Filed 6/30/26 In re G.G. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re G.G. et al. B349076 consolidated with
B345676
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02765)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
Appellant L.M. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s
order under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26
terminating parental rights to two of her children: son G.G. (born
2019) and daughter L.G. (born 2020). She also challenges the
adequacy of the inquiry pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California
law (Cal-ICWA; § 224 et seq.) concerning those two children, as
well as her daughter M.M. (born 2022) and son J.G. (born 2016),
over whom the dependency court also asserted jurisdiction and
removed from parental care. The children’s fathers, Oscar G.
(father of G.G., L.G., and M.M.) and J.G. Sr. (father of J.G.) are
not parties to this appeal.
We affirm the dependency court’s finding that Mother
failed to establish that the parental benefit exception prevented
G.G. and L.G.’s adoption. We also hold the court did not abuse its
discretion in impliedly finding the ICWA-related inquiry
adequate as to all four children, and that substantial evidence
supports that ICWA did not apply.
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We confine our initial background summary to Mother’s
beneficial relationship exception challenge to the termination of
her parental rights. As that challenge concerns only G.G. and
L.G., we mention the dependency proceedings involving the other
two children only as necessary for context. We provide additional
facts relating to Mother’s ICWA challenges in the Discussion
section, post.
A. The Court Detains G.G. and L.G.
In March 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral that
Mother tested positive for amphetamines. Less than a week
later, she gave birth to a premature daughter, L.G., who
remained in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) for over two
months and was never in Mother’s physical custody. At the time
of L.G.’s birth, Mother had nine other children. She lived with
G.G. and J.G.; her parental rights had been terminated as to the
other seven children (born between 1999 and 2017).
On May 19, 2020, DCFS filed a section 300 petition alleging
that Mother’s history of substance abuse placed G.G. and L.G. at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. The petition also
alleged that the children’s father, Oscar G. (Father), had a
history of substance abuse.
The court detained G.G. and L.G. and placed them with
caregivers Maria T. and Roberto T. (the Caregivers) and their
children. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Mother initially did not
have in-person visits. She had 11 video calls with the children in
June 2020. The calls went well. Beginning August 6, 2020,
Mother had in-person visits with the children every Thursday for
two hours. The children looked forward to seeing Mother.
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B. Jurisdiction and Disposition
On August 31, 2020, the court found all allegations in the
operative petitions true and took jurisdiction over G.G. and L.G.
On September 24, 2020, the court ordered G.G. and L.G.
removed from parental custody and granted reunification
services to Mother and Father. Mother’s case plan included three
3-hour monitored visits per week.
C. Reunification Period Through March 2022
1. Six-month Review Period
In March 2021, DCFS reported that Mother had had
consistent in-person visits. She played with the children,
engaged them in art projects, and fed and danced with them.
Mother also had regular phone contact with the children, who
were happy to hear from her.
At the six-month review hearing, the court found continued
jurisdiction was necessary. It found Mother had made significant
progress and continued her reunification services for six months,
but found Father was not in compliance with his case plan and
terminated his reunification services. The court granted Mother
one unmonitored visit per week.
2. 12-month Review Period
a. June 2021 through September 2021
After Mother’s unmonitored visit with the children in June
2021, J.G. reported that Father (who was not permitted to have
unmonitored visits) had been present and punched Mother.
Mother denied that Father had been present at the visit. Months
later, a DCFS social worker observed that Mother had a bruised
left eye. Mother admitted Father had punched her but denied
she had allowed Father to be around the children. She claimed
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the incident J.G. relayed had occurred before L.G. was born. In
early July 2021, DCFS conducted an unannounced observation of
Mother’s unmonitored visit and noted there were no
unauthorized people there.
On August 12, 2021, J.G. reported that Father was again
present during one of Mother’s unmonitored visits. The court
granted DCFS’s request to monitor all of Mother’s visits.
In the 12-month status report filed on September 8, 2021,
DCFS stated that Mother had missed 10 visits. When Mother
had visits, she brought toys, food, and other items for the
children. DCFS observed that Mother interacted more with one-
and-a-half-year-old L.G. than she had before and their bond had
strengthened. Although Mother had difficulty managing two-
year-old G.G.’s tantrums, she followed through with discipline.
DCFS reported that the Caregivers provided G.G. and L.G.
with a loving and stable home. The children appeared
comfortable and sought out the Caregivers’ attention.
b. October 2021 through March 2022
Between October 2021 and March 2022, Mother had eight
in-person visits and eight telephonic visits with the children.
When Mother saw the children, she played with them and was
affectionate. Mother complained of a lack of transportation to the
visits, and DCFS noted it had been unable to give Mother a bus
pass because she had not met with DCFS for three months.
DCFS reported that Mother had been unable to provide to
the Regional Center information necessary to create G.G.’s or
L.G.’s annual plan. The Regional Center therefore canceled
certain services for them. Thereafter, the court designated the
Caregivers as additional educational rights holders for the
children.
5
In November 2021, Mother filed a request for a restraining
order against Father, and was granted a temporary restraining
order (TRO). Due to Mother’s claimed inability to serve Father,
the court extended the November 2021 TRO and continued the
restraining order hearing 10 times. On July 12, 2022, the court
issued an order stating the TRO would expire that day and that
the request for restraining order had not been heard.
In February 2022, Mother gave birth to a daughter, M.M.
On March 25, 2022, the court held a 12-month review
hearing. It found that continued jurisdiction was necessary and
exercised its discretion under section 352 to grant Mother an
additional six months of reunification services. The court ordered
Mother to attend domestic violence counseling.
D. DCFS Files a Section 300 Petition as to M.M.
In March 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf
of M.M. based on domestic violence between Mother and Father
and Mother’s substance abuse. The court found Father to be
M.M.’s alleged father and ordered Mother not to have contact
with him.
E. 18-month Review Period
During the 18-month review period, Mother did not comply
with her case plan. Mother’s landlord reported hearing Mother
speaking to Father on the telephone and telling him that she
loved him despite the no contact order. On April 15, 2022,
Mother collapsed and tested positive for methamphetamine.
Mother later admitted that she had used methamphetamine and,
in May 2022, again tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine. Between June 1 and August 30, 2022,
Mother missed 15 drug tests. On July 13, 2022, police arrested
Mother and Father after they were observed exiting a stolen car.
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During the period April through August 2022, Mother had
four in-person visits with G.G. and L.G., and spoke with them by
telephone or video call three times. The visits generally went
well. Mother played with the children and gave them hugs and
kisses. DCFS noted Mother needed to provide more structure
and discipline when the children misbehaved. The children were
“fine” when they left the visits and did not fuss or become
emotional.
DCFS reported that G.G. and L.G. were bonded with the
Caregivers, sought out the Caregivers for attention, security, and
affection, expressed their wants and needs comfortably, and were
pacified by Maria T.’s embrace. At this time, G.G. (three years
old) and L.G. (two years old) were too young to provide a
meaningful statement about their placement.
On September 29, 2022, the court held an 18-month review
hearing. It found Mother’s progress in the case plan had been
unsubstantial and terminated reunification services for Mother.
F. Permanency Planning Period
1. September 2022 Through March 2023
During the period September 2022 through March 2023,
Mother had six in-person visits with the children, during which
she played with them and brought them food. The children were
happy while with Mother.
Maria T. reported that G.G., who had begun attending
preschool, cried when Maria T. dropped him off in the mornings,
but later cheered up. DCFS did not identify similar concerns as
to L.G.
In February 2023, Father was released from jail.
On March 29, 2023, the court found that the current plan of
adoption was appropriate. However, between March and
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November 2023, DCFS had difficulty identifying relatives able to
adopt G.G. or L.G.
2. April 2023 Through March 2024
Between April 2023 and March 2024, Mother had 40 visits
with the children. She provided them with food, drinks, and
sometimes games, and they were happy to see her. Mother was
mostly appropriate with the children, although DCFS noted that
Mother told the oldest child J.G. that he would go home with her
or Father.
In November 2023, the Caregivers informed DCFS that
they wanted to adopt L.G. and G.G. DCFS noted that Maria T.
“has always been great with the children” and there were no
concerns with her or Roberto T. as prospective adoptive parents.
DCFS reported that Maria T. was protective, loving, and patient
with the children. She ensured their health, educational,
emotional, and developmental needs were met.
In January 2024, Maria T. was removed as monitor for
Mother’s visits due to Mother not adhering to visitation rules.
Specifically, Mother told J.G. that he would be returned to
Mother and that he did not have to listen to Maria T. Thereafter,
DCFS staff monitored the visits.
That same month, G.G. reported to DCFS staff that J.G.
had hit L.G., causing a bruise on her nose. G.G.’s school also
reported that G.G. sometimes did not follow directions and that
he was hitting at school.
G. Proceedings During Reinstated Reunification
Services (April through October 2024)
In March 2024, the court granted Father’s petition to
reinstate his reunification services and continued the
permanency planning hearing.
8
In April through October 2024, Mother had 20 visits with
the children. She played with the children and was protective of
them.
In June 2024, G.G. reported to Maria T. that Mother was
present at a visit with Father, and that Father told L.G. she
could not call Maria T. “mommy.” J.G. yelled at G.G. that he
should not tell Maria T. about their visit with Mother and
Father. J.G. stated that Mother and Father told J.G. not to tell
anyone because if he did he would never see them again.
In September 2024, DCFS reported that Mother’s visits
with the children were “generally” consistent, that G.G. had been
referred to therapy to address defiance issues and throwing
objects when he was upset, and that L.G. was referred to therapy
due to separation anxiety. L.G.’s therapist noted that L.G. had “a
great attachment with resource parent” Maria T.
H. Resumed Permanency Planning
1. November 2024 Through February 2025
a. Mother’s visits with the children
In November 2024 through February 2025, Mother had 15
visits with G.G. and L.G. During this time, Mother was in an
inpatient rehabilitation program, and the visits occurred at the
treatment facility. Mother was uncomfortable with the setting
and sometimes ended the visits early.
On December 21, 2024, while a DCFS social worker drove
the children to their visit with Mother, G.G. stated that he liked
living with the Caregivers, who he referred to as mom and dad.
When the children saw Mother at the visit, they screamed,
“Mom” and ran towards her. Mother hugged the children and
gave them Christmas gifts.
9
During another December visit, Mother played with the
boys while the social worker pushed L.G. on the swings. Mother
became distracted by a phone call and then upset that the
children were playing with other children. She asked, “Did you
guys come to play with them or see me?” Mother called L.G. to
come play with her. When the social worker encouraged Mother
to come to L.G., Mother responded “Um, no.” Mother sat on a
bench watching a movie on her phone with the boys, and L.G.
continued to refuse to join Mother when Mother asked. L.G.
eventually asked Mother to watch her, but Mother ignored her.
Mother ended the visit an hour early.
During a January 11, 2025 visit, L.G. greeted Mother three
times, saying, “Hi [M]ommy” before Mother acknowledged her.
Mother played a movie for the boys on her phone while L.G. and
M.M. played on swings with the social worker. Mother then
approached the swings, greeted M.M., and brought M.M. to the
table to watch the movie with her brothers. L.G. remained on the
swings.
On January 18, 2025, L.G. did not want to visit Mother and
remained home with Maria T. While the other children were
with Mother, Mother telephoned Maria T., yelled at her, and
demanded that Maria T. bring L.G. to the visit. Maria T.
explained that DCFS had told her she did not have to force the
children to attend visits. Mother asked J.G. whether Maria T.
had convinced L.G. not to attend the visit.
Following the January 18, 2025 visit, J.G. had behavioral
issues, including kicking walls, stating that he was going to run
away, and screaming. After he calmed down, he told Maria T.
that he was upset because he knew that he or L.G. would be in
trouble during their upcoming visit with Father because L.G. did
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not go to Mother’s visit. J.G. later confirmed that Father was
mad at L.G. during their visit.
On January 25, 2025, G.G. and L.G. visited with Mother
and appeared happy to see her. Mother cuddled and kissed L.G.,
who laughed and smiled. Mother played with L.G. while the boys
played in the playground. Mother redirected and corrected the
children in an appropriate manner. An hour into the visit, G.G.
asked the social worker if he could go home but did not repeat the
request to Mother. When the visit ended and the social worker
was buckling L.G. into her car seat, L.G. stated that she missed
her mommy. When asked who that was, L.G. said “Maria.”
On February 1, 2025, L.G. and G.G. were happy to go to
visit Mother. When they arrived at the visit, however, L.G.
stated that she missed her mommy, meaning Maria T. Mother
overheard the children referring to Maria T. as “mom,” and
stated, “She’s not your mom, I’m your mom.” Mother and the
children later played tag, and the children appeared to enjoy
themselves, running and laughing with Mother.
During a February 5, 2025 hearing, minors’ counsel asked
the court to suspend Mother’s visits with the children, arguing
that the visits detrimentally affected them. The court ordered
DCFS’s next report to “address visits . . . and whether the visits
are detrimental or helpful.”
On February 8, 2025, the four children visited Mother.
During the visit, L.G. did not interact with anyone and claimed to
have an earache. G.G. was sick and after he blew his nose,
Mother criticized him. Mother sat on her own and J.G.
approached her, asking if she was okay. Mother responded that
she was frustrated because the children did not listen to her and
instead wanted to run around the playground. Mother stated she
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was “done trying.” J.G. asked if Mother did not love them
anymore. Mother stated that was not what she was saying and
“made statements to [elicit] guilt from the children,” although
DCFS did not recount the statements. L.G. asked the social
worker to carry her. When the social worker noted that Mother
could carry her, L.G. indicated she did not want Mother to hold
her. Mother was frustrated and stated that the two youngest
children ruined the visit.
b. Additional information about the children’s
development
(i) G.G.
In December 2024, a dependency investigator asked G.G. to
identify his family. He responded, “My mom is Maria, my dad is
Robert[o],” and also identified the Caregivers’ children. When
asked if he had any other family or mother or father, G.G. stated,
“No, Maria is my mom and Robert[o] is my dad.” The
investigator asked G.G. if he knew Mother, and G.G. stated, “She
is a social worker.” When asked when was the last time he saw
Mother and what they did, G.G. stated, “I don’t see her, but one
day we played [F]or[t]nite and that’s all we did.” The
investigator then asked G.G. if he had a house who would live in
it, and G.G. stated, “Mom, Maria and me and [J.G.] and that’s
all.”
Separately, in January 2025, a social worker spoke to G.G.
He asked G.G. what his definition of a mom was. G.G. stated
that a mom “bring[s] you toys.” The social worker then asked
G.G. how he would feel if he never saw Mother again. G.G.
stated, “Might be sad.” If he never saw Maria T. again, G.G.
stated he would be “sad.” When asked what he liked about
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Mother, G.G. stated that he liked when Mother played with him
by running around.
In February 2025, G.G.’s therapist observed that G.G. had
exhibited increased anxiety over the last two months. He had
become more aggressive and restless and lacked focus in school.
G.G. reported that he did not want to go to visits with Mother.
When leaving the Caregivers’ home to attend visits, he would cry
and resist climbing into his car seat. Maria T. reported that upon
returning from family time, G.G. exhibited emotional
dysregulation including clinginess. The therapist stated that
G.G. did not want to leave the home and was always seeking
Maria T.’s attention. When G.G. was asked how he felt about
being adopted by the Caregivers, he stated, “I like it here.”
(ii) L.G.
In December 2024, the dependency investigator asked L.G.
to describe her family. L.G. identified her “mommy” as Maria
and her “daddy” as Roberto. She added, “I do have other family
like G[.G.]” When asked if she knew Mother, L.G. stated, “Oh
yes, she is my teacher, I see her sometimes.” When asked who
would live in L.G.’s house if she had one, L.G. identified the
Caregivers, three of their children, and their grandchild. L.G.
identified Maria T. as living in L.G.’s happy house. In response
to questions, L.G. stated she did not visit anyone on the
weekends, did not receive phone calls from anyone, and stated, “I
don’t know” when asked to share more information about Mother.
In January 2025, the social worker posed the same
questions to L.G. that he had asked G.G. and L.G. stated,
“Mommy is Mari[a], she cooks some breakfast and takes me to
school.” After being asked what if she never saw Mother again,
L.G. asked, “She lives in your office?” The social worker said no
13
and repeated the question. L.G. appeared distracted and did not
answer the question. L.G. said she would be sad if she never saw
Maria T. again. When asked whether she liked visits with
Mother, L.G. answered, “No,” and explained Mother “[wa]s really
mad because she doesn’t want me to stay right here. She wants
me to go. She said, ‘I’m your mom!’ ”
L.G.’s therapist noted that L.G. is very close and attached
to Maria T. Over the past two months, the treatment team
observed an increase in L.G.’s clinginess toward Maria T.,
tearfulness, reluctance to go to school, and difficulty being away
from Maria T. These behaviors become more evident when L.G.
had to leave for visits with Mother. Maria T. reported that upon
returning from the visits, L.G. exhibited distress by being more
emotional, acting “babyish,” and being clingy. According to
Maria T., L.G. refrained from calling her “mommy” in front of
Mother to avoid getting Mother upset. When L.G. was asked how
she felt about being adopted by the Caregivers, L.G. stated, “I’m
doing good.”
c. DCFS’s observations
DCFS reported that the children did not appear to have a
significant and emotional attachment to Mother and that
Mother’s behavior, including that she shamed and blamed the
children, confused and unsettled them. DCFS stated, “the
children demonstrate[d] a great deal of dysregulation post
visitation with . . . [M]other as demonstrated in the reports made
by [Maria T.] and the children’s mental health team. The
children have been observed to display frequent tantrums and
anxiety in the home and in school after visits, even having night
terrors.” DCFS acknowledged Mother played with the children
14
and provided a fun environment but described Mother and the
children as “hav[ing] more of a friend bond.”
d. Mother’s section 388 petitions
On February 20, 2025, Mother filed section 388 petitions
requesting to have all four children returned to her care or to
have reunification services reinstated due to her case plan
progress.
2. March Through September 2025
a. The court’s ruling on Mother’s petitions
On April 16, 2025, the court denied Mother’s section 388
petitions. It found Mother’s circumstances were changing but not
changed, noting Mother only found a sponsor the week before the
hearing, Mother had a positive drug test on March 26, 2025, and
that the court did not find credible Mother’s testimony that the
positive test was a result of a prescription medication.
On April 18, 2025, Mother filed a notice of appeal from the
denial of her section 388 petitions as to all four children. (Case
No. B345676.) Mother’s opening brief makes no claim of error
regarding the denial of the section 388 petitions; she claims only
that DCFS and the court did not comply with their ICWA inquiry
duties, and, thus, the court’s implicit ICWA findings should be
vacated.
b. Mother’s visits with the children
Mother had four visits with the children in March 2025.
During one visit, G.G. became whiny and tearful when Mother
arrived. During another visit, L.G. called Mother by her first
name, and Mother told L.G. that she needed to call her “mom.”
In April 2025, Mother had three visits with the children.
Mother was appropriate and the children seemed happy.
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In May 2025, Mother had six visits with the children. On
May 10, L.G. and G.G. did not seek out Mother when they arrived
and were more interested in playing in a water area in the park.
L.G. stated she did not want to spend time with Mother and
instead wanted to sit with the social workers. Mother asked L.G.
if she liked visiting her, and L.G. responded no. Mother did not
keep track of the children during the visit. During another visit,
Mother disciplined G.G. for fighting with J.G.; G.G. became upset
and stated, “I hate you” and “I don’t want to visit you.” During
another visit, Mother brought cake and presents for G.G.’s
birthday. Mother told the children that she loved them and
kissed and hugged them.
In June 2025, G.G. attended five visits with Mother and
L.G. attended four. During one visit, J.G. became upset because
G.G. referred to Roberto T. as G.G.’s dad. J.G. told G.G. that
Roberto was not his dad. Mother said it was okay for G.G. and
L.G. to call their foster father “dad,” but that L.G. should also call
Father dad. During another visit, Mother became frustrated that
G.G. and J.G. would not listen to her. J.G. became upset and
threw things. Mother became irritated, gathered her belongings,
and left the visit early.
The following week, L.G. was too scared of J.G. to attend
the visit with Mother. L.G. attended a visit with Mother and her
siblings the next day. Mother asked L.G. why she had missed the
last visit, and L.G. said she was sick. Mother became
confrontational, suggesting L.G. was lying. Mother also kissed,
hugged, played with, and talked with the children. She re-
directed them when needed.
In July, Mother had three visits with G.G. and two visits
with L.G. L.G. was ambivalent about attending visits. Mother
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believed Maria T. was coaching L.G. to say she did not want to
attend. Sometimes during visits Mother remained on her phone
and did not supervise the children. Mother appeared to prefer
M.M. to G.G. and L.G.; she brought new clothes and shoes for
M.M. and used a harsher tone with G.G. when disciplining him.
c. Additional information about the children’s
development
On March 21, 2025, DCFS reported, “The quality of family
time has led to concerns regarding the children’s emotional
wellbeing. . . . [M]other’s lack of insight to parent the children
during challenging situations presented during family time
results in confusion and dysregulation in the children and is
affecting their emotional wellbeing and reports of regression in
mental health services.”
In July 2025, DCFS reported that during team meetings
with Maria T., social workers, and G.G. and L.G.’s therapist, G.G.
and L.G. expressed that they did not want to have visits with
Mother but went because they did not want to get in trouble with
her. DCFS noted that Mother sometimes made guilt-inducing
comments and that the children experienced emotional tension in
their interactions with her. G.G. continued to have issues at
school with hitting and paying attention. L.G. had anxiety in
anticipation of visits with Mother and Father, resisted visits, and
exhibited detachment. L.G. also displayed emotional avoidance
or anxiety after visits.
On August 27, 2025, a team comprised of social workers,
the children’s therapist, a behavioral specialist, the clinical
director of the foster agency, and the foster family agency worker
met to discuss L.G. and G.G.’s progress. The team discussed
their ongoing concern that family time negatively affected the
17
children. L.G. continued to feel anxious before and after family
time with Mother and often expressed that she did not want to
attend although she was persuaded to go on several occasions.
After visits, L.G.’s negative behaviors increased and it took her
days to regulate. L.G. also worried about G.G. when he attended
family time without her.
In September 2025, a team of social workers, L.G.’s
therapist, Maria T., and L.G. met to discuss L.G.’s positive
progress in services. They attributed her progress to her
decreased family time sessions with Mother. L.G.’s therapist
noted L.G. had decreased anxiety.
I. The Permanency Planning Hearing
On September 16, 2025, Mother argued the court should
not terminate her parental rights to G.G. and L.G. because the
beneficial relationship exception applied. That exception
requires a parent to show all of the following three elements:
(1) the parent has consistently visited with the child; (2) “the
child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent”; and (3) adoption would be detrimental to the child
because the benefits the child enjoys from their relationship with
the parent outweigh the stability and permanence of adoption.
(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.); see
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
Counsel for G.G. and L.G. argued that regardless of
whether Mother had visited consistently, her visits had a
negative impact on the children, and severing the bond between
Mother and the children would not be detrimental when weighed
against the benefits of adoption. Minors’ counsel also emphasized
that the children had lived with the Caregivers since very early
in their young lives.
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DCFS joined in minors’ counsel’s arguments and added
that Mother was more like a friendly visitor. During DCFS’s
argument, L.G. approached Mother, hugged her, and gave her a
drawing of a heart with stick figures of L.G. and Mother drawn in
the middle. The picture included the words “L[.] and Mami.”
After speaking with L.G., minors’ counsel confirmed that L.G.
was saying “I love you.”
The court found Mother had shown consistent visits with
the children. The court also commented that the children had a
bond with Mother. Turning to the third prong, the court
described whether G.G. and L.G. would benefit from continuing
their relationship with Mother as depending on several factors,
such as their ages, the portion of their lives spent in their
parents’ custody, the positive or negative effects of the
interactions between the parent and child, and the children’s
particular needs. The court commented that even in the
courtroom, the court had observed that Mother, who was crying,
relied on L.G. for comfort and not the other way around. The
court further observed that, among other things, the portion of
the children’s lives spent in Mother’s care was “negligible.” The
court stated, “There have been many [interactions] that have
been negative, and the court cannot conclude that the
relationship, even if I were to conclude that there’s an emotional
beneficial relationship, I cannot conclude that the third element
that the parents are—by preponderance of the evidence on that,
whether the termination of parental rights would be detrimental
to the children due to losing the relationship, would it be so
harmful, and the courts have to determine is how the child would
be affected by losing that relationship.” The court found that
terminating Mother’s relationship with the children did not
19
outweigh the benefit of the stability and security for the children
of being adopted, and that Mother’s relationship with the
children was that of a friendly visitor. It accordingly terminated
Mother’s parental rights to G.G. and L.G.2
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Did Not Err in Finding the Beneficial
Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
1. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
“ ‘ “At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one
of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster
care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a
strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency
plans.” ’ ” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c) states several exceptions to
this rule, among them the beneficial relationship exception,
which applies if “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination [of parental rights] would be
detrimental to the child due to . . . [¶] . . . [t]he parents hav[ing]
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Id., subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).)
As previously noted, a parent must prove three elements
for the beneficial relationship exception to apply. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) Specifically, a parent must show by
a preponderance of the evidence (1) “regular visitation and
2 Mother appealed the order terminating parental rights as
to G.G. and L.G. We consolidated the appeal with Mother’s
appeal filed April 18, 2025, case No. B345676.
20
contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted”; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and
(3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the
child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 636.)
We review the first two elements or prongs of the test for
substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-
640.) The third element, “whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child, however, is more nuanced.
That issue entails ‘a series of factual determinations’ that are
reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] . . . The court’s
weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating
parental rights (and hence, its ultimate decision), which reflects
‘a delicate balancing of these [factual] determinations,’ is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 833, 853, citing Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640.)
“The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a
unique formulation where, as here, ‘the trier of fact has expressly
or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof
did not carry the burden and that party appeals.’ [Citations.]
‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial,
the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’
[Citation.] Specifically, we ask ‘whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
21
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ”
(In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671.)
“ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318-319.)
2. The Court Did Not Err in Finding Mother Did Not
Establish the Third Caden C. Factor
The parties agree that the court found Mother had
established the first Caden C. prong but disagree whether the
court found that Mother had established the second prong. We
need not resolve that dispute because the third Caden C. prong is
dispositive here. (In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 322, fn. 10.)
In deciding whether the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child, the court must consider “what
life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the
parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
“[T]he question is . . .whether losing the relationship with the
parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on
balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
“When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child
that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh
its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the
child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633-634,
italics omitted.)
“[U]nderstanding the harm associated with severing the
relationship is a subtle enterprise—sometimes depending on
22
more than just how beneficial the relationship is. In many cases,
‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’
will substantially determine how detrimental it would be to lose
that relationship, which must be weighed against the benefits of
a new adoptive home. [Citation.] A child would benefit from
continuing a strong, positive, and affirming relationship, and it
would be destabilizing to lose that relationship. Sometimes,
though, a relationship involves tangled benefits and burdens. In
those cases, the court faces the complex task of disentangling the
consequences of removing those burdens along with the benefits
of the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.)
Mother has not satisfied her burden on appeal to
demonstrate that, as a matter of law, severing her relationship
with the children would be detrimental to them. She points to
the many visits she had with the children, that they played
together, that Mother occasionally appropriately redirected them
or offered them guidance, that Mother was affectionate with
them, and that the children were happy in Mother’s presence at
times. But a “ ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive some
benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods
of visitation” ’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the
statutory preference for adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 803, 818.) Mother “must prove some type of harm
beyond the fact that their loving visits would cease.” (Id. at
p. 820.)
Mother argues she did so because the children expressed
distress at the end of visits with her, indicating a deep emotional
attachment. Specifically, she claims that on March 23, 2025,
G.G. cried and did not want to leave. She further claims, “During
23
another visit, a child yelled and cried when Mother departed.”
Mother also argues the children expressed missing her.
None of these claims is factually correct as to G.G. or L.G.
On March 23, 2025, G.G. began crying before Mother arrived
because of a fight he was having with J.G., not because of
anything to do with Mother. Mother cites to nothing in the
record indicating that on this day or any other day, G.G. or L.G.
cried because Mother left. Mother’s claim that during “another
visit, a child yelled and cried” is about this same March 23, 2025
event and involved J.G.’s actions, not those of G.G. or L.G.
Mother cites an instance in which L.G. states that she
missed her mommy at the end of a visit with Mother as L.G. was
being buckled into her car seat. When asked who she meant,
L.G. responded that she meant Maria T., not Mother. Mother
does not cite a single instance in which G.G. and L.G. had
difficulty separating from Mother at the end of a visit.
Mother’s arguments also ignore the many instances in
which G.G. and L.G. expressed resistance or indifference toward
Mother. The children repeatedly indicated that they did not
want to visit Mother. G.G. resisted getting into his car seat prior
to visits with Mother and, on one occasion, became whiny and
tearful when Mother arrived at a visit. On another occasion,
G.G. sought to end the visit early. L.G. chose not to attend some
visits with Mother, told a social worker that she did not like
visiting Mother, and responded “no,” when Mother asked if she
liked visiting her. L.G. also resisted being held by Mother and
often appeared more comfortable spending time with the social
workers.
As the children grew out of their infant and toddler stages
and Mother’s visits became more regular, the visits destabilized
24
them. Indeed, DCFS reported that following visits with Mother,
G.G. and L.G. became clingy, had difficulty regulating their
emotions, and regressed in therapy. One social services worker
characterized forcing the children to visit Mother as “trauma.”
L.G.’s behaviors markedly improved when she did not see Mother
for three weeks. Thus, it cannot be said that as a matter of law
severing Mother’s relationship with G.G. and L.G. would be
detrimental.
Nor does the record demonstrate that the court exceeded
the bound of reason in concluding that any detriment to G.G. and
L.G. from severing their equivocal bond with Mother did not
outweigh the stability and security of a permanent home with the
Caregivers. In contrast to the children’s above-described
relationship with Mother, G.G. and L.G. showed great
attachment to Maria T., who they had lived with during the five-
year long dependency proceedings. For L.G. this was the entirety
of her young life except for the months she was in the NICU. For
G.G., this was more than 80 percent of his life. Both children
identified Maria T. as their mom and sought her out for comfort,
attention, and affection. Further, the Caregivers were
consistently committed to G.G.’s and L.G.’s healthy development,
including taking them to Regional Center appointments and
participating in their therapy.
B. ICWA
Mother also claims that DCFS and the court failed to
adequately inquire as to whether all four children were Indian
children under ICWA and Cal-ICWA. As to G.G. and L.G., this
claim is properly before us given the appeal of the order
terminating Mother’s parental rights to those children. As to
J.G. and M.M., the claim is properly before us given the court’s
25
continuing assertion of jurisdiction over those children (and their
removal from parental care in favor of foster families) as of the
time of the section 388 petitions. (See generally In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10.)
1. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Congress enacted ICWA “ ‘to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.’ ”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128-1129.) An “ ‘Indian
child’ ” is “[a]ny unmarried person who is under age 18 years of
age and who is either of the following: [¶] (A) A member or
citizen of an Indian tribe. [¶] (B) Eligible for membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe and is a biological child of a
member or citizen of an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.1, subd. (b)(1).)
Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1131-1132.) “This continuing duty can be divided into three
phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry,
and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
The initial inquiry includes asking the child’s family,
including extended family members, whether the child is, or may
26
be, an Indian child.3 (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Extended family
members include adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd.
(c)(1).)
“Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that this duty of
initial inquiry does not require interviewing ‘every’ extended
family member; rather, where the juvenile court’s finding that
[DCFS] conducted an adequate inquiry and that ICWA does not
apply is ‘supported by sufficient evidence,’ conditional reversal is
not required ‘even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who
has an interest in the child.’ ” (In re Bella L. (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290, citing In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1140-1141.)
The duty of further inquiry arises when the agency has
“reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132.) Reason to
believe is statutorily defined as “information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or citizen,
or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an Indian
tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) “Further inquiry includes
‘(1) interviewing the parents and extended family members;
(2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State
Department of Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child
may be affiliated with and anyone else that might have
3 Effective September 27, 2024, the Legislature amended
section 224.2 to require DCFS to conduct its initial inquiry of
extended family members upon its first contact with them.
(§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3.) The instant
matter was pending both before and after this amendment.
27
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a
tribe.’ ” (In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 85; see
§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a
child’s proceeding if it finds DCFS’s “inquiry and due diligence
were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no
reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (In re Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply “ ‘ “implies that
. . . social workers and the court did not know or have a reason to
know the children were Indian children and that social workers
had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.” ’ ” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s
factual finding that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry
is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially
discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard
of review.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) “ ‘On a
well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to
determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the
less developed the record, the more limited that discretion
necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087,
1101-1102.)
2. Additional Factual Background
a. ICWA inquiry of maternal relatives
Between March 2020 and September 2023, DCFS asked
Mother three times whether her children possibly had Native
American ancestry. Mother consistently denied any such
28
ancestry. She also filed a parental notification of Indian status
(Judicial Council ICWA-020) form with the court indicating she
did not have a reason to believe ICWA applied to her or G.G.,
L.G., or J.G. Mother later filed a form with the court, indicating
the same as to M.M.
In April and May 2023, maternal grandmother C.M.
(MGM) and maternal aunt Maria Cecilia M. denied any Native
American ancestry. MGM also stated that maternal grandfather
(MGF), who had passed away 19 years ago, had no known Native
American ancestry.
During a September 27, 2023 hearing, Mother stated for
the first time that MGM was in an unspecified tribe.
In October 2023, DCFS twice spoke with maternal aunt
E.M. and once with MGM. In each instance, they denied Native
American ancestry.
On November 1, 2024, DCFS again asked Mother about
any possible Native American ancestry. Mother declined to
answer, stating she wanted to make the social worker’s job
difficult. However, on December 10, 2024, Mother denied that
she or any known family member had Native American ancestry.
On July 30, 2025, DCFS inquired of maternal cousin
Gerardo M. about Native American ancestry. He reported that
Mother was Mexican and deeply rooted in ancient Mexican
traditions, but not Native American.
On August 1, 2025, DCFS again asked maternal aunt E.M.
about possible Native American ancestry, and she denied any.
On August 1, 2025, DCFS attempted to ask maternal
cousin Julio F. (who DCFS had been in contact with earlier in the
proceedings as he and his wife considered adopting the children)
about any possible Native American ancestry. He did not answer
29
the call. DCFS left a voicemail and sent a text message
requesting a call back but did not hear from Julio.
b. ICWA inquiry relating to Father
On May 22, 2020, Father filed Judicial Council ICWA-020
forms with the court in which he denied having Native American
ancestry.
On July 6, 2020, DCFS spoke with Father about his family.
During that conversation, Father described that paternal
grandfather (PGF) had been born in another country and was not
a United States citizen.
On April 6, 2022, DCFS contacted the paternal
grandmother Maria D. (PGM) and asked her about Native
American ancestry. PGM reported that her family does not have
Native American ancestry and were born in Jalisco, Mexico.
On April 14, 2023, Father again informed DCFS that he did
not have Native American ancestry. Mother also twice denied
any knowledge that Father had any Native American ancestry.
During a May 25, 2023 permanency planning hearing, the
court asked Father whether he had information about PGF.
Father stated that PGF was alive, but Father did not have his or
paternal aunt’s contact information. The court ordered DCFS to
follow up with Father to discover any information regarding
Native American ancestry of paternal relatives.
DCFS obtained PGF’s first and last name and date of birth
and asked Father for contact information for PGF. Father
reported that he did not have contact with PGF or a telephone
number for him.
On August 23, 2023, Father’s attorney advised the court
that Father had told him that his uncle (paternal great uncle)
and a paternal cousin once removed had some tribal affiliation.
30
Father did not have any contact information or dates of birth for
these relatives but could provide their names. The court ordered
DCFS to investigate Father’s possible Native American heritage.
During a September 27, 2023 hearing, Father informed the
court that paternal great uncle and paternal cousin once
removed’s tribal affiliation was Navajo.
On October 12, 2023, DCFS spoke with Father to obtain
contact information for paternal cousin once removed, Tracy C.,
and paternal great uncle, Angel C. Father stated he did not have
their contact information, that he would attempt to get it, and
would provide it to DCFS. DCFS followed up with Father on four
occasions in October, but Father did not have any contact
information or did not respond.
On October 19, 2023, DCFS spoke with PGM to inquire
about PGF’s contact information and whereabouts. PGM stated
that she was not in communication with PGF and did not know
where he was. DCFS asked PGM if her daughter (i.e., paternal
aunt) might have that information. PGM responded that her
daughter might know where PGF was but that PGM could not
provide her daughter’s telephone number to DCFS without her
daughter’s consent. PGM never provided the requested contact
information to DCFS.
On November 22, 2023, DCFS spoke with Father about his
family’s possible Native American ancestry. Father stated that
he believed his father’s lineage included Navajo. When asked to
explain the basis for that belief, Father said his paternal family
lived in Arizona and when he was young his paternal uncle
Angel C. took Father to “pow wows” in Los Angeles. DCFS asked
Father whether any relatives may have more information.
Father reported that PGF might, but Father did not have contact
31
information for PGF. Father also stated that paternal great
uncle Angel C. (PGF’s brother), paternal cousin once removed
Tracy C. (daughter to paternal great uncle Angel C.), or paternal
great-great-grandmother Maria M. might have information about
his Father, but he did not have contact information for any of
them. Father also told DCFS that he has not heard of anyone in
his family living on a reservation or receiving any services from
the Navajo tribe. Father denied any Native American ancestry
on PGM’s side and stated that they are Mexican.
On November 29, 2023, DCFS again asked PGM if she had
any information for PGF. She denied knowing any information
such as his birthday, age, “or any ICWA information.”
As of February 1, 2024, Father had not provided any
additional ICWA information to DCFS. DCFS reported that
Father, paternal aunt Maria S., and paternal aunt Nora G. lived
with PGM in PGM’s home. PGM had five children, but the other
two were not identified in the record. DCFS asked PGM for
contact information for paternal aunts, but PGM declined to
provide that information.
On February 4, 2025, Father stated, “The court found that
there is no ICWA, but I have East Navajo, my father Francisco
G[.] use[d] to take me to the [p]ow-wow as a child and my uncle,
Jesse C[.] . . . told me we were from the East Navajos, but I have
never received medical treatment at an Indian health clinic.”
This was the first time Father identified PGF as taking him to
pow-wows or provided the name of paternal uncle as “Jesse”
instead of “Angel.” Father stated that he did not attend an
Indian school or receive a membership card and is not registered
with the tribe. Father lost contact with PGF and paternal uncle
when he was young. DCFS also reported, “The [paternal uncle]
32
stated that he has previously provided the information above to
the [c]ourt and it was determined that there was no ICWA,” but
DCFS did not provide further information about this statement.
Father agreed to provide new information to the court if he
received any. As of March 24, 2025, Father had not provided any
additional information.
On July 30, 2025, DCFS contacted Father to again inquire
about Native American ancestry, but Father did not respond.
On August 27, 2025, Father denied having any knowledge
that he had Native American ancestry. Father provided no
explanation for his flip-flop on this issue.
c. ICWA inquiry as to J.G. Sr.
On August 12, 2020, J.G.’s father, J.G. Sr., told DCFS that
he did not have Native American ancestry. During the
remainder of the case, his whereabouts were unknown; due
diligence searches were unsuccessful in locating him. Mother
also twice denied that J.G. Sr. had any Native American
ancestry.
d. The court’s ICWA findings
Throughout the proceedings, the court made interim ICWA
findings that there was no reason to believe the children were
Indian children as it received additional information on the issue.
On June 9, 2023, the court found that based on additional
information it received, there was no reason to know or believe
that G.G., L.G., or J.G. were Indian children. However, the court
thereafter continued to ask DCFS to investigate and report any
further ICWA related information. Then, in Father’s February
and March 2024 case plans as to G.G., L.G., and M.M., the court
indicated ICWA did not apply.
33
The court did not make any explicit ICWA findings at the
hearing where it denied the section 388 petitions or at the
hearing at which it terminated Mother’s parental rights as to
G.G. and L.G.
3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s Finding
that ICWA Did Not Apply on Mother’s Side
Mother argues that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate
ICWA inquiry as to the maternal side of her family because
DCFS had had contact with the following relatives during the
pendency of the matter but did not ask them about possible
Native American heritage: (1) maternal aunt Maria Montoya M.,
(2) maternal aunt Maria Guadalupe M., (3) maternal aunt Maria
del Carmen J., (4) maternal first cousin once removed Kenneth
M., and (5) maternal nephew Julio F. Mother does not contest
the adequacy of the ICWA inquiry of her paternal relatives.
Preliminarily, we observe that Mother’s citations to the
record do not support her claim that DCFS spoke to a maternal
aunt named “Maria Montoya M[.]” or that Mother has a relative
by that name. Rather, the record indicates that DCFS spoke
with a maternal aunt named “Maria M[.]” and that there are
three maternal aunts named Maria: Maria Guadalupe M., Maria
del Carmen J., and Maria Cecilia M. The maternal family’s
surname is M[.], meaning that in referring to “Maria M[.],” DCFS
could have been referring to any of the three Maria sisters.
Mother has not cited record evidence that she has a relative
named Maria Montoya M. or that DCFS failed to conduct an
adequate ICWA inquiry as to this person.
As to DCFS’s failure to inquire of maternal aunt Maria
Guadalupe M., maternal aunt Maria del Carmen J., maternal
first cousin once removed Kenneth M., and maternal nephew
34
Julio F., DCFS’s investigation was adequate and substantial
evidence supported the court’s finding that as to maternal
relatives, it had no reason to know or believe that the children
were Indian children.
Notwithstanding the facial requirements of section 224.2,
courts do not read the statute that an initial inquiry be made of
every single member of the child’s extended family. (In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1005-1006, disapproved
on another ground in In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152,
fn. 18; see In re Dezi C., supra, at p. 1140 [the statute “does not
require reversal in all cases in which every possible extended
family member has not been asked about the child’s Indian
ancestry”].) DCFS “is not required to ‘cast about’ for information
or pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053.)
Here, Mother, MGM, two maternal aunts, and a maternal
cousin all denied that their family had any Native American
heritage. MGM also stated that MGF, who had passed away 19
years earlier, had no known Native American ancestry. Because
MGM denied any Native American ancestry on her or MGF’s
behalf, the court could reasonably conclude that asking the two
other maternal aunts, cousin, or nephew would be unnecessary
absent some indication these relatives’ knowledge of the family
ancestry was superior to MGM’s knowledge. (In re C.R. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 793, 802.)
4. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding
that ICWA Did Not Apply on the Children’s Paternal
Side
Mother makes no argument that DCFS conducted an
inadequate inquiry as to J.G.’s father, J.G., Sr., or his relatives.
35
DCFS spoke with J.G., Sr.; he then disappeared and DCFS was
unsuccessful in contacting him again and had no information for
his relatives.
As to G.G., L.G., and M.M., Mother argues that DCFS
failed to inquire of paternal aunts Maria S. and Nora G., and
failed to inquire with the BIA or the Navajo Nation about PGF’s
possible Native American ancestry.
As to Father’s maternal relatives, DCFS’s inquiry was
adequate. PGM stated she had no Native American ancestry and
that her family was from Mexico. Nothing suggests that paternal
aunts (PGM’s daughters) would have had superior knowledge as
to PGM’s own possible Native American heritage than PGM
herself had. (In re C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 802.)
We also conclude DCFS’s inquiry was adequate as to
Father’s paternal lineage. PGM denied having any ICWA
information about PGF. Father initially denied any Native
American ancestry and asserted PGF was born in another
country and not a United States citizen. Although Father later
claimed a paternal great uncle and paternal cousin once removed
might have some tribal affiliation, he later went back to denying
any of his paternal relatives had Native American ancestry.
DCFS sought information to contact PGF directly from
several sources; none was provided. Father had no contact
information for the paternal great uncle or paternal cousin once
removed that he sometimes claimed (and sometimes did not
claim) had Navajo ancestry. Nor did Father have contact
information for other relatives he claimed might have PGF’s
contact information.
In these circumstances, DCFS’s inquiry was adequate. We
recognize that “as a result of forced assimilation policies, ‘younger
36
generations lack[] knowledge of their Native American ancestry
which may only be reclaimed by conducting [a] proper ICWA
inquiry with extended family members and others more
knowledgeable.’ ” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.)
But the failure to contact certain extended family members does
not require automatic reversal; DCFS needs to contact those
relatives “reasonably available to help the agency with its
investigation.” (Id. at p. 1140.)
DCFS concedes it spoke with Maria S. and Nora G. early in
the proceedings but did not ask at that time about the family’s
possible Native American heritage. But the record also shows
that DCFS later attempted to reach out to paternal aunts to ask
ICWA related questions by asking PGM (who was at that time
responsive to DCFS) for the paternal aunts’ current contact
information. PGM declined to provide their current contact
information and then stopped cooperating. For his part, Father
was unable to provide contact information for additional inquiries
of relatives. This indicates either that he did not have it, or that
any relatives he did contact refused to permit him to share their
information with DCFS.
Because the facts did not provide any reason to believe that
PGF was a tribal member or eligible for enrollment in a Native
American tribe, DCFS was not required to contact the Navajo
Nation or the BIA about PGF. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) Father was
not an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation. Even accounting
for potential generational loss of memory, Father knew that PGF
was not born in the United States and was not a citizen. Father
claimed only that PGF’s brother and cousin once removed might
have tribal affiliation, before then retracting that claim and
saying he had no Native American ancestry. PGM also denied
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PGF had Native American ancestry before she stopped
cooperating with DCFS. In these circumstances, the court did
not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding that DCFS’s inquiry
was adequate, and substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding that ICWA did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The order finding ICWA does not apply to J.G., G.G., L.G.,
and M.M. and the order terminating parental rights as to G.G.
and L.G. are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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