Filed 8/11/26 In re H.K. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re H.K., a Person Coming Under the H053496
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 25JD028618)
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
CHILDREN’S SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.K.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant S.K. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders as to nine-year-old H.K. On appeal, Mother argues that substantial
evidence did not support the jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b)(1).1 While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction and dismissed the dependency. Respondent Santa Clara County
Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) moves to dismiss the appeal
as moot. We conclude the appeal is moot, decline to exercise our discretion to review the
appeal, and dismiss it.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In December 2024, the Department received a referral of general neglect as to
H.K. after someone threatened to kill Mother. As a consequence of that referral, the
Department learned about Mother’s ongoing methamphetamine use. Concerned about
Mother’s care for H.K, the Department implemented a safety plan with Mother and she
signed a voluntary family maintenance services agreement.
Mother was required to complete a substance use assessment, drug treatment and
testing, and parenting classes. Mother also agreed to not have drugs or alcohol around
H.K., and if she were to use drugs, she agreed to leave H.K. with her roommate.
Initially, Mother participated in these plans, but soon after, Mother’s cooperation
with the Department declined. The Department met with Mother several times to address
her failure to participate in services. Mother disputed that she had agreed to “all”
services and stated that someone had forged her signature on the voluntary family
maintenance services plan. Ultimately Mother signed another safety plan, agreeing to
many of the same conditions. Despite these voluntary agreements, several months after
the Department began its investigation, it filed a petition under section 300, subdivision
(b),3 alleging Mother’s substance abuse placed H.K. at substantial risk of serious physical
harm, noting that H.K. had autism, and could not advocate for herself because of limited
communication abilities. At the detention hearing, the court found a prima facie showing
that H.K. came within section 300 and permitted H.K. to remain in Mother’s custody.
Before the jurisdictional hearing, the Department recommended sustaining the petition
2 We omit many of the facts related to the Department’s concerns about Mother’s
interactions with others and Mother’s substance use as they are irrelevant to our
disposition.
3 In its first petition, the Department included allegations under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) stating that it did not know H.K.’s alleged father’s
whereabouts. After the juvenile court received a judgment confirming that the alleged
father was not H.K.’s biological father, the Department removed the allegations regarding
his whereabouts in an amended petition.
2
and offering Mother family maintenance services because she continued using
methamphetamine and failed to participate in services.
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, Mother testified about her substance use
and interactions with the Department. She admitted using methamphetamine once or
twice a week. Mother testified that her roommate watched H.K. when Mother used
methamphetamine. She stated that she never consumed the drug near H.K. and kept no
substances in her home. She believed she could stop using methamphetamine on her own
even though she had not participated in substance abuse treatment before. She further
asserted that she cooperated with the Department. Mother insisted that she contacted
them when they reached out to her. She blamed the Department for “caus[ing] the
problems” and believed there had been a “misunderstanding.” Additionally, she claimed
that she did not sign one of the documents4 voluntarily.
At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the facts supported the petition. The court explained that Mother did not
have sufficient insight into the risk her methamphetamine use posed to H.K., especially
because Mother held all legal rights to her daughter. The court amended one of the
allegations to state that Mother used methamphetamine several times a week, and in the
past, stored substances and paraphernalia within H.K.’s reach. The court declared H.K. a
dependent of the court but allowed H.K. to remain in Mother’s custody. The court
further ordered Mother to complete family maintenance services and adopted the case
plan as laid out in the Department’s report. The case plan included, among other things,
services tailored to address Mother’s substance use. The court set the matter for a six-
month review hearing. Mother timely appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders.
4 Mother did not clarify in her testimony whether she meant the voluntary family
maintenance services agreement or the safety plans.
3
While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and
dismissed the dependency.5 The order stated that the conditions justifying jurisdiction
did not exist, and if the court withdrew supervision, the “conditions [were not] likely to
exist.”6 After Mother filed her opening brief, the Department moved to dismiss Mother’s
appeal as moot.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mother argues that the court erred when it granted the section 300
petition and assumed jurisdiction over H.K. Because the juvenile court has now
terminated that jurisdiction and dismissed the dependency, the Department contends that
we should dismiss this appeal as moot. Mother acknowledges that the dependency has
been dismissed and the appeal may be moot, but asserts that we should exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of the moot appeal, arguing that the Department should not
be shielded from misconduct simply because a parent works hard to resolve the issues
that led to the dependency proceedings. We agree that the appeal is moot and decline to
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Mother’s contentions on appeal. Thus, we
dismiss the appeal.
A. Applicable Law
A court has “the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be
carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case
before it.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).) This principle
applies equally in dependency appeals. (D.P., at p. 276.) The court in D.P. set out the
two-part analysis a court must undertake when evaluating whether to proceed with a
dependency appeal that is alleged to be moot. First, we must determine whether
5 We previously granted the Department’s unopposed request for judicial notice of
the December 17, 2025 minute order.
6 The minute order did not provide additional detail.
4
subsequent events in the juvenile dependency matter in fact make the appeal moot.
(Ibid.) “An appeal is moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy due to
postappeal events, and the appellate court is unable to grant effective relief. [Citation.]”
(In re Baby Girl R. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 706, 711 (Baby Girl R.).) Effective relief
may be available if the appellant might suffer ongoing harm that a favorable disposition
on appeal would rectify. (D.P., at p. 276.)
A reviewing court must “decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent
events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision
would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding. [Citations].” (In re Yvonne W.
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.) Speculative future harm and stigma alone are
insufficient to avoid mootness. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.) “[W]hen a parent has
demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal,
the case is not moot[.]” (Id. at p. 283.) On the other hand, where a parent fails to identify
such a consequence, the appellate court may decide that no effective relief can be granted
and dismiss the appeal as moot. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1493; see D.P.,
at pp. 277-278.)
Second, the court in D.P. went on to explain that where the appeal is in fact moot,
we must determine whether to exercise our “ ‘inherent discretion’ ” to reach the merits of
the dispute. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) The second part of the analysis, the court
explained, is particularly important in the dependency context where appeals by parents
are more likely to be rendered moot and “dismissal of an appeal for mootness operates as
an affirmance of the underlying judgment or order[.]” (Id. at pp. 283-285.)
Courts generally exercise their discretion to reach the merits of a moot appeal
when “ ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when
there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material
question remains for the court’s determination.’ [Citations.]” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 282.) The D.P. court reviewed a nonexhaustive list of the additional factors appellate
5
courts should consider in determining whether discretionary review is appropriate in the
dependency context. (Id. at pp. 284-285.) These factors include whether the challenged
jurisdictional finding could prejudice the appellant, affect current or future dependency
proceedings, or have other consequences; whether egregious or pernicious stigmatizing
conduct formed the basis for the finding; and why the appeal became moot. (Id. at
pp. 285-286.) “[N]o single factor is necessarily dispositive,” and “the overarching
principles of the dependency system [guide our determination]: ‘to provide maximum
safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on the ‘preservation of the family as
well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the
child.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 286.)
B. Mother’s Appeal is Moot
In its motion, the Department argues that the appeal is moot because Mother
suffers no ongoing harm from the challenged jurisdictional findings. The Department
contends that because the dependency has been dismissed without limitation on Mother’s
custody over H.K., the challenged findings no longer impact Mother’s parental rights.
Mother acknowledges that the dependency has been dismissed without conditions or
limitations on her parental rights because she complied with her case plan.
The parties agree, and there is no dispute that Mother cannot show ongoing harm.
A dependency case is moot where the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, and the
parent maintains custody of their child without any adverse orders that continue affecting
the parent. (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 61.) Here, after terminating
jurisdiction, the juvenile court did not issue any orders limiting Mother’s custody of H.K.
or her visitation rights. Because there is no order affecting Mother’s rights, and no
ongoing controversy for us to resolve, the appeal is moot. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 277-278; see also In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548 [finding case not
moot where the jurisdictional findings formed the basis for the exit orders restricting the
father’s visitation and custody].) The only question before us, then, is whether we should
6
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of her appeal. For the reasons discussed, we
decline to do so.
C. Discretionary Review Not Appropriate
Even though Mother’s appeal is moot, we must consider several factors in
deciding whether to exercise our inherent discretion to review the merits of the appeal.
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282-286.) Mother argues that the factors identified in D.P.
weigh in favor of considering her appeal on the merits. She contends that her prompt
compliance with her case plan should not prevent review of erroneous findings. She
urges this court to review the findings because dismissal would “perversely incentivize”
future noncompliance by other parents and punish parents who promptly comply.
If we dismiss the appeal based solely on her timely compliance, she contends,
findings against parents who comply promptly will always evade review. We conclude
that exercising our discretion to review the merits of the appeal is not warranted under the
circumstances of this case. While describing potential harm to other parents in other
proceedings, Mother does not identify an issue of public importance that evades review; a
risk of ongoing harm, prejudice or other consequences to her, in this or future
proceedings; nor does she identify egregious or pernicious stigmatizing conduct that
formed the basis of the finding. She also fails to make a compelling argument that
dismissal would be unfair under the circumstances. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 286.)
1. No Issues of Broad Public Interest
Despite her contention to the contrary, Mother’s appeal does not present an issue
of broad public interest that is likely to recur. (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
156, 159.) The only issue raised in her appeal is that substantial evidence did not support
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that H.K. had been harmed or was at risk of
harm due to Mother’s substance abuse. However, the absence of substantial evidence is a
fact-specific inquiry often raised in dependency appeals and well settled in situations
7
where courts find jurisdiction based on a parent’s substance abuse. (Ibid. [holding that
the issue of whether substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional findings based on
the mother’s substance abuse did not present an issue of broad public interest]; see also In
re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 531-532.) While some moot dependency appeals may
present questions of public interest, such as those involving questions of statutory
interpretation, Mother has not identified, nor have we discovered any such issues here.
(See Baby Girl R., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 711 [exercising discretion to review moot
appeal where the juvenile court order requiring reunification services for a parent whose
whereabouts were unknown raised an important question of statutory interpretation].)
2. No Other Factors Support Allowing Discretionary Review
Mother has not identified any of the additional factors specific to dependency
appeals enumerated in D.P. that weigh in favor of considering the merits of this appeal.
She neither contends that there is an ongoing controversy in her case, nor that the
controversy is likely to recur, but evade review. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 282, 287;
see also In re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 30.) The juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction and dismissed the dependency without any ongoing orders or other findings
that impact Mother’s parental rights. We acknowledge that some appellate courts
consider whether the controversy is likely to recur “ ‘ “between the same parties or
others.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1050-1051 (italics added)
[reviewing moot appeal because the issue could recur between the Department and
others].) However, in D.P., the Supreme Court stated that courts may exercise their
discretion when the controversy may recur “ ‘between the parties,’ ” without including
the terms, “or others.” (D.P., at p. 282 (italics added), quoting Cucamongans United for
Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479-
480.) Because the D.P. court did not expand this discretionary factor to include “others,”
we also do not consider this factor to mean an assessment of whether the controversy
would recur in other proceedings. Thus, although Mother asserts possible harm to other
8
parents who promptly comply if we dismiss her appeal, we do not consider this argument
under this discretionary factor.
Further, Mother has not identified any material questions that would remain
unresolved if we dismissed the appeal. (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199,
209 (Cassandra B.) [reviewing the merits of a moot appeal where the expiration of a
restraining order left open the unresolved material question about the consequence of the
restraining order in future proceedings].) Mother also has not identified, nor do there
appear to be, any jurisdictional findings that are egregious, include pernicious
stigmatizing conduct, or that could negatively impact or otherwise prejudice Mother,
affect future dependency proceedings, or have other consequences. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 285-286.) The dependency here was initiated because of Mother’s
ongoing substance abuse and its impact on H.K. The juvenile court has concluded that
the problem leading to the dependency has been resolved at this time. If, theoretically,
the issue resurfaced in the future, the court would evaluate the circumstances and account
for all potential developments at that time. (Id. at p. 284.) We see nothing in the record
or the findings of this dependency that would negatively impact Mother’s future
situation. Mother’s substance abuse is a “ ‘historical fact[]’ ” of her dependency case.
(Ibid., quoting In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915.) Not only is this fact
undisputed on appeal, but even if we considered the appeal on the merits and reversed,
this fact would still be part of the case history.
3. Fairness Does Not Require Merits Review of Mother’s Appeal
Ultimately, Mother’s principal argument for considering the merits of her appeal is
the general unfairness of not doing so. Mother urges us to review her appeal on the
merits contending that as a matter of public policy this court should afford parents who
timely reunify an opportunity for review of the jurisdictional order. Otherwise, she
contends, this will unfairly prejudice parents who timely comply with their case plans and
reward those who do not. The court in D.P. did recognize that “[i]t would perversely
9
incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals
from jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the
court has issued additional orders.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) The court
explained that “[p]rinciples of fairness may thus favor discretionary review of cases
rendered moot by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Ibid.)
To the extent Mother urges us to review her appeal on the merits because failing to
do so would be unfair to other parents who timely comply, and shield the Department
from misconduct, this potential harm is both unrelated to her appeal, and entirely
speculative. She does not identify any specific misconduct by the Department from
which she or other parents should be shielded. We are precluded from deciding abstract
propositions which cannot affect the matter at issue in the case before us. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) While some courts have considered moot appeals where the issue
could affect others, Mother is not claiming that she raises issues on appeal, the resolution
of which could affect others. She contends only that others may similarly be deprived of
review on appeal if they promptly comply with their case plans and dependency
proceedings are dismissed before the resolution of their appeals. Not only is this
speculative, but also an incorrect assumption. Any future appeal would be reviewed
independently, based on the facts of that case, and the various discretionary factors that
compel review of an appeal on the merits. Simply because we find no such basis in
Mother’s appeal does not mean one would not exist in other future appeals where the
dependency is dismissed while an appeal is pending.
Further, Mother misunderstands the import of D.P. In D.P., after concluding that
the father’s appeal was moot because he had promptly complied with his supervision
plan, the court found that the Court of Appeal had conflated the mootness inquiry with
the discretionary review inquiry. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) The court reversed,
holding that the Court of Appeal had failed to consider the various factors favoring
10
discretionary review, and remanded the case for consideration of these factors. (Id. at
p. 287.)
In their discussion of factors to consider before allowing a merits review, the D.P.
court identified the fairness of precluding review where parents timely comply as one
consideration. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) However, the court explicitly stated
that “no single factor is necessarily dispositive[.]” (Ibid.) Nor did the court imply, as
Mother urges, that this consideration was an overarching consideration requiring merits
review in all dependency appeals where a parent’s timely compliance results in the appeal
being moot. The only overarching consideration the court identified was “ ‘to provide
maximum safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on the ‘preservation of the
family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the
child.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) If fairness were the overarching principal, the D.P. court
would not have directed the Court of Appeal to conduct its own evaluation of the various
factors favoring merits review. It would have reversed and instructed the Court of Appeal
to proceed directly to the merits of the father’s appeal. Therefore, contrary to Mother’s
assertions, fairness is but one factor, among many, courts of appeal are to consider before
exercising their discretion to allow merits review of the case before them.
In Mother’s case, fairness does not require us to consider the merits of her appeal.
Mother had agreed to voluntarily participate in services before the dependency, but her
performance declined. She failed to take responsibility for her actions, deflecting blame
on the Department. Mother’s conduct necessitated the Department to file the petition.
Once the petition was filed, it appears that Mother sufficiently complied to warrant the
termination of jurisdiction. While we recognize that prompt compliance during the
dependency is admirable, it was Mother’s own inconsistent compliance with voluntary
services that led to the assumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. Under these
circumstances we find that declining to exercise our discretion to allow merits review
does not offend any principles of fairness.
11
D. Conclusion
Having concluded that Mother’s appeal is moot and having considered the various
factors which may favor merits review, we decline to exercise our discretion to review
Mother’s appeal on the merits.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
12
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H053496 In re H.K.; Santa Clara County DFCS v. S.K.