Filed 9/14/26 In re Ellias V. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re ELLIAS V. et al., a B347812
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP00929)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
CRYSTAL G. et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sumako McCallum, Judge. Affirmed.
Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Crystal G.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Edgar V.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Crystal G. (Mother) and Edgar V. (Father) appeal from the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders
declaring nine-year-old Ethan V. and six-year-old Esmeralda V.
dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (d).1 The court sustained the
allegation that Father sexually abused the children’s maternal
cousin, A.G., when she was between the ages of nine and 13, and
that Mother failed to protect Ethan and Esmeralda from the
danger of sexual abuse. Father and Mother argue substantial
evidence does not support the court’s findings. Father also
argues the court abused its discretion by ordering him to attend
parenting classes. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Referral and Investigation
Mother and Father have three children: Ethan, Esmeralda,
and Ellias V., who was 15 years old at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing. The family lived in a three-bedroom home with
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
Mother’s extended family, including the maternal grandmother
and step-grandfather, maternal aunt Daisey G., maternal
cousin A.G., and another minor cousin.
On March 24, 2025 A.G., who was 15 years old at the time,
revealed to her mother (Daisey) that Father had sexually abused
her starting when she was nine years old and continuing until
she was 12 or 13. Daisey immediately called Mother to tell her
what Father had done, and Mother responded, “Are you fucking
kidding me?” When Daisey told Mother that she intended to
press charges, Mother pleaded with her not to press charges
because Father was her source of income.
The next day, Daisey and A.G. went to the police station to
report the abuse. A.G. told the police that the first incident
occurred when she was asleep in her bed. She “felt someone on
top of her, kissing her on the lips and putting his tongue in her
mouth.” A few months later, Father again entered her bedroom
and penetrated her vagina with his fingers. On another occasion
Father forced A.G. to touch his penis and perform oral sex on
him, after which he ejaculated on her stomach. A.G. recalled at
least six incidents of abuse, stating the abuse “stopped suddenly”
when she was 13 years old. Father was arrested for lewd or
lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a)), sexual penetration with force (id., § 289, subd. (a)(1)),
and oral copulation with a person under 18 (id., § 287,
subd. (b)(1)).
A social worker with the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) interviewed
Mother the day of Father’s arrest. Mother said she learned of the
allegations the previous day from Daisey. Mother asked Father
to leave the family home, fearing that her family “would be mad.”
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Father told her the claims were false. Mother took the children
to a friend’s house for the afternoon to keep them safe, but when
she returned, Father was in the home. At the urging of her
family, Mother asked Father to leave, but he refused, stating he
had not done anything wrong. Mother did not believe the
allegations and stated Father had never been alone with A.G.
Mother added that her family did not like Father, and she
recalled an incident a few years earlier when the maternal
grandmother said she did not want A.G. playing with Father
because “he had touched [A.G.] inappropriately.”
Father denied sexually abusing A.G. He believed Mother’s
family had fabricated the story as “leverage” against him because
they had ongoing arguments since 2021 about “a lot of issues,”
including Father not wanting to give rides to family members.
Father recalled an incident when he had been in the bedroom
with A.G. and her brother with the door closed. The maternal
step-grandfather had seen him leaving the room. Father denied
anything inappropriate occurred, but he recounted that the step-
grandfather had begun making “faces” at him after the incident.
Father stated he had a “very good relationship with children in
general” and he was “very playful” with them. He believed the
maternal grandmother did not like that he had a good
relationship with the children.
The social worker met with A.G. on March 25, 2025.
A.G. recounted that, starting when she was nine years old,
Father would come into her room and get on top of her while she
was asleep. Father would kiss her and put his tongue in her
mouth. She initially kept her eyes closed, but she knew it was
Father because she recognized his voice. A.G. told the social
worker that Father would remove her clothes, lick and suck on
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her breast, insert his fingers into her vagina, force her to “suck
his penis,” and rub his penis on her vagina. She said she did not
know if Father had inserted his penis into her vagina. She said
she “felt a lot of sharp pain in my private area.” When asked if
she ever “felt any fluid from” Father, she said yes, and he would
put the fluid on her breast and stomach. Father told her, “This is
our secret” and “I am showing you how to have sex for when you
grow up.” A.G. initially said the abuse happened “several times”
but then explained it happened every day or every other day. It
stopped when she was almost 13 years old. A.G. shared a room
with her older brother and younger brother, but they were asleep
during the assaults.
A.G.’s older brother reported that approximately
three years earlier he had seen Father enter the bedroom he
shared with A.G. and climb on top of A.G., although the brother
pretended he was asleep. The social worker also learned that
Father had previously been accused of inappropriately touching
the maternal uncle’s minor daughters, who did not live in the
home. One of the daughters had told family members that
Father was “weird” and he tickled her and touched her breast.
The other daughter stated Father touched her buttocks under her
clothing.
B. The Petition and Detention
On April 1, 2025 the Department filed a petition on behalf
of Ellias, Ethan, and Esmeralda pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (d), alleging Father had sexually
abused A.G. on multiple occasions while the children were in the
home and that Father had been arrested for the sexual assault.
The petition alleged Father’s sexual abuse of A.G. endangered
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the three children and placed them at risk of physical harm and
sexual abuse. The petition also alleged Mother knew or
reasonably should have known of the abuse and failed to protect
the children by allowing Father to continue to reside in the home.
At the April 15, 2025 detention hearing, the juvenile court
detained the children from Father and released them to Mother.
The court ordered Father to have unmonitored visits with Ellias
in a neutral setting for a minimum of three times per week. The
court ordered monitored visitation for Father with Ethan and
Esmeralda.
C. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
As of May 2025, Mother continued to state she did not
believe the accusations against Father. Father denied the
allegations, and Mother did not believe the allegations because
many relatives lived in the house and someone would have heard
Father if he was moving around at night. Mother believed A.G.
made up the allegations to get attention from Daisey and the
maternal grandmother. Alternatively, the maternal
grandmother and Daisey may have planned for the allegations to
be made so Father would move out of the house. Mother stated
that the maternal grandmother had previously accused Ellias of
being inappropriate with A.G., but those accusations were not
true.
Mother initially indicated she would not let Father return
to the home even though she did not believe the allegations.
However, she later stated she intended to stay in a relationship
with Father, explaining, “We’re trying to get our family back
together. I’m still communicating with him.” She also told the
social worker that the children “need their dad.”
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Father continued to deny the allegations. He admitted
A.G. was close with him and his family and would seek them out
when she was upset. Father never thought A.G. was
uncomfortable around him. Father stated that he intended to
live with his family again after the conclusion of the case.
D. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was initially
scheduled for June 9, 2025. However, the juvenile court
continued the hearing to allow the parties to review the
transcript of a forensic interview of A.G. conducted on March 28,
2025, which the parties had recently received. The transcript
was later admitted at the continued hearing.
A.G.’s account of the abuse in the interview was
substantially similar to her previous accounts. The abuse started
when she was nine years old with someone entering her room at
night, lying on top of her, kissing her, and putting his tongue in
her mouth. After a month or two the abuse occurred again.
A.G. stated, “That person would touch my vagina but first they
would take my clothes off. He would grab my breasts. He would
lick them and suck on them. He would not put his fingers inside,
but he would rub my vagina. And that would go on for like every
other day at night. It was always at night and the more and
more he did it, the more stuff he would do. For example, he
would end up putting his fingers inside my vagina. He would rub
himself against me. He would make me suck his dick, if not
stroke it. And so he would orgasm on top of me as well.” She
said the abuse did not stop until “the year I turned 13.” During
the first incident, A.G. was not sure who the person was, but she
later recognized it was Father. She stated the abuse occurred
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“[p]robably like every other week, if not every week. For two to
three days.”
After hearing argument from counsel at the July 16, 2025
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court dismissed
the allegation pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and
sustained the subdivision (d) allegation as to Ethan and
Esmeralda as amended by interlineation to remove the reference
to Father’s arrest. The court dismissed Ellias from the petition,
finding he was not similarly situated based on his age.
The juvenile court stated regarding the sexual abuse
allegations that it found A.G. “to be very credible. She has been
largely consistent in her statements. . . . She was very detailed to
law enforcement, the social worker, and forensic interviewer. . . .
The court in the companion case also noted her credibility and
her explanation as to why she didn’t tell anybody because she
was afraid of what would happen, that maybe one of her family
members or herself could be hurt or taken away, as well as the
fact that at such a young age when the sexual abuse began, she
did not yet know right from wrong.” The court also observed
that A.G. “described in detail the sexual abuse, which became
worse and worse over time and described [Father] as breathing
heavily and being shaky on occasion, which does not seem to be a
description that someone of her age would have known about.”
The court noted that A.G.’s brother had reported seeing Father
enter the room and climb on top of A.G. Although the court
acknowledged Ethan was a different gender than A.G., it noted
Ethan was around the age at which A.G.’s abuse began. Thus,
given Father’s “incredibly egregious and aberrant conduct”
against a child living in the family home, the court found Ethan
and Esmeralda were both at risk.
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With respect to the allegations of Mother’s failure to
protect, the court found not credible Mother’s statement that
A.G. was lying to gain approval from Daisey. Nor was Father’s
assertion credible that the family had fabricated the allegations
to get him out of the home. The court stated it was not credible
“that they would go through such extreme means.” The court
further found Mother had failed to protect the children by
continuing to deny any abuse occurred and by indicating she
intended to stay in a relationship with Father after the case.
The juvenile court declared Ethan and Esmeralda
dependents of the court under section 300, subdivision (d). The
court removed them from Father’s custody and placed them with
Mother. The court ordered Mother to attend parenting classes,
sex abuse awareness counseling, and individual counseling; the
court ordered Father to attend parenting classes, sex abuse
counseling for perpetrators, and individual counseling. The court
granted Father monitored visitation with the children for
nine hours per week.
Mother and Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdiction Findings
1. Governing law and standard of review
Under section 300, subdivision (d), a child comes within the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction if “[t]he child has been sexually
abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be
sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the Penal Code,
by the child’s parent . . . , or the parent . . . has failed to
adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the
parent . . . knew or reasonably should have known that the child
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was in danger of sexual abuse.” Under Penal Code
section 11165.1, subdivision (b)(4), “sexual assault” includes
“[t]he intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts,
including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and
buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a child, or of the
perpetrator by a child, for purposes of sexual arousal or
gratification . . . .”
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. (In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892; In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633
[“‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we
look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them.’”].) Substantial evidence is
“‘evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’”
(In re I.C., at p. 892; accord, In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
591, 602.) “‘[W]e draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T., at
p. 633; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.); In re
Cole L., at p. 602 [“while substantial evidence may consist of
inferences, any inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences
based on speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding”].)
“The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of
a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or
orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206; accord,
In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328-329.)
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2. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Father
sexually abused A.G.
Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s finding that he sexually abused A.G. because
A.G.’s “accounts contain significant inconsistencies regarding the
onset of the alleged abuse,” she was unable to identify her abuser
during the first instances of abuse, and her account was “highly
implausible” given that the “small home housed 10 to 11 family
members” and A.G. shared a bedroom with one or both of her
brothers at various points in time.2
Father ignores the juvenile court’s finding that A.G.’s
account was credible. As discussed, we do not reweigh the
evidence on appeal, instead determining whether there are
sufficient facts to support the court’s findings. (In re R.T., supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 633; I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) As the court
observed, despite some inconsistencies in her account of when the
abuse began, A.G.’s statements to the police, the social worker,
and the forensic interviewer were substantially consistent—she
consistently stated the abuse occurred in her bedroom at night
and that it began with an unidentified individual lying on top of
her and kissing her, and it escalated over time to digital
penetration and forced oral copulation. She also explained that
although she initially had her eyes closed, she was eventually
able to identify the individual as Father based on his appearance
and voice. Further, as the court also noted, A.G. recounted a
level of detail that a child her age would have been unlikely to
have known had the abuse not occurred. A.G.’s account was also
2 In her opening brief, Mother joins the arguments raised by
Father. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).)
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partially corroborated by the statements of her brother and step-
grandfather who had seen Father in A.G.’s bedroom.
Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that Father sexually abused A.G.
3. Substantial evidence supports the finding that
Father’s abuse of A.G. placed Ethan and Esmeralda
at risk of sexual abuse
Mother and Father argue that, even if the finding of sexual
abuse were supported by substantial evidence, Ethan and
Esmeralda were not at risk of sexual abuse because they were
differently situated. Specifically, Father contends, “No evidence
shows Father has any propensity to abuse boys or very young
girls in the manner alleged” nor is there evidence he abused a
child biologically related to him. In addition, Ellias, who was
15 years old at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, reported that
Father never sexually abused him.
Despite the parents’ protestations, “[c]ases overwhelmingly
hold that sexual abuse of one child may constitute substantial
evidence of a risk to another child in the household—even to a
sibling of a different sex or age or to a half sibling.” (Los Angeles
County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 968, 970, fn. omitted; see I.J., supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 770 [“We conclude that a father’s prolonged and
egregious sexual abuse of his own child may provide substantial
evidence to support a finding that all his children are juvenile
court dependents.”].) In this case, Father’s prolonged and
egregious sexual abuse of a child living in his household placed
the other children in the household at risk of sexual abuse,
especially where those children were approaching the age of the
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victim when the abuse started. (See I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at
pp. 770, 780 [father’s sexual abuse of his daughter provided
substantial evidence to support jurisdiction over his three sons];
In re Ricky T. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 515, 517 [grandfather’s
sexual abuse of his nine- and 12-year-old step-granddaughters
supported jurisdiction over three-year-old grandson]; In re Ana C.
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1332 [father’s sexual abuse of
cohabitant’s 11-year-old daughter “has been ‘so sexually aberrant’
to support the commonsense conclusion that most every person in
the family home was at risk of sexual abuse,” including father’s
adolescent sons].)
4. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Mother
failed to protect the children from sexual abuse
Mother and Father argue there was no evidence Mother
knew or should have known of the sexual abuse of A.G., and
therefore, substantial evidence did not support a finding that
Mother failed to adequately protect the children from the danger
of sexual abuse pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d). Mother
and Father are correct that there is no evidence Mother was
aware of Father’s abuse until A.G. made her disclosures on
March 24, 2025. However, by the time of the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, Mother was aware of the abuse allegations
but consistently denied any abuse had occurred and blamed her
family for fabricating the allegations. Although Mother initially
packed up Father’s belongings after the social worker expressed a
concern over Father returning to the family home, Mother
repeatedly stated she intended to reconcile with Father and live
together as a family. Father likewise intended to reconcile and
live with Mother and the children. Further, when Mother first
13
heard of the abuse, she pleaded with Daisey not to file a police
report, and Mother continued to deny the sexual abuse had
occurred, failed to acknowledge the severity of the abuse, and
lacked insight into the effect the abuse had on her children. This
provided substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that her failure to protect the children placed them at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. (See In re
Katrina W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 441, 447 [finding that the
mother’s statement, after learning of father’s abuse of daughter,
that she did not believe daughter was molested supported finding
that mother failed to protect daughter from future physical
harm]; In re D.G. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573 [mother’s
denial that father sexually abused minor’s half-sister and
mother’s refusal to deny father access to the children supported
finding mother failed to protect children from future sexual
abuse].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Ordering
Parenting Education Classes for Father
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering him to take parenting classes because the classes were
unnecessary and overly burdensome, and they were not directed
at eliminating a condition that led to dependency jurisdiction.
The court did not abuse its discretion.
We review the juvenile court’s disposition orders, including
those directing a parent to participate in counseling, education,
and treatment programs, for an abuse of discretion. (In re K.T.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25; In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1058, 1071; In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.)
“Juvenile courts should be mindful of the burdens their
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disposition orders impose on parents already grappling with
difficult conditions and circumstances. However, the paramount
concern always must be the child’s best interests, and we cannot
reverse a disposition order reasonably fashioned to eliminate the
conditions that led to dependency jurisdiction, no matter how
burdensome its requirements may seem from the parent’s
perspective.” (In re D.P., at pp. 1071-1072.) In addition, the
juvenile court may implement a disposition order “to address
parental deficiencies when necessary to protect and promote the
child’s welfare, even when that parental conduct did not give rise
to the dependency proceedings.” (In re K.T., at p. 25.)
The juvenile court found Father engaged in pervasive
sexual abuse over approximately four years while his children
were present in the family home. Further, Father failed to take
any responsibility for his actions or acknowledge the impact the
abuse could have on his children. Instead, Father blamed
Mother’s family for fabricating the allegations in an effort to turn
his family against him and remove him from the family home.
Given Father’s lack of insight, it was reasonable for the juvenile
court to conclude that parenting classes would help provide
insight to Father and promote the well-being of the children.
Father argues the parenting classes were overly
burdensome because he faces criminal charges and a restraining
order based on his abuse of A.G., is limited to monitored
visitation with his children, and is dealing with the “emotional
and logistical strain of family separation.” However, Father has
not explained how any of these circumstances affected his ability
to attend parenting classes. Accordingly, the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion by including parenting classes in Father’s
case plan.
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DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction findings and disposition orders are
affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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