Filed 8/24/26 In re J.R. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re J.R., B350626
a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02493)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah Vanessa Perez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Jonathan R. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s assertion
of jurisdiction over his son J.R. (born 2023), as well as a
dispositional order removing J.R. from his care. The child’s
mother, M.G. (Mother), is nonoffending and not a party to this
appeal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. DCFS Investigation
Mother and Father had a dating relationship that began in
2022. Father was in prison when J.R. was born but, according to
Mother, all three of them lived together beginning in October
2024. The parents’ relationship ended, and they stopped living
together in May 2025.
DCFS gathered information from Mother and from police
reports about domestic violence incidents that occurred following
the end of the couple’s relationship. We summarize those
incidents, and the facts about them, only as necessary to explain
our disposition. At the time of these incidents, Father was living
with paternal grandmother, who resided in the same apartment
complex as Mother.
On either May 23 or 24, 2025, Mother left her apartment on
foot and saw Father walking towards her in a common area of
their apartment complex. As Mother passed Father, he struck
her in the back of the head and called her either a “ ‘stupid
whore’ ” or a “ ‘fucken hoe.’ ” Mother did not report the incident
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to police until one or two days later, on May 25, 2025, after
Father had hit her again.
On May 25, 2025, Mother was parked at her apartment
complex and looking for a phone charger inside her car. Father
approached the car, opened the passenger door, and sat inside.
He then opened the glove compartment, broke it, and spilled its
contents. Mother and Father began arguing. Mother got out of
the car, walked around to the passenger side, and attempted to
pull Father out of the car. In response, Father struck Mother’s
face with a closed fist leaving a visible injury. Mother called the
police, and Father left the scene before officers arrived.
On June 9, 2025, Mother texted Father to move his car
after he had parked it in her residential designated parking spot.
Father responded by accusing Mother of stealing from him.
Father then came to Mother’s apartment demanding money and
for her to let him in. When Mother refused, Father forced his
way through the home’s front door, damaging the door frame and
molding. Once inside, he demanded to take J.R. When Mother
(who was holding J.R.) tried to push Father towards the door,
Father struck her face three times with his right fist and grabbed
her by the underarm. Father also stepped on Mother’s feet as she
was holding J.R. and attempted to grab the child from her arms.
J.R.’s six-year-old half-sibling P.M. was present for the entire
incident. Both J.R. and P.M. were crying and screaming. At one
point, P.M. jumped in front of Mother and told Father to stop
hurting Mother. Father fled after Mother called 911. A
responding officer observed visible injuries to Mother’s face,
underarm, and feet.
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Prior to a July 1, 2025 incident,1 Mother received more
than 50 calls from a “ ‘No Caller ID’ ” number she believed came
from Father. Because of Father’s past abuse, Mother did not
answer; she later heard messages he had left calling her a hoe
and a bitch. On July 1, 2025, Father appeared at the front door
of Mother’s residence asking for his clothes. After Mother
provided them, Father began arguing about a purse he had given
Mother as a gift that he now wanted back. Father also asked to
see J.R., who was in the home with Mother. To avoid further
confrontation, Mother closed the door on Father. Father
responded by striking the door with his hands and kicking it with
his feet to force it open. Father damaged the door and managed
to force the lock, but Mother and her niece stood behind the door
and held it closed so that he could not enter. Father threatened
that if they did not open the door “he would ‘fuck them up.’ ”
Father overheard Mother calling 911 and fled. He was later
arrested.
When interviewed by DCFS shortly after his arrest, Father
stated that he only hit Mother in self-defense after she got
physical with him. Regarding the incident on June 9, 2025,
Father denied kicking in the door, hitting Mother, or trying to
grab J.R. Father was unable to answer how Mother’s door came
to be open if Father did not break it down. As to the July 1, 2025
incident, Father stated he was attempting to retrieve money from
Mother and banged on the door when no one answered. The
DCFS interviewer stated that Father stumbled on his words
1 A police report in the record refers to this incident as
occurring on “Tuesday, 07/02/25.” Tuesday was in fact July 1 and
not July 2, 2025.
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when answering her questions and his explanations made little
sense.
On July 7, 2025, Father was charged with attempted first-
degree residential burglary, injuring a spouse or cohabitant, and
vandalism related to the May 25, June 9, and July 1, 2025
incidents, and was served with a criminal protective order (CPO)
listing Mother as a protected person. Father thereafter declined
to provide any further statements to DCFS because of the
pending criminal proceeding.
After Father’s domestic violence began, Mother took steps
to protect herself and J.R. from it. Mother did not resume her
relationship with Father and tried to keep him out of the home
where she and J.R. lived. She asked for and was issued an
emergency protective order after the May 25, 2025 incident, but
police were unable to serve Father with a copy of it. As just
mentioned, Mother was given a CPO as protection against Father
on July 7, 2025.
B. Dependency Proceedings
On August 21, 2025, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions
Code2 section 300 petition alleging J.R. was at a substantial risk
of serious physical harm as the result of Mother and Father
engaging in violent altercations in the child’s presence. The
petition contained two counts, one under section 300, subdivision
(a) (count a-1) and one under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)
(count b-1). Both counts set forth identical supporting
allegations: “[Mother and Father] have a history of engaging in
violent altercations in the presence of the child. On [July 1,
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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]2025, [F]ather forcefully attempted to enter [M]other’s home by
striking and kicking the door and pushing the door with
[F]ather’s body while [M]other and [her] niece . . . held the door
close[d] from the inside. [F]ather threatened to physically harm
[M]other and niece. [F]ather stalked [M]other by repeatedly
calling [her] cell phone over [50] times and leaving [M]other
demeaning and derogatory voicemail messages. On [June 9,
]2025, [F]ather forcefully entered [M]other’s home by breaking
the door frame in the presence of the child and the child’s sibling
[P.M.] [F]ather repeatedly struck [M]other’s face with [F]ather’s
fists while [M]other held the child in [M]other’s arms and then
attempted to grab the child from [M]other’s arms. The child’s
sibling P.M. intervened during the altercation by throwing
herself over [M]other and child. [F]ather stepped on [M]other’s
feet and attempted to grab the child from [M]other’s arms. On
[May 25, ]2025, [F]ather forcefully entered [M]other’s vehicle
from the passenger side and broke the vehicle’s glove
compartment. [M]other exited the vehicle and grabbed [F]ather
by [his] shirt and attempted to pull [F]ather out of the vehicle.
[F]ather struck [M]other’s face with [F]ather’s fists inflicting
swelling and redness to [M]other’s face. On [May 23, ]2025,
[F]ather struck the back of [M]other’s head with [F]ather’s arm.
On prior occasions, [M]other struck and scratched [F]ather. . . .”
At the initial hearing on September 5, 2025, the juvenile
court ordered the child detained from Father and released to
Mother.
On October 31, 2025, DCFS updated the court about
Father’s criminal case. DCFS reported that on October 30, 2025,
the criminal court found Father had violated his parole by failing
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to report to his probation officer as ordered and sent him to jail
for 100 days, with 74 days of custody credit.
On November 5, 2025, at what was scheduled to be an
adjudication hearing, Father’s attorney stated that Father had
been released from custody the previous day. At Father’s
request, the hearing was continued.
On November 13, 2025, the juvenile court held the
adjudication and disposition hearing. Minor’s counsel asked the
court to sustain the petition, stating Father was the primary
aggressor and that the child had been present at some of the
domestic violence incidents. Counsel for DCFS and Mother
joined in the argument from minor’s counsel. Father’s attorney
asked the court to dismiss the petition, or in the alternative to
strike the allegations regarding the May 25 and July 1, 2025
incidents as the child was not present on May 25 and (according
to counsel) slept through the July 1 incident. The juvenile court
sustained the petition as pled.
With regard to the hearing on disposition, Mother’s
attorney asked the court to immediately close the case with a
juvenile custody order. Counsel for the minor, DCFS, and Father
all asked the court to order a case plan and continue supervision,
although they differed on specifics. A portion of DCFS’s
recommendation was to remove J.R. from Father’s care; Father’s
counsel submitted on that portion of the recommendation. The
court found DCFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent
removal, and ordered the child removed from Father and released
to Mother. Finding no reason to keep the case open, the court
indicated it would close the case via a family law order granting
Mother sole legal and physical custody, with monitored visitation
for Father.
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On November 14, 2025, the court signed the juvenile
custody order and terminated jurisdiction. The order provides
that Father’s visitation will be monitored and occur three times
per week. The court found monitored visitation appropriate
based on Father’s need to attend and make substantial progress
in a 52-week domestic violence program, individual counseling,
and parenting classes.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
Assertion of Jurisdiction
The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over J.R. under
both subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300. As substantial
evidence supports the assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to
subdivision (a) of section 300, we address only that ground.
“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its
assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether . . . the other alleged statutory
ground[] for jurisdiction [is] supported by the evidence.” (In re
Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 300, subdivision (a) permits the juvenile court to
assert jurisdiction when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or
guardian.” (Ibid.) “[I]ncidents of domestic violence between a
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child’s parents, if they occur in the child’s immediate presence,
may support a jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision
(a). [Citation.] For example, if a father strikes an infant’s
mother while she is holding the child or an older child intervenes
during a fight to protect her mother from her father’s abuse, the
risk of harm to the child may be properly viewed as
nonaccidental.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 603.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
2. Analysis
Father admits that “[t]he record establishes, without
dispute, that Father perpetrated sporadic intimate partner
violence against Mother from May through July 2025.” There is
also substantial evidence that J.R. was not only present during
the June 9 domestic violence incident but right in the middle of
it—Father tried to rip J.R. out of Mother’s arms as he assaulted
her. J.R.’s six-year-old half-sibling tried to intervene to stop
Father’s brutality; fortunately, she was not injured but Mother
was. Father returned to Mother’s apartment on July 1, where
J.R. was present, and broke down the door demanding to see J.R.
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The only reason J.R. did not again end up in the middle of
Father’s violence against Mother is that Mother and her niece
managed to hold the door closed despite Father’s attempt to force
his way in. These facts are sufficient to support jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (a). (In re Cole L., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 603.)
Father contends that the June 9 incident was an isolated
one and that J.R. was no longer at risk at the time of the
November 2025 adjudication hearing because (1) Mother and
Father no longer resided together, (2) no incidents occurred after
July 1, 2025, and (3) a CPO was in place protecting Mother and
there was no evidence Father violated that order.
The parents did not live together at any point during
Father’s violence towards Mother; all the violence occurred after
Father moved out. Thus, the parents’ lack of cohabitation did not
minimize the risks to J.R. Although no incidents happened after
July 1, 2025, Father ignores that he was in jail for a significant
period between his arrest on July 7 and the November 13, 2025
adjudication hearing. His inability to attack Mother while in
custody hardly demonstrates a lack of risk once Father was
released from custody. Father’s adherence to the CPO was a
factor in his favor, but evidence of past conduct can demonstrate
a current risk of harm if there is a reason to believe the conduct
will recur. (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411 [“in a
domestic violence situation, past violence is highly probative of
the risk that violence may recur”].) Father’s violence not only
continued but escalated before his eventual arrest and
dependency court intervention. Given the relatively short
amount of time between the last incident and the adjudication
hearing, and the fact Father had not yet attended any program
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for domestic violence offenders, the juvenile court could
reasonably infer there was a substantial risk such violence would
recur. J.R. was approximately two and a half years old and
constantly with Mother. The juvenile court thus had substantial
evidence at the time of the adjudication hearing from which it
could find J.R. remained at substantial risk of serious physical
harm inflicted nonaccidentally.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Removal Order
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A juvenile court may remove a child from a parent’s
physical custody where clear and convincing evidence shows that
there is a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child, or
there would be if the child were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means to protect the child without removal from the
parent’s physical custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
When reviewing “ ‘a dispositional order removing a child
from a parent we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make
its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing
evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘The ultimate test is whether it is
reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in
light of the whole record.’ ” ’ ” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
510, 520-521.)
2. Analysis
Father makes the conclusory assertion that “the trial court
failed to consider less drastic measures than removal.” Before
the juvenile court, Father did not argue that any reasonable
means existed to protect J.R. from Father short of removal;
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indeed, Father did not even oppose that portion of DCFS’s
recommendation. Father’s appellate brief likewise fails to
identify any potential reasonable means to protect J.R. short of
removal. The same substantial evidence of Father’s domestic
violence that supports the court’s exercise of jurisdiction also
supports its decision to remove J.R. from Father’s care. Father’s
claim that the court’s assessment of him “paints a skewed picture
that completely overlooks [his] significant redeeming qualities”
asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. (In re I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Father’s primary complaint seems to be that the court
closed the case instead of continuing to assert jurisdiction and
giving him time to complete a case plan. Such complaints might
go to the propriety of issuing a juvenile custody order with
monitored visitation for Father, which Father does not challenge;
they do not cast doubt on the removal order. The lack of time to
make progress with a case plan does not show that, as of the time
of the disposition hearing (when the court had not yet established
any case plan), the court erred in removing J.R. from Father’s
care.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and removal order
are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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