Filed 9/18/26 In re J.F. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re J.F., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT, A175215
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Sonoma County
v.
Super. Ct. No. 25JD00053)
J.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
The juvenile court issued dispositional orders removing J.F. from the
physical custody of his father, J.M. (Father), after J.F. came to school with a
significant bruise the size of a hand on his lower back. The court ordered
reunification services for both Father and K.F. (Mother), who had lost
custody and visitation years earlier due to substance abuse issues. Father
appeals both the removal of J.F. from his custody and the grant of
reunification services for Mother. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND
I. Prior Dependency Case and Reports
In 2020, Mother and her boyfriend (not Father) were arrested for
possession of narcotics, possession of unlawful paraphernalia, and child
cruelty. At the time of the arrest, they were driving with J.F., then one year
old, and were in possession of heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other
drug paraphernalia in close proximity to J.F. Mother admitted to frequent
fentanyl and heroin use. About a week after the arrest, Mother sought to
forcibly remove J.F. from his maternal grandparents’ (Grandparents) home.
Grandparents resisted, suspecting that Mother was under the influence of
narcotics. During this altercation, Mother threw patio furniture, shattering a
window. An emergency protective order was issued to protect J.F. and
Grandparents from Mother.
The San Mateo County Human Services Agency filed a dependency
petition under section 300 of the Welfare & Institutions Code (all statutory
references are to this code). The court detained J.F., found jurisdiction, and
ordered reunification services for Mother and Father. At the 18-month
review in 2022, the court ordered full custody to Father. It also terminated
Mother’s reunification services and ordered no visitation for Mother, finding
that she had not completed the drug abuse treatment program, parenting
classes, or individual counseling required by her case plan.
Later in 2022, Mother gave birth to a daughter, J.F.’s half-sister, who
tested positive at birth for fentanyl and amphetamines. Mother relinquished
the child for adoption.
J.F. lived with Father until May 2025. During this time, Sonoma
County received two reports related to J.F.’s welfare. The first, received in
June 2024, reported that J.F. and Father were living in a shipping container
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on Father’s property with no running water, heat, air conditioning, or sewer.
The second, received in October 2024, stated that Father dropped J.F. off at
school late. J.F. told the reporting party his stomach hurt and he had a cut
on his penis. When the reporting party asked J.F. how he got the cut, J.F.
responded, “ ‘its herbys [sic].’ ” Both reports were evaluated out, meaning the
report failed to satisfy the criteria for child abuse or neglect and so was not
referred to an investigation. (See In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
1142, 1149, fn. 4 [explaining meaning of “evaluated out”].)
In July 2024, Sonoma County filed a complaint against Father alleging
violations of building, grading, zoning, and septic codes at his property in
Healdsburg. Father has contended the code enforcement suit is somehow
related to the current dependency proceeding.
II. Current Dependency Case
a. Section 300 Petition, Detention, and Jurisdiction
On May 1, 2025, J.F., then six years old, arrived at school with a bruise
the size of a hand on his lower back. A social worker and law enforcement
responded to the school; the social worker’s delivered service logs, later
received into evidence by the juvenile court, reflect the following observations
from that day.
The school principal reported that J.F. had not previously come to
school with bruises, marks, injuries, or complaints of pain. That said, the
principal described “a long history of red flag behaviors with the father,”
including that any time staff attempted to communicate with him, Father
would “respond[] with random rambling about non-sense.” The principal also
observed Father and J.F. were very secretive about where they lived.
Law enforcement officers reported Father had been mostly compliant
and open to talking with them. Father told the officers he spanked J.F.
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because J.F. refused to turn off an iPad, and Father “expressed sadness and
crying talking to the officers.” The officers said Father refused to disclose his
address and “fixate[d] on talking about his spiritual and emotional life and
being a sole custody dad, rather than discussing the nature of the situation
concerning the child.” The officers reported that for most of their interaction
with Father, Father was “primarily in a manic rant about irrelevant topics
with pressured, rapid speech” and he “present[ed] with overall strange
behaviors and bizarre comments such as ‘if things don[’]t work out my heaven
will end.’ ” The officers did not suspect that Father was under the influence
of drugs or alcohol and they described both Father and J.F. as clean and well-
groomed.
The social worker agreed that J.F. was well-groomed and dressed
appropriately. She described J.F. as exhibiting developmentally appropriate
behaviors and communication. J.F. said he did not want to talk about where
he lived because he did not want his dad to get in trouble, but he then said he
lives at a shop in San Rafael, apparently referring to Father’s cannabis shop.
J.F. reported the bruise resulted from Father spanking him hard three
times with an open hand after he accidentally “sharted” in his pants. J.F.
said Father gets angry and spanks him because of the shows J.F. watches,
like Bluey. J.F. said Father has spanked him when he “didn’t do anything
bad,” this was the first time he had noticed a bruise, and Father had
threatened to use a belt but had not done so. J.F. added, “he shouldn’t do
that, hit me, it isn’t allowed.”
Father was cooperative at the beginning of the social worker’s
interview but became increasingly agitated as time went on. According to the
social worker, “Father presented with labile affect with rapid and frequent
shifts in emotional expression, often appearing inappropriate or out of
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proportion to the situation. He presented with sudden outbursts of crying,
hostility, compliance, and victimization, often experiencing intense emotions
that seem to come from nowhere.” The social worker also observed that
Father spoke with “pressured very rapid speech that is logical but not
relevant to the conversation.” He exhibited hypervigilance and signs of
paranoia, including stating that everyone is against him, “the system ran
[him] off [his] land,” and the government took his church.
Father refused to discuss a safety plan for J.F. He insisted that he was
“clean and sober and has never done anything wrong,” he was allowed to
spank J.F., and J.F. was “perfectly fine.” Father added that phones and
iPads are “the biggest problem” and “[t]hey give him sugar and treats and
don[’]t honor my beliefs and my heaven and who I am.”
When asked how Father could work with CPS to ensure J.F.’s safety,
Father responded he does not have to promise anything because J.F. is not
the social worker’s child, he is Father’s child. Father commented that the
social worker needs to be respectful toward Father because “this is [his]
heaven and [he is] allowed.” Father’s behavior escalated, and he began to
yell at J.F., “you feel safe with me, don’t you?” Looking at the social worker,
Father told J.F., “people who smile at you can’t be trusted, they are snakes in
the grass and we do not let snakes in the home.”
The social worker stepped out of the interview due to Father’s
combativeness while school officials and law enforcement officers remained
with Father and J.F. Father placed J.F. in front of him “as a barricade” and
yelled that police are scary, the police and social worker can’t be trusted, and
no one was taking his child from him. J.F. became “visibly scared and
distressed by his Father’s behaviors.” After about an hour, law enforcement
persuaded Father to leave the school without the use of physical force. When
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presented with the detention notice and warrant, however, Father reacted
with hostility, accusing the officers of taking his land, his church, and his
child. He went on, “ ‘just let me die bro, this is my third life bro, okay bro,
were in revelations right now right, check it out we will do lie detector and
figure it out bro, right now, right now. . . . I am telling you right now, you are
going to put gun to my fucken head bro, I am telling you bro you’re going to
have to kill me if you’re going to take my kid from me . . . . [W]e are not a
felon, I am not a criminal, I did nothing wrong . . . .”
Another social worker who observed the interaction opined that it did
not appear Father had a grasp on reality. On a phone call with a different
social worker the next day, Father apologized for his behavior and explained
that he felt overwhelmed and was trying to protect his son. Father also
stated that “ ‘God gave [him] [his] child’ and that he is ‘allowed to discipline
his child.’ ”
On May 5, 2025, Mother reported to a social worker that Father had
physically, sexually, and verbally abused her. She alleged Father was
delusional and had grandiose beliefs, including that he was Jesus Christ and
was in heaven. Mother explained she had relinquished her daughter for
adoption because she did not believe she could adequately care for her at the
time. Mother said she served an eight-month sentence in 2023 and 2024 for
felony vandalism and she had been sober since her release from jail. She said
she was attending outpatient treatment at Ward 93 at the Zuckerburg San
Francisco General Hospital, was prescribed methadone, and regularly drug
tested.
On May 5, 2025, the Sonoma County Human Services Department
(Department) filed a petition alleging J.F. came within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j). As to
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subdivision (a), it alleged J.F. was at substantial risk of physical abuse by
Father based on the excessive spanking that resulted in bruising and
Father’s refusal to engage in safety planning. As to subdivision (b)(1), it
alleged J.F. was at substantial risk of physical harm based on the spanking,
Father’s odd behavior and comments on May 1, 2025, and Mother’s history of
substance abuse. As to subdivision (c), the petition alleged J.F. was at
substantial risk of emotional damage due to the spanking and Father’s
actions on May 1, 2025, which had caused J.F. to become visibly scared and
distressed. And as to subdivision (j), the petition alleged J.F.’s sibling had
been abused or neglected, citing his half-sister’s positive drug tests at birth.
On May 6, 2025, the court held a detention hearing. Father entered
general denials but did not contest detention; Father’s counsel noted Father
had not meant any disrespect during the altercation with the social workers
and law enforcement on May 1, and he intended to cooperate moving forward.
Both Father and Mother agreed with J.F.’s placement with Grandparents,
which the court then ordered after finding there were no less disruptive
means of protecting J.F. Mother requested visitation, and the court officer
stated they would bring the request to the Department. Mother’s counsel also
noted that although Mother was not present in person at the hearing, she
was listening by phone. She added that Mother had been on buses for more
than three hours in an attempt to attend in person, but she was still more
than 30 minutes away.
On May 13, 2025, Father met with the Sonoma County social worker
who prepared the Department’s jurisdiction report. Father at times spoke
rapidly and was difficult to follow, often focusing on his spiritual beliefs, his
“crystalized third eye,” and the government. Father spoke about the
allegations against him “nonchalantly” and asserted J.F. had been removed
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from his care because he refused to sign a safety plan. He referred to the
bruise as “ ‘a little bruise on his butt’ ” and stated he saw no alternatives to
physical discipline without more support from Grandparents or Mother.
Father asserted that he was still in love with Mother and Mother had
“crystalized his third eye,” and then he “pointed to the center of his forehead.”
He explained that he did not want to keep J.F. from Mother, but he did not
want J.F. to be exposed to Mother’s “ ‘demonic possession,’ ” an apparent
reference to her substance abuse. When Father read the subsection (j)
allegations related to Mother’s daughter, he “gagged loudly over a trashcan”
and began sobbing. Father commented that “he, as a male, would never be
with another woman if the woman already had a child.” Father then accused
Grandparents of “ ‘lying,’ ” “ ‘plotting,’ ” and “ ‘scheming’ ” against him
because he believed they knew of Mother’s other child.
In a later phone call with the social worker, Father again appeared
dysregulated and spoke in tangents. He stated that Grandparents sent the
photos of J.F.’s “ ‘little bruise’ ” to CPS in an attempt to gain custody and was
resistant to facts inconsistent with his assertions. Father said that J.F. was
his “ ‘seed’ ” and threatened to sue the Department if Mother was allowed
visitation. Father also spoke of sovereign citizens and made other statements
the social worker did not follow, such as “ ‘We are not corporate fictions we
are not for contract.’ ”
Between May 20 and May 24, 2025, Mother spoke by phone with the
social worker. Mother said that the spanking incident reminded her of how
Father used to treat her; she said Father would isolate her and prevent her
from leaving the home if he had left marks on her body. Mother said she had
spoken with J.F. several times by phone before the incident and J.F. told her
that he hadn’t gone to school even though he wanted to. Mother now
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suspected Father had withheld J.F. from school on other occasions due to
bruising. Mother also stated she spoke to Father after the incident and
Father told her he had “ ‘bare bottom spanked him ([J.F.]) and left a mark.
That it was no big deal, and he was going to get [J.F.] back.’ ” As to her past
substance abuse, Mother explained that her incarceration caused her to
realize the need to change her behavior, and she said she now had a stable
job, housing, and a loving relationship. Mother expressed that she was
grateful for the opportunity to reconnect with J.F. with support from the
Department.
On May 22, 2025, the social worker met with Grandparents and J.F.
Grandparents expressed concern that Father had difficulty respecting
boundaries and speaking to J.F. in an appropriate way. They reported that
during one call, when J.F. was excited to tell Father about his new school,
Father responded, “ ‘you should be kicking and screaming that you don’t
want to go to that school and want to be back with me.’ ” On another call,
J.F. told Father, “ ‘You’re not allowed to spank me anymore,’ ” to which
Father responded, “ ‘Yes I can, I can do what I want.’ ” Similarly, during an
in-person supervised visit, Father gently patted J.F.’s lower back “in an
endearing way.” J.F. told Father, “you’re not allowed to do that to me
anymore,” and Father responded “I can do what I want.” (Father disputes
this and claims his response was, “ ‘Okay, bubba, I won’t do that no more.’ ”)
In the jurisdiction report, the Department concluded that Father
“clearly loves his child and wants to instill his values and morals to his son,”
but Father “does not acknowledge or accept that the child safety concerns
include the level of force behind the spanking, and that he punished [J.F.] for
something he could not control.” The report noted that it was unknown
whether Father struggled with substance abuse (Father declined to drug test
9
with the Department), mental health issues, or a dual diagnosis, but “his
parenting is being impacted to where he cannot safely parent the child.”
As to Mother, the Department opined it would take time for Mother to
build a relationship with J.F. and further assessment to determine whether
Mother could safely care for him. The Department also expressed concern for
the safety of both Mother and Grandparents based on Father’s reaction to the
subsection (j) allegation and the fact that Father “is not in state of mind to
comprehend the reality that he no longer has full access to his son as a result
of his own actions,” as opposed to a scheme by Grandparents to obtain
custody.
On June 4, 2025, the court held a jurisdictional hearing. Father’s
counsel addressed four main points: First, Father disputed the jurisdictional
report’s assertion that Father may be struggling with substance abuse or a
mental health diagnosis. Father pointed to records from the prior
dependency hearing reflecting negative drug tests, a finding that he did not
need substance abuse services, and a psychological assessment
recommending only individual counseling. Second, Father viewed the code
enforcement proceeding and June 2024 CPS report as related to the current
case, in that he believed the Department had “had their eye on him since
then.” Third, Father’s counsel emphasized that when Father saw the bruise
from the spanking, Father cried and “was very remorseful of the situation.”
And fourth, Father expressed concern about Mother gaining visitation rights
and requested that any visitation be done carefully and “therapeutically.”
Father did not contest jurisdiction and continued to support J.F.’s placement
with Grandparents. The court found the allegations in the section 300
petition true by a preponderance of the evidence and transferred the case to
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San Mateo County, where J.F. was residing with Grandparents. The case
was then transferred back to Sonoma County several months later.
b. Pre-Disposition Visitation and Services
While the case was pending in San Mateo County, both parents
engaged in supervised visits with J.F. They also were offered service
referrals, though they largely declined them or struggled to follow through
with appointments.
i. Father
Father participated in regular weekly in-person supervised visits with
J.F., first at the juvenile court and then at a park. The visits generally went
well, with Father and J.F. excited to see one another. Father brought toys,
books, food, and sometimes clothes to the visits, where he appropriately
interacted with J.F., including playing with him and asking him about his
activities, safety, and hygiene habits. That said, Grandparents expressed
concern that Father was telling J.F. during visits that he did not need to
listen to anyone but Father, which resulted in behavioral issues after visits.
When the visit supervisor asked Father not to discuss Grandparents
during visits or tell J.F. that he did not need to listen to them, Father became
agitated and called his attorney, then asked J.F. to play somewhere else
while he showed the supervisor a video. During the same visit, J.F.
accidentally collided with another child at a skate park. The collision
appears to have been a run-of-the-mill playground accident, and Father had
previously explained to J.F. the importance of safety and being aware of his
surroundings while skating, but the Department nonetheless expressed
concern that Father’s full attention was not on J.F.
The Department requested a meeting with Father and his attorney to
discuss the case, during which the Department raised this concern, among
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several others. Father insisted that any allegations against him were false,
hearsay, and inadmissible. He asserted he was doing “perfectly” and accused
the Department of “baiting him constantly to make him fail and keep his
child away from him.” Father also objected to social workers meeting with
J.F. outside his presence, accusing them of “manipulating or coercing” J.F.
The social worker also addressed Father’s failure to schedule a psychological
evaluation. Despite previously agreeing to undergo an evaluation, Father
now refused, stating that he did one in the previous dependency case and
“was fine” and was found to be “a great father.” He also disputed the need to
do many of the services in his case plan and again accused the Department of
coercion. The meeting ended after Father allegedly said the social worker
was a “slave,” he was a “master,” and she had to do what he told her to do.
Father disputes using the word “slave” and claims he said “servant,” as in
“public servant.”
Father declined to consent to therapy for J.F. He also initially declined
service referrals for himself, though he accepted housing support referrals.
Father later agreed to accept parenting education and therapy referrals as
well.
ii. Mother
As noted above, the original dependency case resulted in an order of no
visitation for Mother. This time, Mother requested visitation at the detention
hearing and the court indicated it would grant that request, but there was no
written order entered before the case was transferred to San Mateo County.
The San Mateo County Human Services Agency, concerned that Mother had
not satisfied the requirements of her prior case plan, filed an ex parte
application to stop Mother’s visits. The San Mateo court found that the no-
visitation order from 2022 was still in effect and deferred to Sonoma County
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to address any renewed request for visitation upon transfer. When Mother
learned her visits would stop, she “cried and was very disappointed.”
Upon transfer back to Sonoma County, the Department filed a notice of
Mother’s request for visitation and supported reinstating visitation once
Mother had completed an alcohol and drug assessment and provided a
negative drug test. The court held a hearing on August 7, 2025, during which
the Department supported visitation with time, place, and manner subject to
its discretion. Father expressed concern about restarting visits and
requested a hair-follicle drug test, but the court viewed that as unnecessary
because the initial visits would be electronic. The court then granted the
request for Mother’s visitation.
The Zoom visits, when they did occur, were generally positive.
Although Mother was late to a few of them, the reason for delay for one visit
was the need to download Zoom, and she was on time to all visits after a
social worker suggested she log in ten minutes early. Mother was engaged
and attentive during the calls and interacted appropriately with J.F. J.F.
expressed a desire to move to in-person visits with Mother.
As to services, Mother was a patient of Ward 93, where she reported
that she attended outpatient treatment three times per week, participated in
random drug testing, and received methadone. Social workers from both
counties were concerned that Ward 93 did not qualify as intensive outpatient
treatment and that the drug testing only occurred once per month and was
not supervised. They encouraged Mother to complete an alcohol and drug
assessment and to submit to more frequent supervised drug testing, but she
initially declined.
Mother later agreed to complete the assessment. She scheduled and
then cancelled the assessment due to stress. She then rescheduled and
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appeared for her appointment, but billing issues delayed the appointment
again. The assessment center offered to perform the assessment remotely,
but Mother never followed up, and as of the date of the dispositional hearing
had not completed the assessment. Mother also continued to decline the
Department’s invitations to submit to drug tests in addition to those
administered by Ward 93, explaining that additional testing would cause
stress and the testing center would take her three hours to reach by bus.
Mother welcomed therapy referrals, but there was confusion about
which county she needed to be seen in. She was excited to take parenting
classes and reported that she had signed up for several of them.
c. Dispositional Hearing and Orders
In its dispositional report, the Department recommended that J.F. be
declared a dependent of the court and continue to be placed with
Grandparents, and that reunification services be provided to both parents.
As to Father, the Department argued Father “continue[d] not to take full
accountability for the issues in his case. [Father] has continued to make
statements that he will parent his child how he sees fit regardless of the
Department’s . . . concerns.” In addition, Father disagreed with the services
recommendations and “feels that he did not do anything wrong.” As to
Mother, the Department cited her history of substance abuse and argued that
she “has a history of failing to engage in any services including random drug
testing and not maintaining contact with the department or other service
providers.” As such, in the Department’s view, there was “no evidence at this
time to suggest the mother is able to safely care for [J.F.]” The Department
also acknowledged that Mother was eligible for bypass, but it contended that
providing services would be in the best interest of J.F. based on Mother’s
continued sobriety and J.F.’s expressed desire to see and speak with her.
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The court held a dispositional hearing on October 27, 2025. Social
workers from both Sonoma and San Mateo counties testified. The Sonoma
County social worker testified that the Department’s safety concerns as to
Father stemmed from the excessive spanking and a “power dynamic” between
Father and J.F., as well as between Father and others involved in the case, in
which Father’s attitude is “ ‘I am going to continue to do what I want to do.’ ”
She testified that the power dynamic was harmful to J.F., including because
J.F. did not always understand why he was being punished, and without
services, she believed the dynamic would continue. As to Mother, the
Sonoma County social worker testified that it was in J.F.’s best interests for
Mother to receive services based on J.F.’s expressed desire to have a
relationship with Mother and Mother’s changed circumstances, although she
acknowledged that Mother’s follow-through had at times been disappointing.
The San Mateo County social worker testified that Father told her he
regretted the spanking that led to this case and cried afterwards. The San
Mateo social worker also testified that if her office still had the case, it would
have recommended reunification services for Mother—something it viewed as
an easy decision—and would have increased Father’s in-person visits to help
assess whether to request family maintenance or reunification services.
Father then testified. Father explained that he spanked J.F. after J.F.
“sharted” in his pants five times and Father cleaned him up each time.
Father asked him to stop and warned him that he would give J.F. “ ‘a
spanking bare butt’ ” if he continued to poop in his pants. When J.F. did it
again, Father spanked him. Father testified that when he saw the bruise, he
apologized to J.F. and cried. Father said he had spanked J.F. over the pants
on other occasions but had never left a bruise and never used an object to
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spank. Father also testified that after discovering the bruise, he called
Grandparents and told them he needed more help from them.
When asked whether Father would continue to use spanking as a
method of discipline, Father responded, “Definitely not. Not gonna ever,
ever, ever spank my kid ever, ever, ever again. It’s not even necessary. [¶] It
was actionably through threat, duress and coercion of a previous property
[¶] . . . [¶] that my anxiety was elevated to a point to where it was unnatural
because—because of the stress that I went through from my property
abatement and prior case with that.”
When asked how his actions resulted in the pending case, Father had a
two-fold answer. First, by “stating to county counsel that it was my
humanitarian right to provide safe shelter for my child,” he had provoked
someone into making “a false CPS report.” Second, there was “the one-time
disciplinary action, the spanking that resulted after one year of . . . the school
watching me and harassing us, waiting . . . till I made the one mistake and
they came and got him.” It was “that one-time disciplinary action, spanking,
that is never gonna happen again, [that was] the reason—other than the . . .
false CPS report.”
And when asked to elaborate on his allegations that the case was the
result of threat, duress, and coercion, Father began to speak very rapidly and
said that both law enforcement and the social worker had threatened and
coerced him on May 1, 2025, at the elementary school. When asked why he
refused to agree to a psychological evaluation, Father said, “Well, because all
of the things that have been creative have—have been given out of threat,
duress and coercion, and we all know those are all null and void.” He went
on to state that he underwent a psychological evaluation in the prior case and
another was not needed here.
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When asked what services he would agree to going forward, Father
only mentioned breath work. He went on, “I want to answer that I’m willing
to do things; but the truth is all this is done through threat, duress and
coercion; and I’m not willing to continue on really other than being forced for
the safety and well-being of my child I would have to continue [¶] . . . [¶] I
don’t necessarily know how to answer it because I’m doing this against my
free will.”
The court then heard argument from the Department and J.F.’s
attorney on whether to bypass Mother or provide services. Those attorneys
and the court agreed that Mother had not demonstrated the level of
commitment they had hoped for, including based on her refusal to drug test
and her tardiness to visits and court dates. The Department and J.F.’s
counsel nonetheless maintained that J.F. would benefit from giving Mother
another chance.
Mother then asked to speak. While her comments were not sworn
testimony, they may nonetheless bear on the court’s ultimate orders. Mother
first argued that Father sexually, physically, and financially abused her for
seven years, she had warned that he would abuse J.F. during the prior case,
“and he is now abusing my son exactly how he abused me.” Mother explained
that it was traumatic for her to even sit in the same room as Father, and she
apologized that she was not “enthusiastic about the whole CPS situation,” but
she said it was “literally [her] worst nightmare” for her “abuser [to get] [her]
son.” She emphasized that she has been in outpatient treatment for three
years, she served her sentence, and she did not “deserve to never see [her]
son again.” She also stated she “would love nothing more than for [her] and
[Father] to just be able to be adults and co-parent. . . . [¶] All the times he
said he . . . he didn’t have help, I would’ve loved to help him.”
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In their closing arguments, the Department and counsel for J.F. and
Mother all argued against returning J.F. to Father’s physical custody,
stressing his lack of acknowledgment of the seriousness of the issue, his
repeated insistence that he will parent the way that he wants, and concern
that without services, Father will again use excessive corporal punishment
when stressed.
Following the testimony and arguments of counsel, the court found
placement with either parent would be detrimental to J.F. and ordered that
J.F. remain in the home of Grandparents, family reunification services be
provided to both parents, and regular visitation be provided to both parents,
with the time, place, and manner at the discretion of the Department. As to
ordering reunification services for Father instead of family maintenance, the
court explained: “I do believe there was excessive corporal punishment.
There is a level of lack of insight on father that I would ask him to please
have an open mind about and—when you’re exposed to some therapies and
counseling. [¶] What I really wanted to see today, sir, and what I was hoping
for is for you to say things like ‘I need to learn, when I get frustrated and
upset, how I can prevent that from transferring in to the rest of my life.’ ”
The court also found Mother was eligible for bypass under section
361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(13), but nevertheless ordered reunification
services because reunification would be in the best interests of the child.
DISCUSSION
Father challenges multiple aspects of the order removing J.F. from his
custody, as well as the court’s order of reunification services to Mother. We
turn first to the removal order, then briefly address Mother’s reunification
services.
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I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Removal Order
Before a juvenile court may order a child removed from his or her
parent’s physical custody, the court must find there is clear and convincing
evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the child’s physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being if returned
home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child without
removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “In determining whether a child may be safely
maintained in the parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider
the parent’s past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In
re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) The court must also determine
whether reasonable efforts were made to eliminate the need for removal and
“state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” (§ 361,
subd. (e).)
We review the court’s removal order for substantial evidence. (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) Under this standard, we construe the
evidence in favor of the prevailing party and resolving doubts in favor of the
trial court’s order. (B.D. v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132,
1150; In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Where a finding
must be based on clear and convincing evidence, as a removal finding does,
the question is whether “the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that
the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law
requires in a particular case.” (Yvonne W., at p. 1401.) In our review for
substantial evidence, “ ‘[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
19
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the trial court.’ ” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 676, 689 (Kevin R.).)
a. The Risk of Substantial Danger Finding
Father contends that although he did not contest detention or
jurisdiction, clear and convincing evidence does not support the juvenile
court’s finding of a risk of substantial danger to J.F.’s physical and mental
well-being in his home, given the differing standards that apply at each
stage. He argues there was no evidence of any other instance of excessive
corporal punishment, and he asserts that a single instance of past abuse
cannot justify removal in the absence of an ongoing risk of harm. Father also
asserts that the record of supervised visits demonstrates that Father
exercised patience and appropriate guidance and correction toward J.F., and
Father testified at trial that his attitude toward spanking had changed.
Father acknowledges, however, that a single instance of harmful
conduct may be sufficient to establish ongoing risk, depending on the
circumstances. “In evaluating risk based upon a single episode of
endangering conduct, a juvenile court should consider the nature of the
conduct and all surrounding circumstances.” (In re J.N. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025 (J.N.).) “It should also consider the present
circumstances, which might include, among other things, evidence of the
parent’s current understanding of and attitude toward the past conduct that
endangered a child, or participation in educational programs, or other steps
taken, by the parent to address the problematic conduct in the interim . . .
that would help a parent avoid a recurrence of such an incident.” (Id. at
pp. 1025–1026.) A parent’s lack of insight into the issues leading to the
dependency case can support a finding of an ongoing risk of harm. (See, e.g.,
20
In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
159, 170; J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1025–1026.)
The juvenile court found, and Father does not dispute, that Father
administered excessive corporal punishment resulting in serious bruising.
The juvenile court then determined that there was an ongoing risk of
substantial harm based on Father’s “lack of insight” and refusal to take
responsibility for his role in the incident or to take steps to address its
underlying causes. The juvenile court spoke at length about the importance
of learning strategies to deal with stress, underscoring it believed that
without services, there was a risk Father would again engage in excessive
corporal punishment. Although Father cites evidence pointing in the
opposite direction, we conclude substantial evidence does support the juvenile
court’s finding.
First, Father minimized the seriousness of the excessive spanking
incident and refused to acknowledge the dependency case resulted from his
actions, rather than a conspiracy. He repeatedly referred to a dark bruise the
size of an adult’s hand as a “ ‘little’ ” bruise and “ ‘no big deal.’ ” Father
several times insisted that he had done nothing wrong, blamed Grandparents
for not helping him enough, and accused Grandparents, J.F.’s elementary
school, and Sonoma County of various conspiracies against him. When asked
during the hearing how his own actions contributed to the case, for example,
Father blamed the county for allegedly making a false report against him,
the school for “watching me and harassing us, waiting till I . . . made the one
mistake,” and the county for subjecting him to stress through “threat, duress
and coercion” related to his property.
Second, Father took no steps to address “the problematic conduct,”
instead insisting on multiple occasions that he would parent how he saw fit.
21
(See J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1026.) Father refused to engage in
safety planning. On two occasions, when J.F. told Father he wasn’t allowed
to spank or hit J.F. anymore, Father responded that Father would do what he
wants. Father also freely admitted that he felt stressed and overwhelmed by
being a single parent, he needed more help, and he felt stressed when he
spanked J.F. Yet Father declined the majority of services offered to him and
refused to undergo a psychological evaluation. When asked at the hearing
what services he would be willing to engage in, he made clear he would not
voluntarily participate in any services other than breath work sessions, and
that his participation in services was through “threat, duress and coercion.”
Father points out that he testified at trial he would not spank J.F.
again. He also points to the largely positive records of his supervised visits.
Both of these are important facts, and perhaps they could have led the
juvenile court to a different decision on whether to remove J.F. from Father’s
care, but it is not our role to make credibility determinations or reweigh the
evidence; instead, our role is to determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the juvenile court’s findings, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the court’s order. (Kevin R., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 688–
689.) In our view, the evidence is sufficient for the juvenile court to have
found by clear and convincing evidence that there was an ongoing risk of
substantial danger to J.F. in Father’s custody based on the incident of
excessive corporal punishment and Father’s lack of insight into and failure to
address the circumstances leading to the dependency proceedings. (See In re
Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a problem
one fails to acknowledge”].)
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b. The Lack of Alternatives Finding1
Father next contends that the juvenile court’s implied finding of a lack
of reasonable alternatives to removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1)
was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Section 361 provides that “[t]he court shall consider, as a reasonable
means to protect the minor,” the option of removing the “offending parent”
from the home and allowing “a nonoffending parent” to retain physical
custody if that parent can present a plan acceptable to the court
demonstrating he or she can protect the child from future harm. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1)(A)–(B).) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
implied finding that this option was not available here. Father and J.F. lived
alone, so Father’s removal would have left J.F. without a caregiver, and
placement with Mother was not an option based on Mother’s history of
substance abuse.
Father argues there were viable options not specified in the statute,
such as unannounced visits, public health nursing services, or in-home
counseling services, which he faults the court for failing to consider. But the
record shows the court did consider whether family maintenance services
were appropriate and concluded they were not. At different points during the
hearing, the court confirmed it understood Father was seeking family
maintenance services in the alternative to dismissal, and it pushed witnesses
and counsel to address the appropriateness of family maintenance. While no
one at the hearing raised the specific options now advanced by Father,
counsel for the Department and counsel for J.F. did argue that “return home
1 The parties both address the lack of reasonable alternatives and
reasonable efforts findings together. Because they are required by separate
subdivisions of section 361, we treat them separately. (See In re L.G. (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1231–1235 (L.G.) [analyzing arguments separately].)
23
on family maintenance” services was not yet appropriate, citing Father’s lack
of accountability and understanding of the safety concerns, Father’s refusal
to engage in services, and the risk of repeated abuse if Father became
overwhelmed. Before issuing its decision, the court recessed “to review the
document more fully, think about the arguments that I’ve heard to determine
if it should be family maintenance or reunification.”
The court then determined that reunification services were
appropriate, impliedly finding that maintenance services were not a
reasonable alternative to protect J.F. at that time. The same evidence that
supported the substantial danger finding supports this conclusion. (See In re
John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127 [court may reasonably determine
based on prior conduct that child could not be safely returned to parent]; In re
Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 918 (Cole C.) [rejecting argument that
less intrusive measures were available where father refused services; child
could not be returned home safely until father “acknowledged the
inappropriate nature of his parenting techniques and disciplinary methods”].)
In addition, the evidence is sufficient for the court to have found by
clear and convincing evidence that Father was unlikely to have cooperated
with unannounced visits or other in-home services based on his expressed
view that the county conspired against him, his combative response
whenever social workers provided constructive criticism, and his objection to
social workers meeting with J.F. without Father being present. (See In re
D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 997 [rejecting argument that court failed to
consider unannounced visits or public nursing services as alternatives to
removal based on mother’s extreme difficulty in working with service
providers and her refusal to allow uninhibited access to the children or
unannounced visits].)
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c. The Reasonable Efforts Finding
Father next contends that substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to
prevent removal. The Department responds that Father forfeited this issue
by failing to raise it in the juvenile court, and in the alternative, it argues
substantial evidence supports the court’s determination and any error was
harmless. Father did not file a reply brief.
Turning first to the Department’s forfeiture argument, “as a general
rule, failure to object in the juvenile court forfeits a parent’s right to pursue
an issue on appeal.” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 724.) The goal of
the forfeiture rule is to prevent litigants from acquiescing before the juvenile
court and later seeking relief for error that could have been prevented or
cured. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412.) “ ‘The contention that
a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, however, is an obvious
exception to the rule.’ ” (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464,
quoting Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17.)
“[W]hen the merits of a case are contested, a parent is not required to object
to the agency’s failure to carry its burden of proof.” (Javier G., at p. 464.)
Moreover, even where a challenge may be subject to forfeiture, application of
the forfeiture rule is not automatic, and we therefore proceed to address
Father’s arguments on their merits.
Section 361, subdivision (e) requires the juvenile court to “make a
determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to
eliminate the need for removal of the minor from their home.” Here, the
court found such efforts were made. Father faults the juvenile court for not
adequately explaining its determination, which is a separate issue we discuss
in more detail below. As to whether sufficient evidence supported the
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determination, Father contends the Department’s disposition report failed to
include a “discussion of the reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate
removal,” as required by the California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i)
(Rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i)). Instead, the report “simply recite[s] the steps taken
by the Department in its investigation”: “The following reasonable efforts
have been provided to the parents: [¶]1. Supervised in-person visits with the
father; [¶]2. Scheduling zoom visits with the mother; [¶]3. In person and
phone interviews; [¶]4. TEAM meeting and case planning; [¶]5. Referral for
[alcohol and other drug] assessment and testing for the mother.”
Our colleagues in Division Four recently concluded that a similar list of
phrases, without identification of the risks to the child or potential
interventions to mitigate the risks, or an evaluation of any such potential
interventions, did “not meet rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i)’s requirement of a
‘discussion’ ” and was not substantial evidence of reasonable efforts. (L.G.,
supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 1233.) We agree with Father and L.G. that the
disposition report’s list neither complied with rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i) nor
constituted substantial evidence in support of the juvenile court’s reasonable
efforts finding.
Unlike L.G., however, where the record lacked evidence that referrals
to relevant services were actually made or followed up on or that the
department there investigated readily available alternatives to removal
(L.G., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1233–1235), other portions of the record
here contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that
the Department made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. As part of our
analysis of the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts, we consider
Father’s receptiveness to services; as the Department correctly points out, a
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parent’s failure to accept services does not render the Department’s efforts
unreasonable. (See Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.)
At the outset of the case, the Department tried to safety plan with
Father to avoid removal, but Father refused to engage. The Department and
its counterpart in San Mateo County offered Father service referrals,
including for housing support, parenting classes, and individual therapy.
Father initially declined some of these services and, when later accepting
them, expressed the view that he did not need them. The Department sought
psychological testing to best tailor services for Father, but Father refused.
The Department sought permission to enroll J.F. in therapy, which Father
also refused. The Department held a TEAM meeting and developed a case
plan for Father. It also facilitated weekly in-person supervised visits and
attempted to provide Father with feedback on the visits, including through a
meeting with his attorney, but Father reacted defensively to the feedback,
and the meeting ended after Father referred to the social worker as a slave
(or servant) and himself as a master. These efforts were reasonably aimed at
addressing the causes of the dependency proceeding, including Father’s stress
about the code enforcement action, his inability to effectively manage stress,
and his quick resort to corporal punishment. (See D.D., supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 997 [efforts to prevent removal, including provision of
counseling services to parent and children, were reasonable, and failure to
provide public nursing or unannounced visits did not render them
unreasonable].)
d. The Statement of Facts Supporting Removal
Father’s final challenge to the removal order concerns section 361,
subdivision (e)’s requirement that the juvenile court “state the facts on which
the decision to remove the minor is based.” “The requirement for . . . a
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statement by the court of the facts supporting removal (§ 361, subd. (d)),
play[s] [an] important role[] in [the child dependency] scheme.” (In re Ashly
F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 810.) Without it, “there is a danger the
agency’s declarations that there were ‘no reasonable means’ other than
removal ‘by which the [child’s] physical or emotional health may be protected’
and that ‘reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for
removal’ can become merely a hollow formula designed to achieve the result
the agency seeks.” (Ibid.)
Father contends that the juvenile court “provided no explanation for its
removal and reasonable efforts findings” and “did not ‘state the facts’ in
support of a finding that reasonable efforts were made.” We agree with
Father only in part. In our view, the court’s comments at the end of the
disposition hearing focusing on the excessive punishment, lack of insight, and
lack of engagement in services adequately stated the facts supporting its
section 361, subdivision (c)(1) findings that there would be a substantial
danger to J.F. if returned to Father’s home and there were no reasonable
alternatives to removal. The court did not, however, sufficiently state facts in
support of its finding that the Department undertook reasonable efforts to
prevent removal. The transcript is silent as to this issue, and the written
order contains nothing beyond a check-box indicating the court found
reasonable efforts were provided.
The question, then, is whether the court’s failure to state the facts
supporting its reasonable efforts determination was harmless. Cases
addressing a court’s obligation to make such findings “ ‘have held the failure
to do so will be deemed harmless where “it is not reasonably probable such
finding, if made, would have been in favor of continued parental custody.” ’ ”
(In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 247 (L.O.).) “[T]his is because a
28
removal order ‘is subject to the constitutional mandate that no judgment
shall be set aside “unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence, the [appellate] court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Under this
mandate, a ‘miscarriage of justice’ will be declared only when the appellate
court, after examining the entire case, is of the opinion that ‘ “it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1068.)
We conclude this error was harmless. As discussed above, the record as
a whole demonstrated that the Department did, in fact, make reasonable
efforts to prevent removal. Had the court properly stated the facts
supporting its finding, there is not a reasonable possibility that it would have
reached a result more favorable to Father on this point. (See L.O., supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 247 [concluding it was not reasonably probable child could
be returned home, even if court had adequately stated facts supporting
reasonable efforts determination].)
II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering Reunification
Services for Mother
A juvenile court must generally provide reunification services to
parents when children are removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5,
subd. (a).) But in certain circumstances where reunification efforts are likely
to be futile, the court may decline to order reunification services. (In re I.A.
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23.) “The statutory sections authorizing denial of
reunification services are commonly referred to as ‘ “bypass” ’ provisions.”
(Ibid.) “Once it has been determined one of the situations enumerated in
section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, ‘ “ ‘the general rule favoring
29
reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services
would be an unwise use of governmental resources.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 24.)
Accordingly, once the court determines that certain bypass provisions apply,
it “shall not order reunification . . . unless the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.”
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
It is the parent’s burden to prove that the child would benefit from
court-ordered services. (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
1113, 1124 (Jennifer S.).) The juvenile court has broad discretion to
determine whether reunification services would be in the best interest of the
child. (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164–1165 (G.L.).) As part of
this determination, the court may consider “ ‘the parent’s current efforts,
fitness, and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to the
dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child bonds; and
the child’s need for stability and continuity.’ ” (Jennifer S., at p. 1124.)
We review the court’s best-interest determination for abuse of
discretion. (Jennifer S., 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1124–1125.) We do not make
credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. (A.A. v. Superior Court
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237, 242). “To show abuse of discretion, the appellant
must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.” (In re Joey G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 343, 346.) “If the juvenile
court’s finding that further services would be in the child[]’s best interest is
not supported by substantial evidence, then the order for such services
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124,
1141.)
30
Father and the Department agree with the juvenile court’s finding that
Mother was eligible for bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) for
failure to reunify with J.F. and his half-sibling and subdivision (b)(13), given
her history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and
resistance to prior court-ordered treatment during the three years
immediately prior to the filing of the petition. They disagree about whether
the juvenile court abused its discretion when it concluded that reunification
services for Mother were in J.F.’s best interests.
Father highlights evidence weighing against the juvenile court’s
finding, including Mother’s arrest history, jail time, relinquishment of J.F.’s
half-sister, and extensive substance abuse history. He also argues that her
current Ward 93 treatment program is not a sufficient outpatient substance
abuse program, that Mother was several minutes late to two virtual visits
with J.F., and that she has no real bond with him. Father concludes that the
court improperly based its order on hope and compassion, rather than
evidence. The Department concedes there was evidence to support the
opposite finding but insists there was ample evidence to support the court’s
decision to order services.
We agree with the Department. (See G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1166.) The record contained evidence that Mother used her time in jail to
begin her recovery, and she reported she had been sober since her
incarceration in 2023. She attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings and
enrolled in the Ward 93 program well before the dependency proceedings
began. Her drug tests through that program were negative, and though the
testing was not observed, there was no evidence that Mother had relapsed.
Mother attended all visits with J.F., and there was evidence that one of two
times she was late to a visit was due to downloading the Zoom application.
31
She interacted appropriately with J.F. and was attentive during these visits,
and J.F. expressed a desire to spend time with her in person and to continue
to build a relationship with her.
While the Department expressed disappointment that Mother had not
demonstrated better follow-through, social workers from both counties
testified that reunification services were in J.F.’s best interest, and the court
was entitled to give great weight to their testimony. (See Cole C., supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 918.) Moreover, although Mother explained that past
trauma from Father’s alleged abuse and the prior dependency case made it
difficult for her to engage, she expressed a strong desire to build a
relationship with J.F.
In light of this evidence, it was not an abuse of discretion to order
reunification services for Mother. (See G.L., supra, at pp. 1165–1166
[sustained sobriety efforts and positive visits supported reunification services
order].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional orders are affirmed. In the interests
of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
TUCHER, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
In re J.F. (A175215)
32