Filed 7/16/26 In re G.C. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re G.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY F090896
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. JVDP-25-000056)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
B.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette Rees,
Judge.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
* Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Guerra, J.
Thomas Boze, County Counsel, and Michael Kalanta, Deputy County Counsel;
Gordon-Creed, Kelley, Holl, & Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman LLP, and Anne H. Nguyen,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant B.C. (mother) is the mother of one-year-old G.C. (the child), who is the
subject of this dependency case. At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
August 2025, the juvenile court ordered family reunification services were not to be
provided to mother. In November 2025, mother filed a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3881 asking the court to order family reunification services.
The court denied mother’s petition at a hearing on November 25, 2025. On appeal,
mother contends the court erred in denying the petition. We find no abuse of discretion,
and thus we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Removal
In February 2025, the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency)
received a referral after the child’s birth due to concerns about mother’s ability to provide
care. Mother informed hospital staff that she had a long history of methamphetamine
use, mental health issues, and child welfare involvement. Since 2015, six of the child’s
siblings had been removed from mother’s custody due to drug abuse and domestic
violence. A social worker responded to the hospital, and the child was taken into
protective custody pursuant to a warrant.
During an interview with the social worker, mother admitted to smoking
methamphetamine twice per week during her pregnancy. Mother reported being clean
since her arrest in November 2024. She was admitted to a residential drug treatment
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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program after being released from jail on February 2, 2025. Mother had left the same
program after two weeks in September 2024.
Regarding her history of drug use, mother disclosed first using methamphetamine
at age 17. Dependency proceedings resulted in the removal of mother’s older children
due to drug use and domestic violence. In 2015 and 2022, she completed substance
abuse programs during the dependency proceedings, but she began using
methamphetamine daily in 2022. Her oldest five children were living with a maternal
aunt, and another child was recently adopted.
The agency filed an original petition alleging the child was described by
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g) and (j). The petition alleged the child was at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of mother’s significant
history of substance abuse.
The agency’s detention report set forth mother’s child welfare history, which
involved eight substantiated referrals from 2005 to 2025. In May 2005, mother was
offered voluntary family maintenance services after mother and her 18-month-old son
tested positive for amphetamines. Mother completed her voluntary case plan, which
included outpatient substance abuse treatment.
In January 2015, a referral was substantiated due to mother’s substance abuse and
domestic violence relationship. Mother agreed to participate in voluntary family
maintenance services, but four of the child’s siblings were eventually removed in
February 2015 due to mother’s ongoing substance abuse. An additional sibling was
removed at birth in November 2015. Mother’s family reunification plan included
substance abuse treatment, domestic violence services, parenting, and individual
counseling. In April 2017, mother was awarded sole physical custody of four of the
siblings and dependency was dismissed. The oldest of the siblings was appointed a legal
guardian without ongoing dependency.
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In September 2020, mother relapsed on methamphetamine, and the four younger
siblings were allowed to remain with a maternal aunt as part of a safety plan. Mother
failed to follow through with voluntary family maintenance services. A referral for
general neglect was substantiated in March 2021. The maternal aunt agreed to file for
guardianship of the four siblings.
In May 2023, the child’s sibling, M.C., was taken into protective custody after
mother admitted to methamphetamine use during her pregnancy. Family reunification
services were provided to mother. Mother’s family reunification services were
terminated on January 3, 2024, and her parental rights were terminated on April 30, 2024.
At the detention hearing held on February 25, 2025, the juvenile court detained the
child from mother, ordered mother’s visitation with the child to be supervised, and set a
jurisdiction and disposition hearing for April 8, 2025.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The jurisdiction and disposition report, dated April 3, 2025, recommended that the
allegations in the petition be found true and family reunification services be provided to
mother. The child was placed in a resource family home, and a maternal great-aunt was
considering being a placement option for the child. Supervised visits between mother
and the child were going well without any major concerns noted. The social worker’s
assessment acknowledged mother’s five months of sobriety, and her efforts to remain
sober were commended. The agency was hopeful that mother would dedicate herself to
her sobriety and address the traumas that contributed to her methamphetamine use.
The initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued at mother’s request.
A contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing was eventually set for May 19, 2025.
The agency prepared an addendum report to provide updates in advance of the contested
hearing. The child’s father, G.J. (father), was located at the Stanislaus County Public
Safety Center. Family reunification services were not recommended for father due to his
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status as an alleged father. Mother was testing negative for illegal substances, but she
was required to sign a behavioral contract after breaking program rules.
On May 19, 2025, mother and father were present for the continued hearing.
Father was appointed counsel, who requested a continuance to review the report and
obtain genetic testing results. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was reset for
June 17, 2025, based upon father’s request. The agency filed a first amended petition on
June 9, 2025, alleging mother tested positive for methamphetamine on two occasions in
May 2025. The petition further alleged mother admitted to using methamphetamine daily
on May 29, 2025.
A second addendum report, filed on June 11, 2025, recommended family
reunification services not be provided to mother pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10), (11), and (13). Mother had been discharged from her substance
abuse program, and she was not engaged in parenting groups or individual counseling.
There were multiple missed visits in June 2025, which resulted in mother being removed
from the supervised visitation schedule. On June 17, 2025, a contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing was set for August 14, 2025, at the request of mother’s counsel.
The agency filed a third addendum report on August 7, 2025. Mother had only
completed two out of 10 parenting groups, and her individual counseling sessions were
“[o]n [h]old” after she failed to attend two recent appointments. She was also removed
from the visitation schedule again due to three missed visits. The social worker referred
mother for a new substance abuse assessment in June 2025.
Upon her admission to a withdrawal management program, mother tested positive
for methamphetamine on June 19, 2025. The program transferred mother to the
program’s sober living home on July 7, 2025, without the agency’s input. On July 23,
2025, mother self-discharged from the substance abuse program after breaking program
rules. An appointment was scheduled to connect mother to outpatient services on July
28, 2025, but she failed to attend the appointment. The agency lost contact with mother
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following her self-discharge, and she had made no efforts to re-engage in services or
visitation.
The agency’s assessment concluded that mother was not in compliance with any
aspect of her case plan, and she had not been able to demonstrate her ability to achieve
and maintain sobriety. Father was found to be the biological father of the child through
genetic testing results. Family reunification services were not recommended for father
because the agency did not believe it would benefit the child.
At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on August 14, 2025,
father was present and mother was not present. The juvenile court sustained the
allegations in the first amended petition and ordered family reunification services were
not to be provided to mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11), and
(13). Father was not provided family reunification services, and a section 366.26 hearing
was set for December 12, 2025. The agency filed a notice for the section 366.26 hearing
on October 22, 2025, which indicated the social worker was recommending termination
of parental rights and implementation of a plan of adoption for the child.
Section 388 Petition
On November 3, 2025, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting an order that
family reunification services be provided to her. The petition alleged mother had been
sober for over two months. Mother further claimed that she was participating in weekly
appointments with a substance abuse counselor while incarcerated. She was also
engaging in mental health services and adjusting her psychotropic medication. The
child’s best interest was alleged to be served because mother wanted to give the child a
life with family. Mother asserted that she was dedicated to engaging in services to be a
safe parent for the child. The juvenile court set the section 388 petition for a hearing.
On November 25, 2025, the juvenile court held a contested hearing on mother’s
section 388 petition. Mother appeared remotely while in custody at the Stanislaus
County Public Safety Center, and father appeared remotely from state prison. Mother’s
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counsel presented oral argument without any additional evidence to support the
section 388 petition. Her counsel stated, “[mother] has been sober for over three months
now, and she is absolutely willing to do whatever it takes to reunify with her daughter.
[Mother] wants to engage in services and maintain her sobriety. [¶] With that, we are
asking Your Honor to grant [mother]’s [section] 388 motion and extend family
reunification to [mother].”
The agency’s counsel entered an objection to the petition with reference to the
agency’s pending recommendation of adoption. In noting the agency’s opposition, their
counsel stated, “[a]t this time the [caretaker] is willing to adopt; so the [a]gency is
following the mandatory order of preference under … section 366.26
[subdivision] (b)(1) in finding and adoptive adult for the [child].”
Counsel for the child argued that mother’s petition should be denied due to a lack
of changed circumstances. Father’s counsel expressed support for mother’s efforts to
reunify with the child. After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court
proceeded to its ruling on the section 388 petition.
The juvenile court commended mother on her intent to maintain her sobriety, but it
concluded that mother had not demonstrated a change of circumstances or that offering
mother reunification services would be in the best interest of the child. In relation to the
child’s best interest, the court reasoned as follows:
“This is a very young child. Stability and permanence are
paramount and to have this very young child wait for treatment options and
for mom to maintain a lengthy period of sobriety to appear she could
appropriately parent this child is not in this child’s best interests.”
Mother’s section 388 petition was denied, and the section 366.26 hearing
remained set for December 12, 2025.
Appeal and Post-Appeal Proceedings
On December 11, 2025, mother timely filed her notice of appeal. On February 24,
2025, together with her opening brief, mother filed a request for judicial notice, asking
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this court to take judicial notice of a post-appeal order, dated January 15, 2026. The
agency opposed the request by asserting that the post-judgment evidence is not a proper
subject for judicial notice. We deny mother’s request for judicial notice because the post-
judgment order is not relevant to our analysis.2
DISCUSSION
Mother asserts the juvenile court erred when it failed to grant her section 388
petition requesting reunification services.
A. Legal Principles
A petition to modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege facts
showing new evidence or changed circumstances exist and changing the order will serve
the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subd. (a); In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217,
1235.) The petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).) In assessing the petition, the court may consider the
entire history of the case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.)
Section 388 serves as an “ ‘escape mechanism’ when parents complete a
reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but
before the actual termination of parental rights.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528 (Kimberly F.).) “After the termination of reunification services,
the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
2 In her opening brief, mother argues that at the time of the hearing on her
section 388 petition, the agency was opposed to her request due to the current caretaker’s
willingness to adopt the child. Mother claims that the January 2026 minute order
granting a subsequent section 388 petition to change the child’s placement renders the
agency’s previous opposition to her petition moot. However, the request to change
placement was not filed until after the denial of mother’s section 388 petition, and the
juvenile court did not deny mother’s petition based on representations that the current
caretaker would adopt the child. We will, therefore, deny mother’s request for judicial
notice. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 399, 405, 413–414 [post-judgment
evidence not before court should only be reviewed on appeal in rare and compelling
cases].)
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paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency
and stability.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order.
[Citation.] The change in circumstances must relate to the purpose of the order and be
such that the modification of the prior order is appropriate. [Citations.] In other words,
the problem that initially brought the child within the dependency system must be
removed or ameliorated. [Citations.] The change in circumstances or new evidence must
be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the
challenged order.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) “A petition which
alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a
permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with
the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the
child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
In assessing the petition, the juvenile court may consider the entire history of the
case. (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) When determining whether a
modification under section 388 would be in the best interests of the child, courts have
considered several factors, including but not limited to: “(1) the seriousness of the
problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that
problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent
and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or
ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (Kimberly F., supra, 56
Cal.App.4th at p. 532.)
B. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a section 388 petition after an evidentiary hearing for
abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) “ ‘ “The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” ’ ”
(Id. at pp. 318–319.) “ ‘The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an
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abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.) Where
there is conflicting evidence, we reverse only if the evidence compels a finding for the
appellant as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1529.)
C. Analysis
In the present case, the juvenile court determined that mother did not prove the
existence of a change in circumstance or the child’s best interests were served by granting
her request. Mother provided evidence that she was sober for a few months and attending
substance abuse counseling while incarcerated. These facts were understood and
acknowledged by the court. However, it is irrelevant that there may be evidence which
would support a conclusion contrary to that of the court. (In re K.B. (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292.) The court denied mother’s section 388 petition because it did
not find that mother’s circumstances were “changed” or that reunification services were
in the child’s best interests, given the child’s need for permanency. Thus, the court
properly focused on the child’s permanency and stability when it considered mother’s
request to delay the child’s proposed permanent plan.
Mother’s argument that her participation in substance abuse treatment mandated
reunification efforts ignores the legally required shift in focus once reunification services
were denied. Mother’s section 388 petition contemplated further delay in permanency
for a child who had remained in out-of-home care since birth. Although mother had
begun making progress by re-engaging in substance abuse treatment, the circumstances
before the juvenile court showed that mother was still in the early stages of addressing
her substance abuse problem. Mother’s issues with abusing substances dated back to at
least 2015, based upon the removal of the child’s older siblings for substance abuse and
domestic violence.
We acknowledge that mother’s efforts to treat her substance abuse problem
indicate that her circumstances are changing, and mother’s continued efforts are to be
commended. However, mother must demonstrate “changed, not changing,
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circumstances.” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) Thus, it was
reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude mother’s recent efforts in the months prior
to the hearing did not amount to “changed” circumstances, particularly in light of her
claim of sobriety for less than six months. (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
415, 423–424 [200 days of sobriety not enough to demonstrate changed circumstances
given the parent’s history]; Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, fn. 9 [“It is the
nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period than 120 days to
show real reform.”].)
Because mother did not make a sufficient showing that her circumstances had
changed in the three months following the disposition hearing, the juvenile court properly
denied her section 388 petition. Mother had not yet demonstrated that she could
complete a drug program and maintain her sobriety outside of a controlled environment.
Considering the young child’s heightened need for permanency and stability, and the
inability of mother to consistently demonstrate her commitment to sobriety throughout
the proceedings, the court’s decision to forego reunification efforts was not arbitrary or
beyond the bounds of reason. Accordingly, we find the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the section 388 petition.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
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