proof that
Jonathan was a principal in the attempted murder and firearm offenses.
Because the gang evidence was relevant to prove motive, identity, and intent,
and did not improperly prejudice the juvenile court against him, we conclude
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Penal Code section 1109 requires separate phases in a case with gang
enhancement allegations upon request by the defense. The first phase
focuses on the accused’s guilt of the substantive charges, while the second
addresses the truth of the enhancement allegations only if the first phase
results in a finding that the charges are true. (Pen. Code, § 1109, subd.
(a)(1)-(2).) “The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of a
defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the charged
offense.” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31.) Indeed, “[a]lthough
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evidence of gang membership carries the potential for prejudice, it ‘ “is often
relevant to, and admissible regarding, the charged offense. Evidence of the
defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory,
membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises,
rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi,
specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to
guilt of the charged crime.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 772 (Holmes).)
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under Evidence Code
section 352 for abuse of discretion. (Hin, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 476.) Under
the abuse of discretion standard, “ ‘a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed,
and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44
Cal.4th 983, 1004.)
Here, the court agreed gang evidence was admissible to prove motive,
intent, identity, and Jonathan’s aiding and abetting of the shooter. The court
indicated it would be listening carefully to ensure the gang evidence was
relevant to the allegations in the Petition. After admitting the evidence, the
juvenile court expressly stated that it had used the gang evidence only for
permissible purposes, that is, for proof of motive and intent. (Holmes, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 772.)
The gang evidence was relevant to establish Jonathan’s identity as a
gang member, and the identity and affiliation of fellow ESD members O.C.
and E.A. The gang evidence was also relevant to identify D.I. and J.L. as
North Park Locos gang members, especially since they refused to
acknowledge any gang affiliation in their testimony on the witness stand.
15
The gang evidence provided context for the videos Jonathan posted of
himself, taunting and expressing violent hatred of rival gangs in their
territories, including North Park. These videos suggested Jonathan’s motive
when O.C. pointed to the North Park minors and Jonathan subsequently led
O.C. and E.A. to confront them. Jonathan’s post-shooting communication
saying “we are up” was evidence that he attributed the shooting to the gang.
The exchange between O.C. and D.I., in which D.I. said he would have fought
all three ESD members and criticized them for shooting instead of fighting,
and O.C.’s response—“fuck fighting”—illuminated the modus operandi and
specific intent of the gang, that is, that ESD preferred to shoot instead of
fight the North Park members when they had a firearm.
Moreover, the court primarily relied not on the gang evidence, but its
interpretation of Jonathan’s conduct on the surveillance videos.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang
evidence during the substantive hearing.
III. Court’s Commitment of Jonathan to the Secure Track
Jonathan finally contends that the court failed to find that a less
restrictive placement could not offer the programming, treatment, and
education necessary before committing Jonathan to the secure track (also
known as Youth Development Academy (YDA)).
A. Legal Principles
When sentencing issues arise, the defendant must bring the issues to
the trial court’s attention; otherwise, they generally are forfeited. (See People
v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (Stowell) [“ ‘ “ ‘ “The law casts upon
the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s
attention to any infringement of them.” ’ ” ’ ”].) As our Supreme Court has
explained, “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises
16
its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal,” as these issues are “easily prevented and
corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 353, 356 (Scott), overruled on another ground in People v. Soto (2011) 51
Cal.4th 229.) “ ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on
appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have
been easily corrected or avoided.’ ” (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1114.) The
forfeiture rule applies to juvenile court proceedings as well. (See In re
Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754 [“The purpose of the forfeiture
rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the juvenile
court so that they may be corrected”]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th
494, 501-502 [collecting numerous dependency cases in “wide variety of
contexts” in which appellate courts applied the waiver/forfeiture doctrine].)
We review a juvenile court’s placement decision for abuse of discretion.
(In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 908.) The court abuses its
discretion if the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
evidence. (Ibid.) We therefore consider whether substantial evidence—
meaning evidence reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value—
supports the juvenile court’s commitment order in light of the purpose of the
juvenile court law. (Ibid.) We indulge all reasonable inferences to support
the juvenile court’s decision. (In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1080.)
The purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws is twofold: (1) to serve the
best interests of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and
guidance to rehabilitate the ward and enable him to be a law-abiding and
productive member of his family and the community, and (2) to provide for
the protection and safety of the public. (In re Charles G. (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615; § 202, subds. (a), (b), and (d).)
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If a minor is adjudged a ward under section 602, “the court may make
any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of the minor.” (§ 727, subd. (a)(1).) The court has
the discretion to place the ward at home, on probation, with or without
electronic monitoring, or to order various forms of commitment. (§§ 727,
subds. (a)(2)-(3); 730, subd. (a).)
The court also has the discretion to order a juvenile who is 14 years of
age or older to be committed to a secure youth treatment facility for a period
of confinement if certain criteria are met, including a finding on the record
that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the minor is unsuitable.
(§ 875, subd. (a).) The court must base its determination for a less restrictive
alternative disposition on the following criteria: “(A) The severity of the
offense or offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated,
including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done
to victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the
adequacy and success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the programming, treatment, and
education offered and provided in a secure youth treatment facility is
appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward. [¶]
(D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by
assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is
available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental maturity,
mental and emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity and
expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting the safety or
suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in
a secure youth treatment facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
18
B. Additional Background
The probation department (probation) conducted a social study and
submitted a recommendation to the court. Probation’s study contained
Jonathan’s statement about the shooting. Jonathan acknowledged that he
was an ESD gang member, but denied that he was the leader of the group or
that he initiated the confrontation. He felt he was blamed for the shooting
because he was the oldest person in the group. Jonathan said he did not
know E.A. had a gun or that E.A. would fire the weapon at the two victims.
He explained that just because a rival gang member was an “enemy,” this did
not mean Jonathan wanted to kill them. He would not disrespect someone
just because they were from a different gang. Jonathan said he wanted to
leave the gang but did not know how to tell his “homies.”
Probation reported Jonathan’s three previous encounters with law
enforcement. In the first instance, he got into a verbal argument with his
father and spraypainted a line across his father’s truck. His vandalism case
was referred to the Juvenile Diversion Initiative Program. Next, Jonathan
and his girlfriend were found in possession of a stolen truck. Jonathan had
taken it from an elderly victim and left the victim on the side of the road. A
section 602 petition was filed, and upon a true finding of vehicle theft,
Jonathan was put on GPS monitoring, given a stayed 130-day commitment to
Urban Camp, and was referred to Substance Use Disorder Services. In the
final incident, Jonathan threatened to kill his father during an argument at
home. His father sustained a minor injury near his left eye from the
encounter. Jonathan’s stayed 130-day Urban Camp commitment was
subsequently lifted and imposed. He completed all assigned programs and
tested negative while on probation. He was on probation at the time of the
shooting.
19
Jonathan attended school daily while in custody, and school records
showed he maintained passing grades in all classes.
While in juvenile hall, the probation study reported, Jonathan was
involved in a gang altercation.
Probation noted that Jonathan had made no active attempts to remove
himself from the gang. His actions demonstrated an unwillingness to remain
law abiding and showed his entrenchment in the gang lifestyle. Probation
also noted that Jonathan had failed to utilize the opportunities the juvenile
justice system had previously afforded him.
Probation ultimately recommended a custodial placement, but within
the HOPE program, which would offer therapeutic services such as
individual, group, and family counseling, behavioral therapy, substance
abuse counseling, vocational training and life skills programming, and daily
school attendance so Jonathan could complete his high school diploma. The
probation study offered no information about what services and programs
would be offered in a secure track placement.
Jonathan in his disposition brief urged the court to adopt probation’s
recommendation and place Jonathan in the HOPE program. The brief
acknowledged that the secure track offered “specialized programs for high-
risk youth,” but contended that HOPE offered “individual treatment plans
that can be as intensive as those in secure facilities.” HOPE offered
“evidence-based programming” that was “comparable” to that offered in the
secure track, but “in a less restrictive setting,” Jonathan contended.
The People in its disposition brief recommended the court commit
Jonathan to the secure track for a baseline term of five years. The People
provided no information about the services or programs offered in the secure
20
track, but represented that “all of [Jonathan’s] developmental needs can be
addressed in the Secure Youth Treatment facility.”
At the March 2025 disposition hearing, the court learned of updates to
the probation study. In particular, instead of one gang-related incident at
juvenile hall, Jonathan had been involved in a total of five gang-related
incidents in the five months since he had been in custody. In November
2024, Jonathan participated in a gang-related fight against a Logan Heights
gang member. In January 2025, he participated in a “near gang fight”
against a San Ysidro Malos gang member. In February he participated in a
gang-related fight against City Heights Juniors. In March, he yelled gang-
related remarks and displayed hand signs. This incident was reported in the
probation study. Finally, 10 days before the disposition hearing, Jonathan
participated in a gang fight against Southeast Locos gang members.
In addition, a probation officer informed the court that Jonathan’s risk
assessment had been miscalculated, and he properly fell into a category
representing a high risk of recidivism.
The court reviewed probation’s social study and recommendations, the
briefs filed by counsel, videos of the shooting, and some of Jonathan’s social
media posts.
The court ordered Jonathan committed to the secure track. At the
hearing, the court cited the seriousness of the offense and Jonathan’s prior
history in violating past court orders, and disagreed that a HOPE
commitment would be appropriate. In its signed order summarizing the
proceedings, the court found that “[a] less restrictive, alternative disposition
for the youth was not suitable. In making this determination, the court has
considered the criteria listed in . . . section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(A-E).”
21
C. Analysis
Jonathan contends a new disposition hearing is required because the
juvenile court failed to make specific findings that the secure track offered
services to address Jonathan’s specific needs, and that a less restrictive
alternative like HOPE would not satisfy the goals of rehabilitation and public
safety.
First, we must address forfeiture. Jonathan’s counsel did not object
that the juvenile court failed to supply adequate reasons on the record for its
choice of the secure track rather than HOPE.
After sharing its view that a HOPE commitment was inappropriate,
the court expressed its intended disposition to commit Jonathan to the secure
track for a baseline of three years, then invited comment by both parties. A
timely objection that the court’s findings were insufficient would have
allowed the court, the People, and the probation office to add to the record,
and error, if any, could have easily and efficiently been corrected or
prevented. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 353, 356.) Indeed, this seems precisely
the type of situation best suited for immediate objection and remedy.
Even if the claim were not forfeited, Jonathan has not persuaded us the
trial court abused its discretion.
First, the record contained sufficient information about the services
provided in a secure track commitment for the court to assess whether such a
placement would meet the goals of rehabilitation for Jonathan and safety to
the public. All parties involved appeared to concede that the YDA would offer
the same or similar services as HOPE, just in a more restrictive setting.
Defense counsel, for example, indicated that HOPE and the YDA offered
“comparable evidence-based programming,” and that HOPE’s therapy options
included “individualized treatment plans that can be as intensive as those in
22
secure facilities.” The People contended, without opposition from Jonathan,
that “all of [Jonathan’s] developmental needs can be addressed” in a secure
facility. The probation study described services available at HOPE, including
individual, group, and family counseling, behavioral therapy, high risk
substance abuse counseling, skill building, and daily school attendance.
With no disagreement that services were “comparable,” or any
indication that a secure placement would negatively impact Jonathan’s
rehabilitation, the juvenile court’s comments at disposition were directed at
why it believed the less restrictive placement was inadequate. (Cf. In re
Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 910 [record supplied insufficient
information to support juvenile court’s secure track disposition, where
juvenile offered evidence that a secure track commitment would be adverse to
his rehabilitation].) The court explained the reasons why it disagreed with
the HOPE recommendation, using the enumerated criteria in section 875,
subdivision (a)(3). As to the severity of the offense, the court found
Jonathan’s attempted murder allegations were among the “most serious”
cases in juvenile court, and, having reviewed the videos, found it was clear
that Jonathan was “giving some direction to these gang members” in
connection with a shooting on a “crowded college campus.” (§ 875, subd.
(a)(3)(A.) The court addressed Jonathan’s previous delinquent history, noting
that he “violated the court’s orders time and time and time again.” (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3)(B).) As the probation study noted, this was Jonathan’s fourth
referral to probation, and he had been formally supervised on probation for
13 months prior to the shooting.
Jonathan received the benefit of participation in a diversion program,
had an urban camp commitment imposed but stayed, and had the
opportunity to remain home under supervision. He nonetheless engaged in
23
additional, and escalating, misconduct, resulting in the filing of a petition,
imposition of the urban camp term, additional probation, and the current
Petition. (See In re A.R., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082 [the minor’s
continued criminal behavior after less restrictive placements left “little doubt
that less restrictive alternatives have been wholly ineffective in
rehabilitating the [m]inor”].)
As to the goals of rehabilitation and public safety, the court emphasized
that Jonathan appeared to be “gang entrenched” and to have “adopted the
values of the gang,” which led him to commit risky behaviors that could end
up resulting in him being hurt or killed. This reasoning supported a more
restrictive option, to remove Jonathan from gang influences and keep him
and the public safe from gang-related misdeeds. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(D).)
The court expressly stated in its written order that a less restrictive
alternative was not suitable, and that it had considered all of the factors at
section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E).
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
judgment, and its statements at the hearing, combined with its written order,
satisfied the requirement that the court make findings on the record.
24
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
I CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
25
Do, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion but respectfully dissent as
to its affirmance of the juvenile court’s true findings on count 3–possession of
a loaded firearm on campus (Pen. Code,2 § 626.9, subd. h), count 4–minor in
possession of a firearm (§ 29610), count 5–minor in possession of ammunition
(§ 30310, subd. (a)), and count 6–possession of ammunition on school property
(§ 30310, subd. (a)). I agree with Jonathan R. that the People failed to
present sufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the gun used by
E.A. to support these counts.
A minor is in constructive possession of a firearm if he “knowingly
exercises a right to control the firearm, either directly or indirectly through
another person.” (In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778 [cleaned up].)
“Possession may be shared with others.” (People v. Sifuentes (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 (Sifuentes), disapproved on another ground in
People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 304, fn. 6; accord In re I.A., at p. 778.)
“But mere proximity to the weapon, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence
of possession.” (Sifuentes, at p. 1417; In re I.A., at p. 778.) “Nor is knowledge
of a gun’s presence.” (In re I.A., at p. 779.) To prove constructive possession,
the prosecution must show the minor “exercised dominion and control over
the gun.” (Ibid.)
Two cases, cited by the Attorney General, are instructive here: In re
I.A. and Sifuentes.
In In re I.A., the minor and five of his friends—all members of a
criminal street gang—drove through rival gang territory in two cars. One of
them got out of the car ahead of the minor’s car and fatally shot a man
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
believed to be a rival gang member. (In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 771, 772.) Like here, the prosecutor’s theory was that the minor
constructively possessed the gun that his accomplice used to shoot the victim.
(Id. at p. 778.) The prosecutor’s “only evidence tying [the minor] to that gun
was that he: (1) once touched it, (2) was in the [car] following [the car] from
which [the shooter] emerged when it was used, and (3) knew that [the
shooter] had the gun when [the shooter] used it against [the victim].” (Id. at
pp. 778–779.) On this record, the appellate court had no difficulty concluding
“[u]pon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that [the minor] possessed a concealable
firearm” under a constructive possession theory. (Id. at p. 778 [cleaned up].)
Evidence of the minor’s social media account “ ‘replete’ ” with messages he
desired and acquired a gun or showing him holding an assault rifle did not
change the court’s conclusion, because there still was no proof that the minor
exercised dominion and control over the gun that was used in the shooting.
(Id. at p. 779.)
In Sifuentes, the defendant was found in a motel room with a fellow
gang member named Lopez and two other women. (Sifuentes, supra,
195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1413, 1414.) A loaded gun was under a mattress next
to Lopez. (Id. at p. 1414.) The People’s gang expert testified “that weapons,
particularly guns, play a prominent role in the gang subculture,” that “a gang
gun is ‘accessible to all gang members ‘[a]t most times,’ ” and “[a] gang
member possessing a gun will inform other gang members he has a firearm.”
(Id. at p. 1415.) In addition to this testimony, the People introduced evidence
of prior incidents in which the defendant had a woman hide his loaded gun
and ammunition when he was stopped by police in rival gang territory, had
weapons recovered at his home, or had been present with other gang
2
members who possessed a weapon. (Id. at p. 1414.) The appellate court
concluded all this was not substantial evidence that the defendant “had the
right to control [Lopez’s] firearm,” even if the defendant knew a weapon was
in the motel room and even assuming Lopez’s gun “fell into the gang gun
category.” (Id. at pp. 1417–1418.)
Returning to this case, the People contend Jonathan constructively
possessed the gun E.A. used to shoot at D.A. and J.L. because he exercised
“control and leadership over E.A. who had physical possession,” and “because
the gun was the shared property of the gang.” (Italics added.) But as the
People’s own authorities make clear, neither assertion is sufficient to
establish that Jonathan was in constructive possession of E.A.’s gun.
The People argue: Jonathan was “an extremely active member” of the
East Side San Diego gang and “the eldest of the group he was with” during
the shooting. They assert that “[t]hese facts, in addition to the deference
shown to him by E.A. and O.C., as well as [his] own physical displays
commanding the members of his group, all show that [Jonathan] exercised
authority over the group,” and E.A. specifically. (Italics added.) Perhaps.
But “[w]hat is required, and what prosecutors failed to show here, is that
[Jonathan] exercised dominion and control over the gun.” (In re I.A., supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, italics added.)
In my view, the People have not pointed us to evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value, required under the substantial
evidence standard, to show that Jonathan exercised dominion and control
over the gun. The evidence tying Jonathan to E.A.’s gun is even thinner than
the evidence found insufficient in In re I.A. and Sifuentes. Unlike in In re
I.A., there is no evidence he touched E.A.’s gun, at any time. At best, he is
also with a group of his fellow gang members from which the shooter emerged
3
when the gun was used and knew the shooter had the gun when he fired
upon the victims. (See In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 778–779.)
Like in Sifuentes, the People rely heavily on the workings of a criminal
street gang and its “distinct ‘chain of command’ ” in an attempt to tie
Jonathan to E.A.’s gun. They argue, without any citation to the record that,
based on his status as the eldest and leader of the group, “Had [Jonathan]
wanted to take the shots himself, he could have taken actual possession of
the gun. Had [Jonathan] decided a shooting was too public, he could have
prevented the shooting entirely by leading his crew away. Had [Jonathan]
thought that O.C. needed to prove himself, rather than E.A., he could have
instructed O.C. to take the shots.” These claims appear to be based on little
more than “speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture or guess work”
which does not satisfy the substantial evidence standard. (In re I.A., supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 779 [cleaned up].) The claims are also insufficient to
demonstrate dominion and control over the gun. As the court held in
Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419, “[t]he possibility [the defendant]
might have had the right to exercise control over the gun does not by itself
provide a basis to infer he had the right to control it.”
Lastly, the People argue Jonathan had the right to control the gun
“because the gun was the shared property of the gang.” There is no evidence
to support this claim. And although the People do not refer us to their gang
expert on this point, I note the People’s gang expert did testify that “gangs in
general, gang members, like to have weapons on them” and “[a] lot of time
they give them to members. If a member is on probation or parole, they are
going to give the guns to somebody who is not on probation or parole, but
guns get passed around a lot.” (Italics added.) But similar expert testimony
was rejected as insufficient by the People’s own authority.
4
In Sifuentes, the court concluded the gang expert’s testimony failed to
satisfy the People’s burden of proof on dominion and control because,
although he testified to gang guns in general, “the prosecution’s gang expert
did not testify any gun possessed by a gang member automatically
constitutes a gang gun to be shared with all other gang members,” or that the
recovered gun was a gang gun. (Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1417–1418.) Here, too, the gang expert did not testify that any gun
possessed by a gang member is a gang gun, let alone that E.A.’s gun was a
gang gun. Further still, the court in Sifuentes concluded that “[e]ven
assuming the firearm Lopez possessed fell into the gang gun category, no
evidence showed [the defendant] had the right to control the weapon.” (Ibid.)
We can make the same assumption, too, but the same result obtains here.
The majority asserts the surveillance footage of the shooting supports
the finding that “O.C. display[ed] the firearm, Jonathan decid[ed] E.A. would
take the shot, and O.C. duly hand[ed] the gun to E.A” (maj. opn., p. 13), and
this supports the People’s assertion the gun “was shared among the gang”
(id., p. 14.) The trial court did not make such a finding (indeed it did not
address the evidence on the possession charges at all) and I do not believe it
is a reasonable inference that we can draw ourselves. As the People’s
detective testified in narrating the surveillance footage, “The group appeared
to be huddled behind that pole. I can’t tell what they’re doing at this point.”
And because there is “no audio of anything” in the video, the detective
conceded he could not say what Jonathan “might have said to other people” or
what “might have [been] said to him.” The inference that “Jonathan
decid[ed] E.A. would take the shot” is speculation and conjecture.
Ample evidence certainly supported the juvenile court’s true findings
that Jonathan aided and abetted E.A. in two counts of attempted murder
5
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), with the firearm enhancements that E.A., as a
principal, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)–(e)(1).) Jonathan’s specific intent to aid and abet the attempted
murder shows he had knowledge of E.A.’s gun and the intent to aid and abet
E.A.’s use. But constructive possession requires proof of a different set of
facts, namely the right to exercise dominion and control or joint possession of
the gun. The People’s reliance on Jonathan’s control over his fellow gang
members and the unsupported claim of shared gang ownership of E.A.’s gun
was speculative and simply did not meet the required quantum of proof in
this particular case. Consequently, the juvenile court’s true findings on
counts 3 through 6, and the associated enhancements on those counts, should
be reversed and the matter should be remanded for a new dispositional
hearing.
DO, J.
6