Filed 10/29/26 In re Iris M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re IRIS M., et al., Persons B352769
Coming Under the Juvenile Court (Los Angeles County
Law. Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP00098)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
IGNACIO M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy A. Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ignacio M. (Father) appeals from juvenile court orders
regarding two of his children, Iris M. (born in February 2011)
and Naya M. (born in May 2016).1 The orders place the
children under the permanent legal guardianship of the
maternal grandparents pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.26.2
Father contends respondent Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not
comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law (§ 224 et seq.)
(Cal-ICWA), because DCFS did not fulfill its Cal-ICWA duty
to sufficiently inquire into whether the children are “Indian
children” to whom ICWA applies. He argues we must therefore
conditionally reverse the orders. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Because the only challenge on appeal is to the sufficiency of
the ICWA inquiry, our background summary includes only facts
relevant to that issue.
A. Family Members Referenced During DCFS
Investigation
The maternal grandparents are from Cambodia and
primarily speak Khmer. Maternal uncle Kamson I. resides with
the maternal grandparents and translated for them during DCFS
interactions.
1 The children’s mother, M.I. (Mother), did not appeal.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
The children have two adult sisters, Maliya L. and Asia M.;
an adult paternal half sister, Cristal; and a paternal half brother,
Edgar M. Paternal half sister Cristal has two children, Liam and
Helena. Adult sister Asia M. told DCFS about a paternal aunt,
Jasmine C., with whom Asia M. has lived, as well as a maternal
aunt, Ming M. Adult sister Maliya L. reported several maternal
cousins live on the same property as the maternal grandparents.
Mother provided the contact information for a maternal cousin,
Donna K.
According to Iris, she and her parents lived with paternal
grandmother in approximately 2021. Father stated the paternal
relatives no longer speak to him.
B. DCFS Investigation into the Children’s
Heritage
Both parents filed a California Judicial Form ICWA-020,
in which they denied having Native American heritage. In
interviews with DCFS, Mother and Father likewise denied any
such heritage. Mother told DCFS she was born in Battanbang,
Cambodia, and that her family originates from Cambodia. She
and the maternal family moved to the United Stated in 1983.
Father told DCFS he was born in Jalisco, Mexico and
his family originates from Mexico. The paternal grandmother
brought Father and his three siblings to the United States; the
paternal grandfather remained in Mexico.
The paternal half brother Edgar M., maternal
grandparents, maternal half sister Maliya L., maternal aunt
Sunny I., maternal aunt Polynn I., and maternal uncle Kamson I.
all denied knowledge that the children have Native American
heritage. The maternal grandparents also told DCFS more
specifically: “ ‘We don’t have any Native American blood. We are
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Khmer. And the grandkids’ father is Mexican, so I don’t think
the father has any Native American heritage either.’ ” During
a subsequent interview, they reiterated, “ ‘No blood in Native
American. We are Khmer. And the father of the grandkids is
Mexican.’ ” Paternal half brother Edgar M. also told DCFS that
Father is from Mexico.
DCFS called and texted maternal cousin Donna K., but
she did not respond. DCFS was aware the paternal grandmother
lives in Gardena, but made no effort to obtain her contact
information. Nor did DCFS attempt to locate and/or contact
maternal aunt Ming M., paternal half sister Cristal, paternal
cousins Liam and Helena, paternal aunt Jasmine C., or the
unnamed maternal cousins who reportedly live with the maternal
grandparents.3
C. Juvenile Court Inquiry and ICWA Findings
During the January 10, 2024 initial detention hearing,
the court asked the parents, maternal uncle Kamson I., and
the maternal grandfather if they had Native American ancestry,
and all answered in the negative. The court found there was no
3 A DCFS report states that DCFS met with “caregivers,
paternal grandparents” on January 22, 2024. This is a
typographical error; the caregivers were maternal grandparents.
We thus disregard Father’s argument, which relies entirely on
this erroneous reference in the DCFS report, that DCFS met with
the paternal grandfather on January 22, 2024 and failed to ask
about Native American heritage. The only information about
the paternal grandfather in the record is that he remained in
Mexico when Father and the paternal grandmother moved to
the United States.
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reason to believe ICWA applied to the children, and noted
DCFS’s ongoing duty of inquiry into the children’s heritage.
At a February 22, 2024 hearing, the court stated DCFS
had “[done] an ICWA inquiry into relatives about possible Native
American ancestry,” and all relatives DCFS had interviewed
had denied such ancestry. The court again found ICWA did not
apply.
At a February 20, 2025 hearing, the court also asked adult
sister Maliya L. if the children had Native American ancestry
and again posed this question to maternal uncle Kamson I. Both
answered in the negative. The court “continue[d] to find” ICWA
did not apply.
In a February 18, 2026 order, the court placed the children
under permanent legal guardianship with the maternal
grandparents.
Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Principles
The Legislature enacted ICWA “out of concern that ‘an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up
by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them
by nontribal public and private agencies,’ ” and “aims to keep
Indian children connected to Indian families.” (Haaland v.
Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255, 265.) To that end, under ICWA
and Cal-ICWA, a juvenile court and DCFS have duties aimed
at assessing whether a child who is the subject of a dependency
action is an “Indian child” (§ 224.1, subd. (b))—that is,
either “a member . . . of an Indian tribe” or “[e]ligible for
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membership . . . in an Indian tribe and . . . [the] biological child of
a member . . . of an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.1, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B).)
Among DCFS’s duties is “ ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine whether
ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be an
Indian child.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1131–1132
(Dezi C.).) “This continuing duty can be divided into three
phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry,
and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) Only when the duty of initial inquiry
yields “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” in the
proceedings (§ 224.2, subd. (e)) must DCFS proceed to the second
and/or third phases. (See, e.g., In re D.F., supra, at p. 566.)
The initial inquiry phase requires DCFS to ask the child’s
family, including “extended family members,” whether the child
is, or may be, an Indian child.4 (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Extended
family members include adults who are the child’s “grandparent,
aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1,
subd. (c)(1).)
Crucially for our analysis here, “[o]ur Supreme Court has
acknowledged that this duty of initial inquiry does not require
4 Effective September 27, 2024, the Legislature amended
section 224.2 to require DCFS to conduct its initial inquiry
of extended family members upon its first contact with them.
(Id., subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3.) This amendment
does not affect our analysis in the instant matter, however,
because DCFS’s initial contact with each of the extended family
members either predated the amendment, and/or involved
inquiry into the children’s heritage.
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interviewing ‘every’ extended family member; rather, where
the juvenile court’s finding that [DCFS] conducted an adequate
inquiry and that ICWA does not apply is ‘supported by sufficient
evidence,’ conditional reversal is not required ‘even if the agency
did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.’ ”
(In re Bella L. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290 (Bella L.),
quoting Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1140–1141; see Dezi C.,
supra, at p. 1141 [“the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination
that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ ” “subject to a deferential
standard of review”]; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2) [“[i]f the court
makes a finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and
due diligence as required in this section have been conducted
and there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian
child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not apply
to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence”].)
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports that DCFS’s
Inquiry Was Adequate and ICWA Does Not
Apply
Father argues DCFS did not fulfill its duty of initial
inquiry. On this basis, he contends the court’s finding
that ICWA does not apply cannot stand, and that we must
conditionally reverse the challenged orders imposing permanent
legal guardianship. We disagree that the record justifies, let
alone requires, conditional reversal.
In so concluding, we rely not on the absence of information
suggesting the children are “members[ ] or . . . biological
child[ren] of a member or citizen of an Indian tribe” (§ 224.1,
subd. (b)(1)(B)), but rather on evidence affirmatively—and
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strongly—suggesting they are not. As the term “Native
American” implies, ICWA and Cal-ICWA define Indian tribes
as necessarily existing only in the United States. (See § 224.1,
subd. (a)(4) [defining “Indian tribe” as a group “recognized as
eligible for the services provided to Indians by the [United States]
Secretary of the Interior because of their status as Indians”].)
Uncontradicted evidence supports that Mother and Father
were born in Cambodia and Mexico, respectively, and that
the maternal and paternal grandparents were likewise from
Cambodia and Mexico, respectively. This is inconsistent with
either the parents or the grandparents on either side having any
connection with an Indian tribe.
Father cites cases holding a parent’s denial of Native
American heritage is insufficient to satisfy the duty of initial
inquiry. (See, e.g., In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542; In re
S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303.) These cases do not assist
Father. The record reflects both parents did not just deny Native
American heritage—they claimed other heritage inherently
inconsistent with Native American heritage. Moreover, the logic
of these cases is that there are many reasons a parent may not be
aware of his or her Native American ancestry. (See, e.g., S.R.,
supra, at p. 314 [“It isn’t easy to track tribal affiliations and
those connections are easily lost. ‘Oral transmission of relevant
information from generation to generation and the vagaries
of translating from Indian languages to English combine to
create the very real possibility that a parent’s or other relative’s
identification of the family’s tribal affiliation is not accurate’ ”];
accord, Y.W., supra, at p. 554.) These same concerns do not
apply to statements by a parent about his or her place of birth,
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particularly where, as here, other witnesses corroborate those
statements.
Father argues DCFS failed to satisfy its duty of inquiry
because it did not attempt to inquire of at least eight “extended
family members”— maternal aunt Ming M., paternal half sister
Cristal, paternal cousins Liam and Helena, paternal aunt
Jasmine C., paternal grandmother, and an undetermined number
of unidentified maternal cousins. But we must consider this
in light of (1) undisputed evidence that both Mother and Father
were born abroad to foreign parents, and (2) all nine relatives
DCFS did speak with having denied knowledge of Native
American heritage. Considered in that context, and given
nothing suggests the relatives DCFS did not contact would
contradict what those it did speak with stated,5 DCFS’s “failure
[to make these further inquiries] does not render [its] . . . efforts
unreliable or the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply
unworthy of our deference.” (Bella L., supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at
5 We acknowledge it is theoretically possible one of the
parents’ Mexican or Cambodian ancestors at one time lived
in the United States, developed some connection with a Native
American tribe during that time, then returned to Mexico or
Cambodia, respectively. Nothing in the record suggests this
“highly improbable” scenario occurred, however. (See Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1168 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.); see ibid.
[“Or let us imagine a case involving a child who, with his entire
family, recently immigrated from Ukraine, thereby making it
highly improbable that the child is a member of, or may be
eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.
Any court would be hard pressed to find that the Department’s
inquiry regarding his or her Indian ancestry was inadequate
because it did not ask his or her entire extended (Ukrainian)
family about Indian descent”].)
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p. 1290; see Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) To conclude
otherwise would elevate the required form of DCFS’s duty to
inquire above the substantive goal that duty serves. (See In re
K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 385 [“ ‘[t]he juvenile court has
discretion to determine when enough is enough’ ”].)
For these reasons, conditional reversal for further ICWA
inquiry “is neither required nor warranted” here. (Bella L.,
supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290; see ibid. [where DCFS
inquired of 11 extended relatives, “all of whom expressed no
reason to believe the children might have Native American
ancestry,” its failure to inquire of paternal grandfather while
interviewing him on other topics did not justify conditional
reversal], citing Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; see Dezi C.,
supra, at p. 1141 [if “finding that an inquiry was adequate and
proper . . . are . . . supported by sufficient evidence and record
documentation,” “there is no error and conditional reversal would
not be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone
who has an interest in the child”]; see also In re E.W. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 314, 323 [affirming ICWA finding where failure to
interview additional relatives did not “cast[ ] any doubt on the
reliability of the answers already obtained from the parents and
relatives”].)
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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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