Filed 11/12/26 In re G.S. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re G.S. et al., 2d Juv. No. B353844
(Super. Ct. No. 23JD-00077)
Persons Coming Under the (San Luis Obispo County)
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
J.G.,
Objector and Appellant.
J.G. (mother) appeals after the juvenile court terminated
parental rights as to G.S., J.S., Vie.S., and Vio.S. (Welf. & Inst.
Code § 366.26.)1 Mother contends the court improperly
terminated parental rights because the beneficial parental bond
exception applied. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 22, 2023, the San Luis Obispo County
Department of Social Services (the Department) filed a section
300 petition regarding G.S. (born November 2015), J.S. (born
January 2018), and twins Vie.S. and Vio.S. (born January 2020).
The petition alleged that on March 20, 2023, mother was arrested
for domestic violence, leaving the children without a caregiver.
The children had chronic head lice since October 2022, and
mother was aware of the condition. Mother disclosed a diagnosis
of bipolar disorder and stated she was currently unmedicated.
She reported a history of methamphetamine use as recently as
November 2022 but denied current use.
At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing in May 2023, the
court found true the petition’s allegations and declared the
minors under the jurisdiction of the court. The court ordered
reunification services as to mother.
In November 2023, the court placed G.S. and J.S. in
mother’s care with family maintenance services. In March 2024,
the court did the same with Vie.S. and Vio.S. In October 2024,
the Department reported the children were doing well in
mother’s care and appeared very comfortable with and
affectionate toward her.
In March 2025, appellant tested positive for MDMA,
methamphetamine, and amphetamine. In May, mother tested
positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. In August, the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
Department filed a petition asking the court to remove the
children from the home.
In September 2025, the court ordered the children
detained. They were placed with their maternal grandmother
out of county. In October, the court terminated mother’s
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
According to the February 2026 section 366.26 report,
mother currently had phone calls or “FaceTimes” with the
children three times per week. Mother had one four-hour, in-
person visit with the children each month.
According to an addendum report, on March 16, 2026,
mother did not call in her designated window of time. After her
attempt to speak with the children outside of that time window
was rebuffed, mother called the police and asked them to conduct
a welfare check on the children. Grandmother reported that the
police “coming to the door caused fear, confusion, and anxiety in
the children and they had trouble sleeping that night.”
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court stated it would give
“limited weight” to the addendum report and “otherwise allow it.”
Mother called Social Worker Supervisor Valerie Amador, who
testified the children have a close relationship with mother.
Social Worker Kacey Cohen testified that the children enjoy
visitation with mother. J.S., Vie.S., and Vio.S. all had close,
positive relationships with mother, and G.S. had a “very close
and positive relationship” with her.
Cohen noted the children “had a lot of upheavals. And the
ups and downs of lots of visits, lots of phone calls creates undue
anxiety for the kids and causes behaviors and reignites their
trauma responses.” Mother often called outside of the scheduled
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timeframe, and late calls were disruptive. During the calls, the
children became anxious, “hyper,” and vied for attention.
After mother called the police in March 2026, 10-year-old
G.S. called Cohen to report the incident. Vio.S. misbehaved at
school shortly after the police call. J.S. had difficulty sleeping
after the call.
Cohen testified the children had an identifiable
relationship with mother and would suffer some grief and loss if
visitation were reduced or terminated. Cohen believed the
benefits of adoption outweighed preservation of that bond.
Mother testified the children were very excited to see her
for visits. They continued to look to her for comfort, but she
“ha[d] to initiate it . . . .” At the end of visits, some of the children
would cry or become quiet, “like shelled.” In calls, G.S. was
present and talking but “her focus isn’t mainly on [mother] at all
times.” J.S. was the same. One of the twins (Vie.S. and Vio.S.)
was more engaged during calls than the other.
Mother was unaware that the children were very afraid
when the police came to grandmother’s home. Mother last used
methamphetamine two or three days before she testified. Mother
was no longer taking mental health medications as prescribed by
her psychiatrist.
The CASA for G.S. testified that G.S. “does not want to go
back to her mother’s care now.”
Minors’ counsel argued that mother’s continued drug use
and “violent interactions” had “diminished the emotional
attachment that the children have to their mother” and that their
bond to mother “seems more like a trauma bond.”
Regarding the parental-benefit exception, the court agreed
with minors’ counsel. The court determined that regular
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visitation and contact had been satisfied. The court “thought
mother testified honestly. . . . You testified to using. You
testified to some violence within the home. You testified to some
concerns about your phone contact with the children and how
sometimes they didn’t want to engage you so much. You did
those memory books because you have a sense that you maybe
are not going to have those kids going forward. That’s how you
presented to the Court.”
“A big issue” for the court was the call to the police,
“because the clear reaction of those children, based upon the
consequences of that phone call, was a direct showing that while
you have an attachment with your children, it is not the
substantial positive attachment that the Court needs to see to
where I can find the exception.” The court terminated parental
rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues “[i]nsubstantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding that the children did not have a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the mother.” (Bold
omitted.) We disagree.
“‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it
must terminate parental rights unless one of several statutory
exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
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A parent invoking the parental-benefit exception has the
burden of proof and must establish three prongs by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular visitation and
contact” between the parent and child; (2) “a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship”; and (3) “terminating that attachment would be
detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.); § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The inquiry’s focus is the child’s best interests. (Caden C., at
p. 632.)
We review the first two prongs for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) “In reviewing
factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court
should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The
determinations should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also
exists and the trial court might have reached a different result
had it believed other evidence.’” (Id. at p. 640.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
as to the second Caden C. prong. Mother had difficulty calling
the children within the designated timeframe, and her late calls
were disruptive to their schedule. The calls prompted anxiety,
argument, and the children “hitting one another.” While this
behavior might suggest a connection with mother, it also
illustrates the negative impact of their continued relationship
with her. Mother conceded certain children displayed
inattentiveness during the calls.
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Mother’s call to the police further corroborates the juvenile
court’s finding. The call upset the children. It induced G.S. to
contact the social worker and apparently caused Vio.S. to
misbehave at school and J.S. to have difficulty sleeping. Yet
mother was unaware that her children were very afraid when the
police came. Although the record contains evidence as to some
positive aspects of mother’s relationship with her children,
substantial evidence nonetheless supports the conclusion that the
children lacked a “substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to
mother such that continuing the relationship would benefit the
children. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see also In re
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 322, fn. 10 [failure of
proof as to any element of parental-benefit exception is fatal].)
Mother argues the court erred in relying on the “single
incident” of the police call “to negate the substantial, positive,
emotional attachment the children had built with the mother and
demonstrated throughout the dependency matter.” However, the
court did not state it was relying solely on that incident, which it
described as a “big issue . . . .” The court did not err in ascribing
significant weight to a recent incident that negatively impacted
the children.
Mother also contends the court “erred in relying on [her]
recent drug use, past domestic violence, and creation of memory
books for the children in concluding [she] did not meet her
burden without considering whether those facts had any negative
effect on the parent-child relationship.” This contention
misconstrues the court’s comments. The court highlighted those
aspects of mother’s testimony as support for its finding that
“mother testified honestly.” This finding was not error.
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DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Linda D. Hurst, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Appellant J.G. (mother).
Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, and Chelsea K. Kuhns,
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent San Luis Obispo County
Department of Social Services.
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