In re J.H. CA2/7

Filed 9/22/26 In re J.H. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.H., et al., Persons Coming B349120
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00234)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JASMINE G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Dash Talbot, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
instructions.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mother Jasmine G. appeals from jurisdiction findings and
disposition orders declaring her three children dependents of the
juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b).1 Mother contends substantial
evidence does not support the court’s findings that the children
were at substantial risk of physical harm or illness at the time of
the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. We affirm the
jurisdiction findings as to the two younger children but reverse
the finding relating to the eldest child.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children. On January 24, 2025, the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a petition pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b). At the time, Jama.H. was 14 years old, Jami.H.
was three years old, and Jas.H. was a newborn. Count b-1
alleged Mother and the children’s father had a history of

1 All further section references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

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domestic violence.2 On December 28, 2023, Father choked
Mother and struck her face. Jama.H. attempted to record the
incident with a cell phone but Father grabbed it and took out the
SIM card. In count b-2, the petition alleged, as to Jas.H. only,
that she tested positive for amphetamine at birth. In count b-3,
the petition alleged, as to all three children, that Mother is a
current abuser of amphetamine and used it while she was
pregnant.
The juvenile court detained the three children from Mother.
The children were initially placed in foster care but later released
to Mother’s cousin, Maurice J. Maurice moved into Mother’s
apartment while Mother moved into Maurice’s apartment to
allow the children to remain in familiar surroundings. The court
granted Mother monitored visitation.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report, the Department
stated the family was previously referred to the Department in
January and December of 2023. In January 2023, the
Department received a referral alleging that Mother was
16 weeks pregnant and using methamphetamine in the two older
children’s presence. The caller also alleged Jama.H. had been
missing school to care for then two-year-old Jami.H because
Mother “has been locking herself in her room.” In December
2023, the Department received a referral of domestic violence
between Mother and Father. The allegations arising from those
reports were deemed inconclusive.

2 Jamal H. (Father) is the presumed father of the two older
children. The court found him to be the alleged father of Jas.H.
because attempts to conduct genetic testing were unsuccessful.
The juvenile court did not sustain any allegations against Father,
and he is not a party to this appeal.

3
On December 11, 2024, the Department received the
referral that led to these proceedings. The caller reported Mother
was 32 weeks pregnant and had been admitted to the hospital for
preeclampsia. The caller emphasized Mother appeared
“extremely drowsy” during the interview and could not tell the
caller Maurice’s last name, where he lived, or his phone number
even though he had care of her children while she was in the
hospital. Mother stated she had not had a full meal in three days
and had been sleeping all day. Although she had diabetes, she
“does not want to go through the process of checking (her blood
sugar)” every time she eats. Mother also admitted she did not
receive any prenatal care until she was 32 weeks pregnant.
Jas.H. was born prematurely at 36 weeks and tested
positive for amphetamine. Jama.H. reported Mother went into
labor after she asked him to turn on the hot water to take a bath.
He saw the baby’s head crowning and rushed to call an
ambulance. Maurice and Jama.H. helped to deliver the baby.
Mother and Jas.H. were later taken to a hospital. Emergency
personnel noted that Mother appeared “ ‘altered and confused’ ”
when they arrived. Jas.H. was placed in the NICU due to
hypoglycemia, poor feeding, mild tremors, and an elevated
temperature. At the hospital, Mother agreed to drug testing
when asked by the social worker but refused to provide a urine
sample to hospital staff. The Department received a second
referral after Jas.H. tested positive for amphetamine.
Mother denied any drug use aside from marijuana. She
alternately blamed the medication the hospital gave to her or the
wine she consumed at a party shortly before birth for Jas.H.’s
positive toxicology. In an interview shortly after the birth,
Mother admitted, “ ‘Maybe I put myself at risk. It was bad

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judgment on my part. I am not going to spend time figuring out
where it came from. I just want to move forward. I might have
picked up something but wasn’t aware of it. I’d rather not say
more because it is not going to help my case. I just want to say
that it was bad judgment on my part.’ ” Jas.H.’s doctor reported
that the positive test could have been the result of exposure to
amphetamine from as long ago as one month earlier. The doctor
affirmed that “[no] medication was given to the child prior to
being tested that can cause a false positive.”
At the detention hearing, Mother denied using any drugs
aside from marijuana during her pregnancy but agreed to the
Department’s request for drug and alcohol tests. Mother tested
negative on December 9 and 11, 2024; she was a “no show” for a
test on December 31, 2024; she tested negative on January 2,
2025; and she tested positive for marijuana but negative for
amphetamine on January 21, 2025. She missed scheduled tests
on June 13 and 23, and July 2.3
Jama.H. reported Mother was a good mother and they had
everything newborn Jas.H. needed, including “ ‘[s]tacks and
stacks of diapers, ribbons, clothes, crib, [and a] stroller.’ ”
Maurice, Jama.H., and a family friend reported they had never
observed Mother using any drugs and did not know how Jas.H.
tested positive for amphetamine.

3 At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Department
social worker testified she attempted to contact Mother beginning
in February 2025 to discuss drug testing but Mother did not
respond until April 2025, when she chose a testing site that the
social worker was not aware was closed. The social worker
attempted to contact Mother the next day to refer her to a
different site but did not reach her until June 2025.

5
The Department had difficulty staying in contact with
Mother during the proceedings, although Mother regularly
visited the children. Mother enrolled in parenting classes and
attended nine of thirteen classes.
On February 24, 2025, Maurice reported that Mother
assaulted him, when she forced her way into the home and
bruised his lip and neck. She again attempted to enter the home
using force the next day but left after Maurice told her she
needed to have her visits scheduled and monitored. Maurice
stated “he does not know what was going on with the mother,
given that this behavior was out of her character.” When the
social worker spoke with Mother about the incident, Mother
denied attacking Maurice but acknowledged “ ‘he was being
disrespectful and getting in [her] face.’ ” When the social worker
stated she observed scratches and bruises on Maurice, Mother
responded, “ ‘Those were defense wounds.’ ” Mother refused to
discuss the matter further. Sometime in June 2025, Maurice
stopped caring for the children and left them with another family
member.
At the time of the proceedings, Jama.H. was not enrolled in
school. Although Maurice and Jama.H. asserted he was enrolled
in an online school, they could not tell the Department which
program he used. Neither of the older children were up to date
on their medical visits, having missed their annual exams for two
years.
On July 21, 2025, the court conducted a jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. Mother urged the court to dismiss all the
allegations against her. In the alternative, Mother urged the
court to amend count b-3 to state that she was a “ ‘recent user.’ ”
Mother also indicated she was willing to submit to weekly drug

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testing if the court ordered her visits with the children to be
liberalized once she tested negative a certain number of times.
Minors’ counsel requested the court dismiss the domestic
violence allegation under subdivision (a) of section 300, but
sustain it under subdivision (b) of section 300. Minors’ counsel
urged the court to sustain the substance abuse allegations
alleged in counts b-2 and b-3. She argued the court could
reasonably infer Mother used more frequently due to her refusal
to provide urine samples at the hospital and the difficulty in
communicating with her about testing. The Department argued
for the court to sustain all allegations.
The court dismissed the a-1 and b-1 domestic violence
counts. It sustained as pled the b-2 count and sustained the b-3
count after amending it to read that Mother was a “recent”
abuser of amphetamine rather than a “current” one. The court
noted its ruling was based on minors’ counsel’s arguments,
including Mother’s statement that she made mistakes but
refused to test. The court also noted there was “quite a difference
in age for the children” and stated it was persuaded to assume
jurisdiction over Jama.H. because he was not enrolled in school
and the older children were two years behind on their checkups.
It also ordered Mother to participate in random drug testing,
individual counseling, and parenting classes. The court ordered
the Department to liberalize visitation once Mother tested clean
five times in a row.
Mother timely appealed. On January 20, 2026, at the six-
month review hearing, the juvenile court placed the children with

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Mother, retained jurisdiction, and authorized the Department to
conduct unannounced visits.4

DISCUSSION

Here, the juvenile court sustained the b-2 allegation that
Jas.H. “was born suffering from a detrimental condition
consisting of a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine. Such
condition would not exist except [for] unreasonable acts by the
child’s mother . . . The mother’s substance abuse endangers the
child’s [] health and safety and places the child at risk of serious
physical harm and damage.”5 The court sustained the amended
b-3 allegation that Mother is a “recent abuser of amphetamine”
which renders her “incapable of providing regular care and
supervision of the children.” Mother contends the findings that
the children suffered or were at risk of serious physical harm are
not supported by substantial evidence.
We separately address the jurisdiction findings as to each
child because their ages and maturity levels are demonstrably

4 We grant the Department’s request to take judicial notice
of the January 20, 2026 orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
5 Although the language of the b-2 allegation tracks the
statutory presumption set out in section 355.1, subdivision (a) (if
“the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence,
that . . . [a] detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a
nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result
of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of [the parent]
. . . , that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a
person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300”), the
Department does not contend the presumption applies in this
matter. We therefore do not address it.

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different. (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 559 (N.R.) [court
may take into consideration a child’s youth and maturity level as
factors to determine whether a parent’s conduct places the child
in serious risk of physical harm].) Moreover, the juvenile court’s
finding as to count b-2 relates only to the newborn and not to the
two older children.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“[U]nder section 300, subdivision (b), a child may be subject
to dependency jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or
illness as a result of a parent’s failure or inability to adequately
supervise the child, or as a result of a parent’s inability to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s substance abuse.
(§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).)” (In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
315, 324 (B.D.).) Section 300, subdivision (b) “makes it clear that
the government must establish, as separate elements, that (1)
substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian unable to
provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused
the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates a
substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 558.)
“[A] child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care
that the child may require and whether a parent’s . . . substance
abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical
harm. Courts can properly take these facts regarding a child into
account, together with all other relevant evidence, in deciding
whether the government has met its burden at the jurisdictional
stage.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559.) “It is reasonable for

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courts to infer that very young children require a substantial
degree of close supervision.” (Id. at p. 558.)
“A court ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect
the child.’ [Citation.] And a parent’s ‘ “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that
the conduct will continue.” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “[t]o establish
a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be
some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged
conduct will recur.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
696, 712–713; see In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048
(J.A.); In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 849.)
“[I]t is inappropriate to regard a parent’s or guardian’s
excessive use of alcohol or an addictive drug as always being
sufficient, by itself, to show that the parent or guardian is unable
to provide regular care for a young child and that the child is
therefore at substantial risk of serious physical harm.” (N.R.,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 558–559; J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1046.) Otherwise, key elements of section 300, subdivision
(b)(1)(D), go unaddressed. A court may not “shortcut” the inquiry
demanded of it by regarding substance abuse as “prima facie
evidence” of an inability to provide care, then “look[ing] to the
parent or guardian to rebut this presumption.” (N.R., at pp. 559–
560.) Thus, a parent’s drug use, by itself, is not necessarily
sufficient to support jurisdiction. However, the Legislature has
declared that “[t]he provision of a home environment free from
the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition
for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being
of the child.” (§ 300.2.)

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We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for
substantial evidence in light of the entire record. (See In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892 [“the evidence supporting the
jurisdictional finding must be considered ‘ “in the light of the
whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence’ ”]; In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 [“ ‘In reviewing
the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them.’ ”].) Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (In re I.C., at p. 892;
accord, In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) “ ‘[W]e
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ ” (In re R.T., at p. 633; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773; In re Cole L., at p. 602 [“while substantial evidence may
consist of inferences, any inferences must rest on the evidence;
inferences based on speculation or conjecture cannot support a
finding”].) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206
(E.E.); accord, In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328–329.)

B. Newborn Jas.H.
Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that
she was a recent abuser of amphetamine. Mother instead
contends the evidence is insufficient to support a finding under
counts b-2 or b-3 that Jas.H. suffered or was at risk of suffering
serious physical harm or illness as required under section 300,

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subdivision (b). According to Mother, no medical professional
confirmed Jas.H. suffered adverse physical symptoms due to
prenatal drug exposure; there was no evidence that the reasons
Jas.H. was placed in the NICU—hypoglycemia, poor feeding,
mild tremors, and elevated temperature—were due to prenatal
drug exposure and were not simply the normal condition of a
baby born to a diabetic.6 In support of her argument, Mother
emphasizes Jas.H.’s normal birth weight—7 pounds, 13 ounces—
and the lack of documented withdrawal symptoms.
Drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court, the
record contains substantial evidence supporting the court’s
finding that Mother’s drug use created a risk of serious harm to
Jas.H. The evidence shows Mother failed to seek prenatal care
even though she was diabetic and she used alcohol and
marijuana throughout her pregnancy. She also failed to ensure
her older children went to their annual medical exams. Although
Mother recognized she exhibited “bad judgment,” she denied any
substance abuse and blamed others for Jas.H.’s positive
toxicology. The record shows Mother was not forthcoming about
the extent of her drug use and its impact on her newborn.
Mother’s denial supports an inference that her past use of
amphetamine may recur and that she could fail to ensure Jas.H.
received medical care. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293

6 In support of her argument, Mother cites two articles from
medical journals. The Department, in turn, also cites a medical
journal article. There is no indication these articles were
admitted into evidence by the juvenile court or otherwise
considered by it. Neither party moved for judicial notice of these
articles on appeal, and therefore we do not consider them.

12
[denial is a relevant factor in assessing whether parent is likely
to change behavior]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188,
197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].)
Further, Mother exhibited unusual behavior, including
appearing “altered and confused” to paramedics; being unable to
recall Maurice’s name, address, or phone number at the hospital
while she was pregnant; and physically attacking Maurice for
“disrespecting” her. This is substantial evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s findings that Jas.H., a baby who required “a
substantial degree of close supervision” and who suffered from
hypoglycemia, poor feeding, mild tremors, and an elevated
temperature was at substantial risk of serious harm or illness.
(N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 558.)
Mother relies on In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315
(B.D.) and In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036 (J.A.) to argue
that evidence of prenatal exposure to drugs alone does not
constitute substantial evidence Jas.H. was at risk of or suffered
serious physical harm or illness. B.D. and J.A. are
distinguishable.
In B.D., the child tested positive at birth for prescription
opiates. (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 319, 320.) The
mother had received prenatal care and tested positive for
marijuana and a prescription opiate at an early prenatal
appointment. (Id. at p. 318.) She admitted taking an opiate
early in the pregnancy, and again shortly before giving birth to
the child. Mother’s statements led the court to infer she had
taken drugs that were not prescribed to her. (Id. at p. 319.)
Aside from the positive test, hospital staff raised no concerns
about the mother and there was no evidence the newborn
suffered any effects from the drug. (Id. at pp. 319–320.) The

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mother had no prior child welfare history. She also had an older
child who attended school and was reportedly “excelling.” Both
children were also up to date with immunizations and received
regular medical and dental care. (Id. at p. 330.) Social workers
visiting mother’s home raised no concerns about the mother’s
ability to care for the children. (Ibid.) On these facts, B.D.
concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a juvenile
court finding that, even if the mother was abusing prescription
drugs, that abuse placed the children at substantial risk of
suffering serious physical harm. B.D. reasoned substantial
evidence of harm to a child “requires more than speculation or
conjecture.” (Id. at p. 329.)
Similarly, J.A. held, “the evidence is insufficient to
establish mother abused marijuana or that any such substance
abuse placed the children at risk of serious harm” where the sole
basis of dependency jurisdiction lay in the mother’s use of
medical marijuana while pregnant. (J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1038.) In J.A., the mother explained she consumed edible
marijuana to treat pain and swelling during pregnancy.
Although she obtained prenatal care, she did not inform her
doctor about her marijuana use for fear of being judged. When
the doctor told the mother she could not breastfeed until she
tested negative for marijuana, she stopped and tested negatively
shortly thereafter. Further, the Department’s social worker
described her as cooperative and appropriate with the baby. The
mother also had a toddler-aged child and there were no prior
reports or other problems about her care for him. (Id. at p. 1040.)
Instead, the evidence showed the toddler’s doctor recommended
she have him assessed for speech therapy, she did so, and the

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specialist concluded there was no need for therapy. (Id. at
p. 1048.)
In this case, by contrast, Jas.H.’s positive toxicology was
not the sole basis for a finding of risk under section 300. First,
the record reflects the newborn tested positive for amphetamine,
which is a controlled substance (see People v. Davis (2013)
57 Cal.4th 353, 358; Health & Saf. Code, § 11055, subd. (d)(1)),
not a prescribed drug as in B.D. or medical marijuana as in J.A.
Further, in contrast to the mothers in B.D. and J.A., Mother did
not obtain regular prenatal care and she continued to deny she
used any illicit substances even when confronted with Jas.H.’s
positive toxicology. Unlike the older children in B.D. and J.A.,
Mother’s older children were not “excelling.” Jama.H. was not
enrolled in school and both older children had missed two annual
medical exams. The family was also the subject of two prior
dependency referrals in 2023. These circumstances establish
prenatal exposure to amphetamine was not the sole basis for
dependency jurisdiction over Jas.H.

C. Four-year-old Jami.H.
Mother asserts the same argument—that the evidence is
insufficient to support a finding of risk of serious physical harm
or illness under section 300, subdivision (b)—as to Jami.H. For
the same reasons, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s findings of risk of harm to Jami.H., who had just turned
four at the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Like
Jas.H., Jami.H. required a high level of supervision, care, and
protection. He thus faced a substantial risk of harm from a
mother who ingested alcohol, marijuana, and amphetamine
during pregnancy, who failed to acknowledge the extent of her

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substance abuse, who was apparently under the influence of
alcohol or drugs while proceedings were pending, and who failed
to ensure he received regular medical care.

D. 14-year-old Jama.H.
The juvenile court stated at the jurisdiction hearing it
assumed jurisdiction over Jama.H. despite the age difference
among the children because he was not enrolled in school and the
two older children were behind on their annual well-child visits.
We conclude this is an insufficient basis on which to
assume jurisdiction over a 14-year-old child. (See In re
Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 728 [mother’s substance
abuse and failure to ensure child regularly attended school and
completed homework did not justify jurisdiction over 13-year-old
child]; In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388–389.) As In
re Janet T. explained, “It is also no doubt true failing to go to
school regularly is very detrimental to the children. Failing to
attend school regularly not only deprives the children of an
education, but also of the social interaction and ‘peer
relationships necessary for normal growth and development,’ as
alleged in the petition. It is a very serious allegation and a
factual circumstance which needed immediate correction.
However, that is not the same as saying the failure to attend
school created a ‘substantial risk’ of suffering ‘serious physical
harm or illness.’ The lack of education may well cause psychic or
emotional or financial or social harm. But there are no facts
alleged or suggested by the supporting documentary evidence to
indicate mother’s failure to ensure the children’s regular school
attendance subjected the children to physical injury or illness,
serious or otherwise. We thus fail to see how this factual ground

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can support the court’s order sustaining the petition under
section 300, subdivision (b).” (In re Janet T., at pp. 388–389.)
Nor is Mother’s failure to ensure Jama.H. was up to date on his
annual medical exam sufficient to justify jurisdiction of a healthy
14-year-old child. (Cf. In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996,
1005-1006 [substantial evidence supported continued jurisdiction
to permit medical monitoring of child’s potential life-threatening
illness].)
Under these circumstances, we reverse the juvenile court’s
orders as to Jama.H.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings under section 300,
subdivision (b), regarding Jami.H. and Jas.H. and the disposition
order removing Jami.H. and Jas.H. from Mother are affirmed.
The court’s jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision
(b), regarding Jama.H. and its disposition orders relating to
Jama.H. are reversed. The juvenile court is directed to set aside
its jurisdiction finding regarding Jama.H. and vacate its
disposition orders relating to Jama.H.

MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.

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