Filed 11/10/26 In re J.M. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re J.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
G.M.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A176326
MARIN COUNTY,
Respondent, (Marin County Super. Ct.
No. JD0000090)
MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
J.M., at one-and-a-half years of age, was removed from his parents
after the juvenile court determined he was at substantial risk of serious
physical harm due to ongoing exposure to his parents’ severe intimate
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
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partner violence, restraining order violations, and unaddressed substance
use. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).)2 After a juvenile court order
terminated reunification services and set a hearing for terminating parental
rights concerning J.M. under section 366.26, G.M. (Father) filed a writ
petition under rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court, arguing the order
was unsupported by substantial evidence. We ordered respondent superior
court to show cause why relief should not be granted, and in turn, real party
in interest Marin County Health and Human Services (the Agency) filed an
opposition.3 Having reviewed those filings, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the termination of Father’s reunification services, and that
Father lacks standing to challenge the termination of Mother’s reunification
services or to seek the return of J.M. to Mother’s care. Consequently, we will
affirm the order insofar as it concerns Father’s reunification services and
otherwise dismiss the petition.
“ ‘Prior to terminating reunification services, the court must make a
determination that it would be detrimental to the child to be returned to the
parent’s custody.’ ” (M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646, 660.)
This standard is met when it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence
“that the return of the child to their parent or legal guardian would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) “We review the
juvenile court’s finding of detriment for substantial evidence.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
3 The Agency also filed an unopposed request for judicial notice of a
detention order for J.M.’s younger sibling. In order to ensure our record is
comprehensive, we grant the request for its relevance to the petition’s claim
that Y.M. (Mother) is caring for that sibling at home. (Evid. Code, §§ 459,
subd. (a), 452, subd. (d)(1).)
2
(Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864.) “Under
this standard, we do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reweigh the evidence.” (In re A.L. (2015)
243 Cal.App.4th 628, 645.) “Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court’s order
and affirm the order even if there is other evidence to the contrary.” (Ibid.)
Here, in explaining the finding of detriment, the juvenile court averred
that J.M.’s parents had made “misrepresentations . . . to” the Agency,
“misstatements and inconsistent statements . . . to other individuals,
including probation officers, social workers, and ultimately counsel and the
Court,” so as to rule out the conclusion “that Mother and Father have learned
to change their ways and to correct their behavior.” Mother and Father, who
continued to exhibit a “lack of candor,” also “continue[d] to have unresolved
issues, issues with respect to their own mental health, their own well-being,
their ability to be honest with themselves, each other, and every other person
that they engage with on a regular basis.” Both parents repeatedly violated
the juvenile court’s orders; for example, there had been six times when the
police were called to the parents’ residence for “yelling and screaming[,]”
including an instance where a witness heard someone express fear that
someone involved in the dispute was “ ‘going to hurt the baby.’ ” The juvenile
court also noted Father’s refusal to allow for a release of certain information
to a social worker, Father’s persistent anger issues, and Father’s false
statements to his probation officer and others.
Conspicuously, Father fails in his petition to dispute any of these
specific findings or the sufficiency of the evidence for them. Instead, he notes
the parts of the case plan with which he complied and argues he has made
progress to that end. But these contentions are nothing more than requests
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for us to “reweigh the evidence”—something we cannot do on the operative
standard of review. (In re A.L., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 645.) For that
reason, he cannot prevail on this ground.
As for the petition’s arguments concerning the termination of Mother’s
reunification services and the petition’s prayer for returning J.M. to Mother’s
care, Father lacks the requisite standing.4 “[O]nly a person aggrieved by a
decision may appeal.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) And although
appellate courts have liberally construed this requirement to allow, for
example, a father’s challenge to a dispositional order removing a child from
his mother’s custody, this liberal construction has been grounded in the
order’s “potential to adversely affect the father’s own interests in reunifying
with [the child.]” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 849.) By contrast,
Father has no such interests vis-à-vis the challenged order because, as we
have already observed, his reunification services were duly terminated and
he has failed in the instant petition to demonstrate that termination was
erroneous. In short, because Father is not in the relevant sense aggrieved by
the order as it pertains to Mother, he has no standing to challenge the order
in that regard here. (See In re K.C., at pp. 236–37, and In re D.S. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 671, 674.)
DISPOSITION
As to the termination of Father’s reunification services, we affirm. In
all other respects, the petition is dismissed for lack of standing.
4
Father did not ask the juvenile court to return J.M. to his custody. He
argued for returning the child to Mother, who filed a notice of her intent to
file a writ petition but thereafter did not do so.
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_________________________
SMILEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
HUMES, P. J.
_________________________
BANKE, J.
In re J.M. / A176326
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