Filed 8/20/26 In re G.F CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re G.F., B351526
a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01918C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant
County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Principal Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
B.H. (mother)2 appeals the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
her son, G. She argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
jurisdiction.
We disagree with mother. G. was seven years old at the relevant times.
He repeatedly escaped from the family home in ways that put him at risk.
The juvenile court had before it extensive evidence from which it could
reasonably conclude that G. was at substantial and ongoing risk of serious
physical harm. That is enough to support the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over G. under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A). That subdivision states that juvenile court jurisdiction
is appropriate when the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of … [t]he
failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child.”
When reviewing juvenile court jurisdictional findings, “‘we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.
[Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin.,
§ 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our
opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case
and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851
[unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision
“does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].) Undesignated
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 B.H. had adopted G. and his sister, and had previously adopted G.’s
biological mother. B.H. is in her seventies.
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from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court;
we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the
province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) Our
discussion of the factual record reflects this standard of review.
Here, G., age seven, had a history of escaping from his home. On June
3, July 28, August 1, August 2, and September 2, 2025, mother called police
to report that G. was missing. The August 2 police report stated that G. took
a scooter to the Metro station and rode two different trains. He had a scratch
on his arm from falling off the scooter. The police report noted that mother
was “unable to physically control the [child].”
On September 3, 2025, G. ran away from mother at a shopping mall
and tried to run into a busy street. Mother called police. Law enforcement
stopped G. before he ran into the street. On September 27, G. ran away and
mother followed him for an hour in her car until G. agreed to come home.
The following day, G. unlocked the front door and left home at 9:30 p.m. G.’s
therapist noted that although a safety plan was in place, G. continued
escaping.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) on October 7, 2025.3 On November 17, G. told a children’s social
worker (CSW) that he leaves home when he wants to go play with his friends.
3 The family had a dependency history. In August 2024, the juvenile
court sustained a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), in part
because G.’s older sister, K., had episodes in which she ran away from home
and mother did not stop her. K. was seven years old at the time. K. no
longer lived with mother and G. Jurisdiction over G. was terminated in
February 2025.
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The CSW observed that G. “did not seem to understand that he is too young
to leave the home without permission and/or to roam the neighborhood on his
own.” The same day, mother told the CSW that she had several locks on the
front door. Mother also moved her recliner closer to the front door so she
could intervene if G. started to leave. Mother installed a deadbolt on the
bedroom door that could only be unlocked with a key.
G. had been diagnosed with ADHD, impulsivity, and oppositional
defiant disorder. Mother felt that G. might benefit from wraparound
services. At the jurisdiction hearing on December 4, the juvenile court
sustained the petition but stated that it would not remove G. from mother.
The court made clear that its intent was to provide mother with “more tools”
to help keep G. safe.
On appeal, mother argues that G.’s escaping was not “the result of
neglectful parenting.” She also contends there was no “inference that
Mother’s supervision was deficient in a manner that created a risk of harm.”
Mother asserts she was “actively engaged in addressing [G.’s] needs,” rather
than “being neglectful,” so a jurisdiction finding was not warranted.
Mother misinterprets the relevant standard. Section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) “authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is
at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her
child.” (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624.) “Rather than focusing on
parental fault or blameworthiness, the focus instead is on ‘whether the child
is at “substantial risk” of “serious physical harm or illness.”’” (Guardianship
of Saul H. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 827, 851, quoting R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
634.) Thus, jurisdiction may be appropriate despite a parent’s best efforts.
Mother also argues there was no evidence of a risk of serious physical
harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing in December 2025. She does not
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argue that a seven-year-old escaping from home in the manner described
above does not carry risk. Rather, she asserts that “circumstances had
materially improved” because in December 2025, G. was in counseling and
was taking medication.
Mother is correct that there must be significant risk to the child at the
time of the jurisdiction hearing in order to sustain a petition under section
300.4 (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.) However, evidence of past
conduct may be probative of current conditions if there is “‘some reason
beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.’” (In re
D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)
Here, there was evidence that G.’s escaping would recur. Less than a
month before the jurisdiction hearing, G. said he continued to leave home to
play with his friends. G. did not understand the dangers inherent in
wandering the neighborhood alone, riding a scooter unsupervised, running
into traffic, or riding Metro trains without an adult. Although mother
continued her attempts to keep G. inside the house when they were home, the
evidence did not suggest that these efforts were conclusively successful or
that G. was no longer at risk of escaping. Thus, there was sufficient evidence
to support the juvenile court’s finding that G. remained at risk of serious
physical harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.
4 DCFS filed an “update” with information post-dating the jurisdiction
hearing. We have not considered this evidence. It is irrelevant to the issue
presented on appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DAUM, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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