Filed 8/27/26 In re E.G. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B348806
In re E.G. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00914A–C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Appellant D.R. (mother) appeals from juvenile court
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders sustaining a
petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
and asserting dependency jurisdiction over mother’s three
children.1 We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 12, 2025, the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) received a report that mother had
generally neglected the children. The reporting party stated that
roaches and rodents were “jumping on the couches” in the family
home, which smelled “horrible.”
A DCFS social worker visited mother’s apartment on
February 19, 2025, but nobody answered the door. The social
worker left a business card on the door. The social worker then
interviewed the apartment’s property manager, who reported
that mother’s apartment had been “in poor condition and filthy”
for over a year, and was in the worst condition of the 11 units in
the complex. The landlord had warned mother three times about
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
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the condition of the apartment. The property manager reported
that mother violated her lease agreement by allowing the
apartment to become so filthy, and that she had been served with
an eviction notice.
A DCFS social worker visited mother’s apartment again on
February 24 and 26, 2025, but nobody answered the door. On
February 27, 2025, the social worker contacted mother by mail
and email to notify her of the general neglect report and to
schedule a home assessment.
On March 3, 2025, the social worker interviewed the
children at school. All three children reported seeing roaches and
rats in the home. Two of the children said that they saw rat feces
on the floor, and one reported seeing roaches in the fridge.
The social worker spoke to mother by phone on March 6,
2025, and informed her of the general neglect referral. Mother
stated that she planned to move soon and was actively looking for
housing. Mother agreed to schedule a home visit for March 12,
2025, at 9:30 a.m. The morning of the scheduled visit, the social
worker called and texted mother to reschedule the visit to 10:30
a.m. Mother did not respond. When the social worker arrived,
mother did not answer the door and did not respond to several
phone calls or text messages. The social worker detected a
“strong foul odor” coming from the front door, consistent with
“filth and rotten food.” The social worker returned to the home
on March 14, 2025, but nobody answered the door.
On or about March 17, 2025, mother agreed to send the
children to live with their father.2 The next day, a DCFS social
worker visited father’s home and found it had sufficient
2 Father was nonoffending and is not a party to this appeal.
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furniture, food, and clothing for the children. The children were
happy to be with father and did not appear distressed.
Meanwhile, mother’s landlord completed the eviction
process on or about March 14, 2025. Mother told a DCFS social
worker that she planned to move in with maternal grandmother
the following week. Before mother moved, the social worker
conducted a home assessment. The social worker observed that
the apartment was “crammed” with furniture, boxes, and plastic
bags, with just one “walkable area” near the front door. The
home smelled “very foul” through the social worker’s N95 mask.
The refrigerator was unplugged and contained rotting food. The
social worker observed rat feces on the floor. According to
mother, the property management company scheduled a pest
control appointment, but mother was not home at the time, and
the pest control company could not treat the home because it was
too cluttered. Mother admitted that the home had a roach and
rat problem and that it was not safe for the children.
The juvenile court ordered the children removed from
mother on March 24, 2025.
On March 28, 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging that the children were at substantial risk of harm
because mother allowed the home to become filthy and
unsanitary.
At the April 14, 2025 initial hearing, the court released the
children to mother’s home on the condition that the family live
with maternal grandmother and that the home remain safe for
the children. DCFS later determined that maternal
grandmother’s home adequately accommodated the children.
A DCFS social worker interviewed mother about the
petition on May 14, 2025. Mother asserted that the allegations
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were only partially true. She admitted that the apartment had
been infested with rats, but she said that she cleaned every day
and that the infestation was something the property
management company failed to remediate. Mother claimed that
the children had moved in with maternal grandmother, and that
mother was already in the process of moving out, by the time that
DCFS became involved. Mother explained that there was rotten
food in the refrigerator because she had unplugged it in
anticipation of the move.
At the July 10, 2025 adjudication and disposition hearing,
the court sustained the petition. The court declared the children
dependents of the court and released them to the home of the
parents.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court erroneously
sustained jurisdictional allegations that the children were at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. For the
following reasons, we disagree and affirm.
I. Applicable law and standard of review
The juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child
when that child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” resulting
from his or her parent’s failure to protect the child or failure to
provide the child with adequate shelter. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)
We review jurisdictional findings “ ‘ “in the light of the
whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value . . . .’ ” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892 (I.C.).)
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“ ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) “The appellant has the burden of
showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature
to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
II. Substantial evidence supports a finding that the
children were at substantial risk of harm
Mother asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding that children were at substantial risk of suffering serious
physical harm or illness. We do not agree. For more than a year,
mother allowed the children to live in a home that was infested
with roaches and rodents. The rodents defecated on the floor.
(Cf. Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 686,
fn. 2 [plaintiffs’ daughter died after contracting hantavirus,
which spreads through contact with mouse feces].) The
refrigerator sometimes contained roaches and rotting food, and a
social worker could smell a strong odor consistent with rotten
food from outside the front door of the unit. (Cf. Sue E. v.
Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 399, 402 [petitioners’ child
“died of salmonella poisoning probably contracted from eating
rotten food”].) When the social worker finally managed to assess
the interior of the home—some four weeks after first attempting
to contact mother—the apartment was extremely cluttered, and
the social worker detected a “very foul smell” despite wearing an
N95 mask. This evidence supports a finding that the children
faced substantial risk of serious harm or illness. (In re M.D.
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(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 853 (M.D.) [affirming finding of
substantial risk of harm where father left child unsupervised in
“a foul-smelling apartment strewn with ‘hordes of trash’ ” and
dog feces].)
Mother argues that M.D. is distinguishable because the
father in that case denied neglecting his child. (M.D., supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 852; see In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to
acknowledge.”].) In contrast, after DCFS became involved in this
case, mother acknowledged that the home was unsafe for her
children. Yet, mother also allowed the hazards in the family
home to persist for more than a year. Mother’s landlord urged
her to remediate the hazardous conditions of the home at least
three times, but mother was unable or unwilling to do so, and
ultimately the landlord evicted her. Additionally, a full month
passed between DCFS’s first attempt to contact mother and the
home assessment, despite numerous attempts by DCFS to
contact mother and visit the apartment. Mother’s lack of
diligence in ameliorating the home’s condition and responding to
DCFS inquiries casts doubt on her assertion that she truly
understood the severity of the situation. In short, while mother’s
acknowledgement is commendable, the record as a whole
supports the juvenile court’s findings. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p.
892.)
Mother also contends that the jurisdictional findings should
be reversed because there was no evidence that the children were
actually harmed by the conditions in the home. “ ‘The court need
not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’
[Citations.] The focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the
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child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.).)
Consistent with this focus, the statute expressly permits the
juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction after finding that there is a
substantial risk of harm. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) As we have
discussed, the evidence supports a finding that such a risk
existed here.
Next, mother asserts that any risk had been ameliorated
prior to the jurisdictional hearing, because by that time mother
had moved in with maternal grandmother. But the juvenile court
may consider a parent’s past conduct. (In re D.B. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 320, 332; T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [“A
parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.”].)
As we have discussed, mother allowed the children to live in
hazardous conditions for more than a year. Based on the whole
record, including mother’s past conduct, the evidence is
“ ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value,’ ” and is sufficient to
support a finding that mother’s children were at substantial risk
of suffering serious harm or illness. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p.
892.)
Finally, mother also appeals from the juvenile court’s
dispositional orders, but this challenge is premised on the success
of her arguments as to the jurisdictional findings. Because we
affirm the jurisdictional findings, we also affirm the dispositional
orders.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders
are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
OCHOA, J. *
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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