Filed 8/18/26 In re H.D. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re H.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, F090504
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JW147393-00)
v.
H.D., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Keenan
Perkins, Judge.
Nathan A. Coelho, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Meghan
Cox, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence yielded by a search of a satchel he was wearing when probation officers
encountered him in the garage of a probationer. He also challenges several terms of
probation imposed by the court. We modify two of the probation conditions and affirm
the modified judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 21, 2025, the Kern County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship
petition alleging two counts of possessing a concealable pistol (Pen. Code, § 29610,
counts 1 & 2), possessing a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1, subd. (a), count 3), participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a),
count 4), possession of live ammunition by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29650, count 5), and
possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a), count 6.)
On September 12, 2025, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Pen.
Code, § 1538.5.) On September 23, 2025, the juvenile court denied the motion. The
same day, the district attorney amended the petition to reduce count 4 to a misdemeanor.
Appellant admitted counts 1, 4, and 6, and stipulated to a factual basis for his plea. The
district attorney dismissed counts 2, 3, and 5 on condition appellant’s plea remained in
full effect.
The juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and granted probation.
The terms of probation included 15 days in the youth detention center, and the following
electronic search condition:
“The minor shall, without prior consent or notice of intent to search,
submit to a search of any electronic device, including cell phones, over
which the minor [has] control over or access to, for electronic
communication content information likely to reveal evidence that the minor
is continuing his criminal activities upon the request of a probation officer
or a law enforcement officer at any time, day or night, without the necessity
of a search warrant or probable cause.
2.
“This search will be confined to areas of the electronic devices,
including social media accounts, applications, [and] websites, where such
evidence of criminality or probation violation may be found. The minor
shall provide access/passwords to these electronic devices, accounts,
applications, [and] websites to any law enforcement officer or probation
officer.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The juvenile court imposed additional probation conditions, which are discussed
later in the opinion.
FACTS1
On the evening of July 16, 2025, Kern County Senior Deputy Probation Officer
Edward Nesheiwat went to a house in Bakersfield looking for one of his probationers
named Guy Appodaca. As he approached from the side of the residence, he heard a voice
say, “[P]robation is here.” Nesheiwat then noticed two male individuals across the street
standing by a vehicle. After using a flashlight, Nesheiwat observed that one of the
individuals was Appodaca. Nesheiwat announced that he was probation, but Appodaca
ran to the vehicle. Nesheiwat again announced that he was probation, but the vehicle
drove off.
The next night, GPS data indicated Appodaca was at a different residence
belonging to another probationer, Inez Zuniga. Nesheiwat went to the residence and
other officers observed the vehicle from the prior day’s encounter parked in the driveway.
Nesheiwat knocked on the front door. A woman who answered the door granted
Nesheiwat permission to enter after he said he was there to conduct a probation search for
Zuniga. The woman stated Zuniga was home.
The officers then conducted a protective sweep of the residence. The officers did
not locate Appodaca in the residence. The woman said her nephew was in the garage
with friends and told Nesheiwat to check on them.
1 These facts are taken from testimony at the suppression hearing.
3.
Officers conducted a protective sweep of the backyard and noticed that an air
conditioner attached to the garage was on. Nesheiwat approached the door to the garage,
which was slightly ajar. Nesheiwat announced himself and knocked, which caused the
door to open. Nesheiwat observed the woman’s nephew, Appodaca, and several others in
the garage. Nesheiwat said, “[P]robation officers. Let me see your hands.”
Appellant immediately made a gesture towards a satchel he was wearing on the
front of his chest, and began to “go for” the zipper of the satchel. Nesheiwat feared
appellant had a firearm, and issued a second command in an elevated tone, saying, “[D]o
not touch the satchel, raise your hands.” Appellant again “went for” the zipper on the
satchel. Nesheiwat removed his own firearm and held it in a “low ready position” and
pointed it at appellant. Appellant continued to “go for” the satchel. For a third time,
Nesheiwat told appellant not to open the zipper to the satchel. Appellant took a deep
breath, removed the satchel, said, “I can’t believe this,” uttered profanities, and put the
satchel down on the ground between him and Appodaca. Appellant then attempted to
speak to Appodaca. Appellant exited the garage and was detained due to his actions
regarding the satchel, failing to obey verbal commands, and because officers had not
completed a protective sweep of the premises.
Appodaca initially complied with instructions to walk backwards toward officers,
but stopped 10 feet away from Nesheiwat and refused to follow additional instructions to
exit the garage. Appodaca was “still within distance” of the satchel on the floor.
Officers conducted a record search indicating that two additional individuals in the
garage were on probation. Officers then completed a search of the garage, which led
them to the satchel. Nesheiwat picked up the satchel, observed that it was very heavy,
and noticed that metal was clanging together. Nesheiwat searched the satchel because he
was in fear for his life. He believed contraband was inside the satchel. Based on his
prior training and experience, Nesheiwat knew the satchel could be concealing firearms
4.
and illegal contraband. Nesheiwat’s search of the satchel occurred about 10 minutes after
the individuals in the garage had been escorted out.
At some point Zuniga stated the house was hers and that she had access to the
entire residence, including “the back.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court did not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress
Law
When an officer has reason to believe an individual is armed, he or she may
conduct a reasonable search for weapons. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 (Terry).)
“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger.” (Ibid.)
In Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032 (Long), the Supreme Court considered
whether a Terry search could extend “beyond the person.” (Long, at p. 1034.) In Long,
officers stopped a vehicle that had been traveling erratically and at excessive speed
before swerving into a ditch. Defendant Long was the only occupant of the vehicle, and
he met officers at the rear of the car. Long appeared to be under the influence of
something. After being asked to produce his vehicle registration, Long began walking to
the open door of the vehicle. Officers observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard.
They stopped Long and patted him down, which revealed no weapons. (Id. at pp. 1035–
1036.)
Long and one of the officers stood by the rear of the vehicle, while another officer
shined his flashlight into the vehicle in order to search for weapons. The officer noticed
something protruding from under the armrest, knelt into the vehicle, lifted the armrest,
and saw an open pouch on the front seat. He shined his flashlight on the pouch and saw
what appeared to be marijuana inside. Officers arrested Long. Officers then searched the
5.
glovebox and trunk, the latter of which contained 75 pounds of marijuana.2 (Long, supra,
463 U.S. at p. 1036.)
Long sought to suppress the evidence of the marijuana found in the pouch. (Long,
supra, 463 U.S. at p. 1036.)3 He argued that Terry authorized “ ‘only a limited pat-down
search of a person …’ rather than a search of an area.” (Long, at pp. 1045–1046.) The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “Terry need not be read as restricting the
preventative search to the person of the detained suspect.” (Long, supra, at p. 1047,
fn. omitted.)
Important here, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that “it was not reasonable
for the officers to fear that Long could injure them, because he was effectively under their
control during the investigative stop and could not get access to any weapons that might
have been located in the automobile.” (Long, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 1051.) The Supreme
Court held this reasoning was “mistaken in several respects.” (Ibid.) First, the court
emphasized the practical reality that individuals can “break away from police control and
retrieve a weapon .…” (Ibid.) Moreover, even when an individual is temporarily
detained or arrested, they might later be permitted to reenter the area in question. (Id. at
pp. 1051–1052) Thus, it may be reasonable for the officers to conduct a protective search
of the area even while the individual is in police control to ensure he or she will not be
able to acquire a weapon once permitted to reenter the area.
2 The Long opinion only addressed the validity of the search effected when the officer
entered Long’s vehicle. The Supreme Court did not address the search of the trunk
because the lower court had not addressed it.
3 Long also sought to suppress the evidence of the marijuana found in the truck.
However, lower courts upheld that search as an “inventory” search, not a Terry search.
(Long, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 1036–1037.) In any event, we are focused on the search of
the pouch as it is more analogous to the present case.
6.
Analysis
Applying these principles here, we conclude the protective search did not offend
the Fourth Amendment.
First, officers had specific and articulable facts which would raise a reasonable
inference that the satchel contained a weapon. Appellant’s repeated movements toward
opening the satchel in direct defiance of orders from an armed probation officer easily
raises an inference there was a weapon inside the satchel.4 Of course, there are other
conceivable explanations for appellant’s behavior, but all that matters is that one of the
reasonable inferences is that there was a weapon inside. All that is required is articulable
suspicion, not absolute certainty. (See Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.)
Appellant counters that Long is distinguishable because it involved a “clear
indication of a weapon.” But the weapon appellant refers to in Long was a hunting knife
on the floorboard of the car. Yet officers searched a separate pouch located on the front
seat. There was no “clear indication” that the pouch contained a weapon in Long. In any
event, the standard is not whether there is a “clear indication” a weapon is present.
Rather, there only need be an articulable suspicion that a weapon is present—absolute
certainty is not required. (See Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.) Here, there was an
articulable suspicion based on appellant’s behavior towards the satchel in the context of a
confrontation with probation officers.
Nor is it dispositive that appellant had been escorted out of the garage and police
arguably had “control of the situation” before the satchel was searched. The possibility
remained that appellant—or another individual—could “break away from police control”
(Long, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 1051) at any moment and acquire any weapons that might
4 We find this sufficient to constitute an articulable suspicion even without the
observations Nesheiwat later made after picking up the satchel. Consequently, we do not
address appellant’s argument that the Attorney General improperly relied on those
factors.
7.
have been in the garage. Moreover, officers may not have yet decided whether appellant
would be released from custody onsite and therefore able to later reenter the garage while
officers would still be present.5 Officers were entitled to ensure the area was free of
weapons.
Appellant points out some additional differences between the present case and
Long, but none of them are material. First, appellant correctly observes that Long was a
vehicle search case, and that there are unique risks with approaching suspects in
vehicles.6 While vehicles can present unique risks, so can enclosed spaces like garages
or residences. Garages offer limited places for officers to escape to during an escalating
situation. We do not find the danger presented by a vehicle search while the lone
occupant is outside the vehicle to be so different from the present situation so as to
materially distinguish Long.
Appellant also argues he was merely a “bystander,” because he was not suspected
of involvement in Appodaca’s alleged crimes. But he was not a bystander to his own
refusal to comply with the directives of probation officers, nor his repeated movements
toward the satchel. And that is the relevant behavior here because it is what gave officers
an articulable suspicion he was armed.
5 Appellant argues police did not have to allow him to return to the garage. But the
Supreme Court has declined to require that officers adopt alternate measures to ensure
their safety other than a Terry search. (Long, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 1052.) In other
words, the theoretical possibility that officers could have ensured their safety someway
other than a Terry search does not render their choice to perform a Terry search
unreasonable or improper.
6 However, we do note that the search in Long occurred while the suspect was out of the
vehicle.
8.
II. The Challenged Probation Conditions Were Not Improper
Appellant challenges several of his probation conditions.
Law
“The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate [probation]
conditions and may impose ‘ “any reasonable condition that is ‘fitting and proper to the
end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward
enhanced.’ ” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
“The juvenile court’s discretion, while broad, is not unlimited. A probation
condition is invalid if it: ‘ “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was
convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids
conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” ’ [Citation.] In order to
invalidate a condition of probation under the Lent7 test, all three factors must be found to
be present.” (In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.)
“[A] condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper
for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the
juvenile court.” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
“We review a juvenile court’s imposition of a probation condition for
an abuse of discretion.” (In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)
Analysis
Electronic Search Condition
Appellant argues that the record reveals no connection between his use of
electronic devices and the adjudications at issue. Not so. The probation department’s
detention report stated one of the individuals present in the garage told officers that
“everyone in the garage had possession of the firearms while they took videos with them
7 People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, superseded by constitutional amendment on
another point as established by People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290–295.
9.
for social media .…” This establishes a nexus between appellant’s adjudication for
firearm possession and the electronic search condition.
In a single sentence, appellant suggests this sentence in the detention report is
“hearsay.” This contention is not sufficiently developed, considering that hearsay can at
least sometimes be considered at dispositional hearings (In re Vincent G. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 238, 243–244), and that courts may base probation conditions upon
information in probation reports (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122).
He next argues that the probation report only establishes that “everyone in the
garage took videos while possessing the firearms and the videos were for social
media .…” But that is plenty to create a nexus between the probation condition and
appellant’s case.
Appellant observes the probation report does not “clearly establish” that everyone
in the garage took a video with his or her own device or personally uploaded the video to
social media. Not so. The probation report does state the witness said everyone took
videos with the firearms for social media.
Because there is a sufficient nexus to an electronic search condition, we will
uphold it.
Deadly Weapon Condition
Next, appellant challenges the following probation condition:
“The minor shall not use or possess any dangerous or deadly weapon
including, but not limited to, firearms and ammunition nor associate or
initiate contact with anyone known to the minor to be involved with or in
possession of the same.”8
8 We find this wording to be substantially different from that used in People v. Forrest
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074, cited by appellant.
10.
Appellant points out that this condition arguably covers unintended situations,
such as being present when a law-abiding citizen is permissibly carrying a firearm or
responding to inquiries from an armed law enforcement officer or security guard.
The Attorney General responds that the condition “plainly targets unlawful or
criminal conduct.” We disagree. By its literal terms, the condition is not restricted to
association with people who unlawfully possess deadly weapons. We modify the
condition so it more clearly targets unlawful conduct.
Mind-altering Substances Condition
Appellant also challenges the following condition of his probation:
“The minor shall not possess, use or consume any mind-altering
substances without a valid prescription, any illegal drugs, intoxicants or
inhalents [sic] nor associate or initiate contact with anyone known to the
minor to be involved in the same.”
Appellant contends that this condition also impinges his right of association. He
observes the condition would prevent him from sitting at a dinner table while a family
member drinks a beer without a prescription. We do not agree that this is how the
condition is to be interpreted. Recall that probation conditions are to be given the
meaning that would appear to a reasonable reader. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th
375, 382.) A reasonable reader would understand the phrase “without a valid
prescription” to imply that the “mind-altering substances” at issue are only those that
would otherwise require a prescription. Alcohol is not such a substance. Thus, as the
Attorney General observes, appellant would not be prohibited from sitting at a dinner
table while a family member drank a beer.
Acts of Violence Condition
Finally, appellant challenges as overbroad the following condition, “The minor
shall not commit any act of violence against anyone.”
“ ‘[A] probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional
rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being
11.
invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.’ ” (In re Carlos C. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
997, 1002.) “ ‘The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the
fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the
defendant’s constitutional rights .…’ ” (Id. at p. 1004.)
People have a constitutional right to self-defense. (See People v. McDonnell
(1917) 32 Cal.App. 694, 704; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) The Attorney General does
not contend that the juvenile court could have or did restrict appellant’s right to
self-defense. Instead, the Attorney General argues the condition “does not prevent
appellant from using lawful self-defense.” However, the condition as stated is a blanket
prohibition on all acts of violence, without exception. We do not see any grounds to infer
an exception for lawful self-defense. Accordingly, we will modify the condition to read,
“The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone, except for acts of lawful
self-defense.”
12.
DISPOSITION
Appellant’s act of violence condition of probation is hereby modified to read:
“The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone, except for lawful acts of
self-defense.” Appellant’s deadly weapon condition of probation is hereby modified to
read: “The minor shall not use or possess any dangerous or deadly weapon including, but
not limited to, firearms and ammunition nor shall he remain in the presence of anyone
known to the minor to be unlawfully in possession of the same.”
The judgment as modified is affirmed.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, Acting P. J.
HARRELL, J.
13.