Filed 10/8/26 In re J.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.M. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E088093
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1300797)
v. OPINION
A.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I.
INTRODUCTION
A.M. is the mother of 11-month-old twin boys, Jon.M. and Jos.M. Mother appeals
from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and orders over her twin sons.1 On
appeal, she contends there was insubstantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings and thus the petition should be dismissed.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Mother’s History with Child Protective Services
Mother has nine older children that are not in her care due to an extensive history
with the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS). She had
11 prior referrals from 2009 to 2024, primarily related to general neglect stemming from
Mother’s long-standing substance abuse issues, mental health issues and homelessness.
Her oldest child, E.M., was detained in November 2013 due to domestic violence,
mental health issues, and alcohol abuse. Although the court terminated that dependency
in October 2014 after family maintenance services, Mother’s pattern of instability
continued.
In September 2023, Mother again came to DPSS’s attention when both she and
newborn T.M. tested positive for amphetamine at delivery. Mother admitted to daily
methamphetamine use throughout the pregnancy and refused treatment. E.M. and J.M.
1 The twins’ father was unknown and not involved in the dependency matter.
2
were subsequently detained and allegations of general neglect were substantiated due to
Mother’s methamphetamine addiction, homelessness, and living in deplorable conditions.
Mother received family reunification services for all three children, E.M., T.M.,
and J.M., beginning in November 2023, but her minimal progress on her case plan led to
termination of services for T.M. in June 2024 and termination of parental rights as to
T.M. in November 2024. Family Reunification services as to E.M. and J.M. were
terminated in December 2024 due to a lack of progress in her case plan. E.M.
subsequently reached the age of majority during the dependency case in 2024 and J.M.
remained placed with a relative.
B. Current Dependency Matter
Mother gave birth to twin boys, Jon.M. and Jos.M, in September 2025. On
September 8, 2025, DPSS received a referral alleging general neglect of the twins. DPSS
was concerned over Mother’s ability to care for the twins given her “ ‘long history’ ” of
abusing methamphetamine, schizophrenia affective disorder, lack of financial resources,
current open child services case, a lack of family support, and six years of consistent
homelessness. Mother was in an inpatient drug treatment program. The twins were in
the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) after being born premature at 32 weeks and were
expected to remain in the NICU for eight weeks. The infants exhibited respiratory
distress, jaundice, low birth weight, and feeding difficulties requiring incubators and
feeding tubes. Mother drug tested negative at the twins’ birth.
3
Hospital personnel immediately raised concerns about Mother’s ability to care for
the twins. Mother disclosed her extensive substance abuse history and acknowledged
that her children had previously been removed. She expressed fear that losing the twins
would leave her without benefits, money, or food. Staff reported Mother declined to
apply for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, was uncooperative with hospital
requests for information necessary to secure resources and remained guarded about her
mental health.
During DPSS’s initial interview with Mother, Mother vacillated between
cooperation and agitation. She stated the presence of DPSS caused her increased anxiety,
she became argumentative and defensive. She described participation in the MFI
residential program, completion of an array of classes, and periods of sobriety and relapse
triggered by her inability to regain custody of her older children. Mother claimed to have
nine months of sobriety but later stated that her last drug use was on June 13, 2025.
Mother admitted she stopped taking her psychiatric medications during pregnancy,
could not recall the names of her medications, denied needing mental health services, and
argued with the social worker about obtaining a mental health assessment. Although she
eventually contacted the CARES line, she was directed to Jefferson Wellness, where she
failed to follow through and contact them. Mother’s program manager at her sober living
facility expressed concern, reporting Mother was not “mentally stable or mature enough”
to parent newborn twins. Staff at her sober living facility had to remind her to purchase
basic provisions with her SSI income, during which she became argumentative and
4
demanded staff purchase items for her instead. The manager believed mother’s sobriety
was driven by probation, not intrinsic motivation, and described mother as secretive
about her mental health. Although Mother was engaged in weekly therapy and resumed
taking medication, she was inconsistent in her mental health participation and failed to
follow through with obtaining necessary items for the twins.
Given the totality of concerns, DPSS detained the twins after obtaining juvenile
protective custody warrants. On October 9, 2025, a petition was filed on behalf of the
twins pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to
protect) and (g) (no provision for support).
At the October 10, 2025, detention hearing, Mother was appointed counsel, and
the twins were formally detained. Mother was provided with predispositional services
and twice weekly supervised visits with the twins.
DPSS recommended sustaining the allegations, declaring the twins a ward of the
court, and providing Mother with reunification services. DPSS noted Mother’s unstable
progress, limited sobriety, and continued minimization of past issues. The twins were
placed in foster care on October 27, 2025.
Mother reported she was completing her programs, maintaining sobriety, and
participating in a dual diagnosis program. She disclosed diagnoses of schizophrenia and
depression, long term medication use, and cessation of medication during pregnancy.
She admitted resuming medication only after the twins were detained. However, she
2 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
5
could not name her prescribing psychiatrist, had no upcoming appointment, and asserted
she had ADHD and anxiety. Mother’s MFI sober living house manager noted Mother had
been “doing great,” was attending all her meetings, completing her chores, had not
violated curfew, and had a “great attitude.” Mother’s October 2025 drug tests were
negative.
DPSS acknowledged Mother’s participation in her programs but noted Mother had
nine children, none of whom were in her care, and she continued to deny knowledge of
the reasons for her prior cases. Mother disagreed with DPSS’s prior findings and
minimized her departures from past programs. She reported extensive methamphetamine
history beginning at age 16, homelessness, and daily use of methamphetamine by age 22.
She admitted using methamphetamine through the first three or four months of her
pregnancy with the twins and confirmed that her last use was June 13, 2025. She
remained in treatment pursuant to probation requirements.
Although Mother was attending her substance abuse groups and participating in
random drug testing, she struggled to consistently engage in mental health services. She
missed psychiatric and therapy appointments, failed to reschedule therapy sessions, and
resumed psychotropic medications only in December 2025 after DPSS’s prompting. In
late November 2025, the social worker observed Mother’s Lexapro pills to be partially
unused. Mother reported forgetting doses due to conflicting appointments. Mother
continued to refuse to share details about her therapy or appointments. Jefferson
Wellness confirmed that Mother had missed her October and November 2025 psychiatric
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appointments. She had only three therapy sessions by February 2026 and her service
providers did not respond to DPSS’s inquiries about her progress.
During visitation, although Mother was appropriate with the twins, she often
became overwhelmed, ended visits early, and required assistance from caregivers when
both infants cried. She stated she could not soothe the babies using suggested techniques
due to her nail extensions and could not buckle them into car seats for the same reason.
Caregivers observed disruptions to the twins’ routines after visits and episodes of distress
requiring prolonged soothing.
DPSS continued to recommend jurisdiction over the twins based on Mother’s
continued instability, brief sobriety, inconsistent mental health treatment, history of
relapse, and failed reunification.
On February 4, 2026, DPSS filed a second amended petition on behalf of the twins
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), striking one allegation and amending
three other allegations.
On February 20, 2026, Mother’s counsel filed a trial brief and exhibit list in
support of request to dismiss the petition, or in the alternative, an order for family
maintenance services. Mother argued that there was no nexus between her history of
abusing methamphetamine and current risk to the children as she had been sober for nine
months and that speculation about relapse cannot establish risk. She also asserted that
her mental health was being treated and did not create a current risk and that her prior
dependency history cannot be substituted for current evidence. Alternatively, Mother
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argued that even if jurisdiction is sustained, removal of the twins from her care cannot be
justified. The documents in support included Mother’s letter of enrollment in MFI
inpatient treatment program dated June 28, 2025, letters from her MFI outpatient
treatment and sober living programs, her certificates of completion, attendance in
Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, and her negative drug tests from June 20, 2025, to
November 3, 2025.
DPSS recommended that the juvenile court find true the allegations in the second
amended petition, the twins be declared dependents of the court and be removed from
Mother’s care, and that Mother be provided with reunification services and supervised
visitations. DPSS noted that although Mother had successfully completed an inpatient
substance abuse treatment program and was currently participating in an outpatient
program, these efforts were recent and did not show long-term stability. DPSS also
explained that Mother continued to minimize her role in the circumstances that resulted
in the removal of her other children and had not accepted full responsibility, instead she
blamed DPSS. DPSS also pointed out that there were continued concerns about Mother’s
mental health stability as she had yet to show her ability to consistently take her
psychotropic medication and consistently participate in therapeutic services. DPSS
opined given Mother’s limited period of sobriety, lack of demonstrated sustained
behavioral changes, and history of relapse and instability, returning the young twins to
Mother’s care would pose a substantial risk to their safety and well-being.
8
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on March 3, 2026. At
that time, Mother’s counsel argued for dismissal of all allegations while DPSS and the
twins’ counsel supported jurisdiction. Mother’s counsel asserted that there is no nexus
between the allegations and harm to the twins. Mother’s counsel requested family
maintenances services if the court was inclined to find jurisdiction. DPSS’s counsel
noted that certain allegations were modified as a result of negotiations with Mother’s
counsel. DPSS’s counsel argued that DPSS established a nexus in Mother’s
inconsistency in attending her medication management appointments and her failure to
take medications as prescribed. The twins’ counsel argued that Mother has a very long
history of substance abuse, her sobriety is relatively recent, and she has a history of
relapse. The twins’ counsel noted Mother sometimes becomes overwhelmed and
struggles with calming and soothing her very vulnerable young babies.
Following arguments, the juvenile court sustained allegations b-2, b-3, b-4, b-5,
and g-1 in the second amended petition, adjudged the twins dependents of the court, and
ordered family maintenance services to Mother. Mother timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues there is insubstantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), because the evidence
supporting the sustained petition was speculative as she had made progress by the
jurisdictional hearing and the twins remained in Mother’s care.
9
The second amended petition as found true by the juvenile court against Mother
states:
“b-2: The mother has an extensive history of abusing controlled substances,
specifically methamphetamine, thereby placing her ability to provide appropriate care
and/or supervision to the children at risk.
“b-3: The mother suffers from mental health issues to include symptoms of
anxiety and depression.
“b-4: The mother has a history with Riverside County Children Services as to the
child, [E.M.], who i[s] now an adult, due to substantiated allegations of neglect relating to
substance abuse, transient lifestyle, and no provision for her children. The mother failed
to reunify with the child, due to her services being terminated and the child reaching the
age of majority.
“b-5: The mother has an open dependency case with Riverside County Children
Services as to her child, [J.M.] and T.M., due to substantiated allegations of neglect
relating to substance abuse, transient lifestyle, and no provision for her children. The
mother has received extensive Family Reunification Services and failed to benefit
resulting in a permanent plan for both children, and her parental rights being terminated
for the child, T.M. ”
“ ‘The purpose of California’s dependency law is “to provide maximum safety and
protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally
abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and
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physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” [Citation.]
In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law balances a number of vital interests:
children’s interests in safe and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children;
families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and the state’s interest in
protecting society’s most vulnerable members.’ ” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 537
(N.R.); see § 300.2, subd. (a).)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), “provides that a juvenile may be adjudged a
dependent of the court when ‘[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the following: [¶]
(A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or
protect the child. . . . [¶] (D) The inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular
care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental
disability, or substance abuse.’ ” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 537-538, italics omitted;
see In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 626-627; In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 848;
In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712 (S.F.); In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840,
848 (L.W.).)
“A court ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.] And a parent’s
‘ “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe
that the conduct will continue.” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “[t]o establish a defined risk of
harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere speculation to
11
believe the alleged conduct will recur.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 712-713; see In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048 (J.A.); L.W., supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 849; In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216
(Christopher R.).) Furthermore, “[t]he trial court is in the best position to determine the
degree to which a child is at risk based on an assessment of all the relevant factors in each
case.” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766.) The primary purpose of a
dependency proceeding is to protect the child. (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d
1206, 1214; § 300, subd. (b).)
“ ‘ “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We
do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if
there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ” ’ ” (S.F., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; see In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.); In re M.D.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 857; L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 848.) “ ‘The parent
has the burden on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411-412; see In re M.C. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 137, 151; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 168 (N.M.).)
12
Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), the department must establish, “as
separate elements, that (1) substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian unable to
provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer serious
physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (N.R.,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 558.) The Supreme Court has interpreted section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(D), “as assigning the term ‘substance abuse’ its ordinary meaning—
essentially, the excessive use of drugs or alcohol.” (N.R., at p. 531; see ibid. [neither “a
diagnosis by a medical professional” nor “satisfaction of the prevailing criteria for a
substance use disorder as specified within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM)” is “essential under section 300(b)(1)(D)”].)
Initially, we note the allegations sustained by the juvenile court were the result of
negotiation between the parties. DPSS’s counsel explained at the contested jurisdiction
hearing that the second amended petition reflected modifications reached after
discussions with Mother’s counsel. Mother did not object to the amended language,
request clarification, or seek further changes. Instead, she argued solely that DPSS failed
to meet its burden of proof. By acquiescing to the amended allegations and failing to
challenge their form below, Mother forfeited any claim that the petition itself was
defective. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; N.M., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at
p. 166.) Hence, the only issue for appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the
petition as pled.
13
We find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true findings as to the
substance abuse allegation in the second amended petition. Mother has a long-standing
chronic history of abusing methamphetamine and mental health issues. And her recent
sobriety of eight months in a structured setting does not support Mother’s claim that there
was no current risk of harm to her infant twin boys. Mother began abusing
methamphetamine in 2014 at age 16. Her methamphetamine abuse escalated to daily use
at the age of 22 while she was homeless, and continued for six years. In September 2023,
both Mother and newborn T.M. tested positive at delivery. Mother admitted using
methamphetamine daily throughout that pregnancy, including two to three days before
delivery. At that time, she refused drug treatment. Mother admitted to last using
methamphetamine on June 13, 2025, only eight months before the contested
jurisdictional hearing.
Mother had a pattern of relapse after periods of sobriety. Her sobriety was
questioned by her treatment program staff, who reported she appeared motivated by
probation compliance rather than genuine rehabilitation, and that she remained secretive
and inconsistent regarding treatment. Mother’s drug use was neither historical nor
speculative. She used methamphetamine daily for six years, including through the first
four months of her twins’ pregnancy. Mother has repeatedly relapsed after prior attempts
at reunification. In fact, her parental rights to T.M. were terminated just months before
the twins’ birth due to methamphetamine exposure during pregnancy. Her other children,
J.M. and E.M., were also removed from Mother due to her drug use, instability and
14
unsafe home conditions, homelessness and neglect of their care. Due to Mother’s
admission of chronic and severe amphetamine addiction, including methamphetamine
daily use, DPSS removed E.M. and J.M., from Mother. On December 11, 2024, the court
terminated Mother’s reunification services as to E.M. and J.M. due to her lack of case
plan progress, and they remain out of her care.
Recent sobriety of short duration, particularly after chronic abuse, does not
eliminate risk. Here, the risk was heightened because the twins were premature, required
specialized feeding and constant monitoring, conditions incompatible with a caregiver
who was newly sober, minimally compliant with mental health treatment, and unstable.
(In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 212-213.) The twins’ very young ages supported
the court’s conclusion Mother’s substance abuse placed them at substantial risk of serious
physical harm. (See N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [“a child’s youth and maturity level
can bear upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s or guardian’s
substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm”].)
Moreover, while we commend Mother, Mother’s recent eight months of sobriety and
participation was due to residing in structured settings. Previously, she abused
methamphetamine daily for six years, relapsed multiple times, was constantly homeless
due to her drug use, and had a long-standing history with DPSS, resulting in the
termination of her parental rights in T.M.’s case and termination of reunification services
in J.M. and E.M.’s case.
15
The juvenile court could reasonably infer Mother’s recent sobriety was insufficient
to remove a substantial risk of harm or illness to the twins in light of their vulnerable
young ages, Mother’s past conduct, Mother’s mental health issues, and her inability to
care for the twins during supervised visits. (See N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [courts
may “discern an inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness from the evidence that has been introduced in a particular case . . . and the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence”].) As previously noted, “[a]
court ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and
take steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.] And a parent’s ‘ “ ‘[p]ast conduct
may be probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that the conduct will
continue.” ’ [Citation.]” (S.F., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 712-713; see J.A., supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048; L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 849.) There is substantial
evidence to support the substance abuse jurisdictional finding against Mother.
The cases Mother relies on, In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720
(Rebecca C.) and In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999 (Destiny S.), are
distinguishable. In Rebecca C., the court held substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s finding the mother’s substance abuse caused, or there was a substantial
risk it would cause, physical harm to the child because the child in that case was 13 years
old and denied any physical or emotional abuse. (Rebecca C., at pp. 727-728.) Here, the
twins were only five months old at the time of the contested jurisdictional hearing and are
currently only 11 months old. A 13-year-old child, like the one in Rebecca C., is much
16
more mature, independent, and able to take steps to protect himself or herself from a
substance-abusing mother than 11-month-old children who are entirely dependent on
their mother and who require constant care and attention.
Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th 999 involved an 11-year-old, with a mother
who had a history of abusing marijuana and methamphetamine. (Id. at p. 1001.) The
Court of Appeal reversed because the child was a happy, healthy preteen and there was no
evidence that the mother’s drug use harmed her daughter or placed the child at risk of
physical harm. (Id. at pp. 1002-1005.) As the Destiny S. court noted, an 11-year-old
“ ‘was old enough to avoid the kinds of physical dangers which make infancy an
inherently hazardous period of life.’ ” (Id. at p. 1004, quoting In re Rocco M. (1991)
1 Cal.App.4th 814, 825, abrogated on another ground by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622,
627-628.)
Furthermore, Mother here has a chronic history of abusing methamphetamine, a
substance that is far more dangerous and that causes severe side effects that can impair a
parent’s ability to provide regular care for a child. (See In re Alexzander C. (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 438, 449 [methamphetamine is “ ‘an inherently dangerous drug known to
cause visual and auditory hallucinations, sleep deprivation, intense anger, volatile mood
swings, agitation, paranoia, impulsivity, and depression’ ”].) Mother also has a long-
history with DPSS which resulted in termination of parental rights and reunification
services. Moreover, the record indicates Mother was unable to provide care to her two
very young twins during supervised visits without the assistance of their caregiver.
17
Again, the juvenile court did not need to wait for actual harm to occur before asserting
jurisdiction to protect then five-month-old twins from a parent’s recent sobriety and
whose drug abuse created a substantial risk of physical harm. (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 773 [“ ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ”].) We find substantial
evidence to support jurisdiction.3
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
3 Because substantial evidence supported at least one of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings, that is enough. (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-
329; see In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 290 [“if one of the three jurisdictional
bases relative to mother’s conduct is supported by substantial evidence, the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional finding must be affirmed regardless of whether either of the other
alleged grounds for jurisdiction is supported by the evidence”].)
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