Filed 9/29/26 In re J.J. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087774
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J306558 &
J306559)
v.
OPINION
L.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G. Pace,
Judge. Affirmed.
Melissa J. Fox, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Presumed father L.J. (father) appeals from the orders of the San Bernardino
County juvenile court asserting jurisdiction over two of his children, R.J. (born in May
2019) and J.J. (born in April 2023), and bypassing provision of family reunification
services for him. The sole issue raised by father on appeal is whether the juvenile court’s
decision not to provide him with family reunification services is sufficiently supported by
the evidence. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Father has three children with J.W. (the mother) in addition to R.J. and J.J.
In 2016, juvenile dependency cases were initiated by San Bernardino County
Children and Family Services (the Department) on behalf of the eldest two of those
children and resulted in termination of parental rights in December 2017. At that time,
father was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender (a requirement stemming
from his conviction for assault with intent to commit a specified sex offense, a violation
of Pen. Code, § 220). Father was denied family reunification services as to those children
pursuant to subdivision (b)(16) of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5
(§ 361.5(b)(16)).1 That provision authorizes the juvenile court to bypass services for a
parent if there is clear and convincing evidence the parent “has been required by the court
to be registered on a sex offender registry under the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 16913(a)), as required in Section
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise designated. References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2
106(b)(2)(B)(xvi)(VI) of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (42
U.S.C. Sec. 5106a(2)(B)(xvi)(VI)” (the registered sex offender bypass provision).
Father’s youngest child (baby girl) was born in November 2025, and both the
mother and baby girl tested positive for amphetamine and marijuana. The mother
relinquished baby girl under the safe surrender law because the domestic violence in her
relationship with father had become more intense when she became pregnant with that
child. At the time of surrender, the mother said she was coming back for baby girl and
then stated she was unsure if she would reclaim baby girl because of her issues with
father. The mother did not return to the hospital until four days later. By then, baby girl
was in the Department’s custody, a section 300 petition had been filed on her behalf, and
the mother had missed the detention hearing.2
While investigating baby girl’s circumstances, the Department discovered the
mother was living with R.J. and J.J. (sometimes “the children”) in a transitional living
facility due to ongoing domestic violence issues with father. The mother denied knowing
where father was.
When interviewed by one of the Department’s social workers, six-year-old R.J.
reported his parents fight with their hands and that father gets mad and hits the mother.
R.J. also reported father sells “dope” in the form of white crystal packaged in small bags
2 The hearings on jurisdiction and disposition of baby girl’s juvenile dependency
petition resulted in the setting of a section 366.26 permanent plan selection hearing.
Father filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. We dismissed the case after he did
not file a petition or a motion for relief from default. Parental rights as to baby girl were
terminated on May 21, 2026, and the parents’ appeal from that order is pending in our
case No. E088557.
3
to make money because father was unemployed, and the mother drank alcohol and would
sometimes fall asleep so R.J. would have to wake her up. R.J. spoke to father on the
telephone every morning and night, and he had last seen father the day before when
father picked him up from school.
The Department took R.J. and J.J. into protective custody and filed section 300
juvenile dependency petitions on their behalf. The juvenile court ordered the children
placed in the temporary care of the Department and detained in foster care, and ordered
weekly two-hour supervised visits between the parents and children.
In the Department’s report prepared in anticipation of the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing (then set for December 10, 2025), the social worker recommended
removal of the children from their parents. It also recommended not offering family
reunification services to either parent because they came within the section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10)(A) and (b)(11)(A)—the services bypass provisions relating to failure
to reunify with a child’s sibling and termination of parental rights as to a sibling,
respectively.3 In addition, the Department recommended bypass as to father under the
3 Subdivision (b)(10)(A) of section 361.5 (§ 361.5(b)(10)(A)) provides in pertinent
part that services need not be provided to a parent if there is clear and convincing
evidence that the court ordered termination of reunification services because the parent
failed to reunify with siblings after they had been removed from that parent pursuant to
section 361 (which provides for limitations on parental control over a minor who has
been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300) and, according
to the findings of the court, the parent had not subsequently made a reasonable effort to
treat the problems that led to removal of the siblings (the failure to reunify bypass
provision).
As relevant here, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11)(A) (§ 361.5(b)(11)(A))
provides for bypass of services if there is clear and convincing evidence that the parental
4
registered sex offender bypass provision (§ 361.5(b)(16)) as well as under section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(12) (§ 361.5(b)(12)), the violent felony conviction bypass provision.4
In a follow-up report, the Department advised the court that the children were
moved to a new placement on January 12, 2026, because their former caretakers were
unable to accommodate the court-ordered visitation schedule.5
Father and the mother each testified on their own behalf at the January 21, 2026,
hearing on jurisdiction and disposition.
In his testimony, father denied missing a scheduled appointment for a drug test and
said he had never used methamphetamine and had not told the social worker he had used
that substance in the past. He stated he only uses prescribed medication, which includes
marijuana and inhalers, and he had stopped drinking alcohol after the children were
rights of a parent of a sibling have been permanently severed and, according to the
findings of the court, the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the
problems that led to removal of the sibling from the parent (the termination of rights
bypass provision).
4 Section 361.5(b)(12) allows the court to bypass services for a parent who has
been convicted of a violent felony as defined in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision
(c). Subdivision (c)(15) of Penal Code section 667.5 includes assault with the intent to
commit a specified felony in violation of Penal Code section 220. As mentioned ante,
father was convicted of assault with the intent to commit rape in violation of Penal Code
section 220. We note there is pending legislation to amend the violent felony conviction
bypass conviction. The amendment in its current form would limit that provision’s
application to violent felonies involving a child or a person with whom the parent or
guardian had a child in common at the time of the commission of the offense. (Assem.
Bill No. 1201 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) as amended by the Sen. on June 8, 2026.)
5 The report states that the change in placement occurred in 2025, but that is
clearly a typographical error as the children were not in the Department’s custody in
January of that year.
5
detained. Father and his counsel represented that father’s use of prescribed medications
explained why father’s January 5, 2026, drug test was positive for amphetamines, opiates,
and marijuana. Father said he stopped selling drugs 20 years earlier and claimed R.J. was
“[t]o a degree” making up the story that he would see father giving people tiny baggies
containing a white crystal substance and getting money in return, that what R.J. actually
witnessed was not father selling dope but rather father purchasing marijuana “wax.” The
mother testified R.J. was making up the story about father selling drugs.
Father testified he had not engaged in physical domestic violence with the mother
for six or seven years. In response to county counsel’s question whether six-year-old R.J.
was “misinterpreting” what he saw when he gave detailed descriptions of father using his
hands when physically fighting with the mother and of father hitting the mother, father
said he had not hit mother in anger but admitted he grabs her to prevent her from hitting
him, and suggested “a person seeing the altercation might think he was the aggressor.”
According to the mother, the last “physical incident” with father took place in 2021
(when R.J. would have been one or two years old) and she had no clue where R.J. could
have gotten the description of his parents engaging in a physical fight.
At the close of evidence, father submitted on the issue of jurisdiction and asked
the court not to bypass reunification services on the grounds he had not been given an
opportunity to reunify in the cases of his other children, he has a relationship with R.J.
and J.J., and he was committed to complying with the court’s orders and the case plan as
evidenced by the fact he had already started classes.
6
In the course of making its findings and orders, the juvenile court expressed its
agreement with the assessment of counsel for the Department and children’s counsel that
the parents’ statements suffered “credibility issues overall,” that it was hard to believe
that R.J. made up such a detailed description of his father selling drugs, or that R.J.’s
detailed recollection of physical violence between father and the mother was based upon
what he had witnessed years ago when he was one or two years old.
The court found R.J. and J.J. came within subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300,
adjudged them dependents of the court, and removed them from their parents. It found
the Department established the failure to reunify and termination of parental rights
grounds for bypass of services because of a lack of evidence father had engaged in
services between the time of the prior dependency and the children’s removal. The court
also found the Department had established the registered sex offender and violent felony
conviction grounds for bypass and that father had not met his burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that reunification would nevertheless be in the children’s
best interests “given all of the different issues with which he struggled in this case,
including domestic violence and substance abuse.”
Because of the recent change in the children’s placement, the court set the matter
for a permanent plan review rather than setting their cases for selection of a permanent
plan. Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, father argues reversal of the juvenile court’s bypass of family
reunification services for him on the grounds of failure to reunify with the children’s
7
siblings and termination of parental rights as to those siblings is called for because he
made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal and the termination
of parental rights in those dependency proceedings. He also argues the juvenile court
erred when it bypassed services under the violent felony conviction and registered sex
offender bypass provisions because, in his view, there is clear and convincing evidence
that providing services would be in the children’s best interests.
A. The General Application of the Bypass Provisions
Where, as here, the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a
parent comes within the failure to reunify, termination of rights, violent felony
conviction, or registered sex offender bypass provisions, then it is not authorized to order
reunification for that parent unless the parent establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that reunification is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2); In re
A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 281.)
The juvenile court has broad discretion in deciding whether provision of family
reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2) would be in a child’s best
interests. (In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1140-1141.)
B. The Application of the Registered Sex Offender Bypass Provision in This Case
One of the bypass provisions relied upon by the juvenile court to deny
reunification services for father was his status as a registered sex offender coming within
section 361.5(b)(16). Father concedes he comes within the subdivision but argues there
is insufficient evidence of a clear and convincing nature to support the juvenile court’s
finding that providing reunification services is not in the children’s best interest. Father
8
also makes a claim, which is not separately stated but included in his insufficiency of the
evidence discussion, that the juvenile court made a legal error calling for reversal of the
section 361.5(b)(16) bypass order because it did not conduct “the individualized factor-
by-factor analysis that William B. requires,” a reference to In re William B. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1220 (William B.).6 Father’s claims lack merit.
1. Father’s Insufficiency of the Evidence Claim
Father’s framing of the best interest analysis as a question of sufficiency of the
evidence is incorrect.
A registered sex offender coming within section 361.5(b)(16) is presumptively
ineligible for family reunification services in a juvenile dependency proceeding and the
burden is on the parent to show by clear and convincing evidence that reunification
would serve the best interests of the child. (§ 361.5(b)(16) & subd. (c)(2); In re S.B.
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 612, 622, 623.)
Because the burden is on the parent to rebut the no-services presumption and the
court concluded the burden was not met, the issue is not one of sufficiency of the
evidence but rather it is one of a failure of evidence. (In re Raul V. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
290, 293; see In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528 (I.W.), disapproved on other
grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) Our
standard of review when the issue involves the failure of proof at trial is whether as a
6 We remind counsel that rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each point in a brief to be
stated under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
9
matter of law the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant. (I.W., supra, at p.
1528.) To satisfy that standard, the evidence must be (i) uncontradicted and unimpeached
and (ii) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding. (Ibid.)
The evidence presented at the January 21, 2026, disposition hearing does not
compel a finding in father’s favor.
Father testified that he had not been given the opportunity to reunify with his two
eldest children because he was in custody and services were not available to him. He was
mistaken. The reason he did not receive services as to those children was because
services were bypassed under the registered sex offender bypass provision
(§ 361.5(b)(16)).
Father’s testimony that he had attended the parenting, domestic violence, and
anger management classes offered since the initiation of the dependency proceedings as
to J.J. and R.J. is unavailing. Father could have achieved little, if any, progress between
the January 13, 2026, referrals to those classes and the January 21, 2026 disposition
hearing.
And, though it appears father always lived with J.J. and R.J. until mother left with
them in October 2025, that fact does not compel a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that the children’s best interests are served by providing father with services,
especially when it is considered that the children were exposed to father’s drug dealing
and domestic violence in the home and that their elder siblings had also been removed
from home on account of the parents’ substance abuse and domestic violence.
10
Father argues it was error to rely on R.J.’s statements concerning father’s drug
dealing and continuing domestic violence in the home because those statements were
contradicted by father’s and mother’s testimony. That argument is essentially a request
for this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court, which is beyond our authority. (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1166
[when two or more inferences may reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing
court has no authority to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
juvenile court].)
Father also argues R.J.’s claims were hearsay and “[m]ultiple independent
circumstances undermine [the statements’] reliability.”7 Father has forfeited his right to
raise that claim because he did not object to admission of those statements when the
social worker’s report containing them was admitted into evidence. (§ 355; Evid. Code,
§ 353; In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 132-133.)
7 The independent circumstances father mentions include (i) the parents agree that
the last physical altercation they engaged in was in 2021, when R.J. was two years old so
he could not possibly recall it reliably; (ii) R.J.’s statement concerning father’s drug
dealing was not corroborated by independent evidence and was contradicted by the
testimony of both parents, and father had provided a “specific, testable innocent
explanation” for what R.J. reported (i.e., that what R.J. saw was only wax marijuana), an
explanation that was “never rebutted by any witness”; (iii) R.J. lacked expertise in
identifying a controlled substance, a fact father deems “critical[]”; and (iv) the
“sophistication of [R.J.’s] description presupposes adult knowledge of drug transactions
that a six-year-old does not possess” and, moreover, the details in R.J.’s statement are just
as consistent with seeing father making lawful marijuana purchases as they are with his
making an illegal drug transaction.
11
2. The William B. Factors
Father complains the court failed “to conduct the individualized, factor-by-factor
analysis” employed in William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pages 1228-1229 and the
court’s failure to do so “is a legal error and an abuse of discretion, regardless of what a
proper analysis would have found.” We disagree.
The juvenile court in William B. ordered reunification services for a mother who
came within a bypass provision (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13), chronic drug use) under which
services are not to be provided unless the parent establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that reunification would serve the child’s best interests. (William B., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) The court expressed doubts about the mother’s chances for
successful reunification but nevertheless found by clear and convincing evidence that it
was in the children’s best interest to provide services because they testified they loved
their mother and wanted to be with her. (Id., at p. 1226.)
On appeal, the reviewing court reversed, finding no substantial evidence of a clear
and convincing nature to support the best interests finding. (William B., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.) The juvenile court had improperly focused on the children’s
love for their mother rather than any realistic chance of their achieving permanence and
stability in her care. (Id., at p. 1223.) The reviewing court held the children’s bond with
their mother could not be the sole basis for a best interest finding, that the juvenile court
must have some reasonable basis to conclude that reunification is possible before services
are offered to a parent who need not be provided them. (Id., at pp. 1228-1229.) To that
end, before the juvenile court ordered services, it should have considered the factors
12
articulated in In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66-67 (Ethan N.).8 (William B.,
at pp. 1227-1229.) Consideration of those factors would have focused the juvenile
court’s attention on mother’s substance abuse problem that she had not been able to
overcome and the unstable environment the children had suffered with mother (having
been removed from her care four times)—circumstances that militate against a finding
that reunification would be successful. (William B., at pp. 1228-1229.)
Here, the court did undertake an adequate assessment of the Ethan N. factors,
albeit without referring to that case or to William B. As discussed ante, the only evidence
father introduced bearing on the best interests issue was his testimony and that of the
mother, which the court did not find credible. With respect to father’s argument that the
juvenile court should have taken into account the fact he had not committed a sex offense
in the 30 years since his conviction for violation of Penal Code section 220, we note
father did not raise that argument in the juvenile court and, in all events, section
361.5(b)(16) addresses the registration requirement, not the conviction of the offense
itself.
In view of our conclusion that the juvenile court properly bypassed reunification
services as to father under the registered sex offender bypass provision section
361.5(b)(16), we need not address his remaining claims of error with respect to the
8 Those standards or factors are the parent’s history, their current efforts and
fitness, the gravity of the problem leading to the dependency, the strength of the bonds
between the child and the parent as well as between the child and the caretaker, and the
child’s need for stability and continuity. (William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228,
citing Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66-67.)
13
court’s findings that the failure to reunify, termination of parental rights, and violent
felony conviction bypass provisions also apply to father.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
P. J.
We concur:
FIELDS
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J.
MENETREZ
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J.
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