Filed 9/2/26 In re Frankie C. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re FRANKIE C., a Person B349610, B351499
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF Super. Ct. No. 25LJJP00138A
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Jennifer W. Baranoff, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Father Anthony C. appeals two juvenile court orders in
dependency proceedings for his son Frankie C., born 2019. The
first, entered under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 362,
subdivision (a), directed that Frankie (i) receive standard
childhood vaccines necessary to permit him to attend public
school; and (ii) be enrolled in public school once vaccinated.
(Case No. B349610.)
The second, entered under section 362.4, directed that
Father and Mother, Jessica D., have joint legal custody, subject
to Mother’s tiebreaking authority; and joint physical custody,
subject to primary residence with Mother. (Case No. B351499.)
We find no abuse of discretion in either order. As to the
first, the juvenile court was not obligated to delay the previously
ordered vaccinations to accommodate Father’s subsequent
request for allergy testing. And the court plainly acted within its
discretion in ordering Frankie enrolled in public school when
Mother, Frankie and Father all preferred that to homeschooling.
Father attacks the second order on the ground that
primary physical custody to Mother would upset Frankie’s
homeschooling arrangement that Father supervised. To the
extent Father did not forfeit any complaint about Frankie being
enrolled in public school, his reargument of the facts shows no
abuse of discretion.
BACKGROUND
Frankie came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in April
2025 when he was living with Father, Father’s then-girlfriend
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
Rosanna W., and Rosanna’s two children from a prior
relationship: E.W., a 10-year-old boy, and his younger sister A.W.
Father and Mother were married when Frankie was born but
later divorced. Their custody arrangement was the subject of
existing family court orders.
One evening, Father and E.W. had a violent confrontation
that ended with Father knocking E.W. onto a bed and kneeing
him in the face. E.W. sustained a bruise near his eye and
scratches on his face. Frankie and A.W. witnessed the incident
and all three children independently corroborated the story.
Based on this incident, the juvenile court eventually
sustained a section 300 petition against Father alleging Frankie
was at risk of serious physical harm.
When the case began, Frankie was enrolled in a
kindergarten homeschooling program through Gorman Learning
Center. Father oversaw his studies but was working to get him
enrolled in public school. The difficulty in doing so was that
Frankie was unvaccinated. Father “does not believe in vaccines
and [refused to] have Frankie vaccinated.” According to Father,
he and Mother agreed when Frankie was born that he would not
be vaccinated. Mother disputed this, explaining she always
wanted Frankie vaccinated but deferred to Father. When they
were together, Mother felt “completely controlled by [Father].”
The issue of schooling and vaccination first came before the
juvenile court at the May 2025 hearing on DCFS’s request that
Frankie be detained from Father (which was denied). Regarding
vaccination and schooling, counsel for Frankie notified the
juvenile court that Frankie wanted to attend public school in
person beginning that fall, but could not because he was
unvaccinated. Mother also wanted Frankie to attend school in
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person. Father was supportive of the idea, committing to “start
looking for either a school that will allow an exemption[] to the
vaccination requirement or perhaps a private school that won’t
require vaccination.” The court held the issue in abeyance
because the current school year was almost over and it wanted
the parties to work on the issue amongst themselves.
The juvenile court scheduled a combined jurisdictional
dispositional hearing for July 2025. In advance of that hearing, it
received a report from DCFS raising concerns about Father’s
attitudes towards Frankie’s medical care and his behavior in the
case.
Regarding medical care, DCFS reported Father had last
taken Frankie to the doctor in August 2024. In general, Father
did not take Frankie to the doctor because he was “ ‘never’ ” sick.
DCFS advised Father that children needed to see a pediatrician
at least once per year. Father was reluctant to take Frankie to
the doctor because he did not want him vaccinated.
Not reported at the time, because Father had refused to
sign a release of Frankie’s medical information, the reason he
took Frankie to the doctor in August 2024 was to seek a
vaccination exemption to be enrolled in school. He cut the visit
short when the doctor informed him an exemption would require
an actual medical reason—a severe allergic reaction to a previous
vaccination or a compromised immune system.
Father tried again in February 2025 and was again refused
an exemption. The pediatrician counseled Father on the benefits
of vaccines and risks of not vaccinating and specifically
recommended that Frankie receive all childhood immunizations.
Father nevertheless declined to have him vaccinated and signed
a formal declination acknowledging the pediatrician
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recommended Frankie receive certain childhood vaccinations.
Another record for Frankie from May 2025 contained a table
listing four “Immunization Allergies”—egg, neomycin, latex, and
gelatin—with the word “No” next to each one.
Regarding Father’s behavior in the case, DCFS reported
concerns Father had coached Frankie, E.W., and A.W. on what to
say to DCFS. For example, their explanations as to how E.W. got
the bruise and scratches on his face in April 2025 changed
dramatically in a short time, and Frankie said his revised
explanation—that E.W. might have hit himself—was an idea he
got from Father.
At the combined jurisdictional dispositional hearing in
July 2025, the juvenile court sustained the petition against
Father, but declined to remove Frankie from him. It ordered
Frankie released to both parents. During the hearing, the court
asked about Frankie seeing a pediatrician. Father responded he
had just taken him and “was trying to get [Frankie] into regular
school. And the school said [he] needed a specific paper, like a
waiver . . . so he didn’t have to do the immunizations.” But no
pediatrician would provide that waiver and Father again “put
[Frankie] in Gorman Learning Center” for the upcoming school
year. He did not consult Mother on this.
The juvenile court set a section 364 review hearing for
August 2025. That hearing was unreported but the resulting
minute order provided: “Contested Motion Hearing is set for
08/25/25 as to immunizations and school issues.”
Father testified at the August 25, 2025 hearing. He said he
did not want Frankie vaccinated because he was “scared for his
health.” That fear came from “a couple of friends that have had
negative effects” and his belief that his nephew developed autism
5
from getting the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine
when he was a baby. Father acknowledged he was unaware of
any diagnosis linking his nephew’s autism to vaccines.
Father testified no pediatrician had ever told him Frankie
needed to be vaccinated or expressed any concern over Frankie
being unvaccinated. This directly contradicted Frankie’s medical
records. The vaccine declination Father signed in February 2025
acknowledged: (i) Frankie’s pediatrician “recommended [he] be
vaccinated against [specified diseases]”; (ii) vaccine-preventable
diseases “can result in hospitalization and even death”; and (iii) if
unvaccinated, Frankie could be “excluded from . . . school . . . or
other organized activities during disease outbreaks.”
Father also testified he and Mother never discussed
vaccinations except when Frankie was born, when they “kind of
just agreed that [vaccination] wasn’t going to happen because of
the dangers out there.” Mother directly contradicted this in her
testimony, wherein she described three attempts to get Frankie
vaccinated at a young age that Father blocked.
Father did not testify to Frankie having any allergies, nor
did he testify to any family members having allergies or identify
concern about a potential allergic reaction as a reason for Frankie
to remain unvaccinated.
Father and Mother both testified they preferred Frankie
attend public school, with Father saying he “absolutely” would
want that if Frankie could get an immunization waiver.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered
Frankie vaccinated “forthwith.” It based this on vaccination
guidelines from the American Academy of Pediatrics and Father’s
lack of credibility in his testimony that none of Frankie’s
pediatricians recommended vaccination.
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The juvenile court further ordered Frankie attend public
school once he was vaccinated. It allowed Frankie to remain
homeschooled through Gorman Learning Center through the end
of 2025 while he got his vaccinations up to date. It made the
schooling order “based on the testimony from both parents” that,
Father’s objections to vaccination aside, “both parents are in
agreement that Frankie go to public school.” Even though
Father’s counsel, in closing argument, had argued against
ordering public school, counsel did not object to the court’s finding
that Father wanted Frankie to go to public school.
Father appealed the juvenile court’s order on October 7,
2025.
The juvenile court held a progress review hearing on
October 14, 2025. In advance of that hearing, DCFS reported
Mother was growing increasingly concerned about Frankie
remaining in Father’s primary care. She was also frustrated by
Father’s failure to communicate with her about Frankie’s medical
appointments. For example, she learned Father had scheduled a
vaccination appointment for Frankie for January 2026 only from
DCFS. DCFS rescheduled it to October 2025 in light of the
juvenile court’s order to proceed forthwith.
Father appeared to be slow-walking Frankie’s vaccinations
on purpose. DCFS reported he intended to make decisions he
believed to be in the best interests of Frankie, “despite court
orders.” He “continued to disagree [about] having [Frankie]
vaccinated” and planned to take Frankie to the vaccination
appointment to “inquire what’s the risk of having Frankie
vaccinated.” He did not plan to register Frankie in public school.
This was so even though Frankie continued to express a
preference to attend public school. More broadly, DCFS noted
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Father was being uncooperative and even hostile towards DCFS.
He complained it was “ ‘full of girls’ and that ‘everyone is lying’
and ‘making [him] look like the bad person.’ ” He was also
unhelpful to Mother as she sought to be involved in matters
concerning Frankie’s medical care and education.
At the October 2025 hearing, the juvenile court began by
noting a last minute information had been filed (which is not
otherwise in our record) indicating Father “d[id] not want
immunizations done until allergy testing is done.” No new
evidence was taken at the hearing. Father’s counsel contended
prevaccination allergy testing was a matter of “pruden[ce]” given
“someone [Father] personally knows was negative[ly] . . . affected
by a vaccination, at least in [Father’s] opinion and belief.” The
court ordered Mother to take Frankie to his vaccine appointment
and advised Father he could be subject to sanctions if he
interfered. The court further advised Father that it was
considering transferring primary custody to Mother based “not
only on the immunizations but on the power and control that I
see you exhibiting in this case and my concern is . . . your pattern
of not cooperating with the court, with [DCFS], complaining . . .
that everyone handling this case is a woman, it certainly calls
into question what is in Frankie’s best interest, and it also in
many ways seems to validate [Mother’s] prior arguments about
what she has dealt with in her ability to coparent.”
The juvenile court set a further hearing for November 2025.
Immediately after the October 2025 hearing, Father
addressed Frankie outside the courtroom. He said, “Are you
happy[?] I hope you’re proud of yourself, thank your mom,
Frankie, you are going to get shots now.” Father then shouted at
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Mother that “she needed to ‘do some research’ ” and “ ‘nothing
better happen to [Frankie].’ ” (Some capitalization omitted.)
Based on Father’s ongoing “difficulties with co-parenting,
appropriate communication, and cooperation with [DCFS] and
[Mother],” which DCFS characterized as “contrary to [Frankie’s]
emotional well-being and the goals of a collaborative co-parenting
dynamic,” DCFS recommended that the court give Mother
primary physical custody and tiebreaking authority in joint legal
custody with Father.
On October 29, 2025, Frankie received three vaccines. The
parents and a DCFS representative also attended the
appointment. Before the nurse administered the vaccines, Father
“attempted to persuade [Mother] to allow Frankie to receive one
vaccine at a time rather than the recommended three . . . .
[Father] appeared persistent and argumentative, attempting to
convince [M]other that his approach was in [Frankie’s] best
interest.” Mother persisted in requesting all three. Father
“dismissed [Mother’s] input and continued to challenge her
judgment.” After administering vaccines, the nurse told parents
to give Frankie Tylenol if he developed a fever and take him to
urgent care if he developed a rash. Father refused to listen to the
nurse’s advice and stated he would not follow any of the
recommendations. Father does not contend Frankie had an
allergic reaction to any of the vaccines.
At the November 2025 hearing, the juvenile court
considered issues of custody following the conclusion of the
dependency case. Father’s counsel called Frankie to testify. His
third question, after establishing that Frankie lived with Father
and liked it, was: “What is it that you like about living with your
dad?” Frankie replied: “He gives me healthy food.” “What kind?”
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counsel asked. “Broccoli,” Frankie replied, and then confirmed he
liked broccoli in response to follow-up questions on the subject.
Moving on from broccoli, counsel asked what other foods Father
fed him, to which Frankie responded: “Carrots.”
Counsel asked the same questions about living with
Mother, which Frankie testified he also liked, but because
Mother “gives [him] junk food,” such as “Sprite every day” and
Twinkies.
Counsel finally asked Frankie whether he would prefer to
live with Mother or Father. Frankie said both.
Father also testified. On cross-examination, Mother’s
counsel elicited testimony that Father had failed to respond to a
request from Mother as she tried to oversee Frankie’s learning
while in her care and failed to respond to inquiries from Mother
about an eye exam for Frankie.
After hearing closing arguments, the juvenile court
awarded parents joint physical custody, with Mother having
primary custody; and joint legal custody, with Mother having
tiebreaking authority. In support of this conclusion, the court
referred to a detailed social history between parents which
showed Father had completely controlled Mother during their
relationship. The court viewed Father’s conduct in the case as an
extension of his efforts to exert power and control over those
around him, “hinder[ing] coparenting [and] jeopardiz[ing]
Frankie’s emotional and physical health.” It found Father had
coached Frankie’s testimony about what he eats at his parents’
homes. It went on to detail instances in which Father had
resisted court orders, resisted the efforts of DCFS, and resisted
medical and dental care for Frankie. In the court’s view, Father’s
domineering conduct justified giving Mother tiebreaking
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authority “because otherwise the case is just going to continue to
go back to family law court over and over again.”
The juvenile court entered its exit order specifying custody
and other terms on November 21, 2025. Father appealed this
order as well. We ordered his two appeals consolidated.
DISCUSSION
I. Vaccination and Education Order
A. Mootness
DCFS and Father disagree as to whether Father’s appeal of
the juvenile court’s vaccination and education order is moot.
Among other things, the court has terminated jurisdiction,
leaving authority over Frankie’s medical and educational
decisions in parents’ hands; Father has access to the family court
to resolve disputes between him and Mother on such matters;
Frankie received his vaccinations without suffering an allergic
reaction; and he may receive booster shots in the future.
We have broad discretion to consider a dependency appeal
even if it is moot. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 287.) To the
extent the appeal is moot, we exercise that discretion here.
B. Law and Standard of Review
Juvenile courts are authorized to make “any and all
reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct,
maintenance, and support of [dependent children], including
medical treatment . . . .” (§ 362, subd. (a).)
“The court’s authority unquestionably extends to ordering
approved vaccinations for a child over a parent’s objection.” (In re
Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1196.) Such an order is
appropriate “if the evidence before the court, including the
approval of the child’s doctor, support[s] [it].” (Id. at p. 1198.)
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Father does not dispute the juvenile court’s authority to order
Frankie enrolled in public school.
We review orders under section 362, subdivision (a) for
abuse of discretion. (In re F.P. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 966, 975.)
“ ‘The abuse of discretion standard warrants that we apply a very
high degree of deference to the decision of the juvenile court.’
[Citation.] We determine whether the order exceeded the bounds
of reason and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our judgment for
that of the juvenile court.” (In re R.M. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
119, 134–135.)
C. Analysis
Regarding vaccination, Father contends the juvenile court
erred not in entering the August 2025 vaccination order that he
appealed, but by summarily denying his October 2025 request
that the court order allergy testing as a precondition to complying
with the order. To the extent his noticed appeal embraces this
issue, it is without merit.
Father states the juvenile court abused its discretion by
denying him the “right to explore whether there [wa]s a need for
a medical exemption.” This contention is entirely without merit.
Father had primary physical custody of Frankie and was
making medical decisions for him before the case started and
through October 2025, when he claimed allergy testing was
necessary. He was aware not later than August 2024 that a
medical exemption would be based only on a severe allergic
reaction to a previous vaccination or a compromised immune
system.
The record suggests Father concluded Frankie did not
qualify for either of these exemptions in August 2024. There is no
indication Frankie’s immune system is compromised. Indeed,
12
Father claimed Frankie is “ ‘never’ ” sick. At Frankie’s
August 2024 doctor’s appointment where Father sought a
medical exemption, Father reported Frankie had no known
allergies. When the pediatrician told Father a medical exemption
was available only on one of these grounds, he effectively
conceded Frankie would not qualify, complaining he wished the
doctor’s office had told him that the day before instead of
“wasting [his] time.”
Even if Father harbored some question about Frankie’s
eligibility for an exemption based on allergies, he had plenty of
time to investigate—a full year. But in February 2025 when he
went back for a vaccination exemption, he still reported Frankie
had “no . . . known allergies to vaccines.” His pediatrician then
expressly recommended that Frankie get vaccinated. A medical
record from May 2025 states without qualification that Frankie
has no allergies to known vaccine allergens.
At the August 2025 hearing where Father testified about
his reasons for not getting Frankie vaccinated, he never
mentioned concern about an allergic reaction to vaccines. The
only discernable basis for Father’s concern was his lay opinion,
which appellate counsel concedes is unfounded, that Frankie
might end up autistic like his cousin if he were vaccinated.
The juvenile court acted within its authority in ordering at
the conclusion of the August 2025 hearing that Frankie be
vaccinated. And, nothing in Father’s appellate brief shows it was
an abuse of discretion to stand by that order nearly two months
later when Father had not complied and requested an after-the-
fact condition to compliance that was unsupported by any
evidence and, in fact, was contradicted by evidence in the record.
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Regarding the August 2025 order that Frankie be enrolled
in public school, Father does not even argue the juvenile court
abused its discretion. It clearly did not. Father testified at the
hearing he “absolutely” would want Frankie in public school but
for the vaccine requirement. Once the court ordered Frankie
vaccinated, that barrier to enrollment was eliminated. Mother
also testified she wanted Frankie in public school and Frankie
himself expressed a preference to attend public school.
II. Exit Order Regarding Custody
A. Law and Standard of Review
Section 362.4, subdivision (a) permits juvenile courts to
issue family law orders governing custody or visitation when
terminating jurisdiction over dependent children. (Ibid.) Such an
order is commonly called an “exit order.” (In re Cole Y. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1455.)
When making an exit order, “ ‘the [juvenile] court’s focus
and primary consideration must always be the best interests of
the child.’ ” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.) In
determining those interests, the court “ ‘must look to the totality
of a child’s circumstances . . . .’ ” (In re J.T. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 953, 963.) “[Juvenile] courts have broad powers
and have the widest discretion to fashion a custody and visitation
plan that is in the child’s best interest.” (Heidi S. v. David H.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1162.)
We review exit orders for abuse of discretion. We will not
disturb a juvenile court’s decision “ ‘unless the court “ ‘ “exceed[s]
the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the [juvenile]
court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
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inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the [juvenile] court.’ ” ’ ” (In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
1090, 1094.)
B. Analysis
Father contends the juvenile court erred in not ordering
50-50 custody in its November 2025 exit order so Frankie could
continue his homeschooling.
As a preliminary matter, Father fails to acknowledge our
standard of review, much less argue error through that lens. This
alone is a sufficient basis on which to affirm the order. (See
Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 583, 597 [“ ‘When an appellant fails to apply the
appropriate standard of review, the argument lacks legal force,’
and the appellant ‘fails to show error in the judgment.’ ”].)
Even if Father did acknowledge our standard of review, his
arguments would not show error. They boil down to arguing
Frankie would be better off continuing homeschooling, while
acknowledging Mother wanted Frankie to attend public school.
Encapsulating his argument, Father states “the only barrier to a
50-50 arrangement was [Mother’s] desire to put Frankie into
public school. But should [Mother’s] desires trump [Father’s]?
Here it appears that Frankie enjoys home schooling, likes the
time he spends with [Father] being home schooled and overall
seems to prefer it to public school.” Father offers no citation for
the contention that Frankie prefers homeschooling and it is
contrary to considerable evidence in the record that Frankie
preferred to go to public school.
Father did not make any claim or argument at the
November 2025 hearing that Frankie was better off continuing in
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homeschool. During the presentation of evidence, Father did not
seek to walk back his prior testimony that, vaccinations aside, he
preferred that Frankie attend public school. His counsel never
objected to or called into question the juvenile court’s prior
finding that public school was the preference of all parties
involved. The most his counsel argued about schooling was to
assert Frankie was better off with Father because Father was
“capable of keeping up with Frankie’s schoolwork” in
homeschooling and Mother “wasn’t able to.”
In issuing its decision awarding Mother primary custody,
the juvenile court reiterated its prior finding that Father “was in
agreement with Frankie going to public school.” Father again
failed to object to that finding. Because Frankie was to be
enrolled in public school, the court dismissed issues around
homeschooling as irrelevant. There is simply no abuse of
discretion in the court’s exit order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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