Filed 9/10/26 In re J.P. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.P. et al., Persons Coming B347001
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 21CCJP05880EF)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
H.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Eliot Lee Grossman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
H.P. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
terminating jurisdiction over her sons J.P., Jr. (born Nov. 2013)
and N.P. (born Sept. 2017) (collectively, the children), as well as
the exit orders granting J.P. (father) sole legal and physical
custody and limiting mother to monitored visitation.1 Finding no
error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Relevant Family History
In December 2021, mother was arrested for driving under
the influence (DUI) with the children in the car. The juvenile
court took jurisdiction over the children.
In November 2022, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and granted mother and father (collectively, parents)
joint legal and physical custody.
Parents briefly reconciled and moved in together. They
broke up and moved to separate residences after mother’s second
arrest for DUI in February 2023.
II. Referral; Investigation; Detention
In June 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral that
“mother arrive[d] to pick up [the] children from school while
1 The children’s older sister is not part of this appeal.
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intoxicated” for the second time that school year. Mother was
“stumbling[] and unable to walk or talk.”
That same day, a DCFS social worker interviewed father
and the children. Father said that J.P., Jr. had texted him at
5:30 in the morning, telling him that mother was “ ‘drinking
again[.]’ ” When father arrived at mother’s home, he observed
“empty beer cans strewn about . . . [her] bedroom.” He dropped
the children off at school and, later that day, picked them up
after “receiv[ing] an urgent call from school officials, advising him
[that] . . . mother was intoxicated and attempt[ing] to take
custody of the[] children.”
J.P., Jr. told DCFS that he also saw beer cans in mother’s
bedroom that morning, and “immediately felt scared and
nervous” that “it was ‘going to be a bad day’ since . . . mother was
drinking again.” He said that mother “dr[a]nk[] alcohol
frequently in or near his presence[,]” and that he “ha[d] seen her
become intoxicated ‘a lot of times.’ ”
N.P. felt “ ‘scared’ ” when mother arrived to his school
intoxicated. N.P. “ ‘could tell [mother] was drinking beers
because she could not walk straight. And she could not talk
right. That’s how I know when she drinks a lot of beers.’ ” N.P.
reported that this was “not an isolated event, because . . . mother
‘sometimes drinks beers a lot.’ ” N.P. also said that “mother has
shown up [to] school to pick him up with an opened beer can
tucked inside her coat pocket” and that “he can also detect the
smell of alcohol emitting from . . . [her] breath.”
Mother was not available for an interview until four days
later. She admitted to “relaps[ing]” and “consum[ing] several
beers” before arriving to pick up the children but denied “having
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been impaired and[/]or heavily intoxicated” or having any
substance abuse issues.
In August 2024, the juvenile court detained the children
from mother and placed them with father. The court ordered
mother to submit to weekly alcohol testing and have monitored
visits with the children a minimum of three times per week.
III. Jurisdiction; Removal; Disposition
In October 2024, the juvenile court sustained an amended
jurisdictional petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.)2 In relevant
part, the court found that mother “has an unresolved history of
alcohol abuse, and is a current abuser of alcohol” and, on prior
occasions, had “dr[iven] a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol and while the children were passengers in the vehicle”
and been “arrested for . . . DUI” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). Father was
designated a nonoffending parent.
The juvenile court removed the children from mother’s
custody, finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent
removal. Father would retain physical custody. The court
ordered family preservation services for father and enhancement
services for mother. The court ordered mother to, among other
things, “participate in a full alcohol program with random
testing, 12 step program and court card[.]”
IV. Mother’s Progress
In April 2025, Mother “made active efforts to comply
with . . . [c]ourt[-]ordered services and overall . . . ma[de]
significant progress in . . . areas of her recovery[,] . . . includ[ing]
[by] admitting to DCFS staff that she is in fact, a recovering
alcoholic.” She also “show[ed] significant improvement in her
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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ability to openly and calmly discuss case issues[.]” Mother’s
visits with the children went well.
Mother consistently tested negative for drugs and alcohol,
with three exceptions: (1) in September 2024, mother tested
presumptively positive for amphetamines; (2) in December 2024,
mother tested positive for methamphetamines; and (3) in
January 2025, mother tested presumptively positive for a low
level of fentanyl.
Staff at mother’s substance abuse program deemed the
third test negative and the first test a false positive triggered by
mother’s use of Fentermina, a prescription appetite suppressant.
Per a doctor at the substance abuse program, Fentermina “can
cause [mother] to test positive for [a]mphetamines (AMP) on a
drug test . . . . [n]o other substances should be found to be
positive in her drug screen.”
However, staff at the drug testing lab confirmed that
Fentermina could not have triggered a positive test for
methamphetamines, particularly not at the high concentration
shown in mother’s test. Moreover, neither mother nor her
substance abuse program could provide evidence of mother’s
Fentermina prescription or put DCFS in touch with the
prescribing physician.
Mother denied any drug use. In February 2025, she
obtained an independent hair follicle drug test, which came back
negative. That same month, mother texted a social worker
photographs of her current prescriptions, which did not include
Fentermina.
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V. Six-Month Review Hearing; Termination of
Jurisdiction; Appeal
In April 2025, the juvenile court held a contested six-month
review hearing pursuant to section 364. DCFS recommended
terminating jurisdiction and giving sole custody to father, with
monitored visits for mother. Father joined in that
recommendation. Mother asked the court “to keep the case open”
and “[i]n addition, either return the children to her or liberalize
her visitation based on her progress.”
The juvenile court “confirm[ed] that alcohol[,]” rather than
any other illicit substance, “was really . . . mother’s issue.”
However, the court found that the children were “in safe hands”
with father and explained that dependency courts “do[] [not] keep
cases open for parents to work their way back to their children.”
Accordingly, the court terminated jurisdiction over the children,
awarded father sole legal and physical custody, and awarded
mother a minimum of three monitored visits weekly.
The juvenile court stayed termination of jurisdiction
pending receipt of the custody order. In May 2025, the custody
order was filed.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the trial court failed to comply with
section 366 because it did not find (and, on this record, could not
have found) that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide
mother with services. To the extent that mother’s appeal
requires statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. (In re
L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 412.)
A. Statutory Framework
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“If a child has been declared a dependent of the juvenile
court and placed under court supervision, the status of the child
must be reviewed every six months.” (Bridget A. v. Superior
Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 303 (Bridget A.).) “The
applicable standards at the six-month review hearing differ
depending on the child’s placement.” (In re Maya L. (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 81, 98 (Maya L.); see also In re Nicholas H. (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265 [“A parent placement poses very
different considerations for the juvenile court than does a foster
care placement[.]”].)
Generally, “when a child is removed from parental custody
under the dependency statutes, the juvenile court is required to
provide reunification services pursuant to section 361.5 to ‘the
child and the child’s [parents].’ (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose
of these reunification services is ‘to facilitate the return of a
dependent child to parental custody.’ [Citation.] Unless an
express exemption exists, reunification services provided
pursuant to section 361.5 are mandatory . . . and monitored
through periodic . . . reviews” pursuant to section 366 et seq. (In
re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281–1282.)
The law provides alternate paths for a child who remains in
parental custody while under court supervision. Section 364
applies when a child is “not removed from the physical custody of
his . . . parent[.]” (§ 364, subd. (a); see In re R.F. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 459, 469 (R.F.) [“Section 364 governs review
hearings for dependent children who have not been removed from
one or both parents.”]; In re Pedro Z., Jr. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
12, 20 (Pedro Z.) [“when the child remains in a parent’s home, the
court reviews the status of the case every six months under
section 364”].) At the six-month review hearing, “[t]he court shall
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terminate its jurisdiction unless [DCFS] establishes by a
preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which
would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction . . . , or that those
conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364,
subd. (c).)
At a section 364 review hearing, “the [juvenile] court is not
concerned with reunification, but in determining ‘whether the
dependency should be terminated or whether further supervision
is necessary.’ [Citations.]” (Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at
p. 20; see also Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)
Accordingly, the parent from whom the children have been
removed is not entitled to reunification services. (See In re
A.L. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138, 145 [no reunification services
are called for when a child is not removed from his or her
custodial parent].) Instead, that parent may be awarded
enhancement services, i.e. “child welfare services offered to the
parent not retaining custody, designed to enhance the child’s
relationship with that parent.” (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 197, 212; see § 362, subd. (a).) The parent retaining
custody may receive family preservation or maintenance
services.3 (See Bridget A., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 303
[when child remains in home of parent, proper form of child
3 Because family preservation services and family
maintenance services serve overlapping purposes, the terms are
often used interchangeably. (Compare § 16501, subd. (g)
[“[F]amily maintenance services are activities designed to provide
in-home protective services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse,
or exploitation, for the purposes of preventing separation of
children from their families.”] with § 16501, subd. (j) [“[F]amily
preservation services include those services . . . [designed] to
avoid or limit out-of-home placement of children.”].)
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welfare services is family maintenance services, not family
reunification services].)
Alternatively, if a child is removed from his custodial
parent, the juvenile court may place the child with “a parent of
the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that
the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the
provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the
child[.]” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) If the court places a child with a
noncustodial parent, it may, among other options, “[o]rder that
the parent assume custody subject to [court] supervision[.]”
(§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).) If it does, status review hearings are held
pursuant to section 366 et seq. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3).)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err
Mother’s arguments stem from the premise that the
juvenile court “erroneously refer[red]” to the six-month review
hearing as a section 364 hearing. Mother contends that because
“the case law makes it abundantly clear that it was actually a
[s]ection 366 hearing[,]” the court erred by failing to make a
reasonable services finding. She also claims that, on this record,
DCFS could not have satisfied its burden to show that it made
reasonable efforts to provide reunification services.
As an initial matter, mother forfeited the contention that
the juvenile court failed to comply with section 366 by failing to
raise the issue below. (See In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597,
605 [“Failure to object to [statutory] noncompliance . . . in the
lower court results in forfeiture”].)
Mother’s premise also fails on the merits. Section 364
applies when children are not removed from a custodial parent.
(§ 364, subd. (a); see also R.F., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 469,
Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) When this case
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originated in June 2024, parents had joint custody of the
children. While the children were removed from mother’s
custody, they were never removed from father’s custody.
Therefore, section 364 applies to the six-month hearing.
Consistent with section 364, the juvenile court granted
father family preservation services and mother family
enhancement services.4 At the six-month review hearing, the
juvenile court determined that continued court supervision was
unnecessary and terminated jurisdiction. (§ 364, subds. (a) &
(c).) The court thus complied with the applicable dependency
statute. Mother’s arguments that it failed to comply with the
requirements of a different statute (namely, § 366) are beside the
point.
Notably, mother does not argue that continued court
supervision was necessary; that she is entitled to reunification
services under section 364; or that section 364 required the
juvenile court to make a reasonable efforts finding with respect to
mother’s discretionary enhancement services.
Instead, mother conclusorily asserts that since father was a
noncustodial parent, the six-month review hearing was
necessarily held pursuant to section 366. (See § 361.2, subds. (a),
(b)(3).) Mother does not explain why we should deem father, who
had been awarded joint custody of the children in November
2022, a noncustodial parent under section 361.2. (See In re A.T.
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 722, 733 [in the context of section 361.2,
the term “custody” “describes the right of a parent to have
physical possession of and/or the right to make decisions about
4 Mother’s request on appeal for “six additional months of
[r]eunification [s]ervices” (italics added) is puzzling, as she never
received any reunification services.
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the child”]; In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 [“ ‘ “ ‘When an
appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point
as waived.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”].)
Lastly, mother argues that if we reverse the challenged
orders, we should also instruct the juvenile court to grant mother
unmonitored visitation. As we affirm the orders, we decline to
issue the requested instruction.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
GOORVITCH
We concur:
________________________, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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