Filed 10/6/26 In re E.T. CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re E.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, F089850
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 25JL-00037A)
v.
E.T., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mason L.
Brawley, Judge.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Rosanne Rust, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
The juvenile court found E.T. (minor) obstructed a police officer, conspired to
commit assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and aided and abetted assault with a
firearm. Minor contends that the court’s findings are not supported by sufficient
evidence. The People disagree. We affirm the court’s order.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2025, the District Attorney of Merced County filed an amended
juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,
subdivision (a), alleging that minor disturbed the peace by using offensive language in a
public place (Pen. Code,1 § 415, subd. (3); count 1), obstructed a police officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1); count 2), conspired to commit assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 182,
subd. (a)(1), 245, subd. (b); count 3), and aided and abetted the commission of assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 4). The juvenile court held a contested
jurisdiction hearing beginning May 2, 2025, and, at its conclusion on May 5, 2025, found
true counts 2 through 4 but found not true count 1. The court adjudged minor a ward of
the court, placed him under probation department supervision, and ordered him to
successfully complete the Bear Creek Academy long-term program.
Minor filed a timely notice of appeal on May 20, 2025.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Evidence as to counts 1 and 2.
At approximately 12:45 p.m. on September 4, 2024, minor was involved in an
altercation with another individual on his high school campus. Los Banos Police
Department Officer Luis Beltran, assigned as a school resource officer to the high school,
saw two large groups of students near Minor and K.T. who were loudly exchanging
words and profanities. Beltran escorted K.T. to the main office. When he returned to the
location of the altercation, Beltran saw minor ignoring commands and walking away
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
from other security personnel who were trying to secure him. Beltran ordered minor to
accompany him to the main office and then attempted to grab his arm. Minor pulled his
arm away, said he was not going to comply, and called Beltran “the N-word.” Beltran
attempted to handcuff minor to detain him, but minor broke Beltran’s grip by swinging
his arms forward. They struggled for approximately three minutes until Beltran
successfully handcuffed minor and escorted him to Beltran’s patrol car. Minor continued
to use “the N-word” when referring to Beltran and the other security personnel.
II. Evidence as to counts 3 and 4.
A. Evidence of the assault on February 28, 2025
Angel M. drove his cousin, E.A.M., to a store in Los Banos in his aunt’s truck on
February 28, 2025, at approximately 10:00 p.m.2 Angel left E.A.M. in the car and
entered the store to purchase chips and soda. Angel observed an individual with a beard
and wearing a green jacket but did not speak to him. Angel saw the individual walk
across the parking lot toward a white car. After the individual left the store, Angel made
his purchases and went to the truck. As he approached it, he saw several individuals
yelling at him from a white car, including the individual in the green jacket, and two
individuals wearing black. The individual in the green jacket asked where Angel was
from and what he was “claiming.”3 Angel described that the back of the white car was
dirty, as if paint had been scraped off. The individual that exited the front passenger seat
was dressed all in black with a face covering, and the individual that exited the rear seat
2 The video obtained from security cameras shows events outside the store in the parking
lot. While the time stamp at the start shows the time as 21:23, the store owner testified that the
displayed time was approximately 27 minutes behind, which establishes the actual time of the
video at approximately 9:50 p.m. A detective subsequently testified that the call for service was
received at 9:53 p.m.
3 Although Angel testified that he did not belong to a gang, he acknowledged that he
stupidly tattooed three dots under his eye that represented to him “a crazy life” and had a gang
meaning.
3.
wore a black jacket and blue pants. The two individuals wearing black carried bats as
they approached the truck.
As Angel got into the truck and drove away, he and E.A.M. noticed the white car
from the store following them. When they were about 25 meters from the store, Angel
heard approximately 12 gunshots and ducked down into the seat. The white car was the
only car on the road with them and turned right down another street after the shooting.
E.A.M. testified that the first shot hit the truck’s back window, another shot hit the
passenger side mirror, and a third shot went over his head into the windshield and caused
glass to go over his eye. Angel and E.A.M. testified that the shots must have been fired
by an individual on the passenger side of the car because the bullets hit the right side of
the truck. Angel signaled to a patrol car that he needed help.
E.A.M. found three bullets inside the truck and 14 bullet holes. One bullet hole
was in the windshield and would have hit E.A.M. in the head had he not ducked down.
An officer testified that five or six of the bullet holes indicated the bullets came close to
striking where someone sitting normally in the driver and passenger seats would have
been. He also testified that a bullet would have struck the front seat passenger in the head
had they been seated normally and another bullet would have struck the rear seat
passenger in the neck. Officers recovered thirteen .40-caliber casings and .40-caliber
bullet fragments in the area of the shooting.
The store video shows an individual wearing a green jacket and light-colored pants
leaving the store, communicating with individuals in a white car, removing something
from the car’s trunk, leaning into the driver’s side door, and then looking toward the store
as if waiting for someone. When an individual leaves the store and walks toward a truck,
the person in the green jacket approaches the truck as the passengers in the rear and front
seats of the white car get out with long objects in their hands. Both passengers wear dark
tops and masks; one wears lighter-colored pants than the other. Once the driver enters
4.
the truck, the three other men return to the white car and follow the truck as it leaves the
parking lot.
B. Evidence used to identify minor
Neither E.A.M nor Angel identified minor as one of the three individuals who
confronted them in the parking lot and shot at them. The prosecutor provided evidence of
videos and conversations posted to social media near the time of the assault to identify
minor as one of the perpetrators of the offenses. Having received information that
residents of an apartment complex had been involved, an officer retrieved surveillance
footage from the complex earlier on the day of the assault. Detective Stephen O’Day
identified a white sedan that matched the white sedan shown in the store video that was
being driven by Gilberto Ochoa (wearing a green jacket) with E.C. in the back seat.
Sometime later, the video shows Ochoa and minor’s father, R.T., leaving in the white
sedan.
O’Day then reviewed Ochoa’s social media accounts and saw communications
with an account subsequently identified as minor’s account. The officer also reviewed
N.M.’s account, which showed communications with minor’s account. Between
11:45 a.m. and 11:50 a.m.4 on the day of assault, minor and N.M. exchanged a series of
messages as follows:
Minor: “Pole fully loaded.”
N.M.: “oh yupppp.”
4 O’Day testified that the social media accounts posted were displayed in UTC
(Coordinated Universal Time), which he converted to “normal time” by subtracting seven hours.
The trial court granted the prosecutor’s request to take judicial notice that “California time is
seven hours ahead of UTC.” However, Pacific Standard Time is actually eight hours ahead of
UTC (15 U.S.C. §§ 261(a), 263). Pacific Daylight Time is seven hours ahead of UTC; however,
daylight savings time would not be in effect until approximately two weeks after the
communications on February 28 and March 1, 2025. (15 U.S.C. § 260a.) We note, however,
that the inferences raised by the timing of the communications and video are not affected by the
one-hour error.
5.
Minor: “good bullets.”
Minor: “Rip threw cars.”
N.M.: “I could bring the *drum emoji* and extend later today.”
Minor: “Just bring the ext” “and tell em u got a drum at the pad.”
N.M.: “Isggg.”
Minor: “Ay, but tho bullets are some hard,” “the gun hella heavy *laughing
crying emoji*.”
N.M.: “Oh shittt,” “we drilling shit.”
Minor: “Yee Mando … they rip threw cars and pads.”
O’Day explained that the term “pole” refers to a firearm, while “drum” and
“extend” both refer to high-capacity magazines.
At approximately 12:34 p.m. (20:34 UTC), N.M. messaged minor, “Wyo.” Minor
responded, “Abt to go to tha meeting,” “[t]hen see Wsp [what’s popping],” and that
Eddie would be hanging out with him.5 N.M. asked the minor to let him know “what
they say.” Minor also exchanged messages with Ochoa at approximately 12:45 p.m. and
discussed their whereabouts and meeting up later.
Thereafter, at approximately 8:24 p.m. (4:24 UTC),6 Ochoa messaged minor,
“Wya [where you at].” Minor responded at 8:26 p.m. (4:26 UTC), “I’ll drop low” and
provided a map with the location, which was approximately five minutes from the store
where Angel and E.A.M. encountered minor and the other individuals. Police were
called to respond to the shooting at approximately 9:53 p.m., and O’Day testified that
someone at minor’s location would have had time to travel to the store before the
shooting.
5 O’Day testified that E.C. was minor’s codefendant and “Eddie” is a common nickname
for E.C.
6 O’Day testified that the message was sent at 9:26 p.m., but exhibit 20 shows the UTC
date and time as March 1, 2025, at 4:24, which converts to February 28, 2025, at 8:24 p.m.
6.
O’Day retrieved photographs and videos from N.M. and minor’s accounts posted
February 28 through March 2, 2025. One photograph depicted five individuals taken in a
park and flashing gang signals. O’Day identified minor in the middle (wearing a red
jacket and holding a bottle of alcohol), R.T. Jr. (minor’s brother) on the left end, an
individual next to minor holding a vaporizer on the right, another individual between R.T.
and minor on the left pulling at his pants, and N.M. on the far right holding a firearm.
O’Day identified minor in two additional photographs retrieved from his social media
account. The first photograph shows minor wearing dark pants, dark shoes, a black
hooded sweatshirt, and a balaclava around his neck, with a Glock firearm tucked into his
pant pocket. The photograph was posted to his account on the day of the shooting at
9:29 p.m. (5:29 UTC). O’Day also identified a photograph posted to the account at
approximately 7:44 p.m. (3:44 UTC) showing an individual’s lap, displaying the butt of a
Glock firearm in a pocket and a bottle of alcohol (similar to the bottle held by minor in
photograph from the park). O’Day testified that the pants in the second photograph are
the same color as worn by minor in the first photograph, and he believed the second
photograph also depicts minor. Minor posted a third photograph of himself wearing a
black balaclava at 4:39 p.m.
N.M. sent a video to minor’s account after the shooting at approximately
11:52 a.m. on March 1, 2025. Taken from the front seat of a car, the video shows that it
is dark outside and the dashboard clock reads 10:51 p.m., approximately one hour after
the shooting. O’Day testified that the car in the video was the same car involved in the
shooting. The video shows the front passenger holding a .40-caliber Glock handgun and
then pans to Ochoa (driving the vehicle), R.T., Jr. (seated behind the driver), minor
(seated behind the front seat passenger), and E.C. (seated between minor and R.T., Jr.).
Both E.C. and minor are wearing dark hoodies and balaclavas.
O’Day obtained another video posted to one of the social media accounts in the
morning hours of March 1, 2025, that includes Ochoa, E.C., and minor standing on a
7.
street next to the white car. They appeared to be wearing the same clothing as in the
other photographs and video, and O’Day identified E.C., who was dressed in a black
sweatshirt, light-colored pants and carrying a bat, just as the rear seat passenger in the
liquor store video who had approached Angel and E.A.M.
O’Day concluded that minor was one of the three individuals who exited the white
car from the passenger seats to confront Angel because, after viewing the many
photographs and videos posted on social media near the time of the shooting, minor was
the only individual dressed “from top to bottom” in dark clothing. Minor was wearing
dark blue jeans consistent with the front seat passenger in the video. While N.M.
possessed the firearm in two other videos, he was wearing light-colored pants and could
not have been the individual sitting in the front passenger seat.
E.C. and minor were arrested after being stopped by police on April 4, 2025.
They were in the same white car seen in the store parking lot during the assault.
DISCUSSION
I. The court’s finding that minor obstructed a police officer (count 2) is supported
by sufficient evidence.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
(1) Applicable Law
“Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any [police officer] ... in
the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment” is
guilty of a crime. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100,
1108–1109 [§ 148 violated when person willfully resists, delays, or obstructs a peace
officer when they knew or reasonably should have known the officer was engaged in the
performance of their duties].)
Evidence of willful resistance and failure to comply with orders supports a
violation of section 148. (In re J.C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400.) In addition,
“physical resistance, hiding, or running away from a police officer have been found to
8.
violate section 148.” (In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.)
However, “[n]o decision has interpreted the statute to apply only to physical acts, and the
statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.” (People v. Quiroga (1993)
16 Cal.App.4th 961, 968.)
A defendant cannot be convicted of violating section 148 if the officer was acting
unlawfully at the time. (People v. Southard (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 434.) When an
officer makes a command, they have no legal duty to make or use force in excess of that
allowed by law; a person is not guilty under the statute for their response to the officer’s
unlawful conduct. (See In re R.M. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 582, 591–592.)
(2) Standard of Review
“[W]e must ‘ “review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment,” ’ and then determine whether it contains ‘ “evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value” ’ such that a reasonable jury could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] As we have recently explained,
‘sufficiency determinations necessarily take account of the “standard of proof that
applied before the trial court.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]hat is why in criminal cases we must
ensure the record demonstrates substantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167, fourth bracketed
insertion in original (Ware).) “[T]he relevant inquiry on appeal is whether, in light of all
the evidence, ‘any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 44.)
“We must ‘ “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence … ‘… for it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or
falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” ’ [Citation.] But we cannot,
however, venture beyond the evidence presented at trial, and may consider only those
inferences that are reasonably supported by the record. ‘ “[A] reasonable inference …
9.
‘may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition,
surmise, conjecture, or guess work.’ ” ’ [Citation.] It ‘must logically flow from other
facts established in the action,’ and it cannot be ‘based entirely on the suspicions of the
officers involved in the case and the conjecture of the prosecution.’ ” (Ware, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 167–168, second bracketed insertion in original.)
While it is sometimes difficult to identify the precise line between a reasonable
inference and impermissible speculation, substantial evidence to support the conclusion
of the trier of fact may be entirely circumstantial. (People v. Zaragoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at pp. 44–45.) And if the question is one of identity, “the evidence ... must be so weak as
to constitute practically no evidence at all.” (People v. Braun (1939) 14 Cal.2d 1, 5.)
B. Analysis
Minor contends the court’s adjudication under section 148 must be reversed on
two grounds: (1) There was insufficient evidence that Beltran had just cause to grab
minor by the arm and take him to the office because he did not personally observe minor
committing any offense; and (2) Beltran acted unlawfully because his initial use of force
was not legally justified. Neither ground has merit.
Viewing the evidence most favorably to the judgment, minor willfully resisted
Beltran, knowing he was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. Minor
did not comply with Beltran’s order to accompany him to the office or with his
subsequent order to submit to handcuffing. Minor failed to comply and tried to evade the
officer’s grasp. Substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling.
Minor argues that Beltran did not have any justification for directing minor to the
office. “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining
officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be
involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; see People v.
Turner (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 [“ ‘the circumstances known or apparent to the
10.
officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that ... some
activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur’ ”].)
Here, Beltran testified that he witnessed minor and K.T. loudly yelling profanities
at each other and K.T. preparing to lunge himself at minor. Beltran had the responsibility
to maintain school order, which was disrupted by minor and K.T.’s behavior. The record
shows he personally observed facts indicating minor was willfully disturbing the peace
with loud and unreasonable noise (§ 415, subd. (2))7 and willfully disturbing a public
school (Ed. Code, § 32210). As the People note, Education Code section 32210
proscribes “willfully disturb[ing] any public school or any public school meeting” and
authorized Beltran to investigate the loud verbal altercation between K.T. and minor that
drew a large crowd of students. (See People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083
[“where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, ‘the public rightfully expects a
police officer to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of the officer’s
duties” ’ ”]; In re J.C., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404 [“In other words, to ‘willfully
disturb[] any public school’ [citation] means to act violently or in a manner that incites to
violence, or to engage in ‘conduct physically incompatible with the peaceful functioning
of the campus.’ ”].)
Furthermore, reasonable suspicion of a crime was not necessary in the school
context. Detention of minors on school grounds requires only that the detention is not
arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of harassment. (In re Randy G. (2001)
26 Cal.4th 556, 567 [applying this standard to school security officers]; In re William V.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1471 [extending the standard to school resource officers].)
Further, as a school resource officer, Beltran had a responsibility to help promote
school order and protect students and school staff from violence and mistreatment. A
7 While the juvenile court found that the evidence was not sufficient to support count 1, we
need only find a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify Beltran’s actions. (People v.
Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1083.)
11.
school resource officer is deemed a “school official” (In re Joseph F. (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 975, 986; In re K.J. (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1131), and school
officials are tasked with fulfilling California’s constitutional mandate that school
campuses be “safe, secure and peaceful.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(1); see In re
Joseph F., at p. 986 [school officials include “police who assist in maintaining general
order on school campuses”].) Therefore, Beltran’s attempts to investigate the altercation
were consistent with promoting school safety and protecting students.
Having determined that Beltran was justified in directing minor to the office to
investigate the altercation, we conclude that Beltran’s placement of his hand on minor’s
arm was not excessive. When Beltran returned from escorting K.T. to the office, he saw
minor ignoring commands and walking away from other security personnel who were
trying to secure minor. Beltran ordered minor to accompany him to the main office and
placed his hand on minor’s arm. Minor escalated the situation by pulling his arm away,
calling Beltran “the N-word,” and announcing that he would not accompany Beltran to
the office. Minor also physically resisted when he broke Beltran’s hold by swinging his
arms to avoid handcuffs. The law clearly entitles an officer to employ reasonable force to
detain or arrest a person, or in self-defense. Here, the juvenile court could reasonably
find that Beltran acted lawfully when he grabbed minor’s arm. (See People v. Jenkins
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [disputed facts relating to the lawfulness of an officer’s
conduct are for the trier of fact to determine when the charged offense requires the officer
to have been acting lawfully at the time the offense was committed].) Minor has failed to
provide any authority that this level of force was excessive.
Therefore, we find that the juvenile court’s finding that minor obstructed a peace
officer as charged in count 2 is supported by sufficient evidence.
12.
II. The court’s findings that minor committed assault with a fireman and
conspiracy are supported by sufficient evidence.
A. Applicable Law
(1) Assault with a Firearm
Section 245, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits “an assault upon the person of another
with a firearm.” Section 240 defines assault as “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” To be found guilty
of assault with a firearm, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant: (1) committed an act with a firearm that by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to a person; (2) acted willfully in committing
the act; (3) was aware that the act would directly and probably result in the application of
force to another; and (4) had the present ability to apply force with a firearm to a person.
(People v. Flores (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 216, 219–221.)
(2) Conspiracy
“Conspiracy is an inchoate crime. ‘A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that
the defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit
an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together
with proof of the commission of an overt act “by one or more of the parties to such
agreement” in furtherance of the conspiracy.’ [Citation.] ‘Criminal conspiracy is an
offense distinct from the actual commission of a criminal offense that is the object of the
conspiracy.’ [Citation.] Other than the agreement, the only act required is an overt act
by any of the conspirators, not necessarily the defendant, and that overt act need not itself
be criminal. [Citation.] Conspiracy thus criminalizes preparatory conduct at an earlier
stage than an attempt to commit a crime. ‘ “ ‘As an inchoate crime, conspiracy fixes the
point of legal intervention at [the time of] agreement to commit a crime,’ and ‘thus
reaches further back into preparatory conduct than attempt .…’ ” ’ ” (People v. Smith
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616, fourth bracketed insertion in original, superseded on other
13.
grounds in People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 142.) An overt act in furtherance
of a conspiracy must occur after the agreement but before the completed offense.
(People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560, overruled in part on other grounds in
Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 376; People v. Brown (1991)
226 Cal.App.3d 1361, 1368.)
Conspiracy requires specific intent to commit the target offense. (Ware, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 164; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600.) “The mental state
elements of conspiracy require the prosecution to demonstrate the defendant had the
specific intent both to agree to the conspiracy and to commit the object offense.
[Citations.] The two elements are distinct, but closely related. In some cases, it may be
useful to distinguish between the two elements, especially when evidence of one is direct
and the other is circumstantial. (See, e.g., People v. Marsh (1962) 58 Cal.2d 732, 742–
744 [focusing on intent to commit a crime where there was clear evidence of intent to
agree]; People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 629 [focusing on intent to agree
where there was clear evidence of intent to commit a crime].) But in many cases, proof
of the two specific intent elements will overlap. (See, e.g., Harno, Intent in Criminal
Conspiracy (1941) 89 U.Pa. L.Rev. 624, 631 [‘[The two types of intent necessary for
conspiracy] always shade into each other and often there is no practical purpose served in
distinguishing them’].) Together, these two specific intent elements play a critical role in
a conspiracy prosecution: Proof of these elements is what separates a coconspirator from
a mere bystander to the crime.” (Ware, at p. 164.)
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution need not establish the intent to participate in
every act necessary to complete the object offense. (See Salinas v. United States (1997)
522 U.S. 52, 63 [“A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit
or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense.”].) “But ultimately, to
connect any individual to the charged conspiracy, the prosecution must at least establish
14.
that the individual specifically intended to agree to commit the criminal offense and to
play at least some role in achieving it.” (Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 166–167.)
(3) Aiding and Abetting
An aider and abettor must have known the perpetrator’s unlawful intent, intended
to facilitate or encourage the commission of the offense; and performed an act that
actually assisted the achievement of the crime. (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219,
1225; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) An aider and abettor’s culpable
intent must connect to the specific charged offense; liability attaches only where the
defendant acted with knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and with the intent
to encourage or facilitate commission of that offense. (Beeman, at p. 560.) “The actual
perpetrator must have whatever mental state is required for each crime charged .… [A
direct] aider and abettor, on the other hand, must ‘act with knowledge of the criminal
purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of
encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (1998)
18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123.) The aider and abettor’s intent to facilitate or encourage the
principal offense must be formed before or during the commission of the offense.
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
“ ‘Whether defendant aided and abetted the crime is a question of fact, and on
appeal all conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of
the judgment.’ ” (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.) “ ‘Among the
factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are:
presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the
offense.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054; In re Gary F. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1080.)
“It sometimes happens that an accomplice assists or encourages a confederate to
commit one crime, and the confederate commits another, more serious crime (the
nontarget offense). Whether the accomplice may be held responsible for that nontarget
15.
offense turns not only upon a consideration of the general principles of accomplice
liability set forth in People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d 547, but also upon a
consideration of the ‘natural and probable consequences’ doctrine, which is at issue in
this case and will be discussed below.” (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248,
259–260, superseded in part by statute as stated in People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
688, 711.)
Thus, “[a]n aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended, or target, crime but
also of any other crime a principal in the target crime actually commits (the nontarget
crime) that is a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. [Citations.] ‘Thus,
for example, if a person aids and abets only an intended assault, but a murder results, that
person may be guilty of that murder, even if unintended, if it is a natural and probable
consequence of the intended assault.’ [Citation.] [¶] A consequence that is reasonably
foreseeable is a natural and probable consequence under this doctrine. ‘A nontarget
offense is a “ ‘natural and probable consequence’ ” of the target offense if, judged
objectively, the additional offense was reasonably foreseeable. [Citation.] The inquiry
does not depend on whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the nontarget offense.
[Citation.] Rather, liability “ ‘is measured by whether a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted.’ ” [Citation.]
Reasonable foreseeability “is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.” ’ ” (People v.
Smith, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 611.)
B. Standard of Review
(See Discussion, part I.A.(2), ante.)
C. Analysis
This case turns on whether the juvenile court could reasonably infer that minor
was dressed in dark colors in the front passenger seat and approached Angel with Ochoa
and E.C. on February 28, 2025. We conclude it could.
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To summarize, the evidence shows: (1) minor’s messages indicate that he had a
firearm that was fully loaded with ammunition heavy enough to rip through cars, and he
asked N.M. to bring him a high capacity magazine; (2) minor’s messages reveal his intent
to meet up with “Eddie” (E.C.) and Ochoa later that day; (3) E.C. was at the liquor store
in the back seat of the white car and got out of the car with a metal bat, accompanied by
the front seat passenger after Ochoa came back to the car and appeared to talk to the other
subjects in it, including minor; (4) Ochoa, minor, and E.C., who was in the rear passenger
seat of the car, pursued Angel in the parking lot of the liquor store; (5) minor and E.C.
were holding long objects that appeared to be bats while they pursued Angel on foot in
the parking lot; (6) minor went back to the white car with E.C. and Ochoa when Angel
got into his truck, with E.C. returning to the back seat, Ochoa returning to the driver’s
seat, and minor returning to the front passenger seat; (7) the white car immediately began
to pursue Angel’s truck; (8) approximately 10 to 15 seconds after the vehicles left the
parking lot, a .40-caliber firearm was fired at Angel’s truck from the front seat of the
white car; (9) one hour after the shooting, a video was filmed showing Ochoa driving the
white car and someone in the front seat holding a .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun
while minor sat in the back seat of the car with E.C. and another individual; (10) minor
messaged Ochoa his location at 8:26 p.m., which was five minutes from the liquor store;
(11) minor posted photographs to his social media account that show him wearing a dark
hooded jacket, balaclava, and dark pants within hours before and after the shooting;
(12) minor’s photographs show him with a firearm in his pants pocket a few hours before
the shooting; and (13) his physical characteristics did not exclude him as being the
assailant in all-dark clothing.
Minor’s earlier messages (showing his intent to meet up with Ochoa and E.C.) and
later message at 8:26 p.m. (providing Ochoa with minor’s location) support an inference
that Ochoa picked up minor and drove to the nearby liquor store prior to 9:50 p.m.
Minor’s messages with N.M. permit an inference that he possessed a firearm equipped
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with heavy ammunition (consistent with a .40-caliber handgun) before the shooting both
because he indicated the firearm was fully loaded and because he was aware of the
weight of the firearm when loaded. Photographs posted by minor at 7:44 p.m. and
9:29 p.m. show him possessing a firearm tucked in his pocket, which supports the
inference that he possessed the firearm at 9:50 p.m., the time of the shooting. (Cf. People
v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 457 [“the evidence raised a reasonable inference that
it was no coincidence”]; People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436, 452 [“the fact that
[event No. 2] occurred only hours after [event No. 1] raises an obvious inference that it
was not a coincidence”]; People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296, 351 (conc. opn. of
Chin, J.) [in some circumstances “coincidence cannot be a reasonable explanation”].)
The various videos and photographs posted to the accounts of Ochoa, N.M., and
minor permit an inference that minor accompanied Ochoa and E.C. during the hours
before and after the shooting. Because minor was the only one of the group wearing dark
pants, one could properly infer that minor occupied the front passenger seat at the time of
the liquor store video and either fired the shots at Angel and E.A.M.’s truck or provided
the gun to E.C. in the rear passenger seat to fire the shots. Because minor appeared to
boast that the ammunition in the firearm could pierce vehicles, one can infer that minor
intended to use, or that another use, the ammunition to shoot vehicles.
A video taken one hour after the shooting shows minor in the backseat of the car
with Ochoa, E.C., and an unidentified individual in the front seat of the car holding a .40-
caliber semiautomatic firearm, supporting an inference that minor had provided the gun
to the front seat passenger either before or after the shooting. (Cf. People v. Carpenter
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1052 [evidence the defendant possessed a firearm that “might
have been” the murder weapon, but “not ... necessarily,” was admissible as relevant
circumstantial evidence].) As only three individuals were previously seen in the white
car during the parking lot video, one could infer that minor moved to the back seat after
the shooting when another individual joined the group in the car. Additionally, minor’s
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clothing, messages, and presence in the white vehicle with Ochoa and E.C. an hour after
the shooting supports the inference that they were the individuals acting together to
assault Angel and E.A.M. with baseball bats, as depicted in the video footage of the
parking lot minutes before the shooting.
(1) Conspiracy, count 3
CALCRIM No. 415 instructs that the People must prove the members of the
conspiracy had an agreement and intent to commit assault with a semiautomatic firearm
but need not prove that the members actually made or came to a formal agreement to
commit the crime. It further instructs, “An agreement may be inferred from conduct if
you conclude that members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to
commit the crime[s].” (CALCRIM No. 415.) The evidence sufficiently proved that
minor was aware he possessed a firearm equipped with ammunition that could “rip threw
cars” and must have possessed the firearm. Thereafter, Ochoa exited the liquor store and
conversed with the occupants of the white car (E.C. and minor), and all three waited for
Angel to go to his truck. When Angel left the store, the three yelled at him while they
approached. Minor and E.C. appeared to be carrying bats, which permits an inference
that they intended to assault Angel. Because Angel’s flight from the parking lot
interfered with their attempts to assault Angel, one could infer that the three individuals
reentered the white car, chased Angel’s truck, and opted to shoot at the truck instead.
Both the apparent discussion amongst the occupants of the car before Angel left the store
and their coordinated actions in exiting the car with baseball bats demonstrate an
agreement to commit the crime of assault. Minor’s possession of the firearm before the
assault supports a conclusion that he shot at the truck or supplied the firearm to the
individual who did, which demonstrates his participation in a common purpose to commit
the crime.
We find the evidence sufficient to support the juvenile court’s true finding on
count 3 that minor conspired to commit assault with a semiautomatic firearm because he
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participated with the other subjects in committing an assault by pursuing Angel with a bat
and continuing the pursuit in the car, using the firearm he possessed prior to the assault.
(2) Aiding and abetting assault with a firearm, count 4
A person aids and abets a crime when they (1) know of the perpetrator’s unlawful
intent, (2) intend to encourage or facilitate the crime, and (3) commit an act that “ ‘aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v. Marshall
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 40.) Our discussion regarding the evidence of conspiracy, in this
case, is equally applicable to proving that minor aided and abetted assault with a firearm.
Here, the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor
committed assault with a firearm. It shows he aided and abetted the other subjects in the
car in the target offense of assaulting Angel with a baseball bat and continuing the pursuit
of Angel in the car; assault with a firearm was a natural and probable consequence of the
initial assault.
Additionally, the evidence shows that minor was aware of the presence of the
firearm and that it was loaded with ammunition sufficient to pierce a vehicle before the
initial assault in the parking lot, that one of the other subjects would use the firearm later
when they continued to pursue Angel in the car and, therefore, the record is sufficient to
support the court’s reasonable inference that here, assault with a firearm was a reasonably
foreseeable natural and probable consequence of the target offense of assault. The
juvenile court could have reasonably inferred based on the evidence that any continued
attack on Angel by minor would involve the use of a firearm because he had already
demonstrated a willingness to use violence in a coordinated manner with at least one
weapon that minor himself carried and, because the bat was no longer of use, the trio
could use the firearm that minor supplied to fire 14 bullets into Angel’s truck almost
immediately after following him from the parking lot.
A reasonable person in minor’s position should have known that assault with a
firearm was reasonably foreseeable following assault with a bat and pursuit of Angel in
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the car once Angel escaped in his truck. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable
to the judgment, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
finding that minor aided and abetted the commission of assault with a firearm, as charged
in count 4, because he aided and abetted the other subjects in committing the target
offense of assault by pursuing Angel with a baseball bat and continuing the pursuit in the
car. The evidence supports an inference that minor knew a firearm would be used in the
incident, but also that the offense of assault with a firearm was a natural and probable
consequence of the assault offense.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s true findings on counts 2 through 4 and the court’s order are
affirmed.
HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
HARRELL, J.
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