Filed 9/22/26 In re E.V. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re E.V. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E087474
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2500105)
v. OPINION
A.V.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed.
Law Office of Richard L. Knight and Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell, Chief Assistant County Counsel,
and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A.V. (mother) appeals from an order continuing the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
over her minor children. She argues there was no substantial evidence supporting the
trial court’s finding that the conditions leading to the dependency still existed, so it
should have terminated jurisdiction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This appeal concerns mother’s two children: E.M.V.R. (born 2016), and E.S.V.R.
(born 2025).
In March 2025, plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services (department) investigated allegations that mother tested positive for
methamphetamine after giving birth to E.S.V.R. She admitted that she used
methamphetamine a month earlier. She had also previously disclosed methamphetamine
use to hospital staff during a visit in November 2024.
When interviewed, mother admitted to a history of substance abuse, but said she
stopped in 2016 when she became pregnant with E.M.V.R. She admitted to relapsing and
using methamphetamine after a miscarriage in 2023, and she relapsed again in February
2025, when she used for about two weeks while pregnant with E.S.V.R.1 Mother
identified J.F. as E.M.V.R.’s father, and V.O. as E.S.V.R.’s father.
At the time, E.M.V.R. lived with her maternal stepgrandfather and maternal
stepgrandmother because her mother’s pregnancy made certain physical caregiving tasks
1 Mother also tested positive for methamphetamine in 2023 following a previous
referral the department closed as inconclusive. It is not clear whether these are the same
instances.
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difficult. Neither the conditions in maternal grandparents’ home nor E.M.V.R.’s
condition raised any concerns. The maternal grandparents denied having any concerns
about mother, and they denied having any knowledge of mother’s recent drug use, but
maternal grandmother acknowledged mother had a history of substance abuse.
V.O. told the department that he and mother used methamphetamine weekly from
2021-2023, but that he had been sober for a year. He claimed mother did not use
methamphetamine during her pregnancy. He tested negative for all substances in two
saliva drug tests conducted March 10 and 11, but positive for methamphetamine in a
urinalysis test taken March 10.
The department filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code2
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) on March 12, 2025, and an amended petition on
March 21. The amended petition alleged both parents had unresolved substance abuse
issues, that mother neglected E.S.V.R.’s safety by using methamphetamine while
pregnant, that V.O. failed to protect E.S.V.R. from mother’s substance abuse, and that
J.F. left E.M.V.R. without provision for support.
On March 18, the department visited mother at maternal stepgrandfather’s home,
where she was now living without V.O. She denied any knowledge that V.O. was
abusing substances, and submitted to a saliva test that came back negative. She said V.O.
had not seen E.S.V.R. since she moved in with maternal stepgrandfather, and assured the
department that his visits with E.S.V.R., if any, would be supervised.
2 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions code.
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The department obtained a protective custody warrant to remove E.S.V.R. from
V.O. on March 19, 2025. The court held a detention hearing on March 24, 2025. It
detained E.S.V.R. from V.O., but kept the children in mother’s custody.
Before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, mother and V.O. continued to deny all
allegations. Mother tested negative for all substances in two urinalyses on April 8 and
April 25.
The court held the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in May 2025. The court kept
the children in mother’s custody and ordered she participate in family maintenance
services. It continued to detain the children from V.O., and ordered he receive
reunification services.3 The court bypassed reunification services for J.F.
The department prepared a report in October 2025 for the six-month review
hearing. Mother was living alone with the children, did not currently have a relationship
with V.O., and did not want to rekindle one. Mother also began claiming that V.O. was
not E.S.V.R.’s father. Mother participated consistently in services as ordered, which
included individual counseling, a substance abuse program which found she “did not
meet medical necessity,” and random drug testing. There was only one exception:
3 The People note, and we agree, that the court erred by ordering “reunification
services” for V.O., because he was ineligible. (See § 16507, subd. (b) [“Family
reunification services shall only be provided when a child has been placed in out-of-home
care, or is in the care of a previously noncustodial parent.”]; In re Destiny D. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 197, 212 [when child remains placed with one of two custodial parents,
parent not retaining custody is not entitled to reunification services].) We assume the
juvenile court intended to order enhancement services, which are discretionary services
“ ‘offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to enhance the child’s relationship
with that parent.’ ” (In re C.S. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 631, 636.) Mother does not raise
this issue on appeal, and neither party claims this error prejudiced them.
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mother had not yet attended parenting education classes because the department did not
refer her to them until September 29, a little over a week before the department submitted
its update to the court. She tested negative for all substances on seven drug tests between
April and September 2025.
The department recommended continuing services for both mother and V.O.
Specifically, it said that “[a]lthough the [d]epartment’s concern with [mother’s] ability to
care for [E.M.V.R.] and [E.S.V.R.] have remained minimal,” it remained concerned that
she had not yet completed a parenting class. The department said it believed that if
“supervision were withdrawn, the risk level for the children would be moderate.”
The court held the six-month status review hearing in November 2025. V.O.’s
counsel explained he had not had any contact with V.O. and submitted on the
department’s recommendation to continue services. Minor’s counsel argued it was in the
children’s best interests for mother to complete a parenting class, and submitted on the
department’s recommendation. Mother’s counsel requested the court terminate
jurisdiction, and noted for the record that the reason mother had not yet completed
parenting classes was because she was not referred to them until just over a month earlier.
After hearing argument, the court complimented mother for “doing a great job
with her services and her drug testing and her program.” However, the court explained it
“need[ed] more time” to show that “there’s been stability,” though “not necessarily an
additional six months.” It therefore declined to terminate jurisdiction, saying “[w]e’re
almost there but just a little bit more,” time was needed, in hopes “that will give [mother]
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the additional time period . . . for the risk to be even lower and the case be closed earlier.”
The court continued mother’s family maintenance services and father V.O.’s
“reunification” services.
ANALYSIS
Mother argues the court erred by not terminating jurisdiction at the six-month
status review hearing. Specifically, mother argues that because she was in complete
compliance with her case plan—except for the parenting class she had not completed
only because of the department’s delayed referral—there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that the issues giving rise to the dependency remained. We affirm.
Section 364 applies to “[e]very hearing in which an order is made placing a child
under the supervision of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 300 and in which the child
is not removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian.” (§ 364,
subd. (a).) This section requires that “[a]fter hearing any evidence presented by the social
worker, the parent, the guardian, or the child, the court shall determine whether continued
supervision is necessary,” and “[t]he court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social
worker or his or her department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the
conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under
Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.”
(§ 364, subd. (c).) Failure to participate regularly in a court-ordered treatment program
“shall constitute prima facie evidence” that those conditions still exist. (§ 364, subd. (c).)
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“Orders made pursuant to section 364 are reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citations.] Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the appellate court does
not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or draw inferences
contrary to the findings of the trial court.” (In re J.F. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 202, 209.)
“Evidence sufficient to support the court’s finding must be reasonable in nature, credible,
and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law
requires in a particular case.” (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172.)
Substantial—though admittedly slim—evidence supported the trial court’s finding
that the issues giving rise to jurisdiction may not have been resolved by the time of the
six-month status review hearing. Mother has a long history of off-and-on substance
abuse. Mother admitted to using regularly in years past and admitted to multiple
relapses. While she has tested clean since the court obtained jurisdiction—showing
commendable effort—her ability to stay clean was the trial court’s real concern. As the
court said, it felt it still “need[ed] more time that there’s been stability,” to have enough
evidence showing mother’s issues had resolved. Given mother’s struggles with staying
sober, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that her drug abuse was so far behind
her as of the six-month review hearing as to no longer justify exercise of dependency
jurisdiction, even if the same evidence might also reasonably have supported a different
conclusion. As such, we may not disturb the juvenile court’s ruling.
Mother argues the trial court erred by retaining jurisdiction on the basis that she
had failed to participate in her case plan, arguing that the only element she did not
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participate in was the parenting classes to which the department failed to refer her. We
agree that inability to participate in a small portion of a case plan because of the
department’s delay in providing access to that service would not, without more, be an
appropriate basis to retain dependency jurisdiction. But the record shows that was not the
basis for the juvenile court’s ruling, the department’s arguments about the parenting class
notwithstanding. The trial court’s concerns were about long-term sobriety, not
completion of a parenting class.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order declining to terminate jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
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