Filed 8/11/26 In re J.L. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re J.L. et al., B351810
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. DK08393B,C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Juan M. Valles, Referee. Affirmed.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Father J.L. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights over his daughters Jo. and Ju. following a hearing pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 He argues that the court
erred by failing to apply the parental benefit exception to termination of his
parental rights. We find no error and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Initial Proceedings
Father and mother, N.T., are parents to Jo., born in 2014, and Ju., born
in 2016. Mother also has an older daughter, A., born in 2007.2 When the
family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 2015, mother and father were living
together with A., Jo., and Ju.
A. Referral and Petition
On January 5, 2015, DCFS received a referral after mother brought 10-
month-old Jo. to the emergency room. Mother told a social worker that father
had returned home early that morning smelling of alcohol and she confronted
him about cheating on her. When mother tried to leave with Jo., father
kicked her and punched her in the face. After mother and Jo. got into the
car, father punched the car windows. Mother returned home with Jo. later
that morning and father pulled mother’s hair, punched, and kicked her.
Mother was holding Jo. at the time, and one of father’s punches caused
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Father appeals only the termination of parental rights as to Jo. and Ju.
Neither mother nor A.’s father are parties to this appeal.
2
mother’s head to hit Jo.’s head, causing redness to Jo.’s face and redness and
swelling to mother’s head. Mother called the police and father was arrested.
Mother told DCFS that father was verbally abusive toward her and had
been “tipsy” every day since Christmas 2014. Mother admitted keeping a bag
packed so that when father got drunk and tried to fight, she could “just
leave.” A. told DCFS that father was “mean, and drunk” and had choked
mother.
DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of A. and Jo. under section
300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1) and (j). The petition alleged that Jo. was at risk
of serious physical harm due to the history of domestic violence between
mother and father in Jo.’s presence and father’s alcohol abuse, including
while caring for Jo.
DCFS noted a prior incident in 2014 when father came to the hospital
drunk after Jo. was born. Father fell asleep at mother’s bedside. When
mother attempted to wake him, he became angry and threw something at
mother. In addition to his domestic violence arrests in 2014 and 2015,
father’s criminal history included several arrests and convictions for driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI).
At the detention hearing in January 2015, the juvenile court detained
Jo. from father but released her to mother’s custody. The court ordered
monitored visits three times per week for father once he was released from
custody.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In an interview with DCFS in March 2015, father denied any domestic
violence incidents with mother. He admitted to drinking beer two to three
times a week, including around the children, but denied getting drunk.
3
Paternal grandmother reported that father completed an alcohol program
after his DUI arrest in 2008, but continued to drink afterward.
In May 2015, the juvenile court sustained an amended version of the
petition, including the allegations that mother and father engaged in physical
altercations in Jo.’s presence and that father was under the influence of
alcohol while caring for Jo. As for disposition, the court removed Jo. from
father but allowed her to remain in mother’s custody. The court ordered
reunification services and twice weekly monitored visitation for father.
Father’s case plan included a drug and alcohol program and testing, a
domestic violence program, and individual counseling.
As of the December 2015 status review report, father had partially
completed a domestic violence program. Jo. continued to live with mother,
while father had visitation with Jo. three times per week, monitored by
maternal grandmother.
In March 2016, DCFS reported that father had not returned the social
worker’s calls. He also failed to submit to random drug tests. In May,
father’s domestic violence counseling program advised DCFS that father
came to the facility under the influence and smelling of alcohol; he was
resistant when asked to leave. The staff also reported a belief that mother
and father were seeing each other, in violation of the restraining order
against father. Mother and father denied this allegation.
C. Additional Petitions
Shortly after Ju. was born in August 2016, DCFS filed a petition on her
behalf alleging that she was at risk from mother and father’s failure to
protect her siblings from their domestic violence and father’s alcohol abuse.
4
The petition also alleged that shortly after Ju.’s birth, she and mother tested
positive for amphetamine and that mother was a current user of that drug.
At the same time, DCFS filed a subsequent petition under section 342
for A. and Jo. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged that
mother used amphetamine during her pregnancy with Ju. Mother agreed to
a safety plan to have A., Jo., and Ju. placed with maternal grandmother. The
court extended father’s three weekly monitored visits to include Ju.
Father had attended two sessions of a drug and alcohol counseling
class. He admitted violating the restraining order and getting mother
pregnant with Ju. In October 2016, father informed DCFS that he could not
complete his drug and alcohol program because it was overwhelming to
handle work and going to the program.
In October 2016, the court sustained the section 300 petition regarding
Ju., including the allegations regarding domestic violence, father’s alcohol
use, and mother’s drug use. The court also sustained the allegations of
mother’s drug use in the section 342 petition regarding Jo.
D. Period of Review
Father’s substance abuse program terminated him in late October 2016
“due to his poor attendance pattern and lack of interest towards the
program.” Father told DCFS that he was tired of attending programs and
could not afford to lose hours at his job to complete his court-ordered services.
At a hearing in November 2016, the court agreed to allow father six
more months of family reunification services, but admonished him that his
services could be terminated at the next hearing if he was not compliant. The
court ordered Ju. to live with mother as long as mother stayed enrolled in an
in-patient substance treatment program. Jo. remained in maternal
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grandmother’s care. Father stipulated to an updated case plan, including
three weekly monitored visits, conjoint counseling with mother, a full drug
and alcohol program, substance testing, and individual counseling.
DCFS filed a supplemental petition under section 387 in February 2017
as to Ju. after mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The court
detained Ju. from mother and placed her back with maternal grandmother.
The court sustained the supplemental petition in April 2017 and ordered
father to continue to comply with his case plan.
In April 2017, father reiterated to DCFS that he had to focus on his
work and his own needs because he wanted to “buy a better car” and “move to
a bigger and better place.” Father confirmed that mother was living with
him. When asked if he was compliant with visitation, father stated, “I visited
[sic] the children when I have the time, I love my children but for now, it is
all about me first.” Although DCFS explained to father the importance of
completing his case plan in order to reunify with the children, he had not
done so.
In July 2017, father requested a contested hearing as to termination of
his reunification services. After father failed to appear for the hearing, the
court terminated his reunification services as to Jo. Father failed to attend
the next hearing in October 2017. The juvenile court found he had not
complied with his case plan and terminated reunification services as to Ju.
E. Guardianship
In December 2017, DCFS reported that the children were doing well in
maternal grandmother’s home. A. told DCFS that father visited them “but
not all the time.” In January 2018, DCFS reported that father had
maintained “sporadic” contact through visits with Jo. and Ju. According to
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maternal grandmother, father did not have a set visitation schedule, but just
“shows up” to visit with the children.
The court held a permanency planning hearing for the children in April
2018. Father did not appear and his counsel stated that she had not been in
contact with her office. The court granted legal guardianship of Jo. and Ju. to
maternal grandmother and terminated jurisdiction.
II. Resumption of Jurisdiction
A. Section 388 petitions
After maternal grandmother died in April 2025, father filed a section
388 petition. He stated that Jo. and Ju. had been living with father and
paternal grandfather for the past four months while maternal grandmother
was sick. Father requested custody of the children or an order granting legal
guardianship to paternal grandfather.
Maternal uncle, A.T., also filed a section 388 petition seeking to be
appointed as legal guardian for the children. He stated that Jo. told him that
on multiple occasions, father would get drunk or high on drugs and become
violent with paternal grandfather.
The court reinstated jurisdiction and set both petitions for hearing. In
June, DCFS reported that the children went to live with maternal uncle and
his wife after maternal grandmother died. Jo. (now 11 years old) told DCFS
that she thought living with maternal uncle and his family would be a “good
thing” for her and Ju. She reported that she would visit father while they
were living with maternal grandmother, and that father sometimes would
drink alcohol and get into physical fights with paternal grandfather. Jo.
stated that she was “scared about living with my dad because he drinks too
much alcohol, and he fights with my grandpa. I want to live with my dad but
7
first he needs to get sober because he drinks a lot.” Jo. enjoyed visiting father
and paternal grandfather when father was not drinking, but when he was
drunk, father was “mean to everyone, and it makes me scared.” Jo. wanted
father to get sober so she and Ju. “can visit with him more often and maybe
we can go live with him when he gets sober. [¶] My preference would be to
live with my dad, but I know I can’t do that right now.”
DCFS also spoke with Ju. (now 8 years old), who said that maternal
uncle was nice and she was happy and felt safe living with him, his wife, and
children. She also said that father would get drunk when she and Jo. visited
and he would fight with paternal grandfather. She wanted to live with father,
but said, “I know I can’t because he needs to stop drinking and fighting.”
Father told DCFS that he and paternal grandfather lived a few houses
away from maternal grandmother. Father stated that he saw the children
often while they were living with maternal grandmother, including picking
them up from school and helping with homework. Father stated he was in
recovery and no longer drinking and denied any physical altercations with
paternal grandfather.
DCFS monitored a visit with father and paternal grandfather on May
31, 2025. The girls ran to greet father and gave him a hug. Paternal
grandfather told the social worker that they had helped raise the girls with
maternal grandmother. During the visit, the social worker observed the girls
seemed comfortable and bonded with father and paternal grandfather.
Father was physically affectionate with the girls and would often reach out to
hold their hands.
After the visit, both girls expressed to the social worker how much fun
they had and how much they had missed father and paternal grandfather.
When asked who she would want to live with if she had a “miracle wish,” Ju.
8
immediately said father and paternal grandfather, because father was sober.
Jo. said she could tell when father was sober because he did not smile when
he was drinking. Jo. said she did not know who she would want to live with.
DCFS provided an updated criminal history for father, including a
conviction in March 2016 for disorderly conduct and intoxication, a DUI
conviction in 2017, and two additional DUI arrests in 2017 and 2018. On
June 4, 2025, DCFS asked father to participate in an on-demand drug and
alcohol test but he said he could not make it that day or the next. Father met
with DCFS on June 5, and he admitted he had consumed alcohol a few days
earlier. He acknowledged that this was the reason he was avoiding the drug
test and that he “had a slip up” and had taken some amphetamine. Father
stated he had been “in and out of detox programs” and had “struggled with
amphetamine” for the last three to four years. Father was trying to stay
sober and wanted to regain custody of Jo. and Ju. He admitted that the girls
had seen him intoxicated and argue with paternal grandfather one time.
Contrary to the statements by Jo. and Ju., father denied any physical
altercation or that the girls had ever “seen me falling or anything like that.”
Following a hearing, the court denied father’s section 388 petition. The
court granted maternal uncle’s petition in part, setting the matter for a
permanent plan hearing. Paternal grandfather subsequently filed another
section 388 petition seeking legal guardianship of the girls, which the court
summarily denied.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
In its next report, DCFS advised that on July 18, 2025, Jo. and Ju.
were placed with paternal aunt, J.C., and her husband. The prior caregiver,
maternal uncle, was unsure if he could meet the children’s needs and also
9
stated that Jo. and Ju. had a closer relationship to paternal aunt. Paternal
aunt was willing to adopt the girls and provide them permanency. Jo. and
Ju. told DCFS that they wanted to be adopted by paternal aunt and her
husband. They stated that they felt safe in the home and liked living there.
DCFS also reported that father had not visited consistently since the
reinstatement of jurisdiction. In June, father cancelled one visit and did not
respond to the social worker’s attempts to schedule one the following week.
Father did not respond to the social worker’s calls or texts regarding visits in
July. DCFS monitored visits on August 2 and 16, 2025. Father was
affectionate and talked to the girls throughout the visit. Jo. and Ju. looked
happy to be with father and paternal grandfather.
The social worker texted father to set up a visit the following weekend,
August 26, but father responded that he wanted to have visits every other
weekend. Father then cancelled the visit the following weekend. Paternal
aunt told DCFS that father had attended two in person visits since the
children were placed with her in July. Father had video and telephone calls
with the girls multiple times per week. Jo. mostly initiated the calls and she
was disappointed if father did not answer.
Father visited the children on September 6, 2025. After that, father
told DCFS that he had started a new job and could not have visits for a few
weeks. The next visit took place on October 4, 2025.
DCFS also submitted a report analyzing the applicability of the
parental benefit exception to adoption. As detailed further below, this
exception applies if a parent establishes that they have “maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) DCFS reported
that father averaged one visit per month between the end of May and
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beginning of October 2025. The barriers to more frequent visitation included
the girls’ schedule during the week, the distance to the caregivers’ residence,
father’s lack of transportation, and his new job schedule. DCFS also noted
father’s failure to promptly respond to attempts to schedule visits, and
father’s cancellation or postponement of several visits.
Regarding the extent of a beneficial parent-child relationship, DCFS
observed that father had been present in the children’s lives while they lived
with maternal grandmother, and that during visits Jo. and Ju. were
affectionate and comfortable with father. However, DCFS also noted the
negative interactions with father due to his substance abuse struggles. Both
Jo. and Ju. did not want to live with father while he was drinking and felt
scared and unsafe, having witnessed father’s angry and violent behavior
while drunk. As for the children’s needs, DCFS reported that Jo. was
struggling educationally and was behind in school. Father had not been able
to provide the stability or safety they needed. DCFS opined that Jo. and Ju.
had positive emotional affection for father, “as if he were a visiting uncle,”
but not a significant parent-child attachment. In addition, the girls were
bonded to paternal aunt, her husband, and their children. They transitioned
smoothly to paternal aunt’s home and all of their needs were being met.
Thus, DCFS concluded that the relationship with father would not outweigh
the security offered by an adoptive home.
At the next hearing on November 3, 2025, the court ordered DCFS to
submit an additional report focused on the relationship between father and
the children. Father requested more visitation with the children. The court
reiterated the prior order of three visits per week, but ordered DCFS to meet
with father to develop a revised visitation schedule.
11
After DCFS contacted father to develop a revised visitation schedule,
father told the social worker on November 12 that he did not want to set a
more consistent schedule, he just wanted some longer visits. He completed a
two-hour visit with the children on November 22.
In November, DCFS reported that Jo. and Ju. continued to thrive with
paternal aunt and her family. Paternal aunt provided support for their
medical, emotional, and educational needs and the girls had developed a
stable and healthy attachment to the family. Jo. and Ju. both required
extensive dental treatments due to prior neglect, and Jo. also was receiving
additional academic tutoring as she was several grade levels behind in math.
Both girls were also scheduled for weekly therapy sessions and their
caregivers had enrolled them in sports and extracurricular activities.
Jo. told DCFS she felt good about adoption and would feel that way
even with no further visits with father, because paternal aunt “doesn’t do
drugs and I feel safe here and father does drugs and alcohol.” Ju. stated she
liked living with her current caregivers and felt safe.
In November, father told paternal aunt that he preferred guardianship
to adoption because he might be sober and able to regain custody in three
years. Paternal aunt reported that this comment deeply upset Jo. and she
had a “rough week” afterward, as she wondered, “why in three years, why not
now, why not in the past 10 years?” Jo. expressed sadness, anger, and
frustration when father stated he was “fighting for them” but continued to
struggle with sobriety.
In a December 19, 2025 last-minute information, DCFS reported that
father had not requested any visits for the past month. Ju. told DCFS that
she felt “not so close” to father because “I barely see him.” Ju. said she
thought of father every day and missed him. But she looked to paternal aunt
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for comfort and safety. A few weeks later, Ju. told DCFS that she was sad
she could not see father more often and frustrated that “he puts bad stuff in
his body.” She felt joyful living with paternal aunt, but still worried about
father. Ju. expressed that she loved father and felt sad that if she was
adopted, he “isn’t going to be my dad anymore,” but she also loved living with
paternal aunt.
Jo. stated she felt close to father only when he was not drinking. She
thought of father often, wondering when he was going to stop drinking. Jo.
stated she did not feel very safe with father, because “when he’s not sober, I
can’t trust him.” Jo. told DCFS that she felt hurt and disappointment toward
father. She sent father a long text in November asking father to please stop
drinking so that he could be in her life, but father had not responded. Jo.
stated that she loved father but “he wasn’t like a real dad.” Paternal aunt
stated that during the week the girls did not talk about father or ask about
visits, and when they did talk about father it caused them “great stress and
emotional confusion.”
The court held the permanency planning hearing on January 5, 2026.
Counsel for DCFS and counsel for the children asked the court to terminate
parental rights. Counsel for the children acknowledged that they loved
father, but “they have been very frustrated that father has not been able to
maintain his sobriety and visits have been inconsistent.” Counsel for father
argued that the parental benefit exception applied, as he had been visiting
the children as much as he was able. He argued that the children loved and
were bonded to father, and it would not be in their best interest to sever that
bond. He requested legal guardianship rather than adoption.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Jo. and Ju. were
adoptable. Turning to the parental benefit exception, the court found that
13
father had not maintained regular visitation “to the extent allowed by court
order.” The court noted that DCFS had made efforts to set up a more
consistent visitation schedule, but father had not been responsive to those
efforts. As to father’s bond with the children, the court found that it could
consider the children’s perception of father’s sobriety and concluded that the
children’s “relationship with their father is not a healthy one. At almost
every contact the minors are distraught and overcome with anxiety and even
resentment.” While Jo. and Ju. loved father, on balance, “they seem to be
emotionally harmed” by the relationship. The court also found that the
children were thriving in the care of paternal aunt and her husband. Having
concluded that no exceptions applied, the court terminated father’s and
mother’s parental rights. The court ordered adoption as the permanent plan
and designated paternal aunt and her husband as the prospective adoptive
parents.
Father appealed from the court’s order terminating his parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding he had not met
the requirements of the parental benefit exception as to Jo. and Ju. We find
no error.
I. Legal Principles
A. Parental Benefit Exception
The express purpose of section 366.26 is “to provide stable, permanent
homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) After reunification
services are terminated, adoption is the legislative preference. (§ 366.26,
subd. (b)(1); see also In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 (Celine R.)
14
[“‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best
chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker’”])
Thus, once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, “the court must
order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental
rights,” unless a parent can establish one of the exceptions set forth in section
366.26, subdivision (c). (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; see also
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 625 (Caden C.).)
These statutory exceptions “merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which
remains adoption.” (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; see also In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1150.)
Father seeks to apply the parental benefit exception, which permits the
selection of another permanent plan if a parent has “maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) As detailed in
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 631, a parent must prove three elements
to establish the parental benefit exception.
First, the parent asserting the exception must show “regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) This element is
“straightforward,” involving an assessment of whether the parent visits
consistently. (Id. at p. 632.)
Second, the parent must show that “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) In assessing whether the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship with the parent, “the focus is the
15
child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he
age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632.)
Third, the parent must show that terminating the parent-child
attachment “would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 636.) “[C]ourts must assume that terminating parental rights
terminates the relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine,
therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the parental
relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive
home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) This evaluation
consists of a “subtle, case-specific inquiry[,]” including consideration of
whether “the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home” outweighs the
harm the child “would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive,
emotional relationship” with the parent. (Ibid.) In making this detriment
determination, the juvenile court does “not look to whether the parent can
provide a home for the child,” and “is not comparing the parent’s attributes as
custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive parent(s).” (Id.
at p. 634.)
B. Standard of Review
We apply a mixed standard of review to a juvenile court’s findings
regarding the parental-benefit exception. The first two elements—regular
visitation and a beneficial relationship—involve determinations that are
essentially factual; we therefore review those findings for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) The third element requires
16
the juvenile court to determine whether any harm the child would suffer from
the severance of the parental bond would outweigh the benefit to the child of
adoption. (Ibid.) As with the first two elements, the juvenile court must
make a series of factual determinations including determinations about the
child’s relationship with a parent, which we review for substantial evidence.
(Id. at p. 640.) However, “the ultimate decision—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s
relationship with his [or her] parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed
for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court here found that father did not meet his burden of
proving the exception. In such a case, where the trier of fact has “expressly
or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry
the burden and that party appeals,” we determine whether the evidence
compels a finding in father’s favor as a matter of law, asking whether that
evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination it was insufficient to
support a finding. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved
on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn.
7.)
II. Analysis
The juvenile court found that father met none of the three elements for
the parental benefit exception under Caden C. We find no error in that
conclusion.
For the first element, the court found that father failed to establish
that he had regularly visited Jo. and Ju. “Regular visitation exists where the
parents visit consistently and to the extent permitted by court orders.” (In re
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I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212; see also Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852 [“‘The parent must show
regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of
visitation permitted’”].) Father did not meet his burden to establish either
that he visited consistently or to the extent permitted by the court. Father’s
visitation was sporadic throughout the case. In 2017, he told DCFS that he
needed to focus on himself and visited the children when he had time.
Statements from the children suggested that father visited inconsistently and
maternal grandmother reported that he did not have set schedule, but would
show up when he wanted to visit. Father contends that he saw the children
frequently during the seven-year period when maternal grandmother had
legal guardianship. However, once the court reinstated jurisdiction in 2025,
father’s visitation decreased to an average of one visit per month. He did not
respond to the social worker’s attempts to schedule visits and several times
cancelled or postponed a visit.
Even after the court granted his request to discuss additional
visitation, father told DCFS that he wanted some visits of longer duration,
but not an increase in frequency. Although father was entitled to three visits
per week, he never sought a set visitation schedule and visited much less
frequently than permitted. Under these circumstances, the record does not
compel a finding in father’s favor that he maintained consistent visitation
with Jo. and Ju. to the extent he was permitted by the court.
Because father was required to establish all three elements of the
exception, his failure to establish regular visitation is fatal to his claim. (See
In re I.R., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 212; In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 322, fn. 10 [“[A] parent must prove all three components of
the beneficial relationship exception”].) Thus, we need not consider the
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remaining two elements. However, even if we did, we would affirm the
juvenile court.
The second element required father to establish that Jo. and Ju. had a
“substantial, positive, [and] emotional attachment” to him. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “A positive attachment between parent and child is
necessarily one that is not detrimental to the child but is nurturing and
provides the child with a sense of security and stability.” (In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) Father argues that the evidence does not
support the court’s finding that there was no substantial positive attachment
between him and the children. But he cannot show, as he must, that the
evidence was “ ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and … ‘of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination it was insufficient
to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) It was
undisputed that the girls had an attachment to father. Jo. and Ju. expressed
that they loved father and wanted to spend time with him. But the court was
also entitled to consider the significant evidence that the relationship had
negative effects on the children. Jo. and Ju. expressed their anger,
frustration, and concern over father’s longtime struggles with sobriety and
stated that they did not feel safe with father when he was drinking. While
the court could not consider father’s fitness for return of custody at this stage,
father’s continued struggles with substance use were relevant “to the extent
they inform the specific questions before the court: would the child benefit
from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance, by losing it?”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 638.) Thus, the court could take into
account the evidence that father’s inability to stay sober negatively affected
his relationship with Jo. and Ju.
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Moreover, the court could consider that father had not had custody of
Jo. since shortly after she was born, and had never had custody of Ju. The
girls required extra support including extensive dental work, academic
support, and therapy, all of which they received from paternal aunt, and they
looked to her for safety and comfort. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
632 [considering factors including the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody and the child’s particular needs].) Although both girls loved
father, they expressed their desire to stay with paternal aunt and her family
and to be adopted by them. Father’s argument that the court should have
weighed more heavily the positive aspects of his relationship with his
daughters cannot meet his burden on appeal. He has not shown that the
evidence compelled a finding that he had the strong positive bond with Jo.
and Ju. required to apply the parental benefit exception.
Similarly, we find no error in the juvenile court’s conclusion as to the
third element, i.e., that father did not establish that terminating his
relationship with Jo. and Ju. would outweigh the benefits of adoption.
Despite the trauma of losing their longtime caregiver maternal grandmother,
the girls adjusted easily to their new home with paternal aunt, expressing
that they felt safe and loved in their care. Paternal aunt and her husband
were devoted to providing a permanent home for the girls and ensuring their
needs were met. The importance of stability and permanency to be gained
from adoption is strong here, where the children endured several placement
changes over the ten-year course of this case. Thus, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the court to conclude that the benefits of allowing the girls’
adoption by their loving caregivers to whom they were bonded outweighed
any detriment from terminating father’s parental rights.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating father’s parental rights over Jo. and Ju. is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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