Filed 7/7/26 In re J.G. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re J.G., a Person Coming Under B350223
the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01374A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JESUS G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
The father and mother in this case are biological siblings
whose child is in juvenile dependency proceedings. Jesus G.
(Father) appeals from the court’s order denying him family
reunification services with his child, Jacob G. (born
September 2024) under certain statutory bypass provisions. The
court found Father had been convicted of a violent felony and had
previously failed to reunify with Jacob’s older half-sibling, and
that Father had not met his burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that reunification services would be in
Jacob’s best interest. On appeal, Father only challenges the
juvenile court’s best interest determination. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. Father’s Prior Dependency and Criminal Proceedings
In 2003, the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition
on behalf of Jacob’s paternal half-sibling, Jocelyn G. (born
July 2002), based on domestic violence by Father against
Jocelyn’s mother and substance abuse by Father and Jocelyn’s
1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. We therefore limit our
discussion of facts and findings to those most relevant to Father.
2
mother. The case closed in 2005 with Jocelyn in a legal
guardianship, after Father failed to reunify with her.
In 2005, Father was convicted of felony second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and felony first degree burglary (id.,
§ 459). Robbery (of any type) and first degree burglary are
“violent felony” offenses as defined in Penal Code section 667.5,
subdivision (c). (See id., § 667.5, subds. (c)(9), (c)(21).) In 2008,
Father was convicted on a new charge of first degree burglary
(id., § 459) and was sentenced to 20 years in prison under the
three strikes law (id., §§ 667, subd. (a)(1); 667.5). Father’s
criminal history dates to 1994 and includes additional arrests
and convictions for weapons possession and sale, controlled
substance possession, parole violations, and grand theft.
B. Section 300 and Section 342 Petitions
Mother and Father are biological siblings in a relationship
that began around 2022 or 2023. Father is nine years older than
Mother. In September 2024, at the time of Jacob’s birth, the Los
Angeles Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) received a referral alleging that Mother had given
birth to a baby boy, she had another child in permanent
placement, and the baby’s father had an extensive criminal
history.
In May 2025, the Department received a referral after
police responded to a report of an altercation between Father and
Mother on May 2, in which Mother reported Father pushed her
while she was holding Jacob and she was scratched on the elbow.
Father was arrested and charged with domestic abuse (Pen.
Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and violation of parole (id., § 3000.08).
After his May 2 arrest Father was sentenced to 140 days in jail
3
for evading his parole officer. A stay-away order was also issued,
permitting only electronic contact between Father and Mother.
A prior police report of domestic violence between Father
and Mother in April 2025 reported an “assault that caused breath
complaints of strangulation/pain in neck,” with the suspect gone
by the time law enforcement arrived. On May 2, Mother told the
Department that Father hit her repeatedly on the left side of the
torso during the incident in April 2025, which arose from a
parenting disagreement, and that she called the police but Father
left before they arrived. Mother also reported Father punched
her on the shoulder during an incident in December 2023 as well,
after he accused her of cheating.
At the time of the referral Father and Mother were living
together with Jacob in the home of their grandmother (Jacob’s
great-grandmother). When the Department and police officers
returned to the home on May 7 and attempted to interview
Mother, she exhibited erratic and combative behavior, including
yelling, shouting bible verses and referencing Lucifer, and talking
to herself, appearing “disconnected from reality.” At one point
while seated on the couch she also fell asleep and became
unresponsive to attempts to wake her, with Jacob sliding out of
her arms. Jacob was detained and placed in protective custody,
and Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold. Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine during her psychiatric admission.
Mother and Father’s uncle was interviewed and he stated
Mother’s mental health issues started when Father moved into
the home in 2022.
On May 9, 2025, the Department filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 petition alleging Jacob was at risk
of serious physical harm due to domestic violence between Father
4
and Mother and Mother’s mental health challenges.2 The
petition was subsequently amended to add Father’s past history
of domestic violence, criminal history, and failure to reunify with
Jacob’s paternal half-sibling.
In August 2025, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional
hearing and sustained the petition under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), related to counts that alleged the
parents’ domestic violence in Jacob’s presence, Mother’s history of
mental health and emotional problems and substance abuse, and
Father’s history of domestic violence and failure to reunify with
Jacob’s half-sibling.
On August 15 and August 21, 2025, while the disposition
hearing was pending, Father tested positive for
methamphetamine, and he declined to submit to drug tests on
August 29 and September 3. On September 8, the Department
filed a section 342 subsequent petition alleging Jacob was at risk
of serious physical harm as a result of Father’s current
methamphetamine abuse.
C. Disposition Hearing and Bypass Order
On October 30, 2025, the juvenile court held a combined
hearing on the section 300 and section 342 petitions, and it
sustained the 342 petition. The court stated, “Father does have
an extensive history of substance abuse. I think that he is doing
very well in his sobriety at this time. However, it is two months,
and given his long history of use, I do find that there is still a risk
as relapse could occur.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
5
At the disposition stage for both petitions, the Department
asked the court to bypass reunification services for the parents,
and Jacob’s counsel and each parent’s counsel asked the court to
order reunification services.
The reports before the court showed Father enrolled in a
26-week parenting program and a 52-week domestic violence
management program on August 15, 2025, but was discharged
from both for failure to attend. He then re-enrolled on
September 12 and had participated in six weekly sessions each of
parenting and domestic violence classes, most recently on
October 24. Father admitted to methamphetamine use in August
but stated it was to have energy to care for Jacob. Father and
Mother also still resided in the same building, in separate areas,
and maintained unrestricted contact with each other. Mother’s
therapist reported Father accompanied Mother to and from
appointments, “does not le[t] [M]other out of his sight,” and the
parents’ relationship was a “concern” for the therapist because
“they are always together.”
Father’s attorney acknowledged there was domestic
violence in half-sibling Jocelyn’s prior case, as in Jacob’s case,
and that Father failed to complete services then or reunify with
Jocelyn. However, he argued “the court can find by clear and
convincing evidence that it is in [Jacob’s] best interest that
[Father] is offered the chance to reunify.” He argued Father had
made reasonable efforts to treat his past issues, had been sober
for the past two months since his relapse, was now enrolled in a
domestic violence program, and had no new domestic violence
incidents since May 2025. Father’s attorney acknowledged
Father dropped out of his programs “briefly” around the time of
his relapse, and that the parents’ current living situation “doesn’t
6
look wonderful” given the criminal court’s stay-away order
against Father, but Los Angeles was a “very expensive county”
and Mother was “making every effort to move.” He argued that
although Father failed to complete services with Jocelyn, Father
“was also incarcerated during her case and we know services
aren’t easily accessed.” He stated Father cried at the prospect of
no reunification with Jacob, and said, “ ‘I love my son and I just
want this chance to reunify.’ ”
As for the violent felony history, Father’s attorney
acknowledged Father’s past violent felony conviction and recent
“30 or 40 days” incarceration for violation of parole after his
May 2025 arrest. However, he argued the conviction was
21 years ago, with no evidence a child was present, and Father
had served a lengthy sentence and had not committed any new
crimes. Father confirmed to the court that “[o]n May 2nd when
[he] was arrested for domestic violence, [he] did 34, 35 days” for
violating parole, and that he was presently in active violation of
parole again for not checking in with his parole officer and “might
do another 34 days.”
The Department argued the length of time since Father’s
felony conviction was not a relevant consideration, and the court
should take into account Father’s active parole violation status;
his methamphetamine use while the disposition hearing in this
case was pending (and the explanation that it was to stay awake
to care for Jacob); his living situation in violation of the criminal
court’s stay-away order; his “overbearing and controlling”
behavior toward Mother, and Mother’s therapist’s concern about
Father’s constant presence. The Department stated that under
the bypass provisions the court did not have “any leeway to
provide [reunification services] to the parents at this time.”
7
The juvenile court declared Jacob a dependent of the court
and removed him from parental custody. The court ordered
family reunification services for Mother. Although the court
noted that Mother previously had reunification services and
parental rights terminated as to Jacob’s maternal half-sibling, it
found Mother had made a reasonable effort to treat her issues
and that it was in Jacob’s best interests for her to receive
reunification services.
As to Father, the juvenile court stated, “the situation is
different.” The court noted Father’s reunification services were
previously terminated for his older child, after a petition was
sustained for domestic violence by Father. Although Father had
enrolled in programs and had “begun to address the issues” in the
last two months, the court found that it did not “believe that he
has made reasonable efforts to treat the problems,” given how
long ago the prior case was and that there was “additional
domestic violence as recently as May in this case.” The court also
had “a lot of concerns about the power and control dynamic of the
relationship” between Father and Mother. Further, although the
prior felony conviction was “some time” ago, the court found “the
fact that the Father is in violation of the parole is concerning.”
The juvenile court ordered that reunification services be
bypassed for Father based on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)
and (b)(12). The court ordered Father to have monitored visits
with Jacob a minimum of three times per week, three hours per
visit, with discretion to the Department to liberalize.
Father timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“A juvenile court is generally required to order
reunification services for a parent ‘whenever a child is removed’
from that parent’s custody.” (In re Jayden M. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271 (Jayden M.); accord, § 361.5, subd. (a);
see Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113,
1120 (Jennifer S.).) Several exceptions to this requirement exists
under the “bypass provisions” of section 361.5, subdivision (b).
Two bypass provisions are relevant here. First,
reunification services need not be provided if the parent has been
convicted of a violent felony. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12).) Second,
“[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent . . .
when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . [t]hat
the court ordered termination of reunification services for any
siblings or half siblings of the child because the parent . . . failed
to reunify with the sibling or half sibling . . . [and] has not
subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that
led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . .” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(10)(A).) “A ‘reasonable effort to treat’ a problem”
focuses “on the parent’s effort,” “not whether the parent has
‘ “ ‘cure[d]’ ” ’ or ‘ “abolished” ’ the problem [citations], or whether
the parent has ‘attained’ a ‘ “certain level of progress.” ’ . . . It is
not enough to show ‘any’ effort, even a genuine one. [Citation.]
‘[L]ackadaisical or half-hearted efforts’ will also not do.”
(Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276, italics and
fn. omitted; accord, Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
A court may deny reunification services to a parent if it
finds “one or more” of the bypass provisions applies. (Tyrone W.
9
v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 846; see In re A.E.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141 [court may deny reunification if
“any of [the] 17 enumerated bypass provisions apply”].) “By
making the grant of reunification services discretionary in these
situations, the bypass provisions aim to ‘focus reunification
efforts’ and resources on the cases ‘most likely to succeed’ with
reunification.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1271.)
If the Department carries its initial burden of showing one
or more of the bypass provisions apply (which is uncontested
here), “the burden shifts to the parent to prove that it is in the
child’s best interest for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion
to provide reunification services in this case.” (Jayden M., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272; see § 361.5, subd. (c)(2) [“The court
shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in
paragraph . . . (10) . . . [or] (12) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is
in the best interest of the child.”].)3
In determining whether the parent proved reunification
services are in the “ ‘best interest of the child’ ” under
section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), relevant factors include “the
parent’s ‘ “ ‘history,’ ” ’ ” “the parent’s ‘ “ ‘current efforts and
fitness,’ ” ’ ” “the ‘ “ ‘gravity of the problem’ ” ’ that led to the
3 “[S]ection 361.5, subdivision (a), provides that reunification
services are mandatory unless a bypass provision applies;
section 361.5, subdivision (b), lists the bypass provisions and
provides that reunification services are discretionary if any of
them [applies]; but section 361.5, subdivision (c), provides that
denial of reunification services is mandatory, not discretionary,
with respect to nearly all of the bypass provisions, unless the
court makes certain countervailing factual findings.” (In re A.E.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141.)
10
assertion of dependency,” the “ ‘ “strength of the bonds” ’ ”
between the child and the parent and the child and the current
caregiver, and “the ‘ “ ‘child’s need for stability and
continuity ’ ” ’ ” (See Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1271, 1272-1273; accord, In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1153, 1164; In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 281 (In re
A.G.).) There must be “ ‘ “some ‘reasonable basis to conclude’ ” ’
that reunification is possible; if it is not, offering reunification
services that are destined to fail is not in the child’s best
interest.” (Jayden M., at p. 1273.) Other relevant “factors
indicating that reunification services are unlikely to be
successful” include “[t]he failure of the parent to respond to
previous services, the fact that the child was abused while the
parent was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, a past history
of violent behavior, or testimony by a competent professional that
the parent’s behavior is unlikely to be changed by services.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(4).)
“We review a juvenile court’s determination that the
Department has carried its initial burden in the first step for
substantial evidence,” and “[w]e review a juvenile court’s
assessment of what is in the child’s best interest for an abuse of
discretion.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273.)
B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Bypassing
Reunification Services for Father
As stated, Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s
determination that the Department met its burden of
demonstrating that the two statutory bypass exceptions at issue
11
in this case applied, section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (12).4
Accordingly, we examine only whether the juvenile court abused
its discretion by concluding it was not in Jacob’s best interest to
provide Father with reunification services. Before examining the
juvenile court’s assessment of the relevant factors, we address
Father’s procedural arguments.
1. Procedural arguments
First, Father contends the juvenile court’s ruling was based
on the Department’s “erroneous representation” there was no
“leeway” to grant reunification for the parents, rather than a
discretionary determination based on consideration of Jacob’s
best interests. It was clear, however, the court exercised its
discretion and did not rely on the Department’s representation of
the scope of its authority. The Department made this argument
as to both parents, and yet the court granted reunification
services to Mother based on its conclusion that it was in Jacob’s
best interests. By contrast, the court determined “the situation is
different” for Father. The court thus plainly understood its
4 The opening brief argues Father made “reasonable efforts”
to address certain preexisting issues, but Father does not argue
the juvenile court erred by finding the bypass provision under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applied. That subdivision
requires, in relevant part, a finding that after failing to reunify
with the sibling or half sibling the parent “has not subsequently
made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to
removal of the sibling or half sibling.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).)
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12), by contrast, requires no such
finding. In all events, Father discusses his “reasonable efforts”
only in the context of his challenge to the juvenile court’s best
interest determination.
12
authority to bypass reunification services for each parent was
discretionary.
Next, Father argues the juvenile court was required to
make an express finding that it was not in Jacob’s best interest to
provide reunification services to Father and that this failure
means we should not imply findings in support of the order.
Although it would have been preferable for the juvenile court to
state that Father had not met his burden of demonstrating it was
in Jacob’s best interest to order reunification services, we may
examine the record and imply any findings necessary to support
the court’s order. “Ordinarily, of course, appellate courts will
indulge all reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. But
this familiar doctrine becomes potentially subversive where the
Legislature requires the trial court to make an express finding.
Such a requirement may be deprived of all force if appellate
courts feel free to infer a supporting finding where the trial court
has left the record silent. For that reason the doctrine of implied
findings may be given limited scope where an express finding is
required.” (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078; see also
Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1270, fn. 6 [“specific
findings are not required absent a statute so requiring”].)
Father does not cite any statute requiring the juvenile
court to make an express finding it was not in Jacob’s best
interest for Father to receive reunification services.
Section 361.5 does not contain such a requirement. (In re S.G.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260 [rejecting the argument that
“the failure to make findings necessary for a denial of services
under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) mandates reversal” and
instead inferring findings supported by substantial evidence].)
Although “the juvenile court lacks the authority to order
13
reunification [under section 361.5, subdivision (c)] unless it
expressly makes [the best interests] finding by the requisite
standard of proof” (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 92, 107, italics added; accord In re A.M. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1076), this statutory provision does not
require the court to make an express finding when the court
denies reunification services because it is not in the child’s best
interest. (See § 361.5, subd. (c)(2) [“The court shall not order
reunification for a parent or guardian described in
paragraph . . . (10), [or] (12), . . . of subdivision (b) unless the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is
in the best interest of the child”].)5
2. Best interest of child factors
Father cites the following factors from In re A.G., supra,
207 Cal.App.4th at page 281 to support his argument that
reunification services are in Jacob’s best interest: “(1) the
parent’s current efforts, (2) the parent’s fitness, (3) the parent’s
history, (4) the seriousness of the problem that led to the
dependency, (5) the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-
child bonds, and (6) the child’s need for stability and continuity.”
The opening brief, however, advances no argument regarding the
third, fourth, and sixth factors, and makes “reasonable efforts”
5 Father cites In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, at
page 463, but that case does not help him because it does not
address the statutory provision at issue here. (See id. at p. 463
[“it is inappropriate to make implied findings when the juvenile
court fails to make express findings as required by section 361.2,
subdivision (c). We thus decline to make implied findings in this
case”].)
14
arguments as to the factors that are addressed. Although Father
does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that the
bypass provisions apply to him and section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(12), has no “reasonable efforts” requirement, (see footnote 4,
supra), in an abundance of caution, we first examine whether
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
father did not make reasonable efforts to address his prior
history of domestic violence and substance abuse.
a. Reasonable efforts
“[I]n assessing whether a parent made a reasonable effort
to address a problem from a prior dependency case involving the
current child’s sibling or half sibling and where reunification
services or parental rights were terminated under
subdivision[] (b)(10) . . . of section 361.5, the juvenile court should
consider the entire time span between, at the one end, the
earliest time a sibling or half sibling was removed from the
parent’s custody due to that problem and, at the other end, the
dispositional hearing in the current case.” (Jayden M., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) “Reasonableness is assessed by
looking to (1) the duration of the parent’s effort, (2) the ‘extent
and context’ of the parent’s effort, and (3) other factors related to
the ‘quality and quantity of those efforts.’ [Citation.] The
parent’s progress, or lack thereof, ‘both in the short and long
term’—while not dispositive—is nevertheless relevant ‘to the
extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made.’ ” (Id., at
p. 1276, italics omitted; accord, Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1120; R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908,
915.)
15
Here, examining Father’s efforts to address his domestic
violence and substance abuse issues from the time of Jocelyn’s
removal in 2003 through the disposition hearing for Jacob in
2025, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that although Father had recently “begun to address the issues,”
he had not made sufficient “reasonable efforts” to do so. As the
court observed, Jocelyn’s removal was over 20 years ago, but
Father’s domestic violence persisted in repeated incidents of
physical abuse against Mother, including in December 2023,
April 2025, and May 2025 in Jacob’s presence. And in August
2025, while the disposition hearing was pending, Father tested
positive for methamphetamine (which he stated was to stay
awake to care for Jacob) and twice declined to submit to drug
testing thereafter.
Father argues he has made recent efforts to address his
problems. He enrolled in domestic violence and parenting
programs and had attended six sessions of each at the time of the
disposition hearing in October 2025. He had also enrolled in an
outpatient drug treatment program after his most recent relapse
in August 2025, and he tested negative several times. But the
evidence also shows this effort was inconsistent. Father first
enrolled in domestic violence programming on August 15, 2025,
but was discharged for failure to attend. He re-enrolled on
September 12 and maintained weekly attendance until the
hearing six weeks later. And although he enrolled in drug
treatment in August 2025, the court noted “there is still a risk as
relapse could occur.”
Father’s attempts at addressing his domestic violence and
substance abuse issues are commendable, but substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father did not
16
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his six-weeks
of effort immediately before disposition constituted “reasonable
efforts” against the backdrop of Father’s entire history.6 (See
Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1276-1277 [“four months
of uneven effort is a drop in the bucket when viewed in the larger
context of a 20-year history” of drug abuse; “[a]gainst this
backdrop, the juvenile court had ample grounds to find that
mother’s recent effort to treat her drug addiction was not
‘reasonable’ ”].)
b. Father’s current efforts, parental fitness, and
strength of parent-child bond
As stated, Father does not address all the factors he cites
as relevant to a court’s determination of whether reunification
services are in Jacob’s best interest. And even considering those
factors he does address, we conclude Father has not
demonstrated the juvenile court abused its discretion by
declining to order reunification services.
As to Father’s current efforts, he argues he was making
“reasonable efforts” to address his substance abuse issues by
being in a treatment program addressing relapse prevention and
6 Father is also not without a remedy if he continues to make
progress: “If [a parent’s] efforts are commendable but too short
term at the time of the dispositional hearing for the juvenile
court to conclude they are ‘reasonable’ when viewed through the
prism of the total relevant time period, the parent can always
seek to modify the bypass order and obtain an order granting
reunification services by filing a petition under section 388”
alleging changed circumstances. (Jayden M., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1275.)
17
that he “tested negative 16 times,” and as to his domestic violence
issues that he was in a parenting class and domestic violence
prevention program, and he maintained consistent visitation
with Jacob. But the juvenile court also had evidence before it
that Father had a long history of domestic violence with
two different mothers of his children, incidents of physical
violence against Mother as recently as May 2025 with Jacob
present, and an ongoing “power and control dynamic” toward
Mother that concerned her therapist and the court at the time of
the hearing. Father also had an equally long history of drug
abuse with a relapse of methamphetamine use two months before
the disposition hearing, and he justified his methamphetamine
use by stating it was to have energy to take care of Jacob. Father
also had an extensive criminal history with three violent felony
convictions and multiple parole violations, recently served “30 or
40 days” in custody for violation of parole after his May 2025
arrest, and admitted he was again in violation of parole at the
time of the hearing. Against this backdrop, the juvenile court
was within its discretion to conclude that Father’s recent six
weeks of classes and sobriety were insufficient.
As to Father’s parental fitness, he contends he has “take[n]
responsibility for the [domestic violence, substance abuse, and
criminal] issues that caused the dependency” by, among other
things, “admit[ing] he was using methamphetamine” and being
“consistent with services” and visitation. Father also argues he
would benefit from services and that he made “reasonable efforts”
to address his “past history.” As with the prior factor, the
juvenile court also had before it evidence regarding Father’s long
history of domestic violence and substance abuse such that we
cannot say the court abused its discretion by not ordering
18
reunification services. And while it is true that father’s violent
felony conviction was “over 20 years earlier,” the juvenile court
was concerned regarding Father’s on-going criminal history,
violation of the criminal stay away order, and that he was in
violation of probation at the time of the disposition hearing.
Indeed, Father’s failure to reunify with Jocelyn, his violent felony
convictions, and his recurrent physical domestic violence against
Mother many years after Jocelyn’s dependency case also reflect
the gravity of the problems that led to the assertion of
dependency over Jacob (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1272-1273), as well as Father’s “failure . . . to respond to
previous services” indicate that reunification services are likely to
be unsuccessful. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(4)).
As to the strength of the parent-child bond, Father argues
he “maintained his relationship with his son” and had positive
interactions with Jacob. He also argues that this case is like In
re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153 (In re G.L.), where the
juvenile court granted services to the offending parent (mother),
in part, because services were offered to the nonoffending parent
(father). In re G.L. does not help Father because the
nonoffending parent’s receipt of services was not a basis for
affirmance. (See id. at pp. 1164-1166.) In that case the minor
appealed the juvenile court’s order that mother was entitled to
reunification services despite a history of substance abuse, but
the appellate court affirmed because the mother had met her
burden of demonstrating that “reunification, as opposed to
reunification services, was in the best interests of G.L. as set
forth under subdivision (c) of section 361.5.” (In re G.L. at
p. 1166.) And unlike the mother in In re G.L., Father has not met
his burden.
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Additionally, in its disposition order, the juvenile court
charted a reasonable course to protect the parent-child bond by
providing visitation to Father three times a week for three hours
per visit, with discretion to the Department to liberalize. This
order authorized expanded visitation so that Jacob could
maintain and build his bond with Father, while bypassing
reunification services given the lack of a reasonable basis to
believe reunification would succeed. (See In re G.L., supra,
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164 [“ ‘there must be some “reasonable
basis to conclude” that reunification is possible before services
are offered’ ”].)
Under the circumstances, Father has not demonstrated the
juvenile court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services
for Father is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
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