Filed 10/29/26 In re Elijah B. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re ELIJAH B., a Person B347312
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 24CCJP03397A)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Dismissed.
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant K.B. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders made at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code1 sections 342 and 387. Specifically, due to a
typographical error in the factual description of the allegations in
the section 387 petition, father alleges he did not have adequate
notice of the allegation against him. As a result of the court’s
orders, Elijah B. was removed from his father’s care. Because we
find father’s claim is moot and forfeited, the appeal is dismissed.
COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
I. Family background
Elijah B. was born in December 2009 to father and
Stephanie N. (mother). At the outset of these dependency
proceedings, under a July 2014 juvenile custody order, mother
had sole physical custody of Elijah and shared legal custody with
father. In October 2024, Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 300 petition
alleging mother’s substance abuse and untreated mental health
issues placed Elijah at risk.
Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court sustained
the petition as to mother, removed Elijah from mother’s custody,
and placed him with father under a home-of-parent order and
case plan. Mother was granted monitored visits. Mother’s visits
were ordered to be monitored in a neutral setting outside father’s
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
or Elijah’s residence, and father was not permitted to serve as
mother’s monitor. Father’s case plan required conjoint
counseling with Elijah if recommended by the child’s therapist,
random and on-demand drug and alcohol testing, a parenting
education program, a psychological assessment (including
compliance with any prescribed psychotropic medication), and
individual counseling. Father was also ordered not to engage in
any “physical discipline” or “corporal punishment.”
II. February 26, 2025 incident
On February 26, 2025, DCFS received a referral alleging
that father had physically abused Elijah. Elijah reported father
punched him in the face that morning for not getting out of bed in
time for school and called him derogatory names, including
“[f]ag,” “useless,” and “worthless.” Elijah stated he feared for his
safety and wanted to live with maternal step-grandmother
Margarita N.
The investigation also revealed that, several days earlier,
father, Elijah, and paternal grandmother had picked up mother
and brought her to father’s home, where mother and Elijah slept
in the same room. Mother told the assigned social worker she
had witnessed father punch Elijah and tried to intervene, at
which point father became aggressive toward her and forced her
to leave.
DCFS removed Elijah from father’s custody on February
28, 2025. At that time, father told Elijah, “Get out of my house.
You’re not my son,” and refused to let Elijah take his belongings,
stating, “Most of those things I bought for you.” Elijah was
placed with maternal step-grandmother Margarita N. and a
maternal aunt under a safety plan. DCFS recommended that
3
Elijah be detained from father and that father receive monitored
visits in a therapeutic setting.
III. Section 387 and section 342 petitions
On March 4, 2025, DCFS filed a section 387 supplemental
petition and, concurrently, a section 342 subsequent petition
concerning Elijah. Both petitions’ caption pages, child-
identification sections, and attached Indian inquiry attachments
(form ICWA-010(A)) identified the subject child throughout as
“Elijah [B.]” Both petitions also correctly identified mother,
father, and other involved family members.
The section 387 petition’s sole count, s-1, alleged that the
prior disposition had been ineffective in protecting or
rehabilitating the child because father violated a court order by
allowing mother unmonitored and unlimited contact with the
child on or about February 26, 2025. In the factual description of
that allegation, however, the petition referred to “the child Ethan
[R.]” rather than Elijah.
The section 342 petition alleged, in counts a-1 and b-2, that
father physically abused Elijah by striking his face on or about
February 26, 2025, and originally included a count b-1 alleging
father was unwilling to provide ongoing care and supervision;
count b-1 was later dismissed.
IV. Notice and arraignment
On March 5, 2025, arraignment on the two petitions was
held; father was not present for the hearing but was represented
by counsel. The court confirmed proper notice. The court
explained DCFS had filed a section 387 petition alleging father
violated the “custody order by allowing mother to have
unmonitored contact with Elijah,” and a section “342 [petition]
alleging that father physically abused Elijah on or about
4
February 26, 2025.” Father’s counsel waived formal reading of
the petitions and entered a general denial and “strenuously
denie[d] there was any unmonitored contact” between mother
and Elijah. Neither father nor counsel raised an objection to the
s-1 count’s reference to “Ethan R.” at the arraignment or at any
later proceedings.
Counsel for DCFS asked the court to detain Elijah from
father and represented that Elijah had reported father was
“violent” and had “punched him in the face to wake him up for
school,” had called him derogatory names, and Elijah feared for
his safety. Elijah’s counsel reported that “Elijah d[id] not want
visits or phone contact with his father” at that time, though he
would accept unmonitored visits with mother and monitored
visits with father. Father’s counsel noted father “is not trying to
force Elijah to have contact with him” and “submit[ted] on the
detention and the recommendation for monitored visits.”
The court ordered Elijah detained from father. Elijah was
placed with his nonrelated extended family member (NREFM),
Margarita N., where he reported feeling safe. The court granted
father monitored visits twice weekly for two hours each, but
acknowledged Elijah was not yet comfortable with visits and
might need a “cooling off period.” DCFS was ordered to assist in
retrieving Elijah’s belongings from father’s home.
V. Continued investigation of the section 387 allegation
In a March 20, 2025 interview, Elijah confirmed that
mother had come to father’s home on one occasion and stayed in
his room without a monitor present. Elijah told DCFS he wanted
maternal aunt Mia and NREFM Margarita to serve as his legal
guardians until he turned 18, stating, “I do not want to be with
my parents. I am sick of moving around … .”
5
In a March 19, 2025 interview, father denied the
allegations,2 said mother had stayed at his home for three days
and described becoming angry enough that he “felt like flipping
the bed over”; he said mother intervened, that he threw her shoes
at her and told her to leave. When asked about the section 387
allegation, father responded he had not known he was not
allowed to monitor mother’s visit, that his attorney had told him
he could, and that his mother (paternal grandmother) had been
present during the visit; he stated mother “slept with me and my
mom.”
Mother, interviewed separately, confirmed father hit
Elijah, though she said it happened quickly and she did not see a
closed fist. She explained being reluctant to get involved given
father’s violent history—including two prior attempts on her
life—she intervened to protect Elijah. Mother said father had
persuaded her to visit by telling her Elijah was “going through
something,” and explained what was meant to be a one-day visit
extended to three days. She indicated she stayed on a couch in
Elijah’s room with the door open while father, paternal
grandmother, and father’s girlfriend were also in the home and
Elijah was happy to have mother there because he was usually
alone.
Father was not enrolled in or participating in any court-
ordered services. He acknowledged having a temper but did not
believe therapy would help, though he said he was open to
exploring therapy and a fatherhood program. Father told DCFS
he did not want contact with Elijah until Elijah “says the truth”
2 No where in the investigator’s report does it mention
father’s objection to the allegations regarding a child named
“Ethan R.” or any confusion regarding the allegations.
6
and indicated he would not pursue a relationship if Elijah did not
want one. On April 9, 2025, father told DCFS, “I’m done. I’ll sign
over my custody. I don’t need to have custody of him to have a
relationship.” Finally, after several attempts and hostile
exchanges, father refused to allow DCFS to retrieve Elijah’s
belongings, stating that anyone entering his home without a
warrant would face consequences.
VI. March 26, 2025 progress hearing
At a March 26, 2025 progress hearing, the court granted
father’s request for a continuance of the jurisdictional hearing to
allow him to subpoena testimony from investigating police
officers and ordered DCFS to provide father notice of the new
date. During the progress hearing, father did not object to any
lack of notice or confusion regarding the section 387 s-1 factual
allegations naming the child as “Ethan R.”
VII. April 29, 2025 adjudication and disposition hearing
Father was provided notice of the April 29, 2025 hearing.
DCFS’s proof of service reflects that notice, along with a copy of
the petitions, was mailed to father’s current address on April 4,
2025. At the hearing, father’s counsel waived father’s personal
appearance, and the court found notice proper without objection.
The court admitted DCFS’s exhibits 1 through 4 (detention
and addendum reports; last-minute information reports
regarding Elijah’s belongings and visitation; and the
jurisdictional/dispositional report), father’s exhibit A (a six-page
San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office police report with a
supporting subpoena declaration), and mother’s exhibit A
(documentation of mother’s psychiatric appointments).
San Bernardino Sheriff’s Deputy Ronald Conley, who had
investigated the February physical abuse incident, testified on
7
father’s behalf regarding the allegations associated with the
section 342 petition.
As to the section 387 petition and the allegation in s-1,
DCFS asked the court to sustain the petition. Elijah’s counsel
concurred. Mother’s counsel noted mother had corroborated
Elijah’s account and had acknowledged violating the court’s order
by having unmonitored contact with Elijah. Father’s counsel
argued the section 387 s-1 allegation should be dismissed because
father believed he was permitted to monitor mother’s visits and
noted the reports reflected Elijah himself had asked that father
be allowed to monitor those visits. Counsel did not challenge the
petition’s reference to “Ethan R.” or raise any objection based on
the insufficiency of the petition based on the error.
The court amended the section 342 petition’s a-1 and b-2
counts to strike the allegations that father struck Elijah’s face
“with the father’s closed fist” and that the strike resulted in “a
scratch and bruising to the child’s chin”; it dismissed count b-1 in
its entirety and sustained counts a-1 and b-2 as amended. The
court sustained the section 387 petition’s s-1 count as alleged.
The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Elijah
was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1),
and that the prior disposition had been ineffective in protecting
him within the meaning of section 387.
As to disposition, father’s counsel submitted on the
proposed case plan.
The court found notice proper and declared Elijah a
dependent of the court. By clear and convincing evidence, the
court found “there are no reasonable means to protect the child’s
physical or emotional health without removing him from the
physical custody of the parents.” The court ordered monitored
8
visitation for the parents and ordered that father and mother’s
visits not occur simultaneously and that neither monitor the
other’s visits. Father’s case plan was ordered to include random
and on-demand drug and alcohol testing, conjoint counseling with
Elijah if recommended by his therapist, a parenting class, a
mental health assessment with a psychological evaluation and
medication compliance, and individual counseling addressing
anger management and physical abuse. The court set a six-
month review hearing for October 28, 2025, and a 12-month
review hearing for April 29, 2026.
VIII. Notice of appeal
Father timely filed his notice of appeal.3
PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL
On appeal, father has raised only issues regarding the
section 387 petition. He has raised no claim of error as to the
concurrently sustained section 342 petition. Specifically, father
contends he did not have “notice and opportunity to be heard
concerning removal of a minor of whom he is unaware” (boldface
& capitalization omitted), and the court erred in removing Elijah
from his care because “no clear and convincing substantial
evidence” supports the removal of “a child named Ethan R. from
3 Father’s notice of appeal references only the section 342
petition. However, his arguments on appeal concern the juvenile
court’s findings regarding the section 387 petition. Because the
two petitions were heard simultaneously, we liberally construe
the notice of appeal to encompass the section 387 petition. It is
reasonably clear what father was trying to appeal from, and
there is no indication DCFS was misled or prejudiced. (In re J.F.
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75.)
9
[father]” and “no allegations … concerning the minor Elijah B.”
were made.
In response, DCFS concurrently filed a motion to dismiss
father’s appeal and its brief on appeal. In both filings, DCFS
argues father’s appeal is moot because he has made no challenge
to the court’s findings and disposition with regard to the section
342 petition, and he has forfeited the claim of deficient notice
because at the three hearings held on the petition, father did not
object to the allegation referring to a child not his own and never
requested correction of the error.
Alternatively, in its brief, DCFS argues “despite a clerical
error,” “father received actual notice of the factual allegations
[and] any alleged error was harmless.” (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.) Specifically, the record established “father had
sufficient notice of the allegations” under the section 387 petition
because the petition “clearly related to Elijah” as his name and
the family members’ names were included everywhere else on the
form, and the facts in the allegations “were the same allegations
that father was being investigated for and for which [the social
worker] had interviewed father and removed Elijah.” Moreover,
during arraignment on the two petitions, the court referred to the
allegation that “father had violated the juvenile custody order
allowing mother to have unmonitored contact with Elijah,” and
father’s counsel indicated “he had discussed the petition with his
client” and “father denied that Elijah had unsupervised contact
with mother”; and during the DCFS investigation, after the
investigator read the s-1 allegation to father, father said, “No, I
didn’t know I wasn’t allowed to monitor a visit. … My lawyer
told me that I could. [Mother] was never left alone.” In short,
DCFS argues “[f]ather had sufficient notice to mount a defense
10
against the allegations, and any error was harmless as father did,
in fact mount a defense.” Finally, DCFS argues “substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and orders”
(boldface & capitalization omitted) because the evidence
establishes the court’s orders were clear that father was not to
monitor mother’s visits, many of mother’s visits were not
happening because mother would not agree to father monitoring,
and the visits were to take place at a neutral location—not the
parties’ homes.4
Father did not file a reply brief or response to DCFS’s
motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
I. Father’s claim is moot
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’” (Ibid.) “For relief
to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the
plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm
4 DCFS also asks the court to correct what is clearly a
clerical error. Because we dismiss the appeal, we do not reach
DCFS’s request to correct the petition, and we express no opinion
on whether such relief would be available or appropriate on
appeal.
11
must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome
the plaintiff seeks.” (Ibid.)
Father’s claim is moot. The court’s removal of Elijah from
father’s care was ordered pursuant to its findings under two
petitions—the section 387 petition and the section 342 petition.
Father does not challenge the court’s findings and disposition
made pursuant to the section 342 petition, and those
unchallenged findings independently support Elijah’s removal
from father’s custody. Accordingly, even if father’s section 387
claim had merit, no effective relief is available to him because the
section 342 findings remain undisturbed. (See In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 284 [“where there are multiple findings against
one parent[,] the validity of one finding may render moot the
parent’s attempt to challenge the others”]; In re Ashley B. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“As long as there is one unassailable …
finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.”].)
A court has the discretion to hear a moot appeal where (1)
the appeal presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur; (2) there may be a recurrence of the controversy between
the same parties; or (3) a material question remains for the trial
court’s determination. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
We decline to exercise our discretion to hear father’s moot appeal.
Father’s claim—that a typographical error in the section 387
supplemental petition deprived him of adequate notice—turns
entirely on the facts of this case and presents no issue of broad
public interest likely to recur. Nothing in the record suggests any
likelihood of recurrence between these parties. And because the
section 342 findings independently support removal, no material
question remains for the juvenile court to determine on remand.
Under these circumstances, and where father also failed to raise
12
the alleged defect below (discussed post in part II) we decline to
reach the merits of father’s moot appeal.
II. Father’s claim is forfeited
“Acquiescence in error takes away the right of objecting to
it.” (Civ. Code, § 3516.) “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been
but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of
this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of
the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.] [¶]
Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.” (In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted, superseded by statute
on other grounds; see also In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
742, 754.) We note, “application of the forfeiture rule is not
automatic” and appellate courts have discretion to excuse
forfeiture; however, that discretion “should be exercised rarely”
and “with special care.” (In re S.B., at p. 1293.)
Here, based on the record before us, it is clear father was
on notice of the factual allegations he faced in the section 387
supplemental petition. At arraignment, father’s counsel
indicated he discussed the petition with father and waived
reading of the petition and entered a general denial to the
allegations. There were three hearings on the section 387
petition and at no time did father object to or seek clarification of
the s-1 allegation naming “Ethan R.” Furthermore, father was
interviewed regarding the s-1 allegation and was told “a copy of
the petitions … and minute orders [from arraignment] would be
mailed to his home address.” When discussing the s-1 allegation
with father, the investigator “read the allegations to [father]” and
father provided an explanation that included his understanding
that he was allowed to monitor the visits between mother and
13
Elijah. Accordingly, father was on notice of the allegations
against him in the section 387 petition and has forfeited any such
complaint on appeal.
Furthermore, nothing about this case warrants the rare
exercise of discretion to excuse father’s forfeiture. Father was
represented by counsel at every hearing on the section 387
petition, and in fact addressed the substance of the s-1 allegation
directly with the DCFS investigator without ever flagging any
confusion about which child was named. This is not a case where
an important legal issue justifies departing from ordinary
application of the forfeiture rule (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 1293), especially given our mootness finding, discussed ante.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
We concur:
RICHARDSON, J.
GOORVITCH, J.
14