Filed 9/22/26 In re J.H. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re J.H., a Person Coming Under the H053273
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 21JV45389B)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
The juvenile court adjudged J.H. a ward of the court after finding he committed
attempted carjacking, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor minor in
possession of a handgun. The juvenile court placed J.H. on probation and released him to
parental custody, stating the maximum confinement term was seven years.
J.H. argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that
he possessed a handgun. We conclude that substantial evidence supports this finding.
We agree with the Attorney General that the juvenile court erred in setting a maximum
confinement term. We will order the maximum confinement term stricken but otherwise
will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A wardship petition listed three counts against J.H.: attempted carjacking (Pen.
Code, §§ 664, 215, subd. (a));1 assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) with an
allegation that J.H. personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); and
misdemeanor minor in possession of a handgun (§ 29610, subd. (a)).
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, H.O.2 testified that he drove to an
apartment complex at night to share a “nicotine device” with Jose M.3 H.O.’s younger
brother was in the passenger seat of the vehicle as H.O. parked near the apartment
complex. Jose M. walked up to the driver’s side of H.O.’s vehicle and talked with H.O.
through the partially opened window as the two took turns using the nicotine device.
At that point, two more people approached the car, one on the driver’s side and
one on the passenger’s side. The person who went to the driver’s side—identified as
J.H.—pushed Jose M. to the ground in what the prosecution alleged was a coordinated
effort between the two people and Jose M. to steal H.O.’s car. The two people tried to
get H.O. and his brother out of the vehicle.
H.O. testified that while he was sitting in the vehicle, the person standing on the
driver’s side pointed a “weapon” at him. The prosecutor asked H.O. what type of
weapon it was, and he replied: “I don’t exactly know what type of weapon it was, but I
know it was a handgun.” H.O. testified he knew it was a handgun “[b]y the way they
were holding it,” with the person pointing the weapon at him using one arm and the other
arm holding the opposite wrist. H.O. testified that he did not have a “clear view” of the
weapon because both the weapon and a light were pointed at him. H.O. testified that he
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
We use the victim’s initials to protect his privacy. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3
As the Attorney General notes, the record does not clearly reveal whether the
person H.O. agreed to meet was a minor at the time of the alleged offenses. We therefore
use this person’s first name and last initial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(10), (11).)
2
saw “[j]ust the barrel” of the weapon, which was “[r]ight in my face.” H.O. testified that
he had never seen a handgun in person before, and he could not describe the weapon in
terms of its “color or material.” H.O. also saw the person on the other side of the car
pointing a “larger gun” at H.O.’s brother.
H.O. testified that the person standing on the driver’s side struck him in the right
eye with the weapon. H.O. testified that the weapon felt “cold” when the person struck
him with it, and the hit was “[p]retty forceful,” causing him to bleed. H.O. was then able
to put the vehicle in reverse and drive off. He sustained an injury to his right eye which
caused pain and headaches for about two weeks and limited his ability to see.
Law enforcement officials obtained video of the area, which showed the two
people’s actions but were not of sufficient quality to reveal the nature of the weapon the
person on the driver’s side wielded. An officer recognized J.H. on the video as the
person on the driver’s side of the vehicle, based on the officer’s past interactions with
J.H.
About two blocks from the scene, law enforcement recovered a shotgun wrapped
in a jacket matching that worn by the person standing on the passenger’s side of the
vehicle. An officer described the shotgun as apparently “in good working order,” and
“well-kept,” with no rounds in the weapon. J.H.’s fingerprints were not on the shotgun.
A search of J.H.’s residence found a ski mask and clothing matching that of the person
who stood on the driver’s side of the vehicle. The investigation did not locate the
weapon used by the person standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle.
The defense’s lone witness was J.H.’s mother, who testified that J.H. remained at
the family’s residence the night of the alleged offenses. In closing argument, the
prosecutor asserted that “the main issue in the case is obviously identity,” summarizing
evidence showing J.H. was the person standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle. The
prosecution also addressed evidence that this situation involved a “setup” between Jose
M. and the two people to steal H.O.’s car. The defense responded: “I would agree with
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the People that this is a case of whether or not it can be proven and whether identity has
been established.” The defense did not contend that the item the person on the driver’s
side used was not a handgun.
The juvenile court found J.H. committed all three offenses listed in the petition,
and it found the great bodily injury allegation true. The juvenile court released J.H. to
parental custody, noting “for the record the maximum time is seven years . . . .”
This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
J.H. argues that “[n]o sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
that [he] possessed a firearm, as opposed to a replica firearm.” We do not agree.
“Our review of [a minor’s] substantial evidence claim is governed by the same
standard applicable to adult criminal cases. [Citation.] ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[O]ur role
on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, we must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1020, 1026.) “ ‘ “A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a
witness’s credibility.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 970.)
Section 29610, subdivision (a) prohibits a minor from possessing a “handgun.”
This statute likewise prohibits a minor from possessing “any firearm.” (Id., subd. (c).)
The Penal Code elsewhere defines a “handgun” as “any pistol, revolver, or firearm
capable of being concealed upon the person” (§ 16640, subd. (a)), and it defines a
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“firearm” as “a device, designed to be used as a weapon, from which is expelled through
a barrel, a projectile by the force of an explosion or other form of combustion” (§ 16520,
subd. (a)). “[T]oy guns obviously do not qualify as a ‘firearm,’ nor do pellet guns or BB
guns because, instead of explosion or other combustion, they use the force of air pressure,
gas pressure, or spring action to expel a projectile.” (People v. Monjaras (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435 (Monjaras).)
J.H. argues that sufficient evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding
that he possessed a handgun because the item could have been a replica or imitation
handgun as opposed to a real one. He points to portions of H.O.’s testimony in which
H.O. stated he was not certain of the nature of the object pointed at him, the inability to
see on video the nature of the object J.H. held, and the fact that the item was not
recovered.
However, viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings,
substantial evidence supports the finding that J.H. possessed a real handgun as opposed to
a replica or imitation. H.O. may have testified that he did not know the color or material
of the item pointed at him, but he unequivocally stated, “I know it was a handgun.” Even
though H.O. testified that he was distracted by the events occurring and a light shining on
him, he also stated the handgun was pointed directly at him, he saw the barrel, and the
weapon was “[p]retty close” to him. Any lack of certainty in H.O.’s testimony does not
demonstrate a lack of sufficient evidence. “[W]hen faced with what appears to be a gun,
displayed with an explicit or implicit threat to use it, few victims have the composure and
opportunity to closely examine the object; and in any event, victims often lack expertise
to tell whether it is a real firearm or an imitation.” (Monjaras, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1436.) In such a situation, “the victim’s inability to say conclusively that the gun was
real and not a toy does not create a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, that the gun was
a firearm.” (Id. at p. 1437.) The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that H.O.’s
testimony supported the finding that J.H. possessed a handgun.
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Circumstantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding. “The fact that
an object used by a robber was a ‘firearm’ can be established by direct or circumstantial
evidence.” (Monjaras, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435.) J.H. held the item in a
manner consistent with how a person would hold a handgun. “When the evidence shows
that a criminal perpetrator threateningly displays what looks like a real firearm, a
conviction or sentence enhancement depending on firearm use may not be reversed
simply because the victim was not an expert on guns or failed to identify the exact make
and model of the firearm employed.” (People v. Law (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.)
J.H. also used the weapon in attempting to carjack H.O. “[C]riminals ‘do not usually arm
themselves with unloaded guns when they go out to commit robberies’ [citation].”
(Monjaras, supra, at p. 1437.) In addition, J.H. struck H.O. with the item, and H.O.
testified that the strike felt “cold” and “[p]retty forceful.” The juvenile court could
reasonably conclude that these sensations would be unlikely to result if the handgun were
a toy or a replica. The prosecution introduced photographs of H.O.’s injuries, which
showed significant bruising and a cut above H.O.’s eye, further supporting the juvenile
court’s finding. “Simply stated, when as here a defendant commits a robbery by
displaying an object that looks like a gun, the object’s appearance and the defendant’s
conduct and words in using it may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support
a finding that it was a firearm . . . .” (Ibid.)
J.H.’s argument concerning the inconclusive nature of video evidence does not
affect the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding. The videos
showed the attempted carjacking, but most of the videos were taken too far away to
reveal the nature of the weapon. One video excerpt that provided a closer view of the
vehicle was, as a witness testified, “grainy.” The videos simply do not indicate the nature
of the object one way or the other.
Law enforcement did not recover the weapon J.H. used, but this does not affect the
sufficiency of the evidence that J.H. possessed a handgun. “[S]ince the use of what
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appears to be a gun is such an effective way to persuade a person to part with personal
property without the robber being caught in the act or soon thereafter, the object itself is
usually not recovered by investigating officers.” (Monjaras, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1436.) In addition, law enforcement found the shotgun J.H.’s companion used, and it
was assessed to be apparently operational. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude
that the carjackers would not arm the person on the passenger side of the vehicle with a
real firearm while the person on the driver’s side was armed only with an imitation
handgun.
J.H. argues that the facts of his case differ from those in Monjaras, asserting that
H.O. did not have a clear view of the object, H.O. “did not touch the gun and the gun was
not fired,” and “[n]o threats were made to [H.O.] while the gun was visible.” We are not
persuaded. In Monjaras, the defendant merely “displayed the handle of a black pistol
tucked in his waistband,” yet the appellate court held that sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s true finding on a firearm use enhancement. (Monjaras, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1436.) J.H.’s actions in pointing the handgun directly at H.O. and striking H.O. with
the weapon provide more evidence of an actual firearm than the facts in Monjaras did.
J.H. is also incorrect in asserting that H.O. “did not touch the gun,” as J.H. hit H.O. with
the handgun. As to J.H.’s argument that he did not fire the weapon, the defendant in
Monjaras likewise did not fire his weapon yet the Court of Appeal held the evidence was
sufficient to support a firearm enhancement. (Monjaras, supra, at p. 1438, fn. 1.)
Finally, we reject J.H.’s contention that he made “[n]o threats” to H.O. while the
handgun was visible. H.O. testified that the person on his side of the vehicle “told [him]
to get out [of] the car” in an “aggressive” way. He stated that he was “scared,
traumatized” because he “had a weapon pointed at [him].” This indicates J.H. pointed
the handgun at H.O. while threatening him with a carjacking. Even if the statement and
the display of the handgun did not come at the exact same time, H.O. would have
perceived J.H. pointing a firearm directly at him during an attempted carjacking as a
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threat. J.H.’s “viewing of the facts through rose-colored glasses ignores the powerful
message sent by a robber who simply lifts his shirt to let the victim know he has a gun.
Only the most foolhardy victim would demand to be looking down the barrel before
understanding that the robber who displays a gun intends to use it if necessary to get the
goods.” (Monjaras, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438, fn. 1.) Here J.H. actually did
make H.O. look down the barrel of a handgun, and thus we reject J.H.’s argument that he
made no threats to H.O.
For these reasons, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment as we are required to do by law, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court’s finding that J.H. violated section 29610 by possessing a real handgun
as opposed to a toy or replica.
As the Attorney General notes, the juvenile court erred in setting a maximum term
of confinement at seven years. Welfare and Institutions Code section 726,
subdivision (d)(1) states that the juvenile court shall specify a maximum term of
confinement “[i]f the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent
or guardian . . . .” Because the juvenile court did not remove J.H. from parental custody,
the juvenile court was not called upon to set a maximum term of confinement. (See In re
G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129.) “[W]here a juvenile court’s order includes a
maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the
remedy is to strike the term.” (In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592.)
III. DISPOSITION
The maximum confinement term is ordered stricken from the juvenile court’s
dispositional order. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________________
Grover, J.
______________________________________
Danner, J.
H053273 People v. J.H.