Filed 3/5/26 In re G.M. CA4/1
Review denied 6/17/26; reposted with Supreme Court order and statement
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re G.M., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, D084997
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. J245447)
G.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marissa Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
G.M., a juvenile, appeals a probation condition imposed by the juvenile
court on constitutional vagueness and overbreadth grounds and under People
v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). He also contends his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to the probation condition. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
G.M. was charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly
weapon, with allegations of inflicting great bodily injury and using a deadly
or dangerous weapon during the commission of a felony. (Pen. Code, §§ 664,
187, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) At a
hearing in July 2024, G.M. admitted to felony assault after voluntarily
waiving his constitutional rights. (Id., § 245, subd. (a)(1).) At a contested
disposition hearing in August 2024, the juvenile court placed him on
probation.
As part of the imposed probation conditions, the trial court ordered that
G.M. “not use, sell or possess alcohol, drugs, drug paraphernalia, harmful
intoxicants, non-prescribed medications, or any type of mind-altering
substances.” Defense counsel objected to the commitment program suggested
by probation but did not object to any of the probation conditions.
In October 2024, G.M.’s appointed counsel timely appealed the August
2024 disposition order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, G.M. challenges the condition prohibiting “use, [sale], or
[possession] of . . . non-prescribed medications,” arguing that (1) the condition
is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, (2) the condition is invalid under
the standard set forth in Lent, and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the condition. We address each argument in turn.
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I
A. Standard of Review
We generally review probation conditions under an abuse of discretion
standard when challenged on appeal. (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113,
1118.) However, an exception applies when a condition is challenged on
constitutional grounds. (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, 867
(Brand).) We apply de novo review when evaluating constitutional
challenges to probation conditions. (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261
(I.V.).)
B. Analysis
As a general matter, an appellate court will only consider claims that
were properly raised and preserved in the trial court. (People v. Welch (1993)
5 Cal.4th 228, 234–235 (Welch); see also Brand, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at
p. 867.) If a claim challenging a probation condition is raised for the first
time on appeal, it is ordinarily forfeited. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th
875, 880 (Sheena K.).) An exception to this forfeiture rule applies when the
claim involves a facial constitutional challenge, which presents “a pure
question of law” that does not require an examination of the trial court’s
record. (Id. at p. 889.) G.M. argues that the probation condition, specifically
as it relates to “non-prescribed medications,” is unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague on its face. These claims present a pure question of law that may
be resolved without reference to the trial court record. We therefore conclude
that G.M. has not forfeited his constitutional claims, and we address them on
the merits.
G.M. argues that the condition is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad because it hinders his ability to ingest or possess over-the-counter
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medication (e.g., ibuprofen or aspirin) without a valid prescription. We
disagree with this interpretation of the probation condition.
A probation condition that “imposes limitations on a person’s
constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of
the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.”
(Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Additionally, the language of the
probation condition must clearly define what is expected of the probationer
and what circumstances would constitute a violation. (Ibid.; see also People
v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) A probation condition should not be
invalidated as unconstitutionally vague if it can be given any reasonable and
practical construction. (Hall, at p. 501; People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th
375, 382 [“A probation condition should be given ‘the meaning that would
appear to a reasonable, objective reader’ ”].) Moreover, a probation condition
is not impermissibly vague “ ‘ “ ‘simply because there may be difficulty in
determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its
language.’ ” ’ ” (I.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 261.)
Here, the challenged condition prohibits the use of “non-prescribed
medications,” in addition to “alcohol, drugs, drug paraphernalia, harmful
intoxicants, . . . or any type of mind-altering substances.” As suggested in
the appellant’s opening brief, the context of this probation condition
demonstrates that the juvenile court was “concerned that the minor not
ingest intoxicating substances.” Construed in context, the condition
prohibiting use of “non-prescribed medications” can be reasonably and
practically construed to prohibit only illegal activity—namely, use of
prescription medication without a valid prescription. (See Health & Saf.
Code, § 11350, subd. (e).)
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Given this practical construction of the probation condition, we
disagree with G.M.’s contention that using over-the-counter medication, for
which a prescription is not necessary, would result in a probation violation.
Because the probation condition only prohibits illegal conduct that does not
infringe on the juvenile’s constitutional rights, we conclude that the condition
is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
II
G.M. further contends that the condition is also invalid under the
test established in Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. Under Lent, a reasonable
probation condition must be related to the crime of which the offender was
convicted, related to criminal conduct, and meant to prevent conduct that is
reasonably related to future criminality. (Id. at p. 486.) However, a claim
that a probation condition is unreasonable under Lent must be presented at
the trial court level; otherwise, the claim is forfeited on appeal. (Welch,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 237 [failure to timely challenge a probation condition
on Lent grounds in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal].)
Because G.M. has challenged the probation condition for the first time
on appeal, the Lent claim has been forfeited, and we will not address it on the
merits.
III
Lastly, G.M. argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel because she failed to object to the probation condition. We disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant has the
burden to prove that defense counsel’s conduct at the trial court was
deficient, and that such deficient conduct resulted in prejudice which would
not have occurred but for defense counsel’s conduct. (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 333; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
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694.) In doing so, the appellant must show that trial counsel lacked a
rational reason for engaging in the challenged conduct. (Brand, supra, 59
Cal.App.5th at p. 872; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) As has
been previously clarified by our high court, a claim on appeal that counsel
was ineffective must be rejected “ ‘[if] the record on appeal sheds no light on
why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless
there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Mendoza Tello
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.)
Here, G.M. contends that his counsel’s failure to object constitutes
ineffective assistance because there is no satisfactory or reasonable
explanation for such conduct. This argument invites speculation regarding
his counsel’s strategies and tactics at the disposition hearing because the
record does not show defense counsel’s reasoning for choosing not to object.
Moreover, as we have explained, a plausible explanation for his counsel
declining to object could be that she reasonably understood the condition as
merely restricting the use of prescription medication absent a valid
prescription.
Because G.M. has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his
trial counsel’s conduct was deficient, we reject this ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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Filed 6/17/26
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One - No. D084997
S296186
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
En Banc
________________________________________________________________________
In re G.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
G.M., Defendant and Appellant.
________________________________________________________________________
The petition for review is denied.
(See Concurring Statement by Justice Liu.)
______________/s/________________
Chief Justice
In re G.M.
S296186
Concurring Statement by Justice Liu
A verbal altercation quickly escalated into G.M. (Minor)
stabbing a teenager twice. Minor was charged with attempted
murder and assault with a deadly weapon, and he pleaded
guilty to felony assault. At the disposition hearing, the
juvenile court placed him on probation subject to a variety of
conditions. This proceeding concerns only the following
probation condition, labeled as “GC107”: “You must not use,
sell or possess alcohol, drugs, drug paraphernalia, harmful
intoxicants, non-prescribed medications, or any type of mind-
altering substances.”
Before the Court of Appeal, Minor argued that the
prohibition with respect to “non-prescribed medications” is
vague, overly broad, and unreasonable. The Court of Appeal
rejected Minor’s argument, reasoning that the phrase, in
context, could be “reasonably and practically construed to
prohibit only illegal activity — namely, use of prescription
medication without a valid prescription.” It further held that
Minor forfeited his reasonableness challenge to this condition
by not objecting before the trial court. (See People v. Welch
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.)
While I agree it is possible to interpret the phrase as the
Court of Appeal did, the most straightforward interpretation of
“non-prescribed medication” is medication that is not
1
In re G.M.
Liu, J., concurring statement upon denial of review
prescribed. Prohibiting Minor from using any medication
without a prescription would seem questionable given the lack
of any indication in the record that Minor abused legal, over-
the-counter medications or that there was a connection
between lawful medicine use and the offense. On this record, I
question how that condition could be “ ‘reasonably related to
the crime of which [Minor] was convicted or to future
criminality.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1115.)
I agree with the decision to deny review because Minor
forfeited his challenge to the reasonableness of the probation
condition, and the Court of Appeal’s judgment assures that
Minor may use over-the-counter medication without a
prescription while on probation. But an ambiguous probation
condition like the one here can be problematic: It subjects a
probationer to the discretion of the probation officer, and a
probationer might rationally forego lawfully taking medicine
out of concern about the condition. (Cf. In re Victor L. (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913.) An easy cure for this ambiguity is
to clarify the probation condition with the language used by
the Court of Appeal — i.e., prohibiting use, sale, or possession
of “prescription medication without a valid prescription.” (Cf.
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892.)
LIU, J.
I Concur:
EVANS, J.
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