Filed 8/26/26 In re J.C. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re J.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, F090554
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JVDL-18-000092)
v.
J.C., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette
Rees, Judge.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Charlotte Woodfork and
Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant J.C. appeals from a decision transferring his murder case from juvenile
court to adult criminal court. J.C. asserts the trial court lacked substantial evidence to
support its decision to transfer the case. We disagree. The record in this case contains
substantial evidence to support the court’s analysis of the transfer criteria. We therefore
affirm the lower court’s decision.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties agree to the factual background of this case for purposes of the appeal
of this transfer order, and J.C. adopts as his statement of the facts the summary put forth
in the probation officer’s report, which the trial court also adopted. We therefore utilize
this recitation of the facts as well. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)1
On January 21, 2021, at approximately 6:20 p.m., officers were dispatched to a
residential street in Ceres following a report of gunshots. The officers on arrival noticed
a collision had taken place between two cars—a white Honda and a white Toyota. The
driver of the Honda was still present, and was slumped over in the driver’s seat, “not
showing any signs of life.” There was blood in the car and bullet holes in the left rear
window. An officer checked for a pulse and could not find one, but the victim then
gasped for air, and the officers began administering CPR. The victim was eventually
transported to a local hospital, where he died.
Three witnesses reported seeing a male subject flee the area following the
shooting. They described the individual as young and wearing a dark-hooded sweatshirt
and light sweatpants and carrying “something silver and shiny” in his hands.
Surveillance footage showed a male subject running away from the scene. Cell phone
1 Further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless
otherwise specified.
2.
data from J.C.’s phone indicated he was moving in the same direction of travel and along
the path that witnesses reported seeing this male subject fleeing from the scene.
The detective investigating the scene noticed the driver’s window of the Honda
was rolled down and not damaged. Further, despite canvassing the area, he found no
shell casings, leading the detective to suspect the victim was either shot with a revolver or
that the shooter picked up the shell casings afterward. A brief search of the Honda
revealed a cell phone, a pair of sweatpants containing over $1,500 in cash, seven fentanyl
pills, two spent bullets and one bullet hole in the side of the front passenger seat. The
spent bullets appeared to be either nine-millimeter or .38-caliber in size. Nothing was
collected to suggest the victim was armed at the time of the shooting. The victim’s
brother later confirmed to police that the victim sold drugs and was recently arrested in
Modesto for possession of a firearm.
The probation officer and investigators surmised the victim knew the shooter,
because the victim’s window was rolled down and he was shot at close range. An
autopsy of the victim showed stippling around one of the wounds, requiring the shooter
and victim to be very close. Most of the bullets struck the victim through the window. It
appeared the victim was attempting to flee the scene, because the shooter hit the rear
window with several shots. An individual approached officers at the scene and
volunteered that he saw the victim approximately 15 minutes before the shots were
reported. This individual’s house was approximately a third of a mile from the scene at
which the victim was shot.
Searches of the victim’s cell phone records showed he had missed several calls
from J.C. within the 40 minutes prior to the shooting. The victim then returned a call to
J.C. approximately a half hour before the shooting, which lasted about a minute.
Immediately prior to the shooting, J.C. called the victim twice, for 17 seconds and 11
seconds, respectively. Additionally, J.C. texted the victim an address approximately 300
feet east of the crash immediately prior to the shooting; the victim was attempting to text
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back the word “outside,” but never sent the text. Detectives were able to confirm that the
phone number the victim had been texting and calling was registered to J.C., and were
able to confirm with witnesses that the nickname used in the victim’s phone was one
associated with J.C.
Several other texts between the victim and J.C. were found on the phone,
including two from January 2021, approximately three weeks before the shooting, in
which J.C. referenced a particular pistol. The victim had several pictures of that same
pistol on his phone, including one of him holding it. Detectives learned the victim had
previously been arrested on the same day these texts were sent for possession of a
firearm. According to the police report regarding that arrest, officers were conducting a
traffic stop of the victim’s vehicle when he received these two texts, which an officer
read while the phone was sitting in the victim’s lap. Based on the texts’ references to a
firearm, the officers searched the vehicle and found the pistol in the victim’s backpack.
The victim thereafter told the officers that he was trying to sell the gun and had been
entertaining offers. It appears the victim had agreed to sell the gun to J.C., and was going
to deliver it to him, but was apprehended before he could meet with J.C. because J.C.’s
texts alerted the police to the existence of the firearm. The victim’s brother reported the
victim felt J.C. owed him money for the cost of bail for these charges, since it was J.C.’s
texts that led to the victim’s arrest on the gun charges. The victim’s father similarly
corroborated that the victim felt J.C. owed him money; when he first heard of the
shooting, the victim’s father suspected J.C. was involved due to this disagreement. The
victim’s cousin also reported overhearing a phone conversation between J.C. and the
victim shortly before the shooting, in which the two disagreed about whether J.C. owed
the victim money. Ultimately, in the phone call, J.C. told the victim, “I don’t have all of
your money, but I got something.”
Information obtained during the investigation showed J.C. bought a new cell
phone and changed his number the day after the murder. A few days later, while a search
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warrant was being served at his house and J.C. was being detained in handcuffs, J.C.
asked, “What is this about? Is this about the wreck?” The search yielded a number of
firearms and different types of ammunition, including an AR-15 rifle and corresponding
.223-caliber bullets, as well as several empty nine-millimeter magazines and loose .40-
caliber bullets.
J.C.’s mother and stepfather were home while the warrant was being served and
agreed to speak to detectives. J.C.’s mother told police that J.C. hung out with the victim
and his brother. Further, J.C.’s mother advised that J.C. had showed her an article from a
local newspaper about the shooting the day after it occurred, although he denied having
anything to do with it. J.C.’s mother told him that whoever shot the victim was
eventually going to be caught, because some witness would have seen something. J.C.
replied, “Nobody saw anything.” When the detective told J.C.’s mother that he believed
a revolver was used in the shooting, because no shell casings were found, J.C.’s mother
interceded and said, “Oh my gosh, he told me that, too!” She reported J.C. had said,
“They didn’t find any shell casings on the floor. There aren’t any shell casings on the
floor, Mom. How are they going to pinpoint the gun or anything?” The probation officer
noted that no information about casings located at the scene or their absence was released
to the public, and this was therefore information known only to the shooter and the
police.
J.C.’s stepfather confirmed J.C. had recently changed his cell phone number, and
had told them his old cell phone was run over by a friend, so he threw it away, at which
point J.C.’s mother again interceded to say J.C. could not be believed because he is a
“liar.” J.C.’s mother also volunteered that J.C. associated with gang members. Other
information obtained during a search of J.C.’s new phone showed him with various gang
paraphernalia, as well as weapons and drugs.
The officer did not directly question J.C. about the shooting during this search;
however, he allowed J.C.’s mother and stepfather to do so while he listened. During this
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questioning, J.C. denied being involved with the shooting, and instead indicated he was
with another friend—a known gang member—during the time of the shooting. He
repeatedly suggested he was in San Francisco at the time of the murder. However, when
his parents confronted him with cell phone data showing his cell phone was at the
location of the murder at the time it occurred, his story changed, and he confirmed he was
at a friend’s house near that location but then went to San Francisco afterward. J.C.’s
mother then made a comment about J.C. picking up the broken cell phone after his friend
ran it over so he did not leave evidence lying around, to which J.C. smirked and laughed.
The conversation included several other incriminating statements made by J.C.
Surveillance footage from a doorbell camera at the family’s home showed J.C.
returning home late on the night of the murder, wearing a black sweatshirt and light-
colored pants, similar to those described by witnesses of the man seen fleeing the scene.
J.C.’s stepfather also reported that J.C. had showed him a revolver he had in August of
the prior year.
J.C. was later interviewed about his personal and social background by the
probation officer with counsel present for the purposes of the probation officer’s report.
J.C. discussed his home and school life, and reported he was not a special education
student. Regarding his academic performance, he stated, “I went to school, but I did not
get good grades because I did not do the homework. School was never my thing. I went
to school to socialize with my friends.” He reported that he stopped attending high
school approximately eight months prior to his arrest because he did not like doing
homework and was only attending to hang out with his friends. He also confirmed he
was suspended on a number of occasions, probably for fighting or being disruptive, and
was also expelled at some point, although he could not recall why. J.C. advised his
mother tried to give him pills for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), but he
said he did not want them because he was worried his classmates would make fun of him.
6.
Despite this, J.C. said he could not recall being diagnosed with ADHD or any other
mental health disorders.2
For the first year following his arrest on the current charges, J.C. was detained in
juvenile hall, but he did not graduate or achieve a high school education during this time.
He told the probation officer, “I was 56 credits away from earning my diploma, but when
I got into a fight over there (juvenile hall), they sent me here [to the Stanislaus County
Public Safety Center] and I stopped working toward my diploma.” He affirmed he was
given an opportunity while at the adult jail to complete his high school equivalency exam
(GED), but he stated, “completing packets is not his style of learning” and therefore he
did not continue his education. J.C. stated he attended school while at juvenile hall,
because, “You get burned if you don’t go and you don’t get chips and soda”; he also said
there were several other detainees who graduated during that period, which motivated
him to continue. However, he did not feel he could continue with education in an adult
facility.
J.C. noted he maintained good family relationships with his mother, father, and
siblings, especially his sister. He believed his childhood was good, and that he grew up
“middle class” with “everything that [he] wanted.” However, he noted, “as I got older, I
had to work for the stuff. If I did not do good, I did not get things.” His relationship with
his mother in particular was a good one, despite her being the disciplinary parent. He
noted that she cared about him and would worry if he was not home by curfew. He said,
“I wish I had taken her advice a long time ago. Maybe, I wouldn’t have ended up in jail.
Sometimes it goes in one ear and out the other.”
According to J.C., he began smoking marijuana when he was 11 years old and
smoked daily prior to his arrest. He also advised he consumed alcohol occasionally,
2 In the interview for the completion of the initial probation report, in 2021, J.C. did
report he had been diagnosed with ADHD when he was 14 years old.
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every two weeks or so, beginning at the age of 14 or 15 years old. However, he did not
feel he was addicted or had a drug problem.
The probation officer attempted to interview J.C.’s mother as part of writing this
report; however, J.C.’s mother was unavailable and did not return calls placed to her.
J.C.’s mother did participate in the completion of a prior probation report in April 2021,
which is also in the record. In that interview J.C.’s mother reported J.C. lived with her
and his stepfather, who she had married when J.C. was seven years old. She reported J.C.
had a good relationship with both her and her husband, as well as his older sister and half
brother, although he held a “grudge” against his father for not being present as much as
he wanted. J.C.’s mother stated that J.C.’s behavior was good when he was young;
however, when he was approximately 11 years old, he began hanging out with a neighbor
who eventually introduced him to various gang members, who thereafter introduced him
to drugs and guns. J.C.’s mother and stepfather sought to talk to him about his behavior,
but J.C. did not stop hanging out with this neighbor.
According to J.C.’s mother, J.C. was not a special education student, though he
was the subject of a “504 plan”3 at one point. She reported J.C. was suspended
frequently for disruptions and always wanted to be the “class clown.” She stated J.C. had
ADHD and attributed his poor behavior and performance in school to that, as opposed to
a lack of effort. J.C. regularly used marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine, according to his
mother, which he obtained from his friends, and would sneak out of the house at night,
3 This refers to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which generally
requires that people not be subject to discrimination in federally funded programs by
reason of their disabilities. (See 29 U.S.C. § 794.) “Section 504’s implementing
regulations require qualifying public schools to ‘provide a free appropriate public
education to each qualified handicapped person.’ ” (McIntyre v. Eugene School District
4J (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 902, 911.) One of the primary mechanisms by which this is
achieved is to develop a “504 plan,” which is a “written document describing the regular
or special education and related aids and services a child needs and the appropriate
setting in which to receive them.” (Ibid.)
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frequently returning home under the influence. J.C.’s mother stated he was not the victim
of physical or sexual abuse, and never suffered from any physical health issues, although
she reported he was diagnosed with ADHD when he was approximately nine years old.
He took medication for approximately a year, but he then stopped taking medication
because his classmates made fun of him for it. He refused to participate in any other
counseling services, at school or elsewhere.
J.C. was first arrested for possession and sale of marijuana at school at the age of
12. He advised the arresting officers that a third party would give him marijuana to sell;
in exchange, he received a small amount for personal use. J.C. was placed on informal
probation for these charges, which was dismissed after six months.
J.C. was next encountered by law enforcement at the age of 15, after a resident
called the police to report that a juvenile was vandalizing his home. When the officers
arrived and knocked on the front door, no one answered; however, a few moments later,
J.C. emerged from the side of the house, out of breath and surprised to see the officers.
According to the officers, J.C. appeared to be trying to flee the residence and became
confrontational. The officers observed J.C. clench his fist and start to circle the first
officer, at which point the officers overpowered and detained him. The officers contacted
J.C.’s mother, who arrived and advised the officers that he had assaulted her and
destroyed various doors and walls in their residence over the past year; she noted she had
become afraid of him. J.C. was ultimately charged with two misdemeanors, declared a
ward of the court, and sentenced to 45 days in juvenile hall, with 15 days credit for time
served and 30 days on electronic monitoring, as well as probation.
Approximately six months later, J.C. was arrested for violating the terms of his
probation. In particular, he had numerous unexcused absences from school, numerous
fights and other disciplinary problems, and eventually was expelled from his high school.
Further, during a home visit, he was under the influence of marijuana and had half a
pound of marijuana along with a scale and baggies. He acknowledged to probation
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officers at the time that he sold marijuana. J.C. was thereafter given a further term in
juvenile hall and on electronic monitoring. Approximately a year and a half later, the
probation department requested the wardship be terminated and his records sealed, which
the court ordered.
J.C. was next arrested approximately four months after his probation was
terminated, in December 2020. A car driven by J.C. was observed running a red light at a
high rate of speed, and was eventually clocked traveling approximately 80 to 90 miles per
hour. Despite officers attempting to pull J.C. over, J.C. fled the scene, leading officers on
a chase that at times exceeded 100 miles per hour. Given the danger of the chase,
officers broke off pursuit; however, as the officers were disengaging, J.C. hit a curb and
crashed into two parked vehicles. As officers pulled up behind the crash, they saw J.C.
leave the vehicle and begin fleeing on foot. J.C. was apprehended hiding underneath a
pickup truck a short distance away. He was heavily intoxicated, apparently under the
influence of both marijuana and alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests. J.C. was charged
with a variety of crimes, discussed further below, and was pending adjudication of these
charges when the murder occurred.
Additionally, the probation report documented a number of incidents of discipline
during J.C.’s school years, as well as in both juvenile hall and the county jail. Many of
these related to disruptive or inappropriate behavior, including gang-related vandalism;
however, several were of significantly greater seriousness. In particular, J.C.—who by
then had turned 18—and another individual assaulted a 15-year-old while at juvenile hall,
apparently for dropping out of their gang. J.C. was confrontational and did not fully
desist from the assault until after he was pepper sprayed. Afterwards, he was
unapologetic and made comments indicating both advance planning of the assault and a
lack of remorse. He was eventually charged with a felony in relation to this assault, and
was transported to the adult facility.
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Following his transfer to the adult jail, J.C. was involved in another assault on a
fellow inmate, which led to numerous serious injuries to the victim, including a collapsed
lung. This assault resulted in further felony charges against J.C. Further, the probation
officer’s report listed numerous disciplinary incidents at the adult jail, including
possession of contraband, namely drugs and weapons, as well as the manufacture of
alcohol.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Unrelated to the instant appeal, on January 20, 2021, a juvenile wardship petition
pursuant to section 602 was filed against defendant relating to December 19, 2020 events,
alleging the following counts: evading a police officer (count 1; Veh. Code, § 2800.2,
subd. (a)); driving without a license (count 2; Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)); hit and run
(count 3; Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)); resisting arrest (count 4; Pen. Code, § 148,
subd. (a)(1)); and driving under the influence of alcohol (count 5; Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (a)). These charges were all related to J.C.’s high-speed chase while driving under
the influence; he had been released while these charges were pending at the time the
murder occurred. Shortly thereafter, on February 5, 2021, a subsequent wardship petition
was filed against J.C. in the same case, alleging that on January 21, 2021—the day after
the initial petition—J.C. committed murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); and on
February 4, 2021, possessed an assault weapon (count 2; Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a))
and possessed ammunition (count 3; Pen. Code, § 29650). The same day, the People
filed a motion to transfer J.C. to criminal court pursuant to section 707, subdivisions (a)
and (b).
Initially, the probation officer filed a report in April 2021, evaluating whether
J.C.’s case should be moved to criminal court pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a).
The probation officer recommended the case be transferred, and following a three-day
transfer hearing, the court ordered the case transferred to criminal court. The matter was
returned from criminal court to juvenile court in February 2025 for a supplemental report
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and reevaluation of the transfer order, due to the Legislature’s enactment of Assembly
Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) Among other things,
Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended section 707 to require a higher standard of proof—one
of clear and convincing evidence—be demonstrated by the People seeking transfer.
On April 7, 2025, the probation officer filed a new report pursuant to section 707,
employing the heightened standard of proof. The probation officer again recommended
the case be transferred to criminal court. The report concluded that J.C. exhibited a
sophisticated level of criminality, based not only on his prior delinquency history but also
the planning and attempts to evade discovery occurring in the current murder charges.
According to the report, J.C. had also committed several further assaults following his
arrest for murder, each of which appeared to have occurred when the victims were
unsuspecting and/or unable to fight back, again suggesting these assaults were planned.
His criminal sophistication was further demonstrated by his ability to acquire and make
contraband, even while incarcerated in a maximum-security facility. Additionally, the
report concluded that, with only three years remaining until the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, there was insufficient time to rehabilitate him, particularly given that
he had continued to commit new offenses during the intervening time. J.C.’s prior
delinquent history also militated in favor of transfer, according to the probation officer,
given the number and seriousness of the charges against him. The report concluded prior
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate J.C. had failed, since he continued to engage
in criminal behavior; even though some specific instances of probation were completed
successfully, there were also multiple instances of him violating his probation and
successive criminal charges being filed against him after these successful probationary
periods. Lastly, the circumstances of the current alleged offense also counseled in favor
of transfer, the report concluded: J.C. planned and executed a murder of someone he
knew over a dispute about money by luring the victim to a meeting and shooting him at
close range. Although there was a dispute between J.C. and the victim, the facts
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suggested the two were likely friends prior to the murder, given the victim’s willingness
to meet with J.C., the fact that his car window was down, and that the shooting occurred
at close range. The probation officer therefore concluded, even under the heightened
evidentiary standard, that the instant case should be transferred to criminal court.
Following the issuance of the report, the trial court held a new transfer hearing on
September 8 and 9, 2025. The parties stipulated to the court taking judicial notice of the
probation officer’s reports, both the 2021 report and the 2025 report. The authoring
probation officer testified at the hearing. The court also received into evidence various
exhibits, including certificates of completion of various courses by J.C. during April and
May 2025, and a letter authored by J.C.
On October 1, 2025, the trial court issued its order transferring the case to criminal
court. The court found J.C. exhibited a sophisticated level of criminality. The court
noted the crime “appears to have been planned, was methodically violent, and involved
an unsuspecting friend of [J.C.] who was lured to the event by [J.C.].” The victim was
shot four times, at least once at close range, while he sat in his car, per the court. Nothing
about the crime indicated J.C. lacked the maturity or intellectual capacity to know what
he was doing, there was no indication drugs or alcohol were involved, and there was no
evidence J.C. was pressured by his gang associations into committing the crime. The
court thus found this showed a degree of sophistication favoring transfer.
As to whether J.C. could be rehabilitated, the trial court observed there were
approximately two years and six months of juvenile jurisdiction remaining. It noted the
alleged offense “showed a bold, deliberate, and callous disregard for human life,” which
included efforts by J.C. to conceal evidence and create a false alibi by destroying his
phone. Further, J.C. had been charged in two new felony adult cases since the offense,
both of which were violent offenses. Thus, the court concluded that both the
circumstances of the offense and J.C.’s ongoing criminal conduct showed a “mature level
of decision making with appreciation of consequences and consistent disregard for lawful
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conduct and safety.” It therefore concluded J.C. was unlikely to be rehabilitated within
the time left for the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction.
The trial court also concluded that J.C.’s prior delinquent behavior favored
transfer. It adopted the factual history of prior delinquent behavior set forth in the
probation reports, and noted J.C. had “demonstrated continued delinquency, criminal
gang association, and escalating criminal behavior.” The court also commented that it
specifically was not considering any of J.C.’s subsequent criminal charges in its analysis
of this factor, as those could not be considered “previous” delinquent conduct.
The trial court concurred with the probation officer that prior attempts to
rehabilitate J.C. had failed. J.C. had a “well-documented delinquent history” which was
“unreformed despite increasing levels of juvenile probation supervision and incarceration
since the age of 12.” Further, he had “demonstrated a consistent pattern of escalating
intractable tendencies of violence and criminality.” This factor, too, favored transfer, per
the court.
Lastly, the circumstances and gravity of the current offense also indicated transfer
was appropriate, per the trial court. The court reiterated that the current charges involved
a murder which appeared “to have been planned and executed upon another youth who
was an acquaintance of [J.C.], who arrived at the scene unsuspecting and unarmed.” The
court again noted that, even setting aside the current charges, there was evidence J.C. had
committed “two subsequent custodial beating offenses,” in which J.C. chose “to use
unprovoked violence repeatedly on unsuspecting victims.” Based on all of these factors,
the court found clear and convincing evidence that J.C. was not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and granted the transfer
motion.
A notice of appeal was timely filed.
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DISCUSSION
Legal Standards
The standard for transferring a case from juvenile to criminal court is set forth in
section 707. The prosecutor may move the court for transfer of cases involving minors
aged 16 and older. (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) Upon the filing of the motion, the court directs
the probation officer to file a report concerning the “behavioral patterns and social history
of the minor.” (Ibid.) After consideration of that report and “any other relevant
evidence” that may be submitted, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence
that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court” before it orders a transfer. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) In making this finding,
the court must consider five separate factors: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by the minor”4; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”5; (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent
history”6; (4) the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
4 In considering this factor, the juvenile court “shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and
physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s
impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and consequences of criminal behavior; the
effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s
family and community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s
involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the minor as a
victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s criminal
sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).)
5 In considering this factor, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)
6 In considering this factor, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent
history and the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and childhood
trauma on the minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)
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minor”;7 and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to
have been committed by the minor.” 8 (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E).) None of these five
factors are afforded any greater statutory weight than any other, and all must be
considered in determining the ultimate question, which is whether the minor is amenable
to rehabilitation. (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 167.)
We review trial court rulings on motions transferring a case from juvenile court to
criminal court for an abuse of discretion. (D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
441, 451.) Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo. (Ibid.) “ ‘A decision based on insufficient evidence or the court’s
“ ‘erroneous understanding of applicable law’ ” is subject to reversal.’ ” (Ibid.) The
ultimate finding that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (In re Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “Because the juvenile
court must make that finding by clear and convincing evidence, we ‘determine whether
the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the clear and
convincing evidence standard.” (Ibid.) The mere “existence of contrary evidence does
not show that the trial court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence,”
because “we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings, not against
them.” (Id. at p. 169.)
7 In considering this factor, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services previously provided to
address the minor’s needs.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(ii).)
8 In considering this factor, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental state of
the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm actually
caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
16.
Analysis
J.C. argues the trial court erred by concluding there was clear and convincing
evidence that he was not amenable to rehabilitation. According to J.C., the court erred in
its consideration of the first factor—J.C.’s criminal sophistication—because it did not
specifically mention his prior diagnosis of ADHD or sufficiently consider his prior
substance abuse in its ruling. J.C. further claims the evidence of the crime being planned,
methodically violent, and his attempts to evade arrest—including creating an alibi,
destroying evidence, and getting a new cell phone—do not show sophistication, but
rather a lack of sophistication, because they were ineffective at preventing his capture.
We disagree with these assertions.
First, there is no statutory requirement that the trial court specifically mention any
and all prior mental health disorders in its analysis. Rather, the statute requires the court
to consider “maturity” and “intellectual capacity,” as well as “physical, mental, and
emotional health at the time of the alleged offense.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i), italics
added.) The court specifically considered these factors, concluding there was no
evidence of J.C. lacking maturity or having deficient intellectual capacity. It also noted
there was no evidence drugs or alcohol played any role in this offense, or that there was
any outside influence from another member of J.C.’s gang to commit this offense. J.C.
points to no evidence showing otherwise, and we see none, having examined the record.
Further, in order for a mental health diagnosis to be relevant to this factor, it must
be related to the minor’s mental health at the time of the alleged offense. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) The purported diagnosis of ADHD here was scant, inconsistent, and
dated. The only mention of any diagnosis was reported anecdotally by J.C.’s mother in
the initial probation report, in which she said he had been diagnosed at the age of nine,
and by J.C. himself, who claimed he was diagnosed when he was 14; J.C.’s mother did
not return calls by the probation officer during the preparation of the second report, and
J.C. denied any mental health diagnoses at that time. No documentary evidence of a
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mental health diagnosis was provided, nor was any psychological examination conducted
to see whether J.C. continued to exhibit symptoms of this disorder at a time period closer
to the instant offense. Based on the scant and inconsistent nature of this evidence, it is
unclear whether any competent professional ever formally diagnosed J.C. with this
disorder, or what criteria was considered in reaching this diagnosis, assuming it occurred.
Moreover, there was no evidence presented that this disorder was connected to or
in some way caused the instant offense. Acknowledging that people who suffer from
ADHD may have trouble with impulsivity, the facts of this case examined in the light
most favorable to the decision below do not suggest impulsivity. Rather, these facts
suggest J.C. contacted a friend of his with whom he had a monetary dispute, exploited
that connection to lure the victim to a meeting, and then shot the victim—who was
unarmed and unprepared—multiple times. He then escaped, apparently got rid of the
murder weapon, destroyed his cell phone, and created a false alibi. His inculpatory
comments to his parents that the police would not find any evidence to connect the
shooter to the shooting also demonstrated his consideration and planning of this offense.
The fact that he was ultimately unsuccessful in his ability to evade prosecution does not
negate the other evidence of sophistication and planning or turn it into evidence of a lack
of sophistication, as J.C. suggests. If we were to credit this argument, the mere fact of
criminal charges being brought would be evidence of a lack of sophistication, and the
argument would swallow this statutory criterion entirely.
Similarly, there is no evidence that J.C.’s prior substance abuse contributed to or
was connected with the instant crime. J.C. points to nothing in the record showing that
his history of smoking marijuana contributed in any way to the alleged offense. There
was no evidence he was under the influence of any substances when the crime was
committed. The facts of the crime are not the rash actions of an impaired person; rather,
as the trial court concluded, they were indicative of a planned, calculated murder. Nor
are we directed to anything in the record showing what impact, if any, prior substance
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abuse may have had on his decision to kill the victim. Indeed, the current dispute was
apparently entirely unrelated to drugs or drug use; while the victim apparently sold drugs,
the dispute concerned the victim’s belief that J.C. should reimburse him for the cost of
bail associated with a weapon charge.
Concerning the second factor, whether he can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of juvenile jurisdiction, J.C. argues the trial court erred by concluding that two
years was insufficient time to rehabilitate him. Per J.C., he was despondent upon
learning he would be tried as an adult, and therefore gave up on any attempts at
rehabilitation after the first transfer order. Further, J.C. argues the adult jail to which he
was moved from juvenile hall was considerably more violent, and this was why he did
not seek to rehabilitate himself during the intervening four years since this case was
originally transferred to criminal court.
These arguments are not persuasive. The evidence before the court did not show
J.C. was the victim of violence—rather, it showed he was the perpetrator, committing
multiple additional assaults in both the juvenile and adult facilities, some of which led to
serious injuries. Further, this factor is primarily concerned with “whether there is enough
time to rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile
court jurisdiction.” (In re Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Relevant to that
consideration is J.C.’s “predisposition progress toward rehabilitation while still in
juvenile hall.” (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 200, fn. 13.) This
was clearly lacking, as evidenced by the fact that J.C., along with another individual,
seriously assaulted a youth several years junior to him at juvenile hall prior to his move to
an adult facility. Notably, this assault is what resulted in J.C.’s transfer to the adult
facility, not the trial court’s prior order transferring the murder case to criminal court.
Considered as a whole, there was substantial evidence the remaining two years of
juvenile court jurisdiction would be insufficient time to rehabilitate J.C.
19.
The third factor—the minor’s delinquent history—also was not supported by
substantial evidence, according to J.C., because the trial court “failed to appreciate the
crimes committed … after J.C. became an adult were committed at a time when he had
already been committed to adult court facing a potential minimum 25 years to life prison
sentence if convicted. J.C., in his mind, had no incentive to do anything other [than]
what he did considering his situation.” This argument is troubling in at least two ways.
First, it fundamentally misconstrues the court’s transfer order, which noted in relation to
this factor that “the [c]ourt is not considering the former minor’s subsequent criminal
cases as ‘previous delinquent conduct’ inasmuch as they were not previous to the
offenses currently before the Court.” It is therefore clear the court specifically did not
consider the subsequent criminal assaults committed by J.C. in concluding this factor
weighed in favor of transfer. Second, just because J.C. did not see what he personally
stood to gain from not assaulting other people is no reason those assaults should not be
considered. Such an argument is morally repugnant and has no place in our legal system.
Regardless, it is clear the court did not consider these assaults in analyzing this factor.
J.C. fails to show a lack of substantial evidence supporting the third factor. Indeed, J.C.’s
prior delinquency history tended to show behavior of escalating seriousness and
continuing re-offenses, starting with drug possession and minor sales and escalating into
a high-speed police chase, pursuant to which he had been charged with numerous felonies
and was on release at the time of the murder.
Concerning the fourth factor—the success of prior attempts at rehabilitating J.C.—
J.C. appears to argue that some of his rehabilitation was successful, because he completed
at least one instance of probation without further arrest and completed certain adult
courses while incarcerated in county jail. Therefore, according to J.C., there is no
substantial evidence that prior efforts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful; as he puts it, “it
is hard to say [J.C.] has been a total failure under the circumstance[s].” However, the
trial court’s consideration is not limited to whether J.C. was a “total failure,” but rather
20.
more holistically looks at the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(1)(D)(i).) Here, the court concluded prior
attempts had been unsuccessful, because J.C. had shown “a consistent pattern of
escalating intractable tendencies of violence and criminality” despite “increasing levels of
juvenile probation supervision and incarceration since the age of 12.” This is indeed
supported by the probation reports, which show repeated arrests and increasing violence
by J.C. throughout his teenage years, culminating in the instant murder. This conclusion
is clearly supported by substantial evidence.9
The final fifth factor considers the circumstances and gravity of the offense.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(1)(E)(i).) J.C. argues, without citation to the record, that while not
intended to diminish the gravity of the offense, the trial court failed to consider that he
“acted impulsively in committing the alleged crime.” We treat arguments without
adequate record citations as forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Dietz v.
Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 800–801; Regents of University of
California v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1.) Moreover, as mentioned
previously, in reviewing substantial evidence on appeal, we indulge presumptions in
favor of the lower court’s findings, not against them. (In re Miguel R., supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 169.) While this might have been an appropriate argument to make in
the trial court, it has no merit here, as it does not show substantial evidence is lacking:
even if there was evidence which could be construed as indicative of impulsivity, that
evidence was equally (if not more) susceptible of interpretation as evidence of
sophistication and planning. Indeed, the court found the circumstances of the offense
9 To the extent J.C. argues the trial court failed to consider the adequacy of services
provided because he “suffers from untreated ADHD” which was not “addressed when he
was in juvenile hall,” J.C. points to no evidence in the record supporting this assertion.
Even assuming J.C. had ADHD—evidence for which is scant and remote, as discussed
above—the record contains no evidence that rehabilitative services provided to him were
inadequate to accommodate any difficulties he had because of that disorder.
21.
indicated J.C. had a financial motive, planned out a crime, destroyed evidence, and came
up with an alibi, all of which indicated sophistication and planning. Our review looks
only at whether there is substantial evidence to support this conclusion. (Id. at p. 165.)
We have no trouble finding substantial evidence here showing the circumstances and
gravity of the instant offense—namely, the clear planning and exploitation of J.C.’s
relationship with the victim and subsequent attempts to evade capture—weighed in favor
of transfer here.
J.C.’s references to In re O.F. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 133 and In re S.S. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 1277 do not persuade us otherwise. Unlike here, the defendant in In re
O.F. demonstrated exceptional efforts at rehabilitation during the time he was
incarcerated prior to the transfer hearing. As that court noted, “[t]he record is replete
with positive and uncontradicted testimony about his rehabilitative efforts and successes,
including his consistent and sincere engagement in therapeutic and other services, his
academic progress, and his demonstrated potential for maturity and growth.” (In re O.F.,
supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) The court noted that O.F. “completed a CPR
certification program; participated in legal education through Fresh Lifelines for Youth;
earned certification in floor refinishing; consistently engaged in a Secondary Extended
Educational Program; and ‘adjusted well to the rule and expectations’ of juvenile hall.”
(Id. at p. 145.) He also “ ‘frequently achieved “Gold Level” status in his unit, based on
exhibiting prosocial behavior toward staff members and peers’; was ‘often selected as a
unit worker’; ‘has been one of the most well-behaved youths in his unit’; and was often
relied upon ‘to counsel other minors in the unit regarding appropriate behavior.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 145–146.) Further, O.F. had “ ‘done an excellent job of engaging in educational and
self-improvement programs,’ as he ‘graduated from high school, started taking college
courses, and completed a myriad of extra-curricular programs,’ ” including being named
“Vice Youth Poet Laureate of Alameda County.” (Id. at p. 146.) The evidence in that
case also showed that while O.F. had been involved in altercations with rival gang
22.
members during his time in juvenile hall, following those altercations, he expressed
remorse and engaged in private mediations with those individuals, through which they
grew to become friends. (Ibid.) O.F. called a variety of expert witnesses who testified
that his chaotic upbringing, which included significant substance abuse and physical
abuse, introduced him to gang life from an early age via his core family members. (Id. at
p. 152.) This and other evidence led the court to conclude the trial court had erred in its
analysis. (Id. at p. 170.)
In In re S.S., the minor was involved in a drunken altercation at a party and
stabbed several people as part of this conflict. (In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p.
1282.) Moreover, the People did not contest that remand was necessary, given that the
law had changed and now required a higher standard of proof, and therefore the court did
not reach the question of whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding.
(Id. at p. 1281.) Ultimately, all that the court concluded was that there was a reasonable
probability the trial court might reach a different conclusion under the changed standards,
given the paucity of explanation as to how a drunken fight at a party showed criminal
sophistication and an almost total lack of prior juvenile justice history on the part of S.S.
(Id. at pp. 1290–1293.)
These cases stand in stark contrast to the instant case, in which the unrebutted
evidence was that J.C. had a positive and trauma-free upbringing and did virtually
nothing to demonstrate any intent to rehabilitate during the vast majority of the time he
was incarcerated prior to the transfer hearing. The sole evidence in the record supporting
any effort at rehabilitation were seven certificates of completion of various programs
from April and May 2025, long after he had been arrested and only shortly before the
transfer hearing. Additionally, J.C. wrote a letter to the juvenile court, in which he
largely endorsed his positive childhood, and blamed much of his struggles on the
neighborhood in which he grew up. This evidence is not so overwhelming that it negates
the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s analysis of J.C.’s amenability to
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rehabilitation. Moreover, this is not a case in which the juvenile had no history of
involvement with the juvenile system; rather, there is substantial evidence that he showed
an escalating series of dangerous and violent criminal behaviors that continued after he
was detained on the instant charges. We do not think the authority cited by J.C. weighs
in favor of reversal, and we find there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
transfer decision.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons given above, the judgment is affirmed.
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DE SANTOS, J.
HARRELL, J.
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