Filed 10/19/26 In re G.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re G.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
E088557
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
(Super.Ct.No. J306500)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
OPINION
v.
J.W. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.
Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
1
Akila A. Shenoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant J.W.
Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant L.J.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant J.W. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s summary
denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing regarding her daughter, C.M.2 She contends that she made an adequate prima
facie showing to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. Mother additionally requests that if
the denial of her section 388 petition is reversed, that the orders terminating her parental
rights also be reversed. C.M.’s presumed father, L.J. (Father), joins in Mother’s
arguments pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200, subdivision (a)(5).
We affirm the summary denial of Mother’s section 388 petition, and therefore
need not address the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2025, plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and
Family Services (CFS) received an immediate response referral when Mother surrendered
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
specified otherwise.
2 Because C.M. was surrendered pursuant to the Safe Haven Law, she is
frequently referred to in the record as “Baby Girl” or “Girl” rather than by name. We
adopt the parties’ usage of C.M. in this opinion to avoid confusion.
2
C.M. pursuant to the Safe Haven Law (Health and Safety Code § 1255.7). C.M. had been
born at home, brought to the hospital, and surrendered on the same day. C.M. was
admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit and there were concerns that she was showing
signs of withdrawal symptoms. C.M. tested positive for amphetamine and marijuana, and
had difficulty feeding.
CFS filed a juvenile dependency petition with respect to C.M. four days after she
was surrendered. The petition alleged pursuant to section 300, subdivision (g), that C.M.
was left without provisions for support. The following day, the juvenile court ordered
C.M. detained and removed from her parents and placed in a foster home.
As set forth in the jurisdiction and disposition report, when CFS interviewed
Mother, she stated that she was living with two of her sons, J.J. and R.J., at a transitional
living program when C.M. was born. Mother said she intended to surrender and then
return for C.M. because C.M. had been born a week early and Mother had not yet secured
childcare for J.J. and R.J. Mother stated she was unsure if she would reclaim C.M.
because she was having issues with Father, but returned to the hospital four days later and
was informed C.M. was no longer at the hospital. Mother stated she wished to reunite
with C.M.
Mother admitted during her interview with CFS that she had been consuming
vodka daily and smoking marijuana one to two times per week up until October 23, 2025,
when she entered the transitional living program. Mother claimed she last used
amphetamines in 2016, and had attended recovery services in 2016 when one of her
children was removed by CFS. Mother stated the 2016 incident with CFS was “ ‘a bunch
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of false allegations.’ ” Mother stated it was not possible for C.M. to have been born
testing positive for amphetamines and marijuana because Mother was in the transitional
living program and gave birth at the facility, where she was randomly drug tested.
Mother described domestic violence allegations between her and Father dating
back to 2021, which she said “became intense” in 2025 after she informed Father of her
pregnancy. Father threatened to take the children to another state, spread rumors about
Mother, or hurt Mother’s family if she left with the children, and he kept Mother isolated.
Mother stated that she was arrested in 2021 for domestic violence perpetrated against
Father, and the last time Father “put his hands on her” was in 2021. She said Father did
grab her in front of one of the children recently. Mother also admitted to having ongoing
verbal arguments with Father.
Mother told CFS that she believes she has PTSD, although she does not have an
official diagnosis, and that she was previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder by a
psychiatrist but was not prescribed medication.
Mother previously had five children removed from her care by CFS. One child
was placed in legal guardianship with a maternal aunt in 2018, two of the children were
adopted in 2018, and two of the children were placed with their respective fathers in 2016
and 2018. At least one of the substantiated claims against Mother involved living with a
newborn at a drug treatment facility in 2016. CFS additionally removed J.J. and R.J.
from Mother’s custody in November 2025.
In December 2025, CFS filed an amended juvenile dependency petition regarding
C.M. With respect to Mother specifically, the amended petition added allegations
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pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), that she has an ongoing substance abuse
problem, has a history of engaging in domestic violence incidents, and has untreated
mental health issues, all of which affect her ability to parent C.M. Pursuant to
subdivision (j), the amended petition alleged that seven siblings and half-siblings of C.M.
had been removed from Mother and Mother failed to reunify with the children resulting
in termination of parental rights for some of the siblings, placing C.M. at substantial risk
of similar neglect or abuse.
Pending the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Mother was referred to individual
therapy, domestic violence classes, and parenting education. Mother had two negative
drug and alcohol tests in December 2025.
The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on January
21, 2026, with respect to C.M., R.J., and J.J. At the hearing, Father testified that he does
not hit Mother but would grab her to stop her from hitting him. He also testified that in
the last year, Mother swung at him but he “can pretty much get out of the way” before
being hit.
Mother testified that she is in a woman’s home and achieving every goal asked of
her. She denied having a substance abuse problem, saying that she struggled “in the
past” but it “is not an issue anymore” because she is being treated. Mother testified that
she has been abstaining from substances for about three months, and is attending
parenting classes, domestic violence classes, Narcotics Anonymous (NA) or Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA), and individual therapy, all of which she felt were beneficial. Mother
admitted on cross-examination that she was smoking marijuana and drinking while
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pregnant with C.M., however she denied using methamphetamine or amphetamines while
pregnant. She testified that she has not used methamphetamine since 2016, when her
other children were removed.
Mother acknowledged that she has a history of engaging in domestic violence in
the presence of her children, but stated that she now has a restraining order against Father
and if disagreements occur she would remove the children from the situation and call law
enforcement or a family member. Mother admitted that the restraining order she had
against Father was a temporary restraining order (although she was seeking a permanent
restraining order), and it was obtained in January 2026 after the children were removed
from her care. Mother testified that she was the aggressor at one point previously, that
the last incident of domestic violence involving verbal abuse between her and Father took
place in October 2025, and that the last physical incident between her and Father took
place in 2021. Mother at first testified that one of her sons would have seen Father
“grab” her in the past year, but then backtracked and said that she had no idea how the
child would have gotten the idea that the parents were hitting each other.
Mother testified that she believed her life is in a better position now than it was
when her other children were removed, as she was in “survival mode” then but is now
comfortable and safe. Mother stated that she did not recall telling CFS that she had
bipolar disorder or PTSD. However, Mother agreed that she has untreated mental health
issues but she was never diagnosed and never prescribed medication. She testified she
was seeking treatment via therapy about twice per week and found therapy to be
beneficial.
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With respect to surrendering C.M., Mother testified that she was “panicking”
because she had her sons at the house and nobody was available to watch them, so she
had to surrender C.M. to be able to get back to the boys. Mother said she intended to
reunite with C.M. four days after giving birth, and a nurse told her that she had 14 days to
come back for C.M.
The juvenile court sustained the amended petition on all of the allegations
pertaining to Mother except that it amended the allegation regarding Mother’s mental
health to state that “ ‘if left untreated it would put the children at risk,’ ” and it dismissed
the allegation made pursuant to section 300, subdivision (g), regarding leaving C.M.
without provisions for support. The court ordered bypass of reunification services for
Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11).3 The court stated that
although Mother was engaged in services there was no indication she had engaged in
them prior to removal of the children other than possibly a short period of time before
C.M. was born when Mother entered the transitional living program, so it did not believe
that Mother had made a subsequent reasonable effort to address the issues from the prior
dependency actions. The court then set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 regarding
potential termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights.
3 Section 361.5 provides that reunification services need not be provided to a
parent where a court finds certain enumerated circumstances, known as bypass
provisions, to be true. (In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271.) The bypass
provisions at subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5 apply where a parent has
previously had reunification services terminated or had parental rights terminated with
respect to a sibling or half sibling of the subject child and has not subsequently made
reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling or half
sibling.
7
The section 366.26 report prepared by CFS reflects that C.M. has been residing
with her caregivers since she was four days old, the caregivers consider C.M. to be their
own child, and they feel that they have a mutually attached parent and child relationship.
C.M. “appears to be very comfortable in her home environment” with her caregivers.
She has her own bedroom in the caregiver’s home, and the home is clean and organized.
The caregivers love C.M., and believe they are the persons most suited to adopt her
because they have known her for her entire life, she has not known any other home or
family, and they are committed to raising her to adulthood.
On May 13, 2026, Mother filed her request to change court order pursuant to
section 388, wherein she requested that the children (C.M., R.J., and J.J.) be returned to
her, or in the alternative the court order family reunification services, unsupervised visits,
and/or not implement a plan of adoption for C.M. Attached to the request was 34 pages
of documents reflecting: completion of 16 parent education sessions, a prevention and
wellness course, 12 sessions of parenting classes, a 20-week domestic violence awareness
program, and 12 sessions of another class regarding domestic violence; attendance at 43
AA/NA meetings; negative drug test results through April 2026; participation in a
perinatal outpatient program; and letters of recommendation from three staff members at
her transitional living facility regarding her sobriety and her attendance at classes and
therapy sessions.
On May 15, 2026, the juvenile court summarily denied Mother’s section 388
request. On the JV-183 court order form, in the section under “The request is denied
because,” the juvenile court wrote the case number referring to C.M. and checked three
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boxes: “the request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstances,” “the
proposed change of order, recognition of sibling relationships, or termination of
jurisdiction does not promote the best interest of the child,” and “Other.” Next to
“Other,” the court wrote “child has never lived with the mother.” The juvenile court set a
hearing to determine if an evidentiary hearing should be set with respect to Mother’s
requests regarding J.J. and R.J.
At the section 366.26 hearing on May 21, 2026, the juvenile court found C.M. to
be adoptable by clear and convincing evidence, ordered termination of parental rights,
and set a review hearing for November 2026. Mother timely filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to section 388, subdivision (a)(1), a parent of a dependent child may
petition the juvenile court to modify a prior order based on changed circumstances or new
evidence. The section 388 petition must “allege a prima facie case in order to trigger the
right to proceed by way of a full hearing.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584,
592.) The petition for modification “must be liberally construed in favor of its
sufficiency.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570, subdivision (a).)
The prima facie showing requires the parent to demonstrate both of the following:
“ ‘(1) a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that (2) revoking the
previous order would be in the best interests of the children.’ ” (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) “A prima facie case is made if the allegations demonstrate that
these two elements are supported by probable cause.... While the petition must be
liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency [citations], the allegations must nonetheless
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describe specifically how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.” (In re G.B.
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless the
facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a
favorable decision on the petition.” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.)
“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order.” (In
re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 870). Rather, in order to support a section 388
petition, the change must be “substantial” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219,
223) or “ ‘significant’ ” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615). “In the
context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted treatment in the past, a
showing of materially changed circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period
of sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
112, 121.)
The juvenile court’s summary denial of a hearing on a modification petition is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, and “[u]nder this standard of review, we will not disturb
the decision of the trial court unless the trial court exceeded the limits of legal discretion
by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” (In re A.S. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)
As an initial matter, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in giving only a
“single reason” for its denial of her request. However, the juvenile court checked three
boxes on the denial form, not just one. The juvenile court is permitted to deny the section
388 petition ex parte and is not required to furnish a detailed statement of its reasons for
denial beyond those set forth in the form. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) & (2).)
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Mother’s petition did not require a full hearing as it did not show substantial or
significantly changed circumstances, and moreover did not demonstrate that it would be
in C.M.’s best interest to be returned to Mother or for Mother to receive reunification
services. Mother had significant issues that led to the prior removal and out-of-home
placement of five of C.M.’s siblings and half siblings in 2016 and 2018. These issues
were not long in the past, as Mother admitted to drinking alcohol, using marijuana, and
engaging in domestic violence with Father while she was pregnant with C.M. She denied
using amphetamines during her pregnancy, but C.M. nevertheless tested positive for
amphetamines at birth.
Mother has certainly implemented many positive changes in her life recently.
However, it is highly relevant that Mother’s period of sobriety of approximately 6.5
months by the time of her section 388 petition was short relative to the length of time that
she has had substance abuse issues. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-
424 [seven months of sobriety by the father “was not enough to reassure the juvenile
court that the most recent relapse would be his last” for purposes of satisfying section 388
changed circumstances requirement].) Her substance use has been a concern since at
least 2016 when her other children were removed and she spent time at a drug treatment
facility. C.M.’s positive amphetamine test upon her birth, as well as Mother’s admissions
to drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana while pregnant with C.M., support the
inference that Mother relapsed despite previous efforts at treatment. On this record, we
cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that Mother had not
made an adequate showing of changed circumstances.
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Mother argues that the fact that the juvenile court set a hearing with respect to her
section 388 petition for R.J. and J.J. demonstrates that she necessarily made a prima facie
showing regarding changed circumstances with respect to C.M. as well. Mother may
have a point, as the law does not require that the changed circumstances showing be
specifically applicable to a specific child. (See In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
666, 674 [“The change of circumstances may be a change in the circumstances of a
parent which may make the modification of a prior order appropriate. Indeed, this is
precisely what happens in many section 388 petitions, where a parent avers that changes
in his or her circumstances make reunification with a child possible and desirable. In
these cases, there is usually no change in the circumstances of the minor, who remains in
foster care”].)
However, even if we were to agree with Mother that she made an adequate prima
facie showing of changed circumstances, we would nevertheless affirm because Mother
did not present prima facie evidence that it would be in C.M.’s best interest to be returned
to her custody or have reunification services provided to Mother. “In any custody
determination, a primary consideration in determining the child’s best interests is the goal
of assuring stability and continuity. [Citation.] ‘When custody continues over a
significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly
important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the
current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.’ ” (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Once reunification services are terminated, “the parents’
interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount.
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Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and
stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster
care is in the best interest of the child.’ ” (Ibid.; see also In re N.F., supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 121 [“[A]fter the court has bypassed or terminated reunification
services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, the focus of the case shifts from
the parents’ interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child to the needs of
the child for permanency and stability”].)
C.M. was safely surrendered on the day of her birth, so C.M. has never lived with
Mother, as referenced by the juvenile court. C.M. has instead been living with the same
caretakers from the time she was four days old, effectively the entirety of her life. These
caretakers love C.M. and they wish to adopt her and provide her with stability. C.M.’s
best interests are different than those of R.J. and J.J. because of her young age and never
having lived with Mother or known another home besides that of her current caretakers,
so we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court treating the section 388 request
regarding C.M. differently than the request regarding R.J. and J.J.
Mother provided only conclusory statements with her section 388 petition that it
would be in C.M.’s best interest not to move forward with the plan of adoption because
“Mother loves her children very much and it would be in their best interest to be raised
by their mother who is making efforts to better herself for them. Granting mother’s
request is in the child’s best interest because it provides a safe opportunity to reunify with
Mother while preserving their relationship and promoting the child’s long-term emotional
stability.” This does not meet the requisite prima facie showing necessitating a hearing
13
on Mother’s section 388 request. Ultimately, Mother’s efforts to maintain her sobriety
and address her issues are certainly commendable, but C.M.’s “best interests are not to
further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding Mother for her hard work
and efforts to reunify. Mother’s best interests are simply no longer the focus.” (In re
J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)
Mother argues that C.M. never having lived with her is a “fixed” circumstance and
therefore it has no bearing on changed circumstances because it is a circumstance that
necessarily can never change. We agree with Mother on that point. We do not quite
follow Mother’s additional argument, however, that this fixed circumstance “does not
answer” the question of C.M.’s best interests. The fact that C.M. has not lived with
Mother but has lived with her proposed adopters for essentially her entire life is certainly
relevant to the question of whether C.M.’s interest in continuity and stability would be
served by Mother’s proposed change of placement. (See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th
at pp. 325-326.)
Finally, Mother argues that if the denial of her section 388 petition is based on a
circumstance that she necessarily cannot change, i.e., the fact that C.M. never lived with
her, then no parent in Mother’s position could obtain a modification and section 388
would cease to function as an “ ‘escape mechanism’ ” as described by the Supreme Court
in In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309. We do not make such a broad
proclamation here that a parent can never make a best interest showing where the child
has not lived with the parent. We hold only that, based on the facts in this record and
14
with respect to this child, the summary denial of the section 388 petition by the juvenile
court was not arbitrary, capricious, or completely beyond the bounds of reason.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
P. J.
CODRINGTON
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
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