Filed 8/17/26 In re Harmony R. CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re Harmony R., a Person B349113
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No.
CHILDREN AND FAMILY 25CCJP01688C
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.E.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sally Espinoza, Judge. Reversed in part and
affirmed in part .
Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.E. (mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order in dependency proceedings for her daughter,
Harmony R. Mother argues no substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings. She also contends the court abused its
discretion by terminating jurisdiction and placing Harmony with
her father. We find substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b) and the order removing Harmony from mother’s
care. We agree, however, that insufficient evidence supports the
court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (a). The order is
affirmed in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
Dependency proceedings for mother’s six children arose
after domestic violence by the youngest child’s father, Bryan J.,
against mother. This appeal pertains only to Harmony R.,
mother’s third child, who was born in September 2019, and was
five years old when these proceedings began.
I. Past Child Welfare Referrals
Both mother and Bryan J. have a prior child welfare
history involving domestic violence. Beginning in 2017, the Los
Angeles County Department of Child and Family Services
(department) received eight referrals for mother’s children. Two
of the referrals occurred after Matthew E., the father of the two
oldest children, allegedly committed domestic violence against
mother with at least one child present. Both times, mother
reported Matthew’s violence to law enforcement. She had
already obtained a domestic violence restraining order against
Matthew before the first referral. After the latter referral,
mother obtained a second restraining order against Matthew.
2
Her sworn declarations in support of her requests for restraining
orders stated her children were present when Matthew physically
abused her.
The department ultimately closed both referrals based on
domestic violence by Matthew. Of the eight referrals for mother’s
children, the department found only one for general neglect was
substantiated. Based on that referral, mother participated in
voluntary family maintenance for 10 months.
Bryan J., meanwhile, had a referral for physical abuse of
his child with a different mother in 2024. The infant had facial
injuries, a broken rib, and a liver contusion. The department
found the referral substantiated, and the family underwent
voluntary family maintenance. The department’s investigation
also indicated Bryan had once been arrested for domestic violence
against a past partner.
II. Current Proceedings
The current proceedings arose after domestic violence by
Bryan J. against mother in April 2025. The police responded to
the home where mother and her six children lived. She told
officers Bryan came to the home, and they started arguing.
While mother was holding her youngest child, who was two
months old, Bryan punched her in the face about five times.
When Bryan stopped hitting mother, she put the infant in her
crib.
About 10 minutes later, Bryan attacked mother again. In a
bedroom, he pushed her to the ground, hit her in the face, and
kicked her in the stomach. He left, and mother called the police.
Mother told them Bryan had previously committed domestic
violence against her about six times.
3
Around one week after the incident, the department’s social
worker interviewed the two oldest children. The oldest reported
Bryan, who lived elsewhere, entered the home and hit mother
while she held the infant. He had not seen Bryan since. He also
said Bryan had been violent with mother before the infant’s
birth. The second oldest child told the social worker Bryan threw
mother to the ground. She stated Bryan and her mother had
previous altercations before her youngest sibling was born.
In later interviews, the two oldest children again said Bryan had
hit mother before the April 2025 incident.
On June 2, 2025, the department sought authorization to
remove all six children from mother’s care. The court granted the
request. When social workers went to remove the children,
mother protested angrily. She called one social worker a “racist
bitch.” Mother picked up her youngest child and resisted
handing her over. When mother relented, she demanded to
remove and keep the infant’s bracelet and clothes.
Bryan was present when the department removed the
children from mother. A social worker saw her hug and kiss
Bryan. He repeatedly asked mother to calm down.
Two days later, mother enrolled in services with Volunteers
of America. She began attending weekly courses on parenting,
anger management, and domestic violence.
On June 5, 2025, the department filed a dependency
petition alleging the children were subject to juvenile court
jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) (hereafter section 300(a) and section
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
4
300(b)(1)). The petition alleged that mother and Bryan had “a
history of engaging in violent physical altercations” while the
children were present and that mother failed to protect them.
The department alleged this conduct put the children at risk of
serious physical harm.
At the initial hearing, the court ordered Harmony detained
from mother and released to her father’s custody. The court
ordered monitored visits for mother. At the adjudication, the
court sustained both counts of the petition and declared Harmony
a dependent of the court. The court noted the April 2025 incident
was not the first instance of domestic violence by Bryan J.
against mother. As to three of the children, the court ordered
mother to participate in a parenting program, individual
counseling, and a domestic violence support group for victims,
and to undergo a mental health evaluation.
Harmony’s father argued the court should terminate
jurisdiction over her with a juvenile custody order granting father
sole physical custody. The court continued Harmony’s disposition
hearing and ordered the department to evaluate whether
terminating jurisdiction was appropriate. The department
recommended terminating jurisdiction over Harmony and
granting her father sole physical and joint legal custody.
At the continued disposition hearing, Harmony’s counsel
asked the court to keep the case open and grant family
reunification services to mother. Harmony had spent nearly her
whole life in her mother’s care and wanted to reunite with her.
Mother’s counsel sought the same order. Father’s counsel again
argued the court should terminate jurisdiction with a juvenile
custody order. He asserted that, when the noncustodial parent
can care for the child, the court is “duty bound to terminate the
5
case.” He further stated mother was receiving appropriate
services in the proceedings for her other children and could later
seek custody of Harmony in family court.
The court agreed with father’s recommendation. It found
the conditions justifying jurisdiction over Harmony no longer
existed and terminated jurisdiction pending a juvenile custody
order giving father sole physical and joint legal custody. The
court ordered monitored visits for mother three times per week
for three hours each. A week later, the court approved the
juvenile custody order and terminated jurisdiction over Harmony.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that, when the jurisdictional hearing took
place, no substantial evidence supported finding there was an
ongoing, substantial risk of physical harm to Harmony. She
similarly argues there was insufficient evidence to justify
removal at the dispositional hearing. Finally, mother argues the
court erred substantively and procedurally in terminating
jurisdiction over Harmony with a juvenile custody order placing
her with her father.
I. Jurisdictional Findings
Mother argues the court erroneously found Harmony was a
dependent of the court under section 300(a) and section 300(b).
We agree only as to section 300(a).
A. Legal Standard for Jurisdictional Findings
The department bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over a minor under section 300. (§ 355, subd. (a);
6
In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) On appeal, “ ‘we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted,’ supports” the juvenile court’s findings. (I.J., at
p. 773.) “ ‘Substantial evidence is evidence that is “of ponderable
legal significance,” “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value,” and “ ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law
requires in a particular case.” ’ ” (In re R.M. (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 119, 135.) We review the “record in the light most
favorable to the juvenile court’s order” and “may not resolve
conflicts in the evidence, reweigh the evidence, or second guess
the juvenile court’s express or implied determinations regarding
the credibility of witnesses.” (Ibid.)
Count a-1 of the petition alleged there was “a substantial
risk that [Harmony] will suffer [ ] serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally by [her] parent or guardian” under section
300(a). Count b-1 of the petition alleged there was “a substantial
risk that [Harmony] will suffer [ ] serious physical harm” caused
by her mother’s “inability . . . to supervise or protect” her (id.,
subd. (b)(1)(A)) and her mother’s “willful or negligent
failure . . . to adequately supervise or protect” her from any other
custodian of the child (id., subd. (b)(1)(B)).
Both counts arise from allegations that Bryan committed
domestic violence against mother while the children were
present. “[E]xposure to domestic violence” can constitute grounds
for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). (In re
Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599.) Because both
grounds were “based solely on risk to the child, that risk must be
shown to exist at the time of the jurisdiction finding.”
(In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993.)
7
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Jurisdiction Under
Section 300(b)(1)
Mother contends no substantial evidence showed a current
risk of serious physical harm as required under section 300(b)(1).
Evidence of exposure to several incidents of domestic violence can
suffice to show the child faces a “ ‘ “ ‘substantial risk of
encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or
illness from it.’ ” ’ ” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 239
(L.O.).) “In the domestic violence context, past violence is highly
probative of the risk that violence may recur.” (In re L.B. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 402, 416.)
Finding a present risk, however, requires “ ‘evidence that
the violence is ongoing or likely to continue.’ ” (In re B.H. (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 469, 482.) The department must show “ ‘some
reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct
will recur.’ ” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)
Courts have cautioned against dependency proceedings where
mothers are “punished as victims of domestic violence” despite
acting to protect themselves and their children from future
violence. (In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11, 25.)
The record includes reasonable evidence of ponderable legal
significance supporting the court’s finding of an ongoing,
substantial risk to Harmony. Bryan’s domestic violence against
mother in April 2025, while Harmony was present, was not an
isolated incident. It was part of a pattern over several years.
The pattern began with Matthew E., the father of mother’s first
two children. In 2017 and 2019, mother attested that Matthew
committed violence against her in front of the children.
This pattern continued with Bryan. And the record
includes evidence showing mother could have foreseen that her
8
relationship with Bryan would have that result. Mother’s cousin
reported to the department her “concerns of mother’s decision
making as she got involved with [Bryan], even knowing that
he . . . had an open DCFS case regarding physical abuse to his
other child.”
Bryan’s violence against mother began before April 2025.
When mother reported that incident to the police, she said Bryan
had committed domestic violence against her several times.
Mother’s two oldest children stated they had witnessed Bryan
physically abuse mother before.
Mother argues she made progress that sufficiently
alleviated the risk to Harmony as of the jurisdictional hearing.
Two days after the department removed the children from
mother’s custody, she enrolled in a program that provides
domestic violence counseling (among other services). Simply
enrolling in a counseling program, however, does not necessarily
show significant progress toward reducing future risks.
(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156.) The record does not
show mother benefited from this program. There is no evidence
mother gained insight into how her pattern of being in abusive
relationships put her children at risk.
Instead, mother minimized the gravity of the
circumstances. She continued to believe she and her family did
not need the department’s intervention. She stated the
department only intervened because of the April 2025 incident,
which she and Bryan could have prevented by spending time
apart to deescalate the argument.
Mother told the department she ended her relationship
with Bryan and did not plan to reconcile with him. But she
demonstrated affection toward him weeks after the violence that
9
incited these proceedings: she hugged and kissed him when the
department removed the children. Based on those actions, one
could reasonably doubt her sincerity about separating from
Bryan.
Even accepting that mother permanently ended her
romantic relationship with Bryan, that does not mean no
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of ongoing risk.
Mother previously exposed her first two children to domestic
violence by their father, Matthew E. Regardless of Bryan’s
involvement, the court could reasonably infer mother could enter
another abusive relationship that presented a substantial risk of
serious physical harm to Harmony.
Though mother began taking steps toward protecting her
children from future violence, more than mere speculation
supported the court’s finding that Harmony remained at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. The April 2025
incident was only the latest in mother’s long history of exposing
her children to domestic violence. This pattern of “past violence
[was] highly probative of the risk that violence may recur.” (In re
L.B., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.) The juvenile court did not
err by declaring Harmony a dependent of the court under section
300(b)(1).
C. No Substantial Evidence Supports Jurisdiction
Under Section 300(a)
Mother argues that even if we affirm the jurisdictional
finding under section 300(b), we should reverse the jurisdictional
finding under section 300(a). We agree. Generally, “a single
jurisdictional finding supported by substantial evidence is
sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to
the other findings.” (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444,
10
1452.) Nevertheless, we may exercise our discretion to review
one of multiple jurisdictional findings “and often do so when the
finding ‘(1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are
also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) “could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Mother asserts the true finding under section 300(a) could
impact future dependency proceedings. “Findings that [a parent]
‘knowingly or negligently’ harmed the child or exposed him [or
her] to a substantial risk of physical harm are ‘pernicious’ and
‘could potentially impact the current or future dependency
proceedings.’ ” (L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 237–238.) The
department does not contest that finding the section 300(a) count
true could impact these or future proceedings or could have other
consequences. We therefore exercise our discretion to address the
merits of mother’s appeal as to the section 300(a) count.
No substantial evidence supports the finding that Harmony
faced “a substantial risk” of “serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon” her by her “parent or guardian” under
section 300(a). Few opinions have held that domestic violence
against a parent met this standard. (See In re Cole L. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 591, 602–603 & fn. 7 (Cole L.).) There is a
“fundamental difference between a failure to protect a child from
the unintended consequences of intentional behavior and the
deliberate (that is, ‘nonaccidental’) infliction of injuries upon the
child, the distinction between [section 300,] subdivisions (a) and
(b).” (Id. at p. 603, fn. 7.)
Domestic violence between parents ordinarily establishes
“a failure or inability to protect the child” under section 300(a),
11
“but not subdivision (a).” (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p.
603.) “An unintended injury to a bystander child that results
from an intentional act directed at another—for example, due to
an object thrown by one parent at another during an argument—
does not satisfy” section 300(a). (Cole L., at p. 603.) Domestic
violence against a parent without injury to the child, however,
can suffice under section 300(a) when “a father strikes an infant’s
mother while she is holding the child or an older child intervenes
during a fight to protect her mother from her father's abuse.”
(Cole L., at p. 603.)
The evidence only demonstrates a risk of unintended injury
to Harmony as a bystander to domestic violence against her
mother. Bryan struck mother while she held their newborn
child—not Harmony, the subject of this appeal. Harmony was
over five years old at the time. She did not intervene in the
altercation, and the record does not show she was so close to
mother and Bryan during the incident that she could have been
injured. Moreover, Bryan is not Harmony’s father, and nothing
in the record shows he ever lived with Harmony or otherwise
acted as her guardian or custodian.
We conclude insufficient evidence supported the finding
that Harmony faced “a substantial risk” of “serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally upon” her by her “parent or guardian”
under section 300(a). We therefore strike allegation a-1 with
respect to Harmony.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports Removal
Mother contends there was no substantial evidence for the
order removing Harmony from her custody. Removing a child
from her parent’s custody requires “clear and convincing
evidence” (§ 361, subd. (c)) of one of several conditions, including
12
“a substantial danger to the [child’s] physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being” with “no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be
protected without removing the minor from the minor’s
parent’s . . . physical custody” (id., subd. (c)(1)). This burden of
proof “ ‘requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so
clear as to leave no substantial doubt.’ ” (L.O., supra, 67
Cal.App.5th 227, 245.)
On appeal, “[w]e review a juvenile court’s dispositional
order removing a child from parental custody for substantial
evidence, ‘ “bearing in mind the heightened burden of proof.” ’ ”
(L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.) The appellant must show
“ ‘ “there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature” ’ to
support the dispositional removal order.” (Ibid.) We “must
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find the existence of that
fact to be highly probable.” (In re V.L., supra,54 Cal.App.5th at p.
149.)
The same evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional
findings under section 300(b)(1) adequately supports the juvenile
court’s removal order. “The parent need not be dangerous and
the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is
appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the
child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135–136.)
Mother’s recent efforts to protect her children did not cure her
long history of exposing them to domestic violence. The record
does not show she made significant progress toward ending this
pattern. And, as discussed above, the record includes evidence
casting doubt on mother’s sincerity about separating from Bryan
and showing she did not appreciate the necessity of changing her
13
behavior to protect her children from exposure to domestic
violence. From this evidence, the court reasonably found it
highly probable that removal was the only reasonable means to
protect Harmony from a substantial danger to her health, safety,
or emotional well-being.
III. Terminating Jurisdiction with Juvenile Custody Order
Mother argues the court made substantive and procedural
errors when it terminated jurisdiction over Harmony with a
juvenile custody order placing her with her father.
A. Terminating Jurisdiction Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion
Substantively, mother contends the juvenile court abused
its discretion by terminating jurisdiction rather than maintaining
jurisdiction and providing family reunification services. Section
361.2 governs the procedure for placing a child with a
noncustodial parent who desires custody. (In re J.S. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1069, 1077 (J.S.).) Section 361.2, subdivision (a)
provides that “the court shall place the child with the
[noncustodial] parent unless it finds that placement with that
parent would be detrimental to the” child’s “safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being.”
If the court does not find such a detriment, it must choose
one of three options. (See In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
1277, 1281 (Jaden E.).) First, the court may grant legal and
physical custody to the noncustodial parent and terminate
jurisdiction over the child. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) Second, it may
maintain jurisdiction pending a home visit. (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
Third, it may maintain jurisdiction and order reunification
services for one or both parents. (Id., subd. (b)(3).)
14
The court must choose among these three options based on
the child’s best interests. (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
81, 102–103 (Maya L.).) If there is no “need for ongoing
supervision . . . the court terminates jurisdiction and grants”
custody to the noncustodial parent. (In re Austin P. (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135.)
We review the decision below for abuse of discretion.
(Jaden E., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288; Maya L., supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) Under this standard, “ ‘ “the trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the
law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” ’ ”
(Maya L., at p. 102.)
Mother argues continuing jurisdiction and providing
reunification services under section 361.2, subdivisions (b)(2) or
(b)(3) would have served Harmony’s best interests. But we do not
reassess what was best for Harmony; we only decide whether the
juvenile court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd
manner. Mother has failed to make that showing.
Terminating jurisdiction over Harmony was reasonable and
appropriate. The department praised father’s care for Harmony
and recommended terminating jurisdiction. A social worker
“observed the child to be happy and comfortable” with her father.
Her “father presented as very respectful and forthcoming,”
“stated he loves his daughter,” and wanted to give her “ ‘the
chance to be a kid’ ” instead of having to care for her younger
siblings at her mother’s home.
Father said he had “a good co-parenting relationship with
mother,” a willing monitor for mother’s visits, and his parents
served as “a good support system.” When the social worker asked
15
to inspect the home, father “openly agreed and escorted [her]
around the home.” The social worker “observed the home neat,
clean, and organized,” and “nicely decorated with family
pictures.” Father had “adequate utilities and ample food” in the
home. The social worker “did not observe any safety concerns”
and noted no other concerns. The report also stated another
social worker reached the same conclusion after an earlier
meeting with Harmony’s father. Based on this report, the court
reasonably found ongoing supervision was unnecessary.
The related proceedings with mother’s other children
further supported the juvenile court’s decision to terminate
jurisdiction over Harmony. Terminating jurisdiction may be
appropriate where a parent benefits from services “in a parallel
proceeding involving another dependent child” and where the
parent can later seek relief in family court. (J.S., supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.) The court properly exercised its
discretion to terminate jurisdiction over Harmony, as expressly
permitted by section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1).
B. Omission of Express Findings
Mother also contends the court prejudicially erred because
it did not make express findings required by section 361.2,
subdivision (c). That subdivision provides, “The court shall make
a finding, either in writing or on the record, of the basis for its
determination under subdivisions (a) and (b).” Mother contends
that, rather than finding that terminating jurisdiction served
Harmony’s best interest (see Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 102–103), the court made findings mirroring the language of
section 364, which does not apply.
16
The department argues mother forfeited this assertion
because she did not raise it below. We agree. Nevertheless, we
also reject mother’s argument on the merits.
1. Mother Forfeited the Issue
Under the doctrine of forfeiture, “a reviewing court
ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection
could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) “Dependency matters are not
exempt from this rule.” (Ibid.) “[F]ailure to object to a
disposition order on a specific ground generally forfeits a parent’s
right to pursue that issue on appeal.” (In re Anthony Q. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 336, 345.) This rule’s purpose “is to allow the trial
court to correct error—particularly procedural error—where the
asserted errors are apparent at the time they were made and
could have been avoided had there been an objection by the party
belatedly complaining about the errors for the first time on
appeal.” (Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC (2026) 121
Cal.App.5th 60, 73.)
Below, mother did not raise the issue of the findings
required under section 361.2, subdivision (c). Mother’s opening
brief notes that “the court did not address section 361.2 in its
orders and findings at all.” But neither did mother address
section 361.2. The record does not indicate mother mentioned
section 361.2, let alone subdivision (c)’s requirement of express
findings, at any point before this appeal.
Mother contends she did not forfeit this issue because her
counsel stated the correct legal standard, which focuses on the
child’s best interest. This argument conflates the substantive
and procedural issues. Whether terminating jurisdiction served
Harmony’s best interest is substantive. The present issue is
17
procedural: whether, regardless of the basis for the decision, the
court made formal findings on that subject. (See J.S., supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.)
In the juvenile court, mother only raised the substantive
issue. Neither before nor after the court made its findings and
stated its ruling did mother assert the court failed to make
necessary findings. After the court stated its findings (using
language from section 364 instead of section 361.2), it twice asked
mother’s counsel if she had any further argument. In response to
both opportunities, mother’s counsel did not object. Her failure to
do so precluded the juvenile court from correcting any error by
“mak[ing] a finding, either in writing or on the record, of the
basis for its determination.” (§ 361.2, subd. (c).) Mother
therefore forfeited her contention that the court erred because it
did not comply with section 361.2, subdivision (c).
Mother argues any forfeiture should be excused because
objecting would have been futile. “There is a general exception to
the forfeiture rule for instances when an objection would have
been futile.” (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1001.)
An objection is futile “when it is clear the court will not make a
correction despite awareness of an error.” (People v. Jaime (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 941, 946.) This exception to forfeiture “applies
only in unusual and extreme circumstances.” (Ibid.)
Mother has not shown objecting below would have been
futile. The purported error is the procedural matter of whether
the court expressly stated the basis for its decision. (J.S., supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.) Had mother objected, the court
could have cured any error not by changing its ruling, but simply
by specifying that it found terminating jurisdiction and denying
family reunification services to mother advanced Harmony’s best
18
interest. Mother offers no reason to conclude that, in response to
a specific objection, the court clearly would not have stated the
basis for its determination as required under section 361.2,
subdivision (c).
2. Failing to Make Express Findings Was Harmless
The juvenile court arguably made insufficient findings as to
“the basis for its” decision (§ 361.2, subd. (c)) to terminate
jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1) instead of
maintaining jurisdiction under subdivisions (b)(2) or (b)(3). The
court did not expressly state its ruling served Harmony’s best
interest. Instead, the court’s findings invoked the language of
section 364, subdivision (c): “[T]he court finds that conditions
which would justify the initial assumption of jurisdiction . . . no
longer exist and are not likely to exist if supervision is
withdrawn. Continued supervision of the child is no longer
necessary and jurisdiction of the court is terminated.”
A statutory requirement to make formal findings “can
directly influence the trial court’s actual reasoning process by
compelling it to consciously consider and resolve specified issues”
and “can enhance appellate review of the trial court’s reasoning by
making that reasoning explicit and reducing, if not eliminating,
the role of inference on appeal.” (J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1078.) When the Legislature requires an express finding, the
“familiar doctrine” that we make all reasonable inferences in
favor of the judgment “may be given limited scope.” (Ibid.)
Assuming the court’s findings were insufficient under
section 361.2, subdivision (c), any error was harmless. We only
reverse the decision below if we find “ ‘it is reasonably probable’ ”
the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result “ ‘in
the absence of the error.’ ” (J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p.
19
1078.) “A reasonable probability for these purposes does not
mean an absolute probability; the likelihood that the error
affected the outcome need not be greater than the likelihood that
it did not. [Citation.] The test is satisfied, and prejudice appears,
if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable
probabilities.’ ” (Id. at p. 1079.)
The circumstances in this case are analogous to J.S. There,
the court terminated jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivision
(b)(1), without “mak[ing] any formal finding” of the basis for its
decision. (J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) Noting the
court “addressed itself assiduously to” deciding whether to
terminate jurisdiction, J.S. held that the failure to make express
findings was harmless. (Id. at p. 1079.) That issue was “the
predominant subject of [multiple] hearings,” and the court “was
manifestly unpersuaded by” the mother’s arguments. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal recounted factors supporting the
juvenile court’s decision: mother would receive reunification
services in proceedings for her other children, father was willing
to support the relationship between mother and the child, and
mother could seek further relief in family court. (J.S., supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.) These factors adequately explained the
juvenile court’s decision, and J.S. found “no basis to suppose
that” making the required express findings would have changed
the outcome. (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court expressly continued Harmony’s
disposition hearing so the department could contact her father
and “conduct an evaluation of whether it would be appropriate to
terminate jurisdiction.” Before the continued hearing, the
department submitted a last minute information report. Though
it was unable to substantively communicate with or meet with
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Harmony’s father again before the next hearing, the department
recommended terminating jurisdiction based on a home visit only
days earlier. At the continued disposition hearing on August 7,
2025, the court stated it considered this final report.
The hearing focused on whether to terminate jurisdiction
under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1) or to maintain jurisdiction
and provide family reunification services to mother. Minor’s
counsel and mother’s counsel argued continuing jurisdiction
served Harmony’s “best interest,” which is the correct legal
standard. (Maya L., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 102–103.)
Father’s counsel argued mother would receive reunification
services for her other children and, after appropriate progress,
could seek custody in family court.
The record thus indicates that, as in J.S., the court
“addressed itself assiduously to” the issue of whether to
terminate or maintain jurisdiction, “which was the predominant
subject” of the final hearing. (J.S., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p.
1079.) The juvenile court chose to terminate jurisdiction after
considering evidence and arguments like those in J.S. (id. at p.
1081), namely that mother would receive reunification services in
parallel proceedings concerning Harmony’s half siblings and
could petition for custody in family court. We reach the same
conclusion as J.S.: “[T]here is no reason to believe that [the court]
would have found” mother’s or Harmony’s counsel’s arguments
“any more persuasive if it had performed its statutory obligation
to make an express finding in support of the termination of
jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
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C. Any Error in Applying the Wrong Legal Standard
Was Harmless
Lastly, mother argues the court erroneously applied the
standard under section 364 instead of section 361.2. The court’s
findings mirrored the language of section 364, subdivision (c),
under which the court must “determine whether continued
supervision is necessary,” and “shall terminate its jurisdiction
unless the social worker or his or her department establishes by a
preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which
would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction . . . or that those
conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.”
Any error in applying section 364, subdivision (c) was not
prejudicial because that provision does not meaningfully differ
from section 361.2. Mother overstates the difference between the
statutes’ requirements. Though the standards are not identical
(see In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1450–1454
(Janee W.)), the differences are irrelevant here.
The pertinent provisions of section 361.2 do not expressly
require finding that terminating jurisdiction serves the child’s
best interest. Section 361.2, subdivision (a) states the court must
determine (1) whether a noncustodial parent desires custody and
(2) whether placement with that parent would be detrimental to
the child. Neither issue was disputed here. Meanwhile, section
361.2, subdivision (b) provides “the court may do any of the
following,” and subdivision (b)(1) regarding terminating
jurisdiction requires no specific determination or finding.
Cases applying section 361.2, subdivision (b) state that
courts must consider two factors. Neither factor arises from the
statute’s language. First, the court must consider the child’s best
interest. (Maya L., 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 102–103.) Neither
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section 361.2, subdivisions (a) through (c) nor section 364 refer to
the child’s best interest. Both statutes equally require
considering the child’s best interest for the same reason: it is one
of the chief purposes of dependency law. (See § 202, subd. (a); In
re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 536 [“ ‘[t]he fundamental
premise of dependency law is to serve the best interests of the
dependent child’ ”].)
Second, when terminating jurisdiction under section 361.2,
subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court must “determine whether
there is a need for continued supervision.” (Janee W., supra, 140
Cal.App.4th a p. 1451; accord In re A.J., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 537–538.) Similarly, when terminating jurisdiction under
section 364, subdivision (c), the court must “determine whether
continued supervision is necessary.” These are different words
for the same substantive determination. For this factor, applying
section 364 instead of section 361.2 makes no difference.
It is true that the legal standards of sections 361.2 and 364,
subdivision (c) are distinct because under the latter, the
department must justify continued jurisdiction by showing the
initial basis for jurisdiction either “still exist[s]” or is “likely to
exist if supervision is withdrawn.” There is no similar
requirement under section 361.2. This distinction, however, is
irrelevant here because the department recommended
terminating jurisdiction.
This case is analogous to Janee W., which held that
applying section 364 instead of section 361.2 was harmless.
(Janee W., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1450–1453.) Noting the
positive results of placement with the previously noncustodial
father, the department recommended terminating jurisdiction.
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(Id. at p. 1452.) The court held sufficient evidence showed “that
continued supervision of the minors was” unnecessary. (Ibid.)
Likewise, in this case the department approved of
Harmony’s placement with her father. The department had no
safety concerns about the home, reported Harmony appeared
“happy and comfortable,” and stated father’s parents served as “a
good support system.” Regardless of which statute the court
applied, the record adequately supports finding that continued
supervision was unnecessary and terminating jurisdiction served
Harmony’s best interest.
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DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a)
is reversed. The juvenile court’s finding under section 300,
subdivision (b) and its dispositional order are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COGLIATI, J.*
* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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