Filed 6/18/26 In re J.D. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re J.D., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL A175105
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Alameda County Super. Ct.
v. No. JD-035805-01)
K.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
K.M. (mother) appeals a juvenile court order denying her request to
return her son, J.D., to her custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22,
undesignated statutory references are to this code.) She argues there was
insufficient evidence that returning J.D. presented a substantial risk of
detriment to his physical and emotional well-being. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We are familiar with the facts of this case, having recently considered
them in a related dependency writ involving mother’s youngest son, J.C.
(K.M. v. Superior Court (Feb. 9, 2026, A175113) 2026 Cal.App. Lexis 932
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[nonpub. opn.].)1 Mother also has a 16-year-old son, A.S. Neither are the
subjects of this appeal. The facts relevant to J.D. are discussed below.
In January 2023, mother reportedly left the children unsupervised at
home in Berkeley for between five and six hours. A.S., who was 12 years old
at the time, was left to watch his younger siblings. He fell asleep, and J.D.
wandered alone outside the apartment searching for mother. Officers who
responded to the home observed J.D. in soiled pull-ups filled with layers of
hardened feces. Feces leaked out of the pull-up onto his leg. The soiled pull-
up resulted in severe diaper rash on J.D.’s buttocks and legs. It also
appeared that the home had not been cleaned in months, and it smelled of
spoiled food, urine, and feces. The children’s room did not have any beds,
indicating they slept on the floor. When mother returned home, she attacked
law enforcement. She was under the influence, and officers arrested her.
The three children were ultimately detained, and J.C. and J.D. were placed
in the same resource family home.
Based on this incident, the Alameda County Social Services Agency
(Agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition for all three children. As
relevant here, the Agency alleged there was a substantial risk of J.D.
suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of mother’s inability to
adequately supervise or protect him, her failure to provide him with adequate
food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment, and her inability to care for him
due to her own substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A), (C), (D).)
1 J.C. was also the subject of the dependency petition, and the juvenile
court heard the matters related to him as well. We denied mother’s writ
petition seeking extraordinary relief from an order terminating reunification
services and setting a permanency planning hearing for J.C. (K.M. v.
Superior Court, supra, A175113.)
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According to the Agency’s jurisdiction and disposition report, J.D. —
then five years old — threatened to kill himself, mother, and his siblings. He
had significant tantrums, involving screaming, hitting his head against the
wall, and punching himself in the head. His caregiver reported that he
played with his own feces and struggled to independently use the bathroom.
Sometimes, he smeared feces on the bathroom wall and pulled out his hair
when frustrated. Although he displayed developmental concerns — including
speech delays and hyperactivity — he did not have any severe developmental
diagnosis. Rather, a developmental specialist noted he showed signs of
significant trauma and autism. His teacher reported he only knew about 20
letters and could only count to eight.
J.D. also exhibited sexualized behaviors, such as flicking his and J.C.’s
genitals. In conversations with the Agency social worker, mother alluded to
concerns A.S. had previously sexually abused J.D. while staying at their
grandmother’s house. When she tried to discuss the issue with J.D., he gave
conflicting statements — alternatively indicating that A.S. hurt him and
touched his private parts, and denying anything occurred. In the report, the
social worker expressed concerns regarding J.D.’s clear neglect, trauma,
potential sexual abuse, and mother leaving J.D. in A.S.’s care despite
indications of sexual abuse.
Mother reported being drug free for several years and that she had
been attending an outpatient substance abuse treatment program in San
Francisco, where she received methadone. J.C.’s father reported seeing
mother give J.D. methadone to calm him down. The social worker gave
mother referrals to different programs to receive support but, despite
program efforts to connect, she failed to respond. After several weeks,
mother completed prescreenings and preassessments with the programs.
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At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court found the petition allegations true, declared J.D. and his siblings
dependents, and removed them from her custody. It also ordered family
reunification services and mother to comply with her case plan, which
included completing parenting classes, taking accountability for her actions
that led to the removal of the children, participating in outpatient treatment,
complying with random drug testing, and maintaining a suitable residence
for herself and the children free of possible hazards.
During the reunification period, mother demonstrated progress with
certain aspects of her case plan. Initially, she tested positive for alcohol on
three consecutive dates and missed drug testing. Later, she regularly tested
for drugs and alcohol and was consistently negative. She also participated in
parenting services and individual therapy, reporting that she benefited from
services to address her anxiety and depression. Mother and the children
attended family therapy to cope with past trauma, increase stability with
foster care, and repair her relationship with the children. She acknowledged
leaving J.D. in her older son’s care so she could obtain her methadone from
the clinic in San Francisco. She also explained that the poor condition of her
home — which ultimately led to J.D.’s removal — was the result of her
depression. But she denied giving J.D. methadone to calm him and instead
blamed A.S. for giving it to him.
After initial failures to maintain a residence free of hazards, blocked
exits, and excessive trash — all to be verified by an Agency social worker —
mother eventually organized her home two years after the dispositional
hearing. She cleared the walkways, organized the kitchen and stocked it
with food, and placed beds in the children’s room. She recommended A.S.
and J.D. sleep in separate rooms to prevent additional sexual abuse. Mother
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also installed a lock box in her closet with a combination lock to store her
methadone. But some problems remained — her bed was broken and piled
with clothing and household items, a kitchen light did not work, and she
needed to confirm whether she had electricity. The Agency explained she
could not have overnight visits with J.D. until these issues were addressed.
In addition, while mother had a smaller lockbox for transporting her
methadone, it was not locked or in the closet. The Agency advised mother to
keep her portable box locked inside the closet lockbox at all times.
Mother also consistently attended her supervised visitation at a family
center with J.D. She eventually progressed to four-hour unsupervised visits
in the community near the children’s various placements; later, she had ten-
hour visits on the weekend. Though she appeared to resolve initial issues
related to arriving late or completely missing supervised visits, the Agency
social worker voiced concerns that the behaviors that resulted in J.D.’s
removal were still present. Mother frequently externalized blame onto others
for various issues she had when supporting her children. For example, when
engaging in supervised visits, she did not want to continue visits at a certain
host organization based on claims that it made false reports regarding her
participation. But those reports simply documented mother’s tardiness or
failure to attend visits —13 times over the course of approximately three
months.
Mother failed to make significant progress on other issues. At one
point, she was at risk of losing her housing due to difficulties paying rent.
The Agency referred her to a housing organization for rental assistance. It
recommended she participate in a rapid rehousing program that offers
financial support for families living in affordable housing and assists parents
in finding stable employment. But mother expressed displeasure with the
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recommendation, and she stopped communicating with it. The organization
eventually closed her case based on its policy of terminating services if clients
failed to communicate for more than 30 days. The Agency thus continued to
have concerns about mother’s ability to obtain and maintain a stable and
suitable residence. Indeed, by the 18-month review hearing, mother had lost
her housing.
General concerns regarding mother’s ability to attend scheduled
appointments also persisted. She canceled or rescheduled meetings at the
last minute. The Agency social worker repeatedly attempted to contact
mother by phone, but she failed to return messages. She expressed a
preference to communicate through email, but she would send lengthy,
meandering emails to the Agency that were difficult to decipher.
J.D. also demonstrated progress and setbacks during the reunification
period. He was placed with a new caregiver. He improved his toileting and
control over bowel movements, but he continued to display indications of
sexual abuse, such as stating imaginary friends did inappropriate things to
him in the shower. He attended school and an aftercare program, had an
individualized education program, and special education services had been
requested. But the Agency social worker reported J.D. — now six years
old — had a mental health crisis. After a psychiatric visit during which he
reported wanting to kill himself, he was placed on a psychiatric hold,
diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder and post-traumatic
stress disorder, and prescribed medication to address his hyperactivity,
impulsivity, and anxiety. He exhibited severe symptoms of trauma and
neglect, stated that he no longer wanted to live, and expressed desires to kill
his younger brother. He struggled in school — at one point, touching a
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female classmate’s breasts — and had difficulty following the rules in his
placement home.
By April 2025, the Agency recommended that J.D. continue as a
dependent in an out-of-home placement and reunification services be
terminated. At a review hearing held over the course of several months, the
Agency social worker expressed concerns that placing J.D. with mother would
significantly increase mother’s parenting responsibilities — a marked change
from her visits that were, at the time, limited in time and frequency outside
in the community. Indeed, the Agency asked mother to increase visitation to
a full day so she could demonstrate her ability to care for the children for
longer periods of time. But mother disagreed with that length of time
because she was not available in the morning during weekdays. And though
mother identified three people who could provide childcare support when she
needed to be away from J.D., she failed to provide the Agency contact
information for those individuals for verification. Moreover, J.D. often
became dysregulated after visits with mother, particularly when the visits
were longer and unsupervised.
An Agency social worker supervisor further reported mother’s
difficulties with time management during the unsupervised visitation. She
struggled to arrive or drop the children back off on time. In one incident, she
dropped off one child 50 minutes late. Another incident involved her car
battery dying, and the caregiver having to pick up the child at 10:30 p.m.,
three hours after the scheduled return time.
The juvenile court found A.S. could be returned to mother’s custody but
returning J.D. and J.C. would create a substantial risk of detriment to their
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being. For J.D., the court
highlighted his history of suicidal ideation, statements about killing J.C., and
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his significant psychiatric and developmental needs that required a high level
of supervision that mother had not demonstrated her ability to address on a
full-time basis. Mother, the court further explained, demonstrated a chronic
lack of follow through with referrals, which was significant given the various
important medical, psychological, and educational appointments J.D.
required. The court terminated reunification services but did not set a
permanency planning hearing because J.D. was not a proper subject of
adoption or guardianship at that time.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s detriment finding. Having reviewed this finding for substantial
evidence — examining the record for any evidence, “contradicted or
uncontradicted, which would support” the court’s conclusion, resolving all
conflicts and inferences in support of the order — we disagree. (In re John V.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212; In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1394, 1400 (Yvonne W.).)
“The dependency scheme is based on the law’s strong preference for
maintaining family relationships whenever possible.” (Yvonne W., supra,
165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400.) It contains legal safeguards “to prevent
unwarranted or arbitrary continuation of out-of-home placement.” (Ibid.)
Courts generally order reunification services to parents whose children have
been removed from their custody to “facilitate the return of children to
parental custody.” (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470; In re
Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112; § 361.5, subd. (a).) There is “a
statutory presumption that a dependent child will be returned to parental
custody” until the court terminates reunification services. (Yvonne W.,
at p. 1400.)
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Generally, reunification services are provided “for a maximum of 18
months after a child has been removed from parental custody.” (Michael G.
v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 625; § 366.22, subd. (a).) At the end
of this period, the juvenile court must return the child to the parent’s custody
unless it determines return would create a substantial risk of detriment to
the child’s “safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1); Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400.)
The Agency must demonstrate a substantial risk of detriment, a fairly high
standard. (Yvonne W., at p. 1400.) The party challenging the detriment
finding must demonstrate it is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re
L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the
detriment finding because she complied with and completed her case plan.
While “the juvenile court must consider the extent to which the parent
participated in reunification services,” compliance with a case plan and
services is not determinative. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400;
(In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143; § 366.22, subd. (a).)
Rather, the court must also “consider the efforts or progress the parent has
made toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home
placement.” (Yvonne W., at p. 1400.) Substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that mother has not achieved that here.
True, mother did make progress on her case plan — regularly testing
negative for alcohol and drugs, eventually cleaning and organizing her home,
progressing to unsupervised visitation. But as the juvenile court found,
mother displayed a chronic failure to attend necessary appointments and
complete referrals. (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th
1322, 1342 [examining whether parent kept appointments when making
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detriment findings].) Even though she was at risk of losing her housing due
to rental arrears, she failed to communicate with the housing agency
specifically referred to her for rental assistance. She eventually lost her
housing. She also regularly canceled or rescheduled meetings with the
Agency, which stymied its ability to assess her progress towards reunifying
with J.D. (Compare with id. at pp. 1341–1342 [parent attended all individual
counseling sessions, completed parenting course, participated in a parenting
group, was in general compliance with case plan, “responded to comments,
and kept [social worker] informed of pertinent changes”].) This persistent
issue is critical given J.D.’s significant psychiatric and educational needs. As
the Agency social worker noted, J.D. presented with the most severe
symptoms of trauma and neglect, which necessarily required the most
support when dysregulated. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 894
[reunification is not governed “solely by whether the parent has corrected the
problem which required court intervention; rather, the court must consider
the effect such return would have on the child”].)
Though mother progressed to unsupervised visits with J.D., that fact
has limited value here. J.D.’s caregiver noted that his challenging
behaviors — difficulties following rules, participating in school — increased
when unsupervised visits began. Mother also demonstrated difficulties with
time management — on more than one occasion, she was late in bringing the
children back from the visits. She further rejected the opportunity to
increase her unsupervised visitation to full days because she was unavailable
in the mornings, indicating she was not yet in a position to care for the
children on a full-time basis. (Compare with Jennifer A. v. Superior Court,
supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341 [mother permitted daily, unmonitored
visits with children and there was no indication she would leave the children
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unattended].) While mother is “not required to demonstrate perfect
compliance,” the record reflects her myriad difficulties with caring for J.D.,
thus supporting the finding that reunification would be detrimental to his
emotional well-being. (Id. at p. 1343.)
Indeed, the problem here is qualitative — “deal[ing] with an evaluation
of the personality, character and attitudes of the parent” — rather than
simply complying with a case plan. (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996)
45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.) Mother failed to internalize the issues that
resulted in J.D.’s initial removal. The Agency social worker noted that she
frequently blamed external factors for various shortcomings. She claimed
that the supervised visitation family center made false reports regarding her
engagement in visits, even though it was simply reporting that she was often
late or failed to attend scheduled visits. She failed to adhere to methadone
storage protocols and continued to deny giving J.D. methadone to calm him,
instead blaming his brother. Nothing prohibited the juvenile court from
assessing mother’s lack of insight, contrary to her assertions. (Georgeanne G.
v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 867.)
We reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court erred because it
considered the detriment to J.D. and J.C. together rather than individually.
(In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 147.) The record demonstrates
otherwise. Before making its determination, the court highlighted J.D.’s
significant needs. It discussed his repeated suicidal ideation, his desire to
kill J.C., his psychiatric hospitalization, and specific diagnoses requiring
medication. It also noted his problems with schooling — including attempts
to escape from school and his placement — developmental delays, and
autism, thus acknowledging the high level of dysregulation. It was against
this background, including J.D.’s constant need for care, that the court
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determined there was a substantial risk of detriment to J.D. if he was
returned to mother’s custody. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s detriment finding. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A175105; In re J.D.
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