Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

In re Jason S. CA2/2

Filed 6/17/26 In re Jason S. CA2/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 6/17/26 In re Jason S. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JASON S., a Person Coming B350551
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07688F)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FERNANDO S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner. Affirmed in
part and conditionally reversed and remanded in part.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Fernando S. (Father) appeals from an order terminating
his parental rights as to Jason S. He argues the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
failed to give him adequate notice of the Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.261 hearing and failed to comply with its
obligations under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and California’s Indian Child
Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We
affirm the juvenile court’s determination Father received proper
notice, but we agree with the parties conditional reversal and
remand is necessary to ensure Cal-ICWA compliance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Child Welfare History and Current Case
Father, Jason, and Jason’s mother Perla V. (Mother)
previously received voluntary family maintenance services from
DCFS from September 2018 to May 2019, and again from
March 2020 to March 2021.
This case began after then-three-year-old Jason was found
alone in a laundromat in January 2022. On January 18, 2022, the
juvenile court authorized DCFS to detain Jason from Mother.
Mother said Father was not involved with Jason and she did not
know Father’s whereabouts. DCFS later learned Father was
incarcerated at Folsom State Prison.
At the detention hearing that month, Mother appeared but
Father did not. Based upon minute orders from Jason’s earlier
dependency proceedings, the juvenile court found Father was
Jason’s presumed father. Jason was removed from parental

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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custody. DCFS was ordered to arrange for Father to appear
virtually from prison at the next hearing.
DCFS filed a first amended and second amended
section 300 petition.
Father appeared for the first time via Webex from prison at
the June 2022 arraignment hearing and was appointed counsel.
Counsel entered a general denial on behalf of Father and
provided the juvenile court with a notification of mailing address
form listing Father’s address at Folsom State Prison. In
August 2022, DCFS learned Father would be released from
prison in November 2022 and wanted to reunify with Jason.
At the August 2022 adjudication and dispositional hearing,
Father appeared by Webex with his counsel present. The juvenile
court sustained the section 300 petition and removed Jason from
parental custody. The court ordered family reunification services
for Father with monitored visits.
II. Review Period
Father did not attend the progress hearing held in
November 2022 but was represented by counsel. He was released
from prison that day and later contacted DCFS.
At the six-month review hearing in February 2023, Father
appeared with counsel. Father’s visits with Jason had been
inconsistent and he had not enrolled in court-ordered services.
The juvenile court continued Father’s reunification services for
six months.
The next review hearing was held in March 2023. Father
did not appear at the hearing but was represented by counsel.
Father was detained by federal immigration authorities in
Calexico, California. The juvenile court continued Father’s
reunification services for six months.

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DCFS spoke with Father via telephone in May 2023.
Father reported he had been deported to Tlaxcala, Mexico, and
wanted to continue reunification services with Jason. The social
worker gave Father his attorney’s phone number.
Another review hearing was held in August 2023. Father
did not appear but was represented by counsel. The juvenile
court set the matter for a contested hearing in September 2023
and ordered parents’ counsel to notice their clients. DCFS was
ordered to contact the Mexican social services agency to help
Father obtain appropriate reunification program referrals in
Mexico.
In September 2023, DCFS received two slightly different
addresses for Father in Tlaxcala, from a paternal aunt, but was
unable to find them in Google Maps. On September 13, 2023,
DCFS mailed contact letters to both addresses with information
about social services available in Mexico. The following day,
DCFS reached Father via telephone. Father reported he wanted
to receive services in Mexico, and he agreed to contact the
Mexican social services agency the next day and to call Jason
soon. Father gave DCFS his mailing address in Tlaxcala, which
was different from those provided by the paternal aunt.
Father did not appear at the September 2023 review
hearing but was represented by counsel. The matter was
continued to November 2023 to allow DCFS to follow up with the
Mexican social services agency. In October 2023, DCFS provided
additional information to Father with program referrals in
Mexico, and he reported visiting the office and having a pending
appointment. Father said he was busy working long hours every
day and could not call Jason.

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At the next review hearing in November 2023, the court
interpreter unsuccessfully tried to contact Father from the
hearing via the WhatsApp messaging platform. DCFS reported
Father had not contacted Jason recently and had not yet enrolled
in services in Mexico. The court terminated Father’s reunification
services, while Mother’s were continued for six months.
A review hearing was held for Mother in January 2024,
where Father was represented by counsel. Parents’ counsel were
ordered to notice their clients of the next hearing date.
A 24-month review hearing for Mother was held on
February 28, 2024. Father appeared by Webex and was
represented by counsel. DCFS reported Father called Jason’s
caregiver twice in January and February 2024 to ask for money;
on one occasion, he spoke with Jason for five minutes. The
juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services and set
a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for June 25, 2024.
The court ordered Father “to return to this court on June 25th to
address a permanent plan which could include adoption and/or
guardianship.”
III. Permanency Planning Period
DCFS initiated a due diligence search for Father on May 7,
2024. Notice for the June 25, 2024, hearing was sent via mail to
Father at an address in Tlaxcala that partially reflected the
address he had provided DCFS in September 2023. Father did
not appear at the June 25 hearing but was represented by
counsel. DCFS reported there was an active due diligence search
for Father, who had not recently contacted DCFS or Jason’s
caregiver. The juvenile court found notice to Father was not
proper and continued the hearing to December 5, 2024.

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In July 2024, DCFS mailed notices of the December
hearing to 18 addresses in California and Oregon it had
uncovered in its due diligence search. Most could not be
delivered, but two were delivered and two remained in transit by
December 2024. The social worker also attempted to contact
Father via e-mail, telephone, and social media platforms. In
response to one e-mail, a woman who shared other children with
Father contacted DCFS and provided an updated telephone
number for him. The woman had no home or mailing address for
Father, but said he was in Tijuana, Mexico. The social worker
tried the number she provided, which “pulsed” with no response.
By the end of November 2024, DCFS reported Father’s
whereabouts remained unknown.
On the day of the section 366.26 hearing, Father’s counsel
filed a notification of mailing address form on his behalf with a
new mailing address in Tijuana, and an e-mail address. The form
also confirmed the phone number that had been given to DCFS in
November 2024.
Father appeared at the December 5, 2024, hearing via
WhatsApp from Mexico. The juvenile court identified adoption as
Jason’s permanent plan, found Father had not received proper
notice, and ordered DCFS to perfect notice and interview Father.
The court ordered Father “back April 11th, 2025, for this
hearing–for the further hearing to address a permanent plan.”
Thereafter, DCFS attempted to contact Father via multiple
avenues, without success. In January 2025, it e-mailed him the
notice of the April 11 hearing and sent the notice to a Tijuana
address (similar to the address provided by Father in Dec. 2024)
via United States Postal Service (USPS) International Registered
Mail. In February 2025 at the post office’s recommendation,

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DCFS corrected the address to include “Mexico,” and sent the
notice via registered mail to the address again. In March 2025,
DCFS sent notice of the April 11 hearing via first-class mail to
two California addresses for Father. DCFS also tried to call
Father in January, February, and March 2025 at the most recent
phone number he had given to the court, but the number “pulsed”
without answering.
On March 27, 2025, DCFS reported it continued its due
diligence search for Father and that Father had not had contact
with Jason since December 5, 2024.
On April 11, 2025, the day of the hearing, Father’s counsel
filed a new form notifying the court of Father’s phone number
and mailing address in Tijuana. The phone number was the same
as before, and the mailing address was substantially similar but
included some additional details.
Father’s counsel was at the April 11, 2025, hearing, but
Father was not. The juvenile court identified adoption as Jason’s
permanent plan and continued the hearing to August 8, 2025, to
allow DCFS “to provide timely 1st class notice to . . . father.” On
April 17, 2025, DCFS sent Father the hearing notice via USPS
first-class mail to the Tijuana address Father provided, but it
may have contained a typographical error.
Father’s counsel attended the August 8, 2025,
section 366.26 hearing, but Father did not. The juvenile court
found notice to Father was not proper and ordered DCFS to give
him notice by USPS first-class mail to the address he had
provided in Mexico. The hearing was continued to November 6,
2025.
On August 11, 2025, DCFS sent notice of the November 6
hearing to Father by USPS International Registered Mail to the

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Tijuana address his counsel had provided on April 11, 2025. The
notice included the hearing date and stated “the court may
terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption.”
(Boldface omitted.) USPS tracking information indicated the
parcel arrived in Mexico and delivery was attempted on
September 2, 2025, but the addressee was “not available.”
Deliveries were unsuccessfully attempted again on September 4
and 24, 2025, and ultimately, the package was returned to DCFS.
DCFS tried to call Father on three occasions in September 2025,
without success. In October 2025, Jason’s caregivers reported
Father had not contacted them.
Father did not appear at the November 6, 2025,
section 366.26 hearing, but was represented by counsel. The
juvenile court could not hear the matter and sua sponte
continued it to November 7; at the request of Father’s counsel,
the hearing was further continued to November 12, 2025.
At the November 12, 2025, continued section 366.26
hearing, Father was not present but was represented by counsel.
The juvenile court’s interpreter and Father’s counsel both
unsuccessfully tried to reach Father from court.
The parties disputed whether DCFS’s August 11, 2025,
notice to Father complied with the requirements of section 294,
subdivision (f). The juvenile court determined “notice was given
as required by law,” and it terminated parental rights as to
Jason.
Father timely appealed. (See § 395, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)

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DISCUSSION
I. Father Received Adequate Notice
Father complains DCFS did not adequately notify him of
the section 366.26 hearing. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Because the facts regarding notice are not disputed, we
review de novo the juvenile court’s conclusion Father received
adequate notice. (See In re D.B. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 592, 603
[application of dependency statutes]; In re Jayden G. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 301, 308 [due process] (Jayden G.).)
B. DCFS Complied with Section 294
California law provides that presumed fathers, like Father,
are entitled to notice of section 366.26 hearings. (§ 294,
subd. (a)(2); see also In re A.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 340, 350
(A.H.).) Section 294 governs the procedure noticing those
hearings and prescribes several alternative means of providing
notice to parents. (See A.H., at p. 368; see also § 294, subd. (f)(1)–
(7).)
DCFS argues it provided adequate notice to Father of the
section 366.26 hearings under section 294, subdivision (f)(1) and
(5). Subdivision (f)(5) provides “[i]f the residence of the parent is
outside the state, service may be made as described in
paragraph (1), (3), or (4) or by certified mail, return receipt
requested.” (§ 294, subd. (f)(5).) In turn, subdivision (f)(1)
provides “[i]f the parent is present at the hearing” when the
section 366.26 hearing is scheduled, “[t]he court shall direct the
parent to appear for the proceedings and then direct that the
parent be notified thereafter only by first-class mail to the
parent’s usual place of residence.” (§ 294, subd. (f)(1).)

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We agree with the juvenile court that DCFS provided
Father statutorily adequate notice of the November 6, 2025,
section 366.26 hearing.2 On February 28, 2024, Father was
present at the hearing and the court ordered him back for the
section 366.26 hearing, originally scheduled for June 25, 2024.
Father did not appear, and during that time, DCFS conducted a
due diligence search for him. His whereabouts remained
unknown until December 5, 2024, when his counsel notified the
court of his Tijuana address.
It is undisputed Father was living in Tijuana, Mexico
during 2025. On April 11, 2025, his counsel filed a new form
notifying the juvenile court of a revised Tijuana mailing address.
DCFS sent notice of the November 6, 2025, hearing to that
address via USPS International Registered Mail on August 11,
2025. Despite three attempted deliveries, the notice could not be
delivered to Father and was returned to DCFS.
That the notice was not successfully delivered to Father
does not mean DCFS provided inadequate notice. While part of
section 294, subdivision (f)(5) requires notice be sent with “return
receipt requested,” it does not require DCFS to receive a signed
return receipt. (Ibid.) That is different from subdivision (f)(2),
where a signed return receipt is required. (Id., subd. (f)(2).)
Moreover, because Father had already been ordered to return for
the section 366.26 hearing by the juvenile court, and DCFS
mailed the notice to the residence address he gave them, the

2 Father argues notice of the November 12, 2025, continued
hearing was also inadequate, for the same reasons. The
argument is forfeited because it was raised for the first time on
appeal. (See In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754
[forfeited claim of defect in notice].)

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notice also complied with section 294, subdivision (f)(1). (See id.,
subd. (f)(5).)
C. DCFS Had No Obligation to Provide Additional
Notice
Father does not seem to dispute DCFS complied with
section 294, but instead argues DCFS also had to show it made
“reasonable efforts to notice [him]”, and left “ ‘no stone
unturned’ ” to ensure he actually received the notice. But Father
has not identified any relevant authority imposing that
additional obligation on DCFS in these circumstances.
First, Father relies upon cases discussing a county welfare
department’s obligations when a parent’s whereabouts are
unknown. (See A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 350–351 [“an
alleged father has a constitutionally protected due process right”
to notice and an opportunity to appear]; id. at pp. 362–363; In re
Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 712 [“[t]here is no due
process violation where a child welfare services agency has
exercised reasonable diligence to provide notice to a parent whose
whereabouts are unknown”]; Jayden G., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 308–310 [search for an alleged father whose “whereabouts
were always unknown” was not reasonably diligent]; see also In
re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 583–585 [the mother’s
whereabouts remained unknown and she “never appeared, either
personally or through counsel”]; id. at p. 588.)
We acknowledge DCFS has a “constitutional duty to
exercise reasonable diligence to find” parents whose whereabouts
are unknown. (A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 350; see also
§ 294, subd. (f)(7) [describing service procedure if a parent’s
whereabouts are unknown and the parent cannot be served in
usual manner with reasonable diligence].) But we fail to see why

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that duty is relevant here, when Father’s whereabouts were not
unknown when DCFS sent him the notice in August 2025.
(Cf. A.H., at p. 369 [county welfare department had spoken to the
father so “his whereabouts were known” (italics omitted)].) DCFS
sent the notice to the Tijuana address provided by his counsel on
April 11, 2025, and Father’s opening brief does not question the
accuracy of that address. Instead, he acknowledges DCFS mailed
notices “to [Father] at his Tijuana address” on three different
occasions.
“The statutory scheme places on the parent the
responsibility of keeping DCFS apprised of his or her current
mailing address, so that mailed notices do not go awry.” (In re
Jennifer O. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 539, 549 (Jennifer O.).) It was
Father’s responsibility to apprise the juvenile court and DCFS of
his address. (§ 316.1, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.534(i)
[parents must provide and update their mailing address].) DCFS
has no “duty to track [a parent] continually throughout the
dependency process[,] even after he had been identified,
contacted by a social worker, apprised of the proceedings,
provided with counsel[,] and participated in hearings.” (In re
Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 441; see also Jennifer O.,
at p. 550 & fn. 12 [letters sent to address provided by parent were
returned].) As we already explained, DCFS complied with its
statutory obligation to mail notice of the section 326.66 hearing to
Father’s Tijuana address. (See § 294, subd. (f)(1), (5).)
Second, Father suggests the August 11, 2025, notice
violated his due process rights. But Father never argued in the
juvenile court there had been a due process violation, and it is too
late for him to do so now. (See In re Wilford J., supra,
131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.)

12
Moreover, we see no merit in a constitutional due process
claim. It is undisputed Father personally appeared at several
hearings and entered a general denial to the petition. Father was
well aware of the pendency of Jason’s juvenile court proceedings,
he was represented by appointed counsel, and he had an
opportunity to defend. (See Jennifer O., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at
p. 548 [the father had appeared and was aware of proceedings, so
subsequent notice could be provided via statutory procedures].)
Father received all the process he was due. (See In re Mia M.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807 [“ ‘due process requires parents be
given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an
action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend’ ”];
see also In re Raymond R., supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 441 [the
father “cannot blame the [county welfare] Department for his
disappearance”].)
II. Remand Is Required to Ensure ICWA and Cal-ICWA
Compliance
ICWA and its California counterpart, Cal-ICWA, set
standards governing “ ‘the placement of Indian children outside
the family home.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125
(Dezi C.); see also id. at p. 1129 [defining Indian child].) Our
Legislature has decreed compliance with ICWA is mandatory,
and in section 224.2, it has “codifie[d] and expand[ed] on ICWA’s
duty of inquiry to determine whether a child is an Indian child.”
(Dezi C., at p. 1131.) That statute sets forth “ ‘the specific steps a
social worker . . . or court is required to take’ ” to determine if a
child may be an Indian child (Dezi C., at p. 1131; see also § 224.2,
subd. (a)), which include asking “ ‘extended family members’ ”
(Dezi C., at p. 1132; see also § 224.2, subd. (b)(2)).

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Here, the juvenile court determined ICWA did not apply.
(See § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.)
DCFS concedes, however, the record does not show it asked some
available extended family members (maternal grandmother, a
paternal uncle, and a paternal aunt) about Jason’s possible
Indian heritage. We agree with the parties that DCFS’s Cal-
ICWA inquiry was deficient in that regard. (See Dezi C., at
p. 1141.)
We therefore conditionally reverse and remand “for
compliance with the inquiry requirements of section 224.2,” and
for the juvenile court to thereafter make further findings
regarding the adequacy of that inquiry and the application of
ICWA and Cal-ICWA. (In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, 291; see
also Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1137–1138.) “If the juvenile
court thereafter finds the inquiry duty has been satisfied and
ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate [its] order. If the
juvenile court concludes ICWA applies, it shall proceed in
conformity with ICWA and [Cal-ICWA].” (In re Ja.O., at p. 291.)
DISPOSITION
The order is conditionally reversed and remanded for the
sole purpose of ensuring ICWA and Cal-ICWA compliance. In all
other respects, the order is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOORVITCH, J. GILBERT, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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