Filed 9/28/26 In re J.J. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.J., a Person Coming B348009
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP03382A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
I.J.,
Defendant and Appellant;
B.R.,
Objector and Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Cristina G. Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded with directions; order terminating
jurisdiction vacated.
Joseph D. MacKenzie, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Respondent B.R.
__________________________________________
In this juvenile dependency appeal, I.J. (father) challenges
three juvenile court orders. Father challenges the scope of a
permanent restraining order, the denial of his motion to dismiss
the underlying Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
petition,1 and the summary denial of his section 388 petition,
which sought to dissolve the permanent restraining order
entirely. We conclude substantial evidence does not support the
inclusion of M.P. (father’s son’s half sibling) as a protected person
in the challenged restraining order. Although we find no error
with the juvenile court’s denial of father’s motion to dismiss the
section 300 petition, we conclude the court abused its discretion
in denying father’s section 388 petition without a hearing. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions. We
also vacate the order terminating jurisdiction.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
BACKGROUND
1. The Family
Father and B.R. (mother) dated for nine months in high
school. They have one child together, a son, J.J. (son). Mother
has one younger child from a different relationship, M.P. (half
sister), who initially was named in the proceedings below, but
ultimately was dismissed from the case. When the underlying
proceedings began, son was six years old. Son and half sister
lived with mother and her mother (maternal grandmother).
Father lived with his girlfriend of five years. A March 2023
family law order was in place, which specified father had
parenting time with son two days a week and alternating
weekends.
Son is autistic and has a speech delay. He has an
Individualized Education Program (IEP) and qualifies for special
education and language and speech therapy. He spoke his first
word when he was three years old. Mother also has a diagnosis
of Autism Spectrum Disorder and speech delay.
2. Events Preceding Petition
In November 2022 and February 2023, when son was four
years old, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) received two related referrals
alleging father had sexually abused son and son was acting out
and exhibiting sexualized behaviors. The Department concluded
the initial November referral was “unfounded” and the February
referral was “Evaluated Out” as a secondary referral.
In September 2024, the Department received a new referral
again alleging father had sexually abused son and son was
exhibiting inappropriate behavior at home and at school. The
following day, another similar referral was received. According to
3
the referrals, son recently had disclosed he was scared of father
and did not want to visit him. Son stated that, during visits with
father, father showered with him, touched son’s penis, “stuck a
finger up [son’s] bottom,” “ ‘jiggles’ ” son’s bottom and says
“ ‘booty, booty,’ ” and tells son to keep it a secret. It was also
reported that son often said the word “ ‘booty’ ” and, at school,
tried to kiss another boy, told others to spank him, and touched
his penis inappropriately.
Law enforcement was called. Son told the responding
officer father had touched son’s penis and anus on two occasions
and the “ ‘Bad-Touch’ ” was to be kept secret. The officer stated
son “displayed the ability to reason through both” the concepts of
right and wrong and truths and lies. The officer reported son
“was visibly distraught, had tears forming in his eyes and covered
himself with a blanket during” the interview, leading the officer
“to believe [son] was genuine with his responses and possibly
traumatized.” A detective who worked on the earlier referrals as
well as on the September 2024 referrals noted while mother could
articulate her thoughts, she needed time and usually asked for
help. The detective stated maternal grandmother “really hated”
father, would speak for mother even when asked not to, was “the
driving force behind the [2022] alleged sexual abuse,” and made
it difficult to speak with mother alone. Similarly, the social
worker who had responded to the earlier referrals remembered
mother had a “comprehension delay” and, as a result, maternal
grandmother spoke for her. He said father had been cooperative.
A Department social worker, Ms. Chen, responded to the
September 2024 referrals. She spoke with father and his
girlfriend. Father denied the allegations of sexual abuse. Son’s
teacher had told father that son danced inappropriately (“shaking
4
his butt in class”) and one time pulled down his pants before he
made it to the rest room. Both father and his girlfriend stated
son would not tell them what he did at mother and maternal
grandmother’s home. Son said “it’s a secret and that he’s not
allowed to say anything about mother and [maternal
grandmother].” Father believed mother and maternal
grandmother were coaching son.
Social worker Chen also spoke with mother and maternal
grandmother together. Social worker Chen reported “mother
would look to [maternal grandmother] to help her answer most of
the questions” and maternal grandmother often spoke for mother.
They confirmed the allegations contained in the referrals.
Mother and maternal grandmother also each alleged father had
sexually assaulted mother, which resulted in her pregnancy with
son. Additionally, mother stated father had pushed her and
grabbed her arms when she was pregnant. No criminal charges
were brought against father, however, because law enforcement
“didn’t find anything.”
Social worker Chen spoke with son alone. Son was unable
to answer questions as to the difference between the truth and a
lie. It was unclear whether son understood the difference. Son
refused to answer some questions, including whether father
touched son’s penis, “put fingers in [son’s] butt,” and what “booty”
meant. Son also met with another social worker, Ms. Velasquez.
According to social worker Velasquez, son “appeared to
understand” the difference between a truth and a lie. Each time
she reminded son “about the truth and lie, he would think and
not say anything.” Son refused to answer most questions, saying
simply he did not like to go to father’s home and it was scary
there.
5
In September 2024, son’s teacher reported son had been
dancing inappropriately, which included “body rolls, like slow
motion moving of his torso,” “shak[ing] his butt,” and one time
almost pulling down his pants. The teacher was not sure if he
needed to go to the rest room. Once, son asked another student
to spank him and, at random times, son would say the word
“booty” in class. Son had started to do these things a few weeks
earlier and had not done them the year before. He seemed to do
these things when he was excited about something. His teacher
also reported she was able to communicate and have
conversations with son. She said son had been “more emotional”
recently, but she did not have concerns of abuse or neglect. A few
weeks later, son’s teacher reported son’s behaviors had been
“escalating.” He seemed more emotionally overwhelmed and had
begun grabbing his genital area over his clothes. His teacher
noted it “was not uncommon for students on the spectrum to do
so as they are exploring that private area” and she had seen past
students do the same. She stated son was “really good” at
identifying and articulating his emotions and “what he needs.”
Son underwent both a forensic medical exam and a forensic
interview. The forensic medical exam report stated son gave “a
clear disclosure of sexual abuse by . . . father.” Son stated “father
touches his penis and ‘sticks his finger’ inside [son’s] anus.” Son
also reported “ ‘white stuff, it looks like milk, come out of
[father’s]’ (penis)” and that father watched “ ‘bad stuff’ ” at night,
“ ‘Boys and girls kissing, they’re all naked.’ ” The medical
examiner took an “anal swab” and asked son if “the feeling of the
swab is the same as when [father] puts his finger in his butt.”
Son replied, “ ‘No, bigger.’ ” Son said father told him to keep his
actions a secret. Son’s anogenital exam was “within normal
6
limits,” which does not exclude sexual abuse. The remainder of
the physical exam was normal.
During the forensic interview, son refused to answer most
questions. He sat and moved around in a chair, responding to
questions with silence or by pointing to a body part, making
gestures or noises, or stating he did not know the answer. When
asked if someone put fingers somewhere in his body, son pointed
to his butt and said “ ‘yah.’ ” He would not say who. When asked
if he felt safe at father’s house, son shook his head no. When
asked the same about mother’s house, he said “ ‘yah,’ ” but he
refused to discuss what “safe” meant. He pointed to his penis
when asked if he had “seen milk come out of someone’s body.”
The interviewer reported son “demonstrated a limited
understanding of the interview guidelines” but appeared to
understand what truths and lies were. The interview was
“difficult” because son was “anxious” and “really reluctant.” The
interview ended prematurely because son refused to speak. The
interviewer believed “there may be something that had happened
to him because [son] did have a physical reaction to when she
brought up the father and his father’s girlfriend’s names.” She
noted, “Although [son] said only a few words throughout his
interview, concerns remain due to [son] nodding and saying yes,
pointing to his butt and penis, previously reporting that he saw
‘milk’ coming out of his father’s penis, denying that he felt safe at
his dad’s house, and appearing anxious and restless when asked
about the allegations.”
Social worker Chen also spoke with maternal grandfather.
He reported son “would wiggle his bottom and tries to pull down
his pants in the playground area” and said father does those
things. Maternal grandfather said son “has always been this
7
way” “ever since he was a baby” but now “they can understand
him better.” He believed “the system had failed” mother and son.
Maternal grandfather also reported sexual abuse in the maternal
family, involving a maternal great uncle, maternal uncle, and
mother. He said maternal grandmother’s brother (maternal
great uncle) raped a maternal uncle, who later sexually abused
mother. In a later interview, mother also mentioned this abuse.
In October 2024, a meeting was held at Department offices
with Department staff and members from both maternal and
paternal families. During the meeting, both families accused the
other of sexual abuse and not caring for son. The maternal
family did not address the generational sexual abuse and how it
might affect son. Maternal family members, especially maternal
grandmother, had to be asked several times not to speak while
others were speaking. There was “palpable tension in the room.”
Department staff worried about how the families’ treatment and
obvious dislike of each other affected son.
3. Petition
In October 2024, the Department filed a three-count section
300 petition, on behalf of son and half sister (petition). The three
counts were identical and brought under subdivisions (b), (d), and
(j) of section 300. They alleged father had sexually abused son on
multiple occasions, masturbated in front of son, exposed son to
pornography, and told son to keep the sexual abuse a secret. The
petition also alleged mother failed to protect son and both son
and half sister were at risk as a result of mother’s and father’s
conduct.
At the initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court
denied father visitation with son, and granted mother’s request
for a temporary restraining order protecting her, son, and half
8
sister from father. Son was detained from father and released to
mother, with whom he remained for the duration of the
underlying proceedings.
4. Adjudication and Disposition
In November 2024, another Department social worker, Ms.
Gravett, spoke with son, who was “open and emotional.” Son
stated everything he previously had said about father was true.
He referred to father as “the monster” and said father’s girlfriend
knew about the “bad touching.” Son was happy he was not seeing
father anymore. Later, son also confirmed the sexual abuse to
the investigating detective. When speaking with the detective,
son used an apple to show how father touched his bottom. Son
put his finger into the indentation on the top of the apple where
the stem would be and said father touched like that, “ ‘In it.’ ”
Mother told social worker Gravett that son was in therapy
and was doing better but cried at night and was afraid of father.
Mother explained that, when she first reported sexual abuse in
2022, son was younger and did not talk as much. In January
2025, maternal grandmother similarly told social worker Gravett
that son had “ ‘been opening up for the last few months’ ” and
“ ‘[a] lot of memories are coming up.’ ” Maternal grandmother
reported son cried at night and called father “ ‘Monster.’ ”
Social worker Gravett also spoke with father and his
girlfriend. Both continued to deny the allegations and father
reiterated his belief that maternal grandmother was coaching
son. Father “was extremely emotional and crying” and stated he
wanted more time with son and to co-parent. Father also spoke
with the investigating detective to whom he repeated his belief
that mother and her family “hate him” and are lying in order to
obtain full custody of son and receive more money from the state
9
due to son’s disability. Father’s girlfriend said son was
independent and did not appear scared when he visited. Son told
her he was “ ‘not allowed to tell me what happens at his mom[’s]
house.’ ”
Social worker Gravett also spoke with paternal
grandmother, who said the allegations were false and the
maternal family told son what to say. She called maternal
grandmother “evil.” She explained maternal grandmother and
mother never wanted father in son’s life and mother “ ‘goes along
with what [maternal grandmother] says.’ ” Paternal
grandmother believed mother’s family was abusing the system.
She was proud of father for being persistent and working to be in
son’s life.
The Department concluded it was “apparent” father had
sexually abused son. The Department stated son had been
“consistent in his statements despite having a speech delay due
to his Autism.” He was visibly upset during several interviews
and was scared of father. The Department stated son “has shown
emotions while disclosing [the sexual abuse] that do not appear to
be coached or fake.”
A combined adjudication and disposition hearing was held
in January 2025. Social worker Chen testified. She stated she
had interviewed son one time and did not find him reliable. Son
was unable to answer her questions regarding the difference
between the truth and a lie. She also was unsure if son was
truthful during his forensic interview and had concerns that
maternal grandmother might have coached son. Nonetheless,
she explained the Department recommended sustaining the
petition based on the forensic exam, forensic interview, and police
report. She testified the “biggest difference” between the earlier
10
unfounded referral and the instant referral was son’s age,
development, and improved speech.
The juvenile court amended the petition by striking the
subdivision (j) count related to sibling abuse, the allegations
regarding mother’s failure to protect, and all references to half
sister. Noting this was “a difficult case,” the court sustained the
petition as amended. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court found son described father’s “actions in a
very consistent way,” especially given that son was “a six-year old
on an IEP.” The court believed son acted out at school in the
ways that he did “because that is what he is exposed to.” The
court concluded son was not coached. Had there been coaching,
the court believed son would have used more sophisticated words
and would have alleged father committed more serious
transgressions.
The court declared son a dependent of the court and
removed him from father’s custody and care. Son remained
placed with mother under Department supervision. The court
issued a permanent restraining order protecting mother, son, and
half sister from father (January restraining order). The January
restraining order did not allow for court-ordered visitation
between father and son. The court ordered father to complete sex
abuse counseling for perpetrators and to attend individual
counseling. Although the court granted father monitored visits
with son in a therapeutic setting, the court also ordered father to
comply with active restraining orders, which did not allow for
visits.
5. First Appeal
Father appealed the court’s January 2025 orders. (In re
J.J., B344838 (first appeal).) In his notice of appeal, father
11
stated he was appealing the January “Jurisdictional,
Dispositional, and Restraining Order findings and orders.” In his
opening brief, however, he challenged only the propriety of the
January restraining order. Mother filed a motion to dismiss
father’s first appeal because in August 2025, while the first
appeal was pending, the juvenile court issued a new, superseding
restraining order, which father also appealed and which is the
subject of the instant appeal as discussed below. On January 7,
2026, we granted mother’s motion to dismiss father’s first appeal
as moot. (In re J.J., B344838.)
6. Department’s July 2025 Report
On July 15, 2025, in advance of the scheduled review
hearing, the Department submitted its report for the court (July
2025 report). Son was participating in individual and family
counseling as well as Regional Center services. The July 2025
report noted “a significant bond between mother and [son].”
During the review period, yet another Department social
worker, Ms. Perez, met with son several times. She reported son
interacted well with her, was “social,” “makes friends easily,” and
“has a very active imagination.” During a June 2025 session with
son, social worker Perez became concerned son had been coached
to say certain things. Without having been asked about father,
son said he wanted to talk about “the ‘Bad touch’ ” and he wanted
mother to be there. Before then, son had never discussed father
with social worker Perez. Social worker Perez reported son’s
statements that day “appeare[ed] somewhat rehearsed” and he
“appear[ed] ‘matter of fact’ as he discussed the alleged sexual
abuse with no show of emotion. In addition, while [son] discussed
the alleged sexual abuse of his father, he looked at his mother
and then stated, ‘My mom is the best mom in the whole world
12
and she takes good care of me and she loves me.’ ” Social worker
Perez reported further, “[Son] expressing sexual abuse from his
father at random times without being asked and stating that he
did not remember because he was a baby sounded rehearsed and
[son] appeared to be concentrating on what he was supposed to
say to this CSW.” The Department reported “concerns about
emotional competence of [son] due to potential coaching in
regards to the sexual abuse allegations.”
Father continued to believe maternal grandmother put
false allegations in son’s head. Father said maternal
grandmother wanted father out of son’s life. Father said he loved
son, would not hurt him, and wanted to be involved in his life as
his father. Father stated if the Department or court could “see
the interactions between him and his son it would show that his
son is not afraid of him.” However, the January restraining order
prohibited contact between father and son. Thus, father had no
visits with son and social worker Perez had not observed them
together. Son did not want to visit father. Son “said he would
feel ‘scared and anxiety’ ” about visiting with father. Father was
participating in individual counseling. He was having difficulty
enrolling in sex abuse counseling for perpetrators. He had
completed a “Parents in Partnership Parent Orientation” and
was open to attending parenting classes for fathers.
The Department recommended the juvenile court terminate
its jurisdiction with a final custody order granting the parents
joint legal custody, sole physical custody to mother, and
monitored visitation for father.
13
7. Father’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition and Request
to Change Court Order
On July 29, 2025, father filed a section 390 motion to set
aside the jurisdictional findings and to dismiss the petition in the
interests of justice (390 motion). Father argued the court erred in
taking jurisdiction based on son’s statements because son did not
know the difference between the truth and a lie, his statements
were not reliable, he had been coached, and his developmental
delays hindered his comprehension. Father claimed it was in the
best interests of son to have father in his life and to be raised in a
home without coaching. Finally, father argued he did not require
treatment because he had not sexually abused son. Although in
support of his motion father cited social worker Perez’s recent
coaching concerns, father relied predominantly on statements
and exhibits the court already had or could have considered.
The next day, July 30, 2025, father filed a section 388
petition to change a court order (388 petition). Specifically,
father asked the court to dissolve the January restraining order.
Father based his request both on his position that the
Department’s July 2025 report for the court contained “[n]ew
evidence of coaching” as well as on his 390 motion. Father
argued the court should grant his 388 petition because it was in
son’s best interest “to have his Father involved in his life and for
[son] to be raised in a home without coaching. Father has a
thorough understanding of the needs of the child and desires to
be engaged, active, and support his son’s needs.”
8. July 30, 2025 Review Hearing
On July 30, 2025, the same day father filed his 388
petition, the juvenile court held a review hearing. After hearing
argument, the court denied father’s 390 motion and summarily
14
denied father’s 388 petition without a hearing. The court stated
neither was “appropriate timely or relevant at this time” and
believed father’s recourse was “best served by an appeal.” The
court found father was attempting to relitigate jurisdiction,
stating, “Any additional information or additional pieces of
evidence . . . that the father is using as part of his evidence in
this motion he certainly has the right to raise that on his appeal
and request that the appellate court augment the record or
anything else like that. [¶] But this is not the forum.” Similarly,
the court told father, “you have the ability to go to a different
court and ask for any modifications. But it won’t be through this
court.”
The juvenile court concluded dependency jurisdiction was
no longer needed and terminated its jurisdiction, ordering joint
legal custody of son to mother and father and sole physical
custody to mother. Father was granted monitored visitation in a
therapeutic setting only. The court agreed to amend the January
restraining order to allow for the ordered visitation. The court
stayed termination of jurisdiction pending receipt of the final
custody order.
The final custody order was filed and jurisdiction
terminated on August 1, 2025. Attached to the final custody
order was the amended restraining order, which the court had
entered that same day. The new restraining order continued to
protect mother, son, and half sister from father but allowed for
court-ordered visitation between father and son (August
restraining order).
9. Instant Appeal
Father appealed the juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 orders
and August 1, 2025 final custody order.
15
DISCUSSION
1. August Restraining Order
Father argues substantial evidence does not support the
inclusion of mother and half sister as protected people in the
August restraining order. Although mother agrees substantial
evidence does not support the inclusion of half sister, mother
argues substantial evidence supports the inclusion of her as a
protected person in the August restraining order. The
Department took no position on this issue.
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 213.5 permits a juvenile court to issue a restraining
order enjoining a person from, among other things, molesting,
attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, harassing,
or disturbing the peace of a child, a child’s parent, or other
specified people. (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) “ ‘Issuance of a restraining
order under section 213.5 does not require “evidence that the
restrained person has previously molested, attacked, struck,
sexually assaulted, stalked, or battered the child.” [Citation.]
Nor does it require evidence of a reasonable apprehension of
future abuse.’ ” (In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466.)
Courts have held section 213.5 is analogous “to Family Code
section 6340, which permits the issuance of a protective order
under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act in the first instance,
if ‘failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the
petitioner.’ ” (In re B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 194; see also
In re N.L., supra, at p. 1466.)
Mother and father agree the substantial evidence standard
of review applies to our review of the August restraining order.
(See In re N.L., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465–1466.)
“Under that standard ‘we view the evidence in a light most
16
favorable to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and
reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s
determination. If there is substantial evidence supporting the
order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not be
disturbed.’ ” (Id. at p. 1466.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not
synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] A decision
supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on
appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
b. Substantial evidence does not support the
inclusion of half sister as a protected person in
the August restraining order. However,
substantial evidence supports the inclusion of
mother.
As to half sister, we agree with both father and mother.
There is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, that father
had contact, or spent time, with half sister or ever acted violently
toward her. Moreover, the juvenile court dismissed half sister
from the petition, finding she was “separately situated” and there
was “absolutely no nexus as to [her].” Thus, the juvenile court
erred when it included half sister as a protected person in the
August restraining order.
As to mother, however, we conclude substantial evidence
supports her inclusion in the August restraining order. The
record contains evidence that father pushed, grabbed, and
sexually assaulted mother in the past. Mother and maternal
grandmother both reported father sexually assaulted mother,
which resulted in her pregnancy with son. Moreover, in her
initial application for the restraining order, mother stated she
remained fearful of father. On this record, we conclude
17
substantial evidence supports the inclusion of mother as a
protected person in the August restraining order.
2. Section 388 Petition and Section 390 Motion
Father argues the juvenile court erred when it denied his
390 motion and 388 petition without a hearing. He claims the
court failed to support its denials with legal authority and
erroneously believed both the motion and petition were untimely.
The Department and mother argue the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion.
a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court
orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change
of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous
order is in the child’s best interests.” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1, 6–7.) Filing a section 388 petition does not
automatically entitle the movant to a hearing on the petition.
“To obtain a hearing on a section 388 petition, the [movant] must
make a prima facie showing as to both elements.” (Id. at p. 7.)
“ ‘[T]he prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts
alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing,
would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’ ” (Ibid.) “The
petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a
hearing.” (Ibid.) “If the liberally construed allegations of the
petition do not show changed circumstances such that the child’s
best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order,
the dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony
W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)
“Section 390 authorizes a juvenile court to set aside
findings and dismiss a dependency petition if it finds (1) the
interests of justice and the welfare of the child require dismissal,
18
and (2) the parent is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.”
(In re Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.) The juvenile
court may grant a section 390 motion “at any time before the
minor reaches the age of 21 years.” (§ 390.) A section 390 motion
may be brought by way of a section 388 petition. (In re Samuel
A., supra, at p. 8.)
We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for
abuse of discretion. (In re Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at
p. 7.) Similarly, we review the denial of a section 390 motion for
abuse of discretion. (In re K.S. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 327, 399–
340.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318–319.)
b. Section 388 petition
Through his 388 petition, father sought to have the
January restraining order dissolved.2 To support his request,
father relied on the “[n]ew evidence of coaching” the Department
had presented in its July 2025 report as well as his pending 390
motion. Because as explained below we find no error in the
juvenile court’s denial of the 390 motion, that motion does not
2 At the time father filed his section 388 petition, the
August restraining order had not yet been entered. Thus,
father’s 388 petition sought to dissolve the then-existing January
restraining order. As mentioned earlier, the January restraining
order was superseded by the August restraining order. Father’s
388 petition applies equally to the August restraining order.
19
support father’s request. However, the new evidence of coaching
does.
Social worker Perez’s June 2025 concerns of coaching
constituted new evidence for purposes of father’s 388 petition. In
June 2025, social worker Perez became concerned that son had
been coached to discuss sexual abuse by father. Her concerns
were reported in the Department’s July 2025 report. The
juvenile court and counsel believed social worker Perez’s concerns
did not constitute new evidence because coaching had been an
issue since the start of the proceedings. This misses the mark.
The issue of coaching and evidence of coaching are two different
things. By the July 2025 review hearing, the issue of coaching
certainly had been raised repeatedly. At the January 2025
adjudication, the juvenile court considered the possibility that
son had been coached and, based on the evidence before it at the
time, concluded he had not been. Of course, however, at the
January 2025 adjudication, the court did not have before it the
concerns of coaching voiced by the new social worker, Ms. Perez,
and reported by the Department in July 2025. Those concerns
were not and could not have been presented or considered at the
jurisdiction hearing. Thus, while we agree the issue of coaching
was not new, the coaching concerns raised post-adjudication
constituted new evidence for purposes of father’s 388 petition.
Without explanation, the juvenile court stated father’s 388
petition was untimely. On appeal, counsel has cited no legal
authority supporting such a conclusion. In fact, although father
filed the 388 petition on the same day as the review hearing, the
Department had reported the evidence on which the petition was
based only two weeks earlier. Moreover, the case was not yet 12
months old at the time the 388 petition was filed. We find no
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support for the conclusion that father’s 388 petition was
untimely.
The court also incorrectly stated it was not the proper
forum for father’s 388 petition. The court concluded neither the
388 petition nor the 390 motion was “appropriate timely or
relevant at this time” and stated, “Any additional information or
any additional pieces of evidence that . . . father is using as part
of his evidence in this motion he certainly has the right to raise
that on his appeal and request that that appellate court augment
the record or anything else like that.” To the contrary, the
juvenile court is the proper forum to hold a hearing to consider
new evidence as presented by a section 388 petition. The juvenile
court should consider the new evidence first.
On appeal, mother claims social worker Perez’s
“conclusions” about son’s credibility and coaching would not be
admissible. Citing two criminal cases, mother argues “there is no
indication that CSW Perez spent enough time with [son] to
provide meaningful information about his character for honesty.”
First, social worker Perez had “met with [son] for several
months” and had never heard him speak of father until June
2025, when she noted a difference in how son interacted with her.
Second, social worker Perez did not make any conclusions as to
son’s credibility or coaching. Rather, she reported what she
observed and stated her concerns. Finally, if at a hearing on
father’s 388 petition social worker Perez testified as to her
observations and concerns as reported in the July 2025 report,
the juvenile court would consider and weigh her testimony.
We conclude father made a prima facie showing entitling
him to a hearing on his section 388 petition. If the new concerns
of coaching are supported by evidence given credit at the
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hearing—i.e., it is shown that son was coached to say in June
2025 that he was scared of and did not want to visit father and
father had sexually abused him—father’s request to modify the
restraining order should sustain a favorable decision. (In re
Samuel A., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.) In other words, if it is
demonstrated that coaching occurred, the juvenile court not only
can dissolve or otherwise appropriately modify the existing
restraining order but also can make further orders in son’s best
interest.
Of course, it is possible the evidence presented at a hearing
on father’s 388 petition will prove unconvincing such that no
change will be required. Although on appeal counsel proffers a
guess as to why, in June 2025, son spoke in the way he did, it is
improper to speculate as to whether or not the new evidence of
coaching is to be credited.3 That is what a hearing on the new
evidence is for. Considering the persistent concerns of coaching
throughout these proceedings, the egregiousness of the
allegations against father, the animosity between the families,
and the special needs and speech delays of both son and mother,
it is particularly important that the juvenile court consider and
fully address new concerns of coaching.
For all of the above reasons, we conclude the juvenile court
abused its discretion in denying father’s 388 petition without a
hearing.
3 Counsel for the Department asserts the juvenile court
could determine that, in June 2025, son was open and matter-of-
fact about father’s abuse because son had made progress in
therapy and had not seen father in months. This may or may not
be true, but the court (not counsel) must make any such
determination after holding a hearing on the new evidence.
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c. Section 390 motion
Although a section 390 motion may be brought by way of a
section 388 petition, that is not what father did here. He filed his
390 motion the day before he filed his 388 petition. He cited his
390 motion as a reason to grant the 388 petition. We agree with
the juvenile court that father’s 390 motion, through which he
sought dismissal of the petition, in essence sought to relitigate
issues and facts the juvenile court already had considered or
could have considered at adjudication. The only part of father’s
390 motion that could not have been considered earlier was social
worker Perez’s June 2025 concerns of coaching. Although as
noted above, that new evidence is significant with respect to
father’s 388 petition, it is less significant with respect to his 390
motion. Even assuming social worker Perez’s June 2025 coaching
concerns are substantiated (i.e., son was coached in June 2025),
that alone is insufficient to show that son also was coached prior
to the January 2025 adjudication. Thus, we conclude the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s 390 motion.
Nonetheless, depending on the outcome of the hearing on father’s
388 petition, it may be that father seeks to file a new section 390
motion.
We vacate the juvenile court’s order terminating
jurisdiction and remand the matter to the court so that it may
modify the existing restraining order and hold a hearing on
father’s 388 petition in accordance with this opinion.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 order denying appellant’s
section 390 motion is affirmed. The juvenile court’s July 30, 2025
order denying appellant’s section 388 petition is reversed. On
remand, the juvenile court is ordered to hold a hearing on
appellant’s section 388 petition in accordance with the applicable
statute. Additionally, the juvenile court is ordered to modify the
August 1, 2025 restraining order by removing half sister M.P. as
a protected person. The court’s August 1, 2025 order terminating
jurisdiction is vacated.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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