Filed 6/30/26 In re J.A.-M. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re J.A.-M. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174004
v.
(Sonoma County
F.S.,
Super. Ct. No. 25JD00031,
Defendant and Appellant. 25JD00032, 25JD00033)
In this appeal, F.S. (Father) challenges the orders made at the
detention hearing, a restraining order hearing, and the combined
jurisdiction/disposition hearing.1 He contends those orders are void because
they were made by a commissioner without the parties’ stipulation that the
matter may be heard and decided by a temporary judge. Father further
1 “The purpose of a detention hearing in juvenile court is to ascertain
whether the minor need be detained in custody pending his jurisdiction
hearing.” (In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337, 340, fn. 2.) “California
juvenile court law provides for a jurisdiction hearing to determine ‘whether or
not the minor is a person described by Section 300, 601, or 602’ of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, thus establishing whether or not the juvenile court
may exercise its jurisdiction over the minor.” (Id. at p. 340, fn. 1.)
1
argues his due process rights were violated because he did not receive
adequate notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. We agree that Father
was denied due process and accordingly reverse the jurisdictional findings
and disposition orders. We otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
A. Initial Dependency Proceedings
In March 2025, the Sonoma County Human Services Department
(Department) received reports that Father’s three children, nine-year-old
J.A.-M., six-year-old F.A.-M., and four-year-old H.A.-M., “were unsafe in the
care of [Father] due to his severe mental health issues.” According to the
Department’s detention report, a social worker subsequently met with
Father, who presented as “paranoid, and possibly manic.” He purportedly
made several comments that made the social worker “fear his perception of
reality.” The children’s mother, K.T. (Mother), was living with Father at that
time and told the social worker that Father had “always been delusional” and
was “now involving the children in his delusions.” She showed the social
worker recordings, which, according to the social worker, showed Mother
being “verbally and emotionally abused” by Father in front of the children,
Father throwing objects at Mother, and Father ripping objects off the wall.
The children reported feeling unsafe around Father. Father refused to work
2 Many of the facts we recite are contained in confidential reporter’s
transcripts. The parties cite and rely on these confidential materials without
seeking to file a brief under seal, which we treat as a waiver of the
confidentiality. (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 617, fn. 38,
overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046,
1060 & fn. 13, and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 355–356; see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.47(c)(2) [to maintain confidentiality, parties can move to file a
document under seal].)
2
with the Department to develop a safety plan for the children and asserted he
was “a sovereign citizen and libertarian and would not be signing
documentation.” The Department helped Mother and the children move to a
confidential location.
In April 2025, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition for
the children, alleging jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code3
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (serious physical harm and failure to protect)
and subdivision (c) (serious emotional damage) based on Father’s mental
health symptoms. Father appeared in propria persona at the April 2, 2025
detention hearing and asked for a continuance on the ground that he was
“served fraudulent papers.” After questioning Mother about the children’s
paternity, the juvenile court elevated Father to the status of presumed father
and asked him if he wanted a one-day continuance. Father responded in the
affirmative. Father also made several bizarre statements during the hearing,
prompting the Department’s counsel to raise concerns as to whether Father
understood the nature of the dependency proceedings. After some back and
forth between Father and the court, the court found that Father understood
the nature of the proceedings, and it continued the matter for one day.
Near the end of the hearing, Mother’s counsel requested a temporary
restraining order based on remarks Father made “regarding taking the
children to Germany.” Father appeared to admit the allegation. The juvenile
court granted a temporary restraining order and informed Father he was to
have no contact with the children “until we can have a hearing.” In setting
the date for the restraining order hearing, the court officer stated, “[W]e can
return . . . for two dates. The juris dispo would be set on April 30th. That’s
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
3
over the 21-day mark. Both parties agreed to that, . . . .” The court
responded that “[Father] will need to have the length of the restraining order
be within the statutory authority.” The court thus set the restraining order
hearing for April 23, 2025. It also ordered Father to move out of the family
home within two days. No further mention was made of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Father did not appear at the continued hearing the next day. The
juvenile court ordered the children detained from Father.
B. The Restraining Order Hearing
Father appeared at the April 23, 2025 restraining order hearing. He
asserted “a formal challenge to the jurisdictional of this court to proceed in
any capacity over matters involving custody, visitation, restraining orders or
seizures of natural heirs.” The juvenile court advised Father to “reconsider
representing [himself]” in the matter and “overruled” his objection to
jurisdiction.
Regarding Mother’s request for a restraining order, the Department’s
counsel first noted that Father had been arrested for violating the temporary
restraining order. Counsel said the children were present during the
incident. Father interjected, claiming counsel’s assertion was “[l]ies.
Fabricated lies.” Counsel also noted Father “has not been responsive to the
social worker at all,” and the Department “need[ed] an updated mailing
address for the father.” Mother’s counsel said Mother would testify that the
paternal grandmother had contacted Mother and had asked for Father’s mail
and personal property. In response to these arguments, Father said he had
“filed papers.” The juvenile court refused to accept his papers, however,
because they were not served on the other parties. The court granted
Mother’s request for a three-year restraining order prohibiting Father from
4
contacting Mother or the children or from coming within 1000 yards of the
family’s home. After the matter was adjourned, Mother’s counsel asked,
“April 30th, 10:00 a.m.?” The court simply responded, “Yeah.”
C. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department recommended the
juvenile court declare the children dependents and order family maintenance
services for Mother. As for Father, the Department requested that he receive
services “under the children’s case plan as he is not entitled to Family
Reunification Services” due to “the recommendation of Family Maintenance
to the mother.” The Department also recommended that the court find
visitation with Father would be detrimental to the children. The report
further stated that the social worker had attempted to contact Father five
times since the detention hearing, with “no response” from Father. When the
social worker attempted to speak to Father at the restraining order hearing,
Father said “she had no authority or jurisdiction to speak to him.”
To support the Department’s recommendations, the report set forth
many of the same facts contained in the detention report, plus some facts
from a recent interview with Mother regarding the allegations in the
dependency petition. Additionally, the report noted that Father “has
continuously violated” the restraining order. The report alleged that on one
such incident, Father had to be forcibly detained by law enforcement after he
had parked outside Mother’s home and was yelling “insults, sexually
offensive comments, and other threats.” The report also detailed the family’s
child welfare history and Father’s criminal history. The children reported
feeling safe and happy living with Mother and indicated they did not want to
see Father. The social worker concluded the children were “demonstrating
5
specific behaviors that indicate fear of the father and emotional dysregulation
at the thought of contact with him.”
Father did not appear at the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing
on April 30. As a result, the juvenile court found father waived his
advisement of trial rights and proceeded in his absence. The other parties
submitted on the Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report. The court
adopted the recommendations of the Department and found J.A.-M., F.A.-M.,
and H.A.-M. to be children described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).
The court also found that visitation with Father would be detrimental to the
children.
D. Father’s Section 388 Petition
Approximately two months later, Father filed a section 388 petition to
set aside the juvenile court’s findings and orders made at the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Father alleged he was not served with the
“JV-100 petition,” was not given notice of the “April 2, 2025 jurisdictional
hearing,” was not given an opportunity to respond to the detention report,
call or cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence, and was “denied the
right to contest jurisdiction.” He requested that the court “[r]estore [his]
custodial and parental rights pending a lawful and noticed hearing.”
The juvenile court summarily denied Father’s petition, reasoning that
Father was in court on April 2, 2025, at which time his request for a one-day
continuance was granted and he was personally served with a minute order
notifying him of the continued hearing, but he failed to appear for the
continued hearing. The court further found that Father was given notice of
the jurisdiction/disposition hearing at the restraining order hearing, was
personally served with a copy of the minute order for the restraining order
hearing reflecting the date of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, and was
6
properly served with the Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report, which
stated the date and time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court appointed counsel to represent
Father. Father’s counsel subsequently requested a hearing, which was held
on July 24, 2025. At the hearing, Father requested that he represent himself.
When the court mentioned that he did not appear for the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Father claimed he did not know about the
hearing. He said, “I wasn’t sure if there’s any notice. I got nothing.” The
court responded that Father “would’ve left with a copy of the minutes” at the
restraining order hearing. Father said he “was given nothing” and was not
served with any documents regarding the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
The court claimed it announced at the restraining order hearing that the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing was set for April 30, which Father refuted.
The court ultimately denied Father’s request to represent himself.
II. DISCUSSION
Father’s contentions on appeal are that (1) his due process rights were
violated because he was not given proper notice of the jurisdiction/disposition
hearing, and (2) the orders made at the detention hearing, the restraining
order hearing, and the jurisdiction/disposition hearing must be reversed
because the judicial officers presiding over those hearings failed to announce
that they were commissioners and failed to acquire Father’s stipulation to the
commissioners acting as temporary judges. We agree with Father’s first
contention but conclude he forfeited the latter argument.
A. Forfeiture of Father’s Arguments
The Department argues that because Father filed an appeal from the
July 24, 2025 order, he forfeited his right to raise notice and commissioner
stipulation issues arising from the April 3, 2025 detention order, the April 23,
7
2025 restraining order hearing, and the April 30, 2025
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. As the Department correctly asserts, “ ‘[a]n
appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not
challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has
passed.’ ” (Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1396.)
This “waiver rule” protects the “dominant concerns of finality and reasonable
expedition.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 207.) The
Department further contends Father forfeited his notice arguments by failing
to object to the alleged defects in notice in the juvenile court.
Father acknowledges he did not timely appeal the prior orders but asks
this court to reach the merits of his appeal anyway “on the basis he was not
given proper notice of the hearing that was conducted by a commissioner
without [his] knowledge or stipulation.”4 He further claims he “raised this
issue within a reasonable time after the hearing.” We agree with Father in
part.
The waiver rule should not be applied if “due process forbids it.” (In re
Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) “First, there must be some defect
that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent
would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections
afforded by the scheme as a whole . . . . Second, to fall outside the waiver
rule, defects must go beyond mere errors that might have been held
reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed,” or else the waiver
4 Father’s notice of appeal was filed on August 5, 2025, after the
statutory time to file an appeal from the prior orders had passed. (See In re
A.J. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 7, 16 [“[t]he time for appeal of an order . . . is 60
days from the date of the order’s pronouncement in open court”]; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.406(a)(1) [notice of appeal “must be filed within 60 days after
the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed”].)
8
issue would “turn . . . into a review on the merits.” (Id. at pp. 208–209.)
Other factors may also weigh in the analysis. (See id. at p. 208 [declining to
“try to catalogue all circumstances that might allow relaxation of the waiver
rule”].) Our consideration of this constitutional issue is de novo. (In re J.H.
(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183.)
In re A.K. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 252 is instructive. There, the father
was not given proper notice of the jurisdiction and disposition hearings. (Id.
at pp. 267–268.) The social services agency contended that the father’s
appeal was untimely because it was made more than 60 days after
disposition, and that the waiver rule and forfeiture principles applied to the
father’s appeal because he failed to raise his arguments with the juvenile
court. (Id. at p. 268.) The appellate court rejected the agency’s arguments,
noting that the father “did not receive proper notice of the jurisdictional and
dispositional hearings, and did not receive proper notice of the importance of
those hearings,” and he “raised concerns (to varying degrees of specificity) in
the juvenile court.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that the father’s “efforts . . .
reflect that, to the extent he could do so, he timely raised below the defects he
raises in this appeal.” (Id. at p. 269.)
We conclude Father’s due process challenge is not forfeited on appeal.
Like the father in In re A.K., and as discussed in more detail below, Father
did not receive adequate notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing or of
the importance of that hearing. Nonetheless, Father filed a section 388
petition approximately two months later, seeking to vacate the jurisdictional
findings and disposition orders on the ground that he did not receive notice of
the “April 2, 2025 jurisdictional hearing, violating WIC § 291 and due
process.” While it is unclear from the petition whether Father was claiming
he lacked notice of the April 2, 2025 detention hearing or of the April 30,
9
2025 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court addressed both
claims in denying Father’s petition. Then, at the very next hearing, Father
informed the court he did not receive notice of the jurisdiction/disposition
hearing. Although Father did not specify the defects in notice, it is clear from
his responses to the court that he was claiming he did not receive any notice
of the hearing.
Even if Father did not timely or adequately raise his due process
challenge in the juvenile court, we “would excuse that failure in light of the
fundamental due process issues implicated by this appeal.” (In re A.K.,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 269; see In re Christopher L. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1183, fn. 4 [“We need not determine whether Father
forfeited these arguments, however, because even if he did, we would exercise
our discretion to address Father’s appeal, which raises fundamental due
process issues”].)
We do not reach the same conclusion for the commissioner stipulation
issues Father raises on appeal. As mentioned, Father argues the judicial
officers who presided over the detention hearing, the restraining order
hearing, and the jurisdiction/disposition hearing failed to inform the parties
that they were commissioners and failed to acquire the parties’ stipulation to
the commissioners acting as temporary judges, as required by the California
Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure section 259. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 21; Code Civ. Proc., § 259, subd. (d); In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 91; In
re Marriage of Djulus (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1044.) Orders made by a
commissioner are void absent a stipulation by the parties. (In re Marriage of
Djulus, at pp. 1048–1049.)
Even if Father’s commissioner stipulation claims are meritorious,
Father does not contend these issues implicate his due process rights, nor
10
have we located any authority to support such a proposition. Raising
“ ‘issues . . . involv[ing] the important constitutional and statutory rights’ ”
alone does not justify relaxing the waiver rule. (In re Janee J., supra,
74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 206, 208.)
In sum, we conclude Father has forfeited the commissioner stipulation
issues but not his due process challenge based on inadequate notice of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
B. Due Process Notice Issues
Father contends he was not given proper notice of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing because the Department did not send him
written notice of the hearing and the juvenile court’s “oral” notice was “not
explicit and clear” and did not advise Father of the nature of the hearing or of
the consequences of a failure to appear for the hearing.
Reviewing the issue de novo (In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at
p. 183), we agree the notice was deficient in those respects. Notice of the
jurisdiction hearing must be given to the parents and must include, among
other things, the date, time, and place of the proceeding, a statement of the
“nature of the hearing,” “including what will be decided therein,” and a
statement that if the party “fail[s] to appear, the court may proceed without
them.” (§ 291, subd. (d)(1)–(6); In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742,
746.) Here, Father was not represented by counsel until after the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The record does not reveal that the
Department provided Father with notice of the hearing in compliance with
section 291. At most, the record indicates the juvenile court may have
provided Father a copy of the minute order from the restraining order
hearing, which noted only the date and time of the “Juris/Dispo” hearing.
While the court concluded Father was properly served with the Department’s
11
jurisdiction/disposition report, the record shows the report was mailed to the
address that Father was ordered to move out of a few weeks earlier.
Moreover, the “oral notice” at the April 2 and April 23 hearings was unclear
as to whether a hearing had, in fact, been set for April 30, 2025, and did not
disclose the nature of the hearing or the consequences of a failure to appear.
Thus, there is a strong possibility Father did not have actual notice of the
date and time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Even if Father was
aware that a hearing was set for April 30, 2025, nothing in the record
suggests he was aware of the nature of the hearing or of the consequences of
a failure to appear.
We further agree that such defects amount to a violation of Father’s
due process rights. In the dependency context, parents have a due process
right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. (In re Mia M. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807.) “A parent’s fundamental right to adequate notice
and the opportunity to be heard in dependency matters involving potential
deprivation of the parental interest [citation] has little, if any, value unless
the parent is advised of the nature of the hearing giving rise to that
opportunity, including what will be decided therein. Only with adequate
advisement can one choose to appear or not, to prepare or not, and to defend
or not.” (In re Stacy T. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424.) Therefore, it is not
sufficient to merely inform the parent of the date and time of a hearing; the
parent has a due process right to be informed of the nature of the hearing so
that the parent may make an informed decision whether to appear and
contest the matter. (In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 751 [“a
parent whose child may be found subject to the dependency jurisdiction of the
court enjoys a due process right to be informed of the nature of the
12
hearing, . . . in order that he or she may make an informed decision whether
to appear and contest the allegations”]; In re Stacy T., at p. 1424.)
Indeed, the defects in notice here were consequential. They deprived
Father of the opportunity to make informed decisions as to whether to appear
at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, to call, confront, and cross-examine
witnesses, and to present his own evidence. (See In re Stacy T., supra,
52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424; In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 620
[“[d]ue process includes the right to be heard, adduce testimony from
witnesses, and to cross-examine and confront witnesses”].) As a result, the
juvenile court made jurisdictional findings and disposition orders based solely
on the Department’s reports, leading to the court declaring the children
dependents of the court, removing the children from Father, and denying
Father reunification services.
Notwithstanding the defects in notice, the Department claims it made
“reasonable efforts” to “confirm that [Father] received notice even when he
kept refusing to cooperate.” We acknowledge the record indicates the
Department attempted to contact Father by phone and while he was in jail
after he was ordered to move out of the family home, and Father either did
not respond or refused to speak to the social worker. The Department also
noted during the restraining order hearing that it needed an updated mailing
address for Father. But the Department did not press the issue after the
court failed to address it. Nor does the record reveal any other efforts the
Department took to provide Father with notice of the jurisdiction/disposition
hearing or to ascertain his current whereabouts. Father’s refusal to
communicate with the Department does not excuse the Department from its
13
duty to act diligently to serve Father with notice of hearings.5 (See In re
Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 309 [“ ‘[s]ocial services agencies . . . are
bound by law to make every reasonable effort in attempting to inform parents
of all hearings’ ”]; County of Orange v. Carl D. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 429, 439
[“[t]he county has a constitutional responsibility to use due diligence to notify
absent parents” of dependency hearings].)
Further, as Father notes, it does not appear from the record that the
juvenile court complied with section 316.1, subdivision (a), which requires the
court to advise parents that the mailing address they provide the court will
be used “for notice purposes unless and until the parent . . . notifies the court
or the social services agency of a new mailing address in writing.” (§ 316.1,
subd. (a).) Thus, Father’s failure to provide the court with an updated
mailing address after he was ordered to move out of the family home does not
excuse the court “in mailing notice . . . to an address it knew was no longer
good.” (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1243; see id. at pp. 1240–
1243 [mother had good cause excusing her failure to timely file a writ petition
where court mailed notice to an address at which mother could not be
reached and failed to inform mother of the importance of updating her
mailing address].) As such, we agree with Father that notice of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing did not satisfy due process.
5 For example, the record suggests the Department knew Father was in
contact with his mother and that his mother was in contact with Mother
(K.T.), but there is no indication the Department asked either woman about
Father’s current address prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Reasonable diligence “includes searching not only ‘standard avenues
available to help locate a missing parent,’ but ‘ “specific ones most likely,
under the unique facts known to the [Agency], to yield [a parent’s] address.”
’ ” (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 712.)
14
Finally, we conclude the defects in notice were not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See In re Vanessa M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1132
[constitutional due process violations in dependency context require
application of the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard].)
First, the record indicates that if Father had adequate notice of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing, he would have appeared and testified as to
the relevant factual allegations, presented his own evidence, and/or cross-
examined Mother and the social worker who prepared the reports. (In re
Stacy T., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426 [considering, in assessing
prejudice, whether mother would have appeared and testified on her own
behalf if she had notice that the settlement conference would “accelerate into
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings”]; § 355, subd. (b)(2), (c)(1).) In
his section 388 petition, Father denied the detention report’s factual
allegations, “reserve[d] [his] full right to rebut all allegations,” and claimed
his eldest child felt “safest, most loved and emotionally supported” with
Father. He also attempted to file papers ahead of the restraining order
hearing, contested the court’s jurisdiction at the hearing, and indicated that
the social worker’s version of events regarding his alleged violation of the
temporary restraining order was untrue.
Second, the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings under subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of section 300 was not conclusive.
In fact, there appears to be little evidence in the Department’s reports
indicating Father presented “a substantial risk” of “serious physical harm or
illness” to the children at the time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
(§ 300 subd. (b)(1), italics added; see In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
104, 113 [concluding father’s violation of restraining order “did not
demonstrate a risk of physical harm to the children justifying the assertion of
15
jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300”].) Moreover, no testimony
was heard at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing nor was any evidence
admitted, and the factual allegations in the reports were based on statements
made by Mother, the social worker, and the children, as relayed by the social
worker who prepared the reports.6 None of the reports contained any
statements or evaluations from medical professionals indicating the children
were suffering from “serious emotional damage” or were at risk of such.
(§ 300, subd. (c).) Thus, had Father appeared and testified on his own behalf
and/or cross-examined Mother and the social worker who prepared the
reports, the jurisdictional findings would likely depend on the court’s
credibility determinations. (See In re M.M. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 955, 964
[“[t]he Department’s position ignores the vital role that live testimony plays
in a court’s assessment of credibility and its evaluation of conflicting
evidence”].)
Since we cannot speculate as to the substance and effect of the parties’
testimony, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defects in
notice were harmless. (See In re Stacy T., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426;
In re R.O. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 586, 593–594 [denial of contested
jurisdiction hearing not harmless because “Mother could have provided the
juvenile court with context concerning the allegations of the petition” and her
current circumstances and “could have cross-examined the social worker on
the contents of the jurisdiction report or offered other evidence”]; In re
Vanessa M., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 [concluding violation of
6 Although the jurisdiction/disposition report attached a “Sonoma
County Pretrial Assessment Report” for Father’s alleged violation of the
temporary restraining order, the facts of the incident were set forth by the
social worker in the report.
16
father’s due process right to be heard was not harmless where father
disputed the jurisdiction allegations; “it would be entirely speculative to
decide that additional testimony from Father would not have been useful to
the court in resolving the credibility disputes present”].)
In sum, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings must be reversed.
Such reversal, in turn, necessitates reversal of the disposition orders. (See In
re Jesus M., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 114.) We note, however, that “[o]ur
conclusion . . . does not mean the [Department] cannot try again. Indeed, it is
entirely possible valid grounds exist for the state to assume jurisdiction over
these children and indeed it may be in the children’s best interests for this to
happen.” (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 392.) Moreover, the
restraining order issued prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing remains
in place, as the court was not required to make jurisdictional findings under
section 300 before issuing a restraining order. (§ 213.5, subd. (a).)
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition orders are
reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
17
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
Sonoma County Human Services Department v. F.S. / A174004
18