Filed 10/1/26 In re H.W. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re H.W., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E088051
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J306852)
v. OPINION
L.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.
Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, David R. Guardado, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant L.W. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order
bypassing reunification services with respect to his son, H.W. (born May 2025; Minor).
Minor’s mother, S.C. (Mother), is not a party to this appeal.
Father asserts that the juvenile court erred in finding that plaintiff and respondent
San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) met its burden pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361.5, subdivision (b), to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Father had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems
that led to the removal of Minor’s half siblings from his custody. Father also argues that
he met his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would be in Minor’s
best interest to offer Father reunification services. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2024, a dependency case was initiated in Riverside County with respect
to Minor’s half-siblings, twins J.J. and N.J., based on allegations that Father had
committed domestic violence against the children’s mother. Father’s reunification
services with respect to the twins were terminated in the Riverside case in July 2025.
Paternal grandmother (PGM) is the twins’ legal guardian.
On December 18, 2025, CFS received an immediate response referral when law
enforcement arrested a woman, M.V., who had two children with her. One of the
children was Minor, whom M.V. claimed was her child. M.V.’s mother identified Father
as Minor’s parent, and CFS contacted Father immediately. Father stated that he was on
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
specified otherwise.
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his way to the police station and would be there in 30 minutes. Approximately 2.5 hours
later, after Father did not show up at the police station and said that he was sending PGM
in his place to pick up Minor, CFS informed Father that it had obtained a detention
warrant with respect to Minor. Minor was placed in foster care.
On December 19, 2025, CFS determined from vaccination records, the birth
certificate, and a photograph, that Mother was Minor’s parent. Mother stated that while
trying to coparent with Father, she had agreed to him picking up Minor on December 4,
2025, and he was supposed to return Minor two days later, but instead withheld Minor
and tried to extort her for money. Mother informed CFS that there had been an incident
of domestic violence between her and Father in November 2025. She stated she had
recently sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Father. Mother
was later able to provide CFS with a copy of her DVRO application filed on December
11, 2025, in Long Beach, and the temporary restraining order that had been granted to
restrain Father.
CFS obtained an additional detention warrant on December 19, 2025, to detain
Minor from Mother due to the concerns regarding identification of Minor’s biological
parents and the domestic violence incidents raised by Mother.
CFS filed a section 300 petition on December 22, 2025. The petition alleged
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), that Minor was at substantial risk of serious
physical injury, abuse, and/or neglect due to Father’s criminal history and domestic
violence between Father and Mother. The petition also alleged pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (j), that Minor was at substantial risk of abuse and/or neglect because
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Minor’s half-siblings had been adjudged dependents of the Riverside juvenile court and
Father had been unsuccessful in reunifying with them.
At the initial detention hearing on December 23, 2025, the juvenile court found
that a prima facie case had been established and ordered Minor removed from Mother
and Father.
On January 12, 2026, CFS filed an amended petition. As relevant to Father, one
of the new allegations in the amended petition made pursuant to section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), was that Father engaged in substance use, including marijuana, which placed
Minor at risk of substantial abuse and/or neglect.
On March 10, 2026, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition
hearing. Mother testified that there had been a “physical altercation” between her and
Father two years prior, and that the November 2025 incident was a “verbal” incident
where Father was in her face yelling, calling her a “bitch,” and was “flinching” at her as
if he was going to hit her. Mother also testified that during their relationship, Father was
regularly controlling her finances, controlled where she went, and controlled who she
spoke with “[t]o a certain extent.”
Father testified that he had completed a parenting course in August 2025, a
substance abuse program in December 2025, and a domestic violence program and
individual counseling in January 2026 as part of the Riverside case. He stated he
completed these various courses even though the Riverside case had already been closed,
“[b]ecause I still wanted to proceed to getting my twins back. I didn’t want to just give
up because the case was closed.” He testified that he stopped smoking marijuana as his
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New Year’s resolution “[b]ecause I need my kids back.” Father repeatedly denied there
ever being domestic violence in any of his prior relationships and stated that the findings
of domestic violence in the Riverside case were based on “false allegations.” When
asked to confirm if his testimony was that both Mother and the mother of his children in
the Riverside case were lying about domestic violence, he responded, “Yes. Because
they want their children back. That’s what happens.”
Father was found to be Minor’s presumed father. The juvenile court declared
Minor to be a dependent child of the court and ordered his removal from both parents.
With respect to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), the court stated on the record that
although Father may have completed most of the case plan, the court did not believe “that
it is sufficient to demonstrate that he took the classes or completed the classes. Because,
especially with respect to the domestic violence, there is a significant lack of progress.
All I heard was that nothing happened in this case, nothing happened in the other case,
and that both of the mothers of his children lie. I do not believe for a second that that is
what led to either dependency case. ¶ So, it’s not enough to simply go to the classes and
get a certificate without even acknowledging the most significant factor in this case.
Because, I do think it impacts whether providing him services would be a waste of
government resources.” The juvenile court accordingly found that CFS had met its
burden under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), by clear and convincing evidence. The
court also found that although it believed it would be in Minor’s best interest to continue
having visitation with Father, it did not believe it was in Minor’s best interest to continue
offering services to Father. Thus, reunification services were not ordered for Father.
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Father filed his notice of appeal on the same date as the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, March 10, 2026.
DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, in a dependency action where a child has been removed from his or her
parents’ custody, the juvenile court is required to order family reunification services to
the dependent child, the child’s mother, and the child’s presumed father. (§ 361.5, subd.
(a).) However, section 361.5, subdivision (b), provides that reunification services need
not be provided to a parent where a court finds certain enumerated circumstances to be
true by clear and convincing evidence, which are known as bypass provisions. (In re
Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271 (Jayden M.).) The purpose of the bypass
provisions is to avoid the “ ‘fruitless’ ” use of “ ‘scarce’ ” resources where there is little
likelihood of reunification based on the parent’s past failures. (Ibid.)
Included among the bypass provisions is that the juvenile court previously ordered
termination of reunification services for any siblings or half siblings of the child, and the
offending parent has not subsequently made “a reasonable effort to treat the problems
that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent or
guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).) Section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), specifies that
the juvenile court “shall not order reunification” for a parent described in subdivision
(b)(10) “unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in
the best interest of the child.”
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 361.5 have been described as a “two-step,
burden shifting procedure.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.) The child
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welfare agency first bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence
that one of the provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies and, assuming that it
has done so, the burden shifts to the parent “to prove that it is in the child’s best interest
for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to provide reunification services in this
case.” (Jayden M., at p. 1272.)
A. REASONABLE EFFORT
“We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of
section 361.5 for substantial evidence.” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121 (Jennifer S.).) When undertaking a substantial evidence review,
“we ask whether there is sufficient evidence in the record that is reasonable, credible and
of solid value—when viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
determination—for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that [the child welfare agency]
carried its burden by clear and convincing evidence.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1273.)
Father focuses the first portion of his argument on the fact that there is no dispute
that he completed the various counseling and other programs offered by CFS or the
Riverside child welfare agency, and proclaims that since there is no factual dispute there
is therefore insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding pursuant to
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). He is correct that there is no dispute that he
completed various services. But the question posed by the statute is not whether he
engaged in services at all; it is whether his utilization of services qualified as a reasonable
effort to address the problems that led to the removal of Minor’s half siblings from
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Father’s care. (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914 (R.T.) [“We do
not read the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass provisions to mean that any effort
by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will
constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these provisions inapplicable”].)
In assessing whether a parent has made a reasonable effort, it is appropriate for the
juvenile court to consider “the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, as well
as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts .... And while the
degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a parent’s progress, or lack of progress,
both in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the
reasonableness of the effort made.” (R.T., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914, italics
omitted.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that, based on the
factors identified in R.T., supra, Father’s completion of the services offered by CFS and
the Riverside child welfare agency did not qualify as a “reasonable effort.” The juvenile
court credited Mother’s testimony regarding domestic violence and found it to be
“compelling.” The court did not believe Father’s claims that no domestic violence had
occurred in his relationship with Mother or in his relationship with the mother of his
children in the Riverside case, and we defer to the court’s credibility determinations
under the substantial evidence standard. (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
Based on the determination that Father had committed domestic violence, his continued
insistence that no domestic violence had occurred even after his completion of a domestic
violence education program led to the reasonable concern by the juvenile court about
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Father’s “lack of progress.” As the juvenile court appropriately summarized, “I believe
he’ll do the classes. He’s done them before. I just don’t think that he’s going to benefit,
because after all of the time he’s had to do the classes and the completion of the classes,
we’re still in the position where ‘there’s no domestic violence.’ And ‘both women are
liars.’ ”
As the juvenile court also noted, despite Father engaging in a substance abuse
program, the court had “evidence that he was still using marijuana at the time, which was
a specific finding in Riverside that his marijuana use affected his ability to parent.”
Father is correct that after a positive result for marijuana at the beginning of January
2026, he had two negative drug test results commencing at the end of January 2026.
However, as the juvenile court observed, Father also had a positive result in his February
2026 test for alcohol “that was collected at 6:00-something in the morning,” which the
court found “to be extremely concerning given the prior history of substance abuse that
has been found true.” It was also reasonable for the juvenile court in February 2026 to
consider one month of clean drug tests to be an inadequate indicator that Father had truly
made progress with respect to his relationship with the illicit substance, that had in part
led to the prior removal of his other children, especially considering “the conventional
wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough
to counter a long-standing pattern of use and relapse.” (Jayden M., supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1277.)
Father argues additionally that pursuant to Jennifer S., it was reversible error for
CFS to fail to provide all relevant reports regarding the prior removal of Minor’s half
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siblings in the Riverside case. However, the passage from Jennifer S. quoted by Father
was merely dicta, wherein the First District Court of Appeal stated its desire for the kinds
of documentation it hoped to see from the child welfare agency in future appeals; the
introductory sentence of the paragraph containing the passage quoted by Father makes
this abundantly clear: “While, based on our various standards of review, we affirm the
juvenile court’s bypass determinations in this matter, we take this opportunity to express
our continued frustration at the state of the evidentiary record regularly provided to us by
many child welfare departments in bypass cases.” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1126, italics added.) The lack of reports from the sibling’s dependency case was not a
basis for reversal in Jennifer S. and is not a basis for reversal here.
B. BEST INTEREST
Because CFS met its burden of proof with respect to section 361.5, subdivision
(b), the burden then shifts to Father to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it
is in Minor’s best interest for Father to be offered reunification services. (Jayden M.,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.) “To determine whether reunification is in the child’s
best interest, the court considers the parent’s current efforts, fitness, and history; the
seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the parent-child and
caretaker-child bonds; and the child’s need for stability and continuity.” (In re Allison J.
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116.) “A best interest finding requires a likelihood
reunification services will succeed; in other words, ‘some “reasonable basis to conclude”
that reunification is possible.’ ” (Ibid.) Once it is determined that section 361.5,
subdivision (b) applies, “ ‘the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a
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legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental
resources. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The burden is on the parent to change that assumption
and show that reunification would serve the best interests of the child.” (In re William B.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227 (William B.).)
The juvenile court’s determination as to the child’s best interest under section
361.5, subdivision (c), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Jayden M., supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1273.) Under the abuse of discretion standard, we do not disturb the
juvenile court’s statutory exercise of discretion unless the court’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd. (In re Raymundo B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1456.)
We acknowledge that Minor appears to be bonded to Father, and that the CFS
social worker described Father as appearing to be “great with the child” during his visits
with Minor. However, a child’s bond with his parent “cannot be the sole basis for a best
interest finding.” (William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.) Father also testified
that he helped care for Minor when he and Mother were still residing together, which
testimony was not challenged by Mother or CFS. But we also note that the record
contains reason to question Father’s caretaking ability of Minor, specifically the fact that
after Father refused to return Minor to Mother’s custody in December 2025, Minor was
found by law enforcement in the custody of an unrelated woman who was being arrested
for trespassing and who claimed that Minor was her own child. Father then refused to
show up at the police station where Minor was being held by CFS and instead attempted
to have PGM (the legal guardian of his other children) pick up Minor for him.
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As set forth ante, the juvenile court identified its concerns about Father lacking
insight into the reasons Minor was removed from his custody in this case and his other
children were removed from his custody in the Riverside case. This included Father’s
belated efforts to stop using marijuana and his continued insistence that both mothers had
lied about him committing domestic violence despite Father’s completion of a substance
abuse program, domestic violence education, and individual therapy. We have
previously held that “the determination that reunification would be in the minor’s best
interests is not simply a matter of whether a parent engages in parenting classes and
counseling,” and that a parent’s lack of insight into the factors contributing to the prior
removal of his children is a proper consideration regarding the child’s best interest. (In re
S.B. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 612, 623-624.) Here, there was more than adequate
evidence for the juvenile court to find that offering Father additional reunification
services would be an “unwise use of governmental resources.” (William B., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.)
It is true, as Father argues, that there will be no delay in permanency for Minor if
Father receives reunification services, because Mother is receiving reunification services
and Father was granted visitation with Minor. However, “[t]hat there is evidence in the
record supporting the opposite finding ... does not mean the court abused its discretion.”
(In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1166.) Father’s burden of proof and our
standard of review are significant here; although there may be some factors in Father’s
favor with respect to Minor’s best interest, based on Father’s lack of insight despite
having engaged with various services offered in both of his dependency cases, we cannot
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say that there was anything arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd about the juvenile
court’s finding that Father failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that providing
him with additional reunification services would be in Minor’s best interest.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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