Filed 9/23/26 In re I.F. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re I.F. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF A176098
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Lake County
Super. Ct. Nos. JV320681-A,
v.
JV320681-B & JV320681-C)
C.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
After holding a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing
(statutory references are to this code), the juvenile court found I.F., L.F., and
F.F. (the children) likely to be adopted and terminated the parental rights of
C.F. (mother).1 The court found the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.; ICWA) applied to this case but, as the children’s tribe chose
not to intervene or make placement decisions, the court did not consider
tribal customary adoption.
Mother contends the court and the Lake County Department of Social
Services (DSS) erred by failing to consult with the tribe as to the permanent
1 The court also terminated the parental rights of S.F. (father), who had
been bypassed for services. Only mother is a party to this appeal.
1
placement plan before terminating parental rights. She also argues
substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that the children are
adoptable. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 2024.
In May, DSS filed a juvenile dependency petition as to I.F., then 15
months old (born January 2023), and twins L.F. and F.F., then almost two
months old (born March 2024), pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a)
(serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect), (e) (serious physical abuse
to a child under five), (i) (acts of cruelty), and (j) (abuse of a sibling).
The petition alleged the following. Mother took F.F. to the hospital on
May 11 after coming home to find F.F. had been injured while in father’s
care. F.F. had a brain bleed in multiple places, lesions on her face, bruising
on her chin and left leg, and fractures to her rib and leg. L.F. was also
assessed for injuries and had a brain bleed and multiple rib fractures.
Doctors determined the injuries were caused by nonaccidental trauma and
the children were placed in protective custody.
Detention Hearing
The detention report further detailed the injuries. F.F. had four brain
hemorrhages consistent with blunt force trauma; fractures to her left fibula
and tibia; a bruise on her calf in the shape of a handprint; abdominal
bruising; elevated liver enzyme levels consistent with blunt trauma such as
from a punch, kick, or stomp; and bruising on her chin, cheek, eye, tongue,
and armpit. L.F. had a subconjunctival hemorrhage, small brain bleed, and
fractures to six ribs.
The detention report stated mother was the children’s sole caretaker
except on two occasions in May when she went grocery shopping, including
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the time she returned home to find F.F. injured. Mother did not believe the
doctor’s assessment that the injuries appeared to be the result of child abuse.
Father had a history of alcohol abuse that resulted in a physical
altercation with mother while she was holding their older child, I.F. He had
previously been charged with assaulting mother, resulting in a criminal
protective order, and in May was charged with numerous offenses related to
the injuries to F.F. and L.F.
The report also stated DSS was informed that mother is an enrolled
member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation (the Tribe). DSS contacted the Tribe
and was informed its policy was to not intervene in cases where children live
outside of Oklahoma.
At the May 16 detention hearing, the court ordered the children
detained and vested temporary placement and care with DSS.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings
The jurisdiction report and addenda provided the following relevant
information.
By late May, the children had been placed with a nonrelative extended
family member, R.C.
Mother repeatedly denied knowledge of injuries to the children, but
DSS found it unreasonable to believe she was unaware of the abuse as it
appeared to have been committed over multiple days or weeks. Yet, mother
continued to allow the children to remain in father’s care and repeatedly
sought to justify the injuries as well as father’s behavior. As of June, mother
still did not believe father was a danger to the children.
At the August contested jurisdiction hearing, the court found the
children were abused by father and sustained the allegations in the
dependency petition. The court was concerned that mother still had a plan
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for father to be in her life and found her inability to believe father abused the
children put them at extreme risk. The court set the disposition hearing for
later that month.
The disposition report stated that, in August, mother acknowledged
father was responsible for the injuries but ascribed it to his mental health.
The maternal grandfather and step-grandmother had applied for emergency
placement for the children, which DSS denied due to substantiated
allegations of sexual abuse for the maternal grandfather.
The Tribe informed DSS that the children were considered “ ‘Indian
child[ren]’ ” under ICWA, but the Tribe did not intend to become involved in
the case or make placement decisions as the children lived outside of
Oklahoma.
At the disposition hearing, the court declared the children dependents
of the court and ordered family reunification services to mother only,
bypassing services to father.
Six-month Review Hearing
In a January 2025 status report, DSS requested the court terminate
reunification services to mother. F.F. and L.F. had been diagnosed with
cerebral palsy caused by the nonaccidental brain trauma precipitating this
case. Although mother had attended nearly all her supervised visits with the
children and participated in various classes, she continued to deny F.F.’s and
L.F.’s diagnoses, in particular, that they were caused by the injuries from
father. She told a psychological evaluator she was “ ‘just saying what [DSS]
wants to hear’ ” to get the children back. Such superficial compliance and
failure to acknowledge father’s role in the injuries placed the children at risk
of future harm.
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The report noted the children had been placed with R.C., who was a
member of a different tribe than the children, since the outset of the case.
R.C. had been involved in all the children’s medical appointments during that
time; had arranged, transported, and supported F.F. and L.F. in all of their
medical, physical, and occupational therapy appointments; and had
committed to understanding their diagnoses and long-term developmental
needs.
However, DSS had concerns about long-term placement with R.C.
based on her close relationship with the maternal grandparents given the
maternal grandfather’s substantiated sexual abuse allegations. Further,
DSS became aware that R.C. had been sharing medical information with the
maternal grandparents and other community members, but R.C. signed a
safety plan to ensure she would not continue to do so. Finally, R.C. had a
history of child welfare complaints.
A May 2025 addendum stated mother and father had exchanged almost
200 phone calls and numerous messages since January.
At the June 2025 six-month status review hearing, mother requested
an extension of services and objected to the children’s continued placement
with R.C. DSS stated it had investigated the child welfare complaints
against R.C. but did not find evidence of intentional abuse or neglect and did
not believe moving the children was warranted.
The court was concerned that mother maintained consistent contact
with father, lacked insight into the causes of the children’s injuries, and did
not prioritize their well-being. The court stated more time was spent at that
hearing focusing on R.C.’s alleged faults than mother’s own progress. The
court terminated services to mother and set a selection and implementation
hearing under section 366.26 (section 366.26 hearing) for October 2025.
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Section 366.26 Hearings
The court continued the section 366.26 hearing multiple times,
ultimately holding it in February 2026.
In its December 2025 section 366.26 report, DSS recommended a
permanent plan of adoption be ordered for the children. DSS identified R.C.
as a prospective adoptive parent, noting she had provided stability for the
children, committed to raising them, and was enthusiastic about officially
making them part of her family. DSS had ongoing discussions with her about
setting boundaries with those who may not be safe for the children—
presumably the maternal grandfather given his history of child sexual abuse
allegations—and R.C. was willing and able to set such boundaries to keep the
children safe.
Adoption assessments completed for each child by California’s State
Department of Social Services (CDSS) found the children were likely to be
adopted and CDSS therefore recommended termination of parental rights
and a permanency plan of adoption. R.C. was committed to adopting the
children and CDSS believed it was in their best interest to remain with her.
The adoption assessments stated that all the children’s developmental
needs were being met. Despite their diagnoses, both F.F. and L.F. were
making good progress in reaching their developmental milestones and there
were no concerns regarding their emotional health or well-being. There were
also no concerns about I.F.’s emotional health or well-being.
Richard England, a qualified ICWA expert retained by DSS after the
Tribe did not respond to inquiries regarding a preferred expert, agreed with
DSS’s permanency plan for the children.
Ahead of the continued hearing in January 2026, the court noted that,
if it found the children were adoptable and terminated parental rights, the
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court was “not designating necessarily anyone as the adoptive parent,” which
it could do later.
At the February 2026 section 366.26 hearing, R.C. testified she was
related to and worked with the maternal step-grandmother, who helped
watch the children around three times a week. The maternal grandfather
was involved with the children at the beginning of the case, before the
allegations against him were known, but R.C. did not see him behave
inappropriately around them. Since around July, R.C. ensured the children
did not have any contact with him other than some phone or video calls. R.C.
believed the children would be safe in either her care or the maternal
grandparents’ care.
DSS argued the children were likely to be adopted, even as a sibling
group, and no statutory exception applied that should prevent termination of
parental rights. DSS had concerns over R.C.’s testimony regarding the
maternal grandfather and thought “some difficult discussions and meetings”
would be required. However, that did not change its assessment that the
children were likely to be adopted, even if not by R.C. DSS could also
consider other potential adoptive parents if the court so ordered and asked
the court to leave the placement to be determined.
The children’s counsel requested termination of parental rights and a
permanent plan of adoption. Counsel asserted the children were adoptable,
as evidenced by R.C.’s willingness to adopt them.
Mother argued that placement with R.C. was not best for the children
and asked the court to order a guardianship without termination of parental
rights.
The court noted that ICWA applied but the Tribe did not get involved
with children outside of Oklahoma. The qualified expert, England, opined
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adoption and termination was appropriate, though he did not have contact
with the Tribe personally.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children
were adoptable and terminated parental rights to mother and father. The
court explained that it was likely the children would be adopted, “whether or
not they’re adopted by their current caregiver or grandparents,” as “[t]hese
are very young children, and while they do have medical needs, none of those
medical needs indicate that they would not be adoptable as a group.”
The court declined to designate an adoptable home as it needed to be
“worked out.” While it was likely R.C. would be the adoptable parent, and
the court did not hear any testimony that disqualified her as such, the court
felt there remained questions about allegations made against R.C. that
needed to be answered before it would designate her. The court stressed it
was not questioning that the children were adoptable or that parental rights
were to be terminated.
The court set a March 2026 hearing for an update. At that hearing, no
decision was made as to adoptive placement as DSS was waiting for more
information and a report from CDSS. The court clarified it did not have an
issue with R.C.’s qualification as an adoptive parent but rather was
concerned that she would be a proxy for the maternal grandparents given
their close relationship, so the court wanted further inquiry. Mother
informed the court she had three family members (a grandparent and two
cousins) that she wished the court to consider for potential adoptive
placement. DSS stated it would investigate those family members as options
for placement.
Mother appealed from the order terminating her parental rights.
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DISCUSSION
Mother argues the court erred by failing to ascertain the Tribe’s opinion
on the permanency plan, including whether it requested tribal customary
adoption. She further contends substantial evidence does not support the
court’s finding that the children are adoptable. We address each issue in
turn and conclude neither is persuasive.
I. Legal Principles
“ ‘The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect abused or
neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide
permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a
prescribed period of time.’ [Citation.] When the child is removed from the
home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the
family.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52.)
If reunification services are unsuccessful, the court terminates
reunification efforts and sets a section 366.26 hearing, also called a
permanency planning hearing, which is designed to select and implement a
permanent plan for the child. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 52.)
“ ‘Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the
needs of the child for permanency and stability.’ ” (Ibid.)
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court either terminates parental
rights and places the child up for adoption, or it selects another permanent
plan, such as placement with a guardian or long-term foster care. (In re Z.G.
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 373, 378.)
In general, there is a statutory preference for termination of parental
rights and placement for adoption. (In re A.S. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 131, 143
(A.S.), citing § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) But, “[i]n 2010, legislation was enacted
establishing ‘tribal customary adoption’ as an alternative permanent plan for
9
a dependent Indian child who cannot be reunited with his or her parents.
Tribal customary adoption is intended to provide an Indian child with the
same stability and permanency as traditional adoption under state law
without the termination of parental rights, which is contrary to the cultural
beliefs of many Native American tribes.” (In re H.R. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
751, 755 (H.R.).)
However, tribal customary adoption is an available option for the court
“only when identified as such by the child’s tribe.” (H.R., supra, 208
Cal.App.4th at p. 765; see §§ 366.24, subd. (c)(6), 366.26, subd. (e)(2).) If a
child’s tribe so recommends, tribal customary adoption becomes the preferred
permanent plan. (A.S., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.) Nonetheless, the
juvenile court retains discretion to select the most appropriate permanent
plan. (Ibid.)
II. The Court and DSS Did Not Err by Failing To Consult the Tribe
as to the Permanent Plan
Mother avers the court and DSS erred by failing to consult the Tribe on
tribal customary adoption as a permanent placement plan prior to
terminating parental rights. She contends that, despite being repeatedly
informed that the Tribe was not going to intervene in this case or make
placement decisions, the court or DSS was required to ascertain the Tribe’s
opinion on the permanent placement plan.
DSS argues mother forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below
and further argues it is unavailing on the merits. We need not decide
whether mother forfeited her argument as, assuming it is not forfeited, we
find no error.
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A. Additional Relevant Facts
From the inception of the proceedings, DSS inquired with the Tribe as
to the children’s Indian status and learned mother is an enrolled member of
the Tribe.
On May 14, the same day the dependency petition was filed, DSS
contacted the Tribe to provide notice of the proceedings. DSS was then
informed the Tribe’s policy is to not intervene in cases where children live
outside of Oklahoma. Specifically, according to the disposition report, the
Tribe’s intake unit coordinator told the social worker on a May 14 phone call
that “the Tribe does not intend to become involved with this case nor make
placement decisions due to the family living outside of Oklahoma” and its
“only request was to be provided with updates as the case progresses.”
Indeed, the singular additional communication from the Tribe to DSS
occurred the next day, May 15, when DSS received a letter from the Tribe
stating the children would be considered “ ‘Indian child[ren]’ ” under ICWA.
The letter indicated the Tribe’s “Indian Child Welfare Program” would be
staffing the case and set forth a list of placement preferences for the children;
it asked that, if those preferences could not be followed, the court conduct a
good cause hearing to establish on the record the reason for deviating from
them. Most of the placement preferences related to homes in Oklahoma
approved or certified by the Tribe.
Due to the Tribe not approving specific foster homes outside of
Oklahoma, DSS requested the court find good cause to deviate from the
Tribe’s stated placement preferences so that the children could be placed
within California.
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1. ICWA Compliance Hearing
In an October ICWA compliance report, DSS stated placement with
extended family or a foster placement specified by the Tribe were considered
but neither allowed the children to be placed near their parents in California.
Therefore, it recommended continued placement with R.C., a member of a
local tribe who was applying for resource family approval. DSS argued that,
to the extent the Tribe objected to this placement, good cause existed for
deviating as the Tribe’s other placement preferences did not facilitate
services with the parents in California.
a. Qualified Expert Witness
DSS made several attempts to determine whether the Tribe had a
specific qualified expert witness it wanted DSS to engage, but the Tribe did
not respond to those inquiries. Therefore, DSS retained England as an
expert witness to provide evidence of the prevailing social and cultural
standards of the Tribe.
England submitted a September declaration stating as follows. He is a
member of the Yurok Tribe who served as an expert witness and consultant
for 24 years in ICWA cases for various tribes, including providing testimony
for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation for several years. He did not personally talk
to the Tribe regarding this case.
England opined that active efforts were being made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of this
Indian family as well as thorough and timely efforts intended to maintain or
reunite the Indian children with their family. He believed placement with
R.C., who was a member of another tribe and specialized in taking Native
children, was the best placement for the children at that time.
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In England’s opinion, there was good cause to deviate from the Tribe’s
placement preferences so the children could remain in California, where their
parents are located, and because of their placement with R.C. He concluded
mother and father “were not behaving in a manner that is reflective of the
Muscogee Creek Nation’s child rearing practices,” under which “the children
are considered sacred and to be the most important resource of the Tribe.”
b. ICWA Compliance Findings
At the October ICWA compliance hearing, the court found continued
custody with the Indian parent was likely to cause the children serious
emotional or physical damage. It found DSS had made appropriate inquiries
and that ICWA applies to the proceedings.
The court noted the Tribe did not intend to become involved in the case
or make placement decisions as the children were living outside of Oklahoma.
It found DSS had used diligent efforts to comply with the statutory
placement preferences (§ 361.31) and, because no extended family members
were available and no foster placement within California would be approved
or specified by the Tribe, the children were placed in the highest placement
preference that allowed them to stay in California.
The court directed DSS to give the Tribe its requested progress
updates.
At the June 2025 six-month review hearing, the court found DSS had
made active and timely efforts to provide services to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family, that those efforts and the case plan were conducted to the
maximum extent possible in partnership with the family and the Tribe, but
the active efforts proved unsuccessful.
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2. Continued Contacts with the Tribe
In accordance with the Tribe’s request to be provided with updates on
the case, DSS regularly provided the Tribe with updates throughout the
proceedings. For example, DSS served the Tribe copies of the ICWA
compliance report, the addendum to the six-month review report, and the
section 366.26 report. DSS repeatedly affirmed in its reports that it was
continuing to provide the Tribe with updates.
DSS also provided the Tribe notice of various hearings. For example,
the Tribe was served notice of the ICWA compliance hearing as well as the
six-month review hearing, which indicated DSS was recommending
terminating reunification services. It was also served notices of the request
to continue the October 2025 section 366.26 hearing and each of the four
continued hearings held in late 2025 and early 2026.
Critically, each of the notices of the section 366.26 hearings stated the
social worker recommended termination of parental rights and
implementation of a plan of adoption; for each notice, the box next to “Tribal
customary adoption” was unchecked. There is no indication in the record the
Tribe made any further outreach to DSS or made any further requests
regarding the children, including as to requesting tribal customary adoption.
The only apparent communication from the Tribe during the section 366.26
hearing period was an October 2025 letter to CDSS reaffirming that the
Tribe would not intervene in this case.
B. Analysis
We find no error in the court or DSS not considering tribal customary
adoption as part of the permanency planning.
California’s dependency scheme makes tribal customary adoption “the
preferred permanent plan for an Indian child if the child’s tribe recommends
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[it].” (In re N.S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 816, 841; accord, A.S., supra, 28
Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)
Here, the Tribe expressly and repeatedly indicated it was not going to
intervene in this case or make placement decisions. It plainly did not “elect[]
a permanent plan of tribal customary adoption” (§ 366.26, subd. (e)(2)) nor
did it “identif[y] tribal customary adoption as the permanent placement plan
for the Indian child[ren]” (§ 366.24, subd. (c)(6)) such that it would have
become an available option for the court. (See In re H.R., supra, 208
Cal.App.4th at p. 765.) The Tribe did not intervene despite being made
aware that DSS was pursuing termination of parental rights and state
adoption rather than tribal customary adoption in at least four notices that
were sent to the Tribe regarding the section 366.26 hearings. The Tribe thus
had multiple opportunities to make any objection to that plan known, yet it
did not do so.
Further, we reject the contention that the court or DSS had an
affirmative duty to ascertain the Tribe’s opinion on the proposed permanency
plan in this case. Mother does not point to any authority requiring such an
affirmative duty where a child’s tribe has chosen not to make placement
decisions even after receiving multiple notices of permanency planning
stating tribal customary adoption was not being pursued. We will not fault
the court or DSS for not doing so under these circumstances.
We are also unpersuaded by mother’s assertion that the court directed
DSS to obtain the Tribe’s input as to the permanent placement, but DSS
failed to follow the court’s instruction. The record does not contain any
evidence that the court gave any such direction.
In support of her claim, mother focuses on the first section 366.26
hearing in October 2025, during which the court continued the hearing until
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December for reasons related to the qualified expert witness. Specifically,
after DSS reiterated that the Tribe was not intervening in this case and that
R.C. was a member of a different tribe, which had “some degree” of preference
for placement, the court stated: “It would be helpful if the [Tribe] . . . [¶] . . .
[w]ould come in and tell us what they would like to do. I’m not usually in the
position of saying, ‘Hey, can you appear in an ICWA case. I’d join you if you
wanted to be there.’ [¶] But all right. Let’s just continue this to December
. . . .” The hearing transcript does not demonstrate the court affirmatively
directed DSS to inquire with the Tribe as to the recommended permanency
plan. Rather, after the court was told, yet again, the Tribe was not
intervening in this case, it appeared to merely express the understandable
opinion that having the Tribe’s input would be helpful.
That the court did not direct DSS to make such an inquiry is further
evidenced by the lack of any suggestion elsewhere in the record that anyone
else—including mother—sought to follow up on this supposed order. To the
contrary, at the continued section 366.26 hearing, the court explicitly stated
the Tribe did not get involved with cases outside of Oklahoma such as this
one.
In sum, even assuming the issue is not forfeited, the court and DSS did
not err by failing to affirmatively consult the Tribe on the permanency plan
under the circumstances present here.
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Adoptability Finding
As we have concluded there was no basis for considering tribal
customary adoption in this case, the general statutory preference for
termination of parental rights and state adoption applies. (See A.S., supra,
28 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)
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A. Relevant Law
At the section 366.26 hearing, if the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted, “the court shall
terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) “Whether a child is likely to be adopted is the ‘pivotal question’
at a section 366.26 hearing [citation] and it is a question on which the child
welfare agency carries the burden of proof.” (In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th
803, 817 (B.D.).)
When making an adoptability determination, “the court must focus on
the child—‘whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state’
lends him or her to finding an adoptive family.” (B.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th
at p. 817.)
Adoptability falls into one of two categories: general adoptability and
specific adoptability. (B.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 817.) “If the child is
considered generally adoptable, we do not examine the suitability of the
prospective adoptive home.” (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051,
1061.) “However, where the child is deemed adoptable based solely on the
fact that a particular family is willing to adopt him or her,” the child is
considered specifically adoptable, and the court must determine whether
there is a legal impediment to adoption and whether a prospective adoptive
parent is able to meet the child’s needs. (Ibid.; B.D., at p. 817.)
Though not determinative, the existence of a prospective adoptive
parent that is interested in adopting the child is evidence of general
adoptability. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649–1650 (Sarah
M.); B.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 817.) “In other words, a prospective
adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely
17
to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive
parent or by some other family.” (Sarah M., at p. 1650.)
With general adoptability, the section 366.26 inquiry does not focus on
the suitability of a potential adoptive parent because that person’s suitability
does not bear on whether the child is likely to be adopted. (Sarah M., supra,
22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.)
We review the court’s adoptability finding for substantial evidence. (In
re Carl R., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.) Under this standard, “we
review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations
and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders. [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the [juvenile] court.’ ” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688–689.)
B. Analysis
Mother argues that substantial evidence does not support the court’s
finding that the children are likely to be adopted within a reasonable time,
asserting the court’s finding was made in the absence of clear answers about
R.C.’s suitability as a potential adoptive placement. We are not convinced.
As an initial matter, mother incorrectly characterizes the court’s
adoptability finding as one that the children are specifically adoptable rather
than generally adoptable. The record reflects the court found the children to
be generally adoptable as a group as it explicitly stated its finding was
premised on a determination that they were likely to be adopted “whether or
not they’re adopted by [R.C.] or [maternal] grandparents.” (Italics added.)
Further indication that the court found the children generally
adoptable is the fact that the court did not designate R.C. or anyone else as
18
prospective adoptive parents at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, yet
still found the children to be adoptable. In addition, the court was willing to
entertain DSS looking into the family members suggested by mother at the
March 2026 hearing as to potential adoptive homes.
Therefore, while the court stated it believed R.C. was likely to become
the adoptive parent, the court was not premising its adoptability finding on
any one specific adoptive parent and it explicitly left the door open to others.
Accordingly, mother’s arguments focusing on R.C.’s suitability rather than on
the children’s adoptability are misplaced. (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1650.)
Having determined the court made a general adoptability finding, we
conclude that finding is supported by substantial evidence. The court cited
proper considerations as support for its finding, such as the children’s young
age and that their medical needs did not serve as a barrier to finding a
prospective home. (See B.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 817 [adoptability
finding must focus on children’s age, physical condition, and emotional
state].)
CDSS’s adoption assessments support that conclusion. Although we do
not wish to minimize the medical needs of F.F. and L.F., the assessments
found that both twins were making good progress in reaching their
developmental milestones. CDSS further found there were no concerns as to
the emotional health or well-being of any of the children.
Additionally, the fact that R.C., among others, expressed interest in
adopting the children provides further support for the fact that they were
likely to be adopted, either by her or by some other family. (Sarah M., supra,
22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.)
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Given the children’s youth, the progress F.F. and L.F. were making, the
lack of emotional health concerns, and the existence of potential adoptive
families, the court’s finding that the children were likely to be adopted is
supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s February 9, 2026 order terminating parental rights
is affirmed.
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
A176098 / In re I.F.
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