Filed 7/24/26 In re E.P. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re E.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE E087625
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DLRI2400018)
v. OPINION
E.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Petersen, Judge.
Affirmed.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley, and
Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant and appellant E.P., who was 17 years old at the time, committed a series
of robberies by posing as a potential buyer of online listings of iPhones. E.P. would
contact the seller, obtain their address, arrange to meet with them at their home, and upon
arrival he would ask the seller to hand him the phone for inspection while he remained in
the vehicle. Once E.P. had the phone in his hands, his coparticipant E.J., also a minor,
would drive away at a high rate of speed. During one of the robberies, a victim was
dragged by the vehicle and sustained injuries that ultimately caused her death. E.P. was
charged with one count of second degree murder, one count of second degree robbery,
and one count of attempted robbery.
The People filed a motion pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 707
seeking to transfer E.P.’s case from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The
juvenile court granted the motion after finding three of five statutory criteria weighed in
favor of transfer under section 707, subdivision (a)(3), and finding that E.P. was not
amenable to rehabilitation under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
On appeal, E.P. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by granting
the motion to transfer because there was no substantial evidence supporting the court’s
findings on the three criteria. E.P. also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
evaluating the first criterion, criminal sophistication, by ignoring, overlooking, or
misapplying evidence regarding statutorily enumerated factors. We find that substantial
evidence supports the court’s findings. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Alleged Offenses
On January 7, 2024, at approximately 12:14 p.m., police officers responded to a
residential address regarding an alleged hit and run accident. An unconscious victim,
identified as J.S., suffered major head trauma, a compound fracture, and other serious
injuries consistent with being struck by a vehicle. J.S. remained unconscious, intubated,
and medically sedated. She was declared brain dead, taken off life support, and suffered
fatal cardiac arrest.
Officers learned during their investigation that E.P. was using an account on the
OfferUp application under the username Mathew to negotiate with others to purchase
iPhones. On January 7, 2024, E.P. contacted victim J.S. to ask if her iPhone was still
available and at approximately 12:08 p.m., E.P. said, “I’m here.” J.S. met with E.J. and
E.P. who were driving a black Cadillac. J.S. leaned into the passenger window to speak
with E.P., who was in the passenger seat and E.J. accelerated at “a high rate of speed with
J.S. still on the passenger side window.” J.S. hung onto the passenger side of the vehicle
as it accelerated down the street. She was thrown from the vehicle, causing her to tumble
and land on asphalt leading to her injuries.
Officers searched records on OfferUp and learned of additional potential victims.
Victim L.F. reported her husband posted an iPhone for sale. On January 7, 2024, at
approximately 9:07 a.m., E.J. and E.P. arrived at L.F.’s home and asked to see the iPhone
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while still in their vehicle. L.F. handed E.P. the phone and the car “sped off.” L.F.’s arm
was caught in the open window and she reported, “they almost took me with them.”
Later in the afternoon of January 7, 2024, around 3:30 p.m., E.J. and E.P. arrived
at victim R.N.’s house to buy a phone. E.J. and E.P. stopped the vehicle in front of her
garage but would not get out of the car. R.N. and her husband told them to exit the
vehicle to buy the phone, but they refused. R.N. asked them to leave believing they were
acting suspiciously. Officers located three additional victims who had their iPhones
stolen by two younger Hispanic males matching E.P. and E.J.’s description.
On January 25, 2024, E.P. was arrested. The next day, a juvenile wardship petition
under section 602, subdivision (a), was filed, alleging that on or about January 7, 2024,
E.P. committed one count of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), one
count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and one count of attempted robbery
(Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664). The People filed a transfer motion under section 707. At the
detention hearing, the court ordered probation to prepare a transfer report per section 707,
subdivision (a)(1).
B. Transfer Report and Addendum Transfer Report
The transfer report detailed the alleged offenses, as set forth above, and provided
additional information. A search of coparticipant E.J.’s phone revealed that a phone
account belonging to E.P.’s mother sent E.J. multiple OfferUp ads and addresses. A video
showed E.J. and E.P. together in the black Cadillac one-half hour before they met with
victim J.S. at her home. E.J. also created a video bragging about an iPhone that appeared
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to be from another robbery. There were also videos claiming the “South Side Verdugo
Flats Giovanna Street” gang, and an image with E.J. next to gang affiliated graffiti.
Officers arrested E.J. on unrelated charges of evading, hit and run, carrying a loaded
firearm in a vehicle, and minor in possession of a firearm.
E.P.’s mother, Miriam (Mother), stated during an interview that she did not believe
E.P. associated with gang members but acknowledged that her older son, Cesar, was
previously a member of the South Side Verdugo Flats (SSVF) gang. Mother also
suspected coparticipant E.J. was or was becoming a SSVF gang member.
E.P. was in 12th grade and was an average student with a grade point average of
3.09. He had good attendance and no reported behavioral referrals. He did not receive
special education services and did not have an individualized education program (IEP).
E.P. was laid off in December 2023 from employment and was looking for work.
E.P. began drinking and smoking marijuana at around age 15 but denied being
addicted or needing substance abuse treatment, although he would complete a treatment
program if court ordered. Mother believed E.P. smoked marijuana because “he is
depressed over not having his father in his life and when his friends received expensive
gifts from their parents.” Mother confirmed E.P. had never been diagnosed with a mental
health disorder but believes he suffers from depression. E.P. denied his biological
father’s absence had an impact on him because his stepfather, Miguel (Stepfather), was
present for most of his life. E.P. also denied that Mother and Stepfather’s recent
separation affected him. Mother confirmed that E.P. was not close to his Stepfather but
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reported their separation has created economic hardship for their family. Mother relayed
that E.P. “would often worry about her when she was unemployed.”
E.P. reported a “good and close relationship” with Mother. E.P. denied any history
of abuse, child protective services involvement, and reported he felt safe in his home.
Mother reported a domestic violence incident between herself and Stepfather in March of
2013 and that her older son Cesar witnessed the incident. Probation located one prior
child protective services referral from 2015 that was “evaluated out.”
When Mother learned that law enforcement was looking for E.P., she asked him
about the circumstances and he admitted he did some “dumb things” with E.J. E.P. later
told Mother that he committed the robberies because Mother needed the money. E.P. told
her that he was “unaware anyone had passed away due to the incidents, and he told her he
never wanted or intended for that to happen.” Mother “did not notice any difference in
[E.P.’s] behavior between the day of the incidents to the day he was arrested.”
Probation originally recommended in its transfer report that E.P. remain in juvenile
court based on three of the five criteria under section 707, subdivision (a)(3):
rehabilitation before juvenile court’s jurisdiction expiration, previous attempts to
rehabilitate, and delinquency history. The two remaining criteria — criminal
sophistication and gravity of the offense — weighed in favor of transferring E.P. to
criminal court.
As for criminal sophistication, probation found E.P. demonstrated an “elevated
level of sophistication and callousness” by conspiring and planning to commit multiple
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robberies throughout two counties with his coparticipant E.J. The crime involved
stealing multiple phones, each worth several hundred dollars, in a short period of time.
Evidence collected from E.P.’s phone showed that he researched potential victims and
prepared a plan with E.J. prior to committing the offenses by compiling a list of addresses
to expedite multiple quick and seamless robberies. This was demonstrated by their
strategy in driving up to each victim’s home and asking to see the phone while refusing to
exit the vehicle, which facilitated the “acquisition of the phone and their getaway.”
Probation likened the use of a vehicle to a weapon and given the size, weight, and speed
of the vehicle, the victims were vulnerable to considerable bodily harm.
Although E.P. had no prior documented criminal history, he “is at the very least
associated with gang members” which “further increases the level of criminal
sophistication; in that, members of a criminal street gang are inherently exposed to crime,
drugs, and older more sophisticated gang members.” While understandable that E.P.
reportedly committed the offenses to help his Mother financially, his actions were not
justified, especially given his history of prior lawful employment. Moreover, E.P. did not
have any previously diagnosed mental health disorders or intellectual disabilities that
would indicate an inability to understand the seriousness of his participation in the
offenses. Probation observed E.P. “appeared to display an appropriate level of maturity,
appeared confident in his demeanor and his responses, and conducted himself in a
respectful manner.”
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Regarding the circumstances and gravity of the offense, probation described the
offenses as “concerning, serious, and grievous.” E.P. played an active role in planning
and orchestrating a series of robberies in a short period of time with complete disregard
for not only the safety and security of the victims, but also the community given the rate
of speed used to leave each scene. Although his intent may not have been to injure
anyone, given the “method of operation,” “injury to a victim was probable.” Victim J.S.
was “savagely dragged” by the vehicle while E.P. fled with her stolen phone. E.J. and
E.P. made no effort to check on her well-being and their negligent actions led to her
death. E.P. also showed no remorse for his actions given Mother’s report there was no
change in his behavior or attitude in the days following the incident. Probation reported
that “[s]ince the incident, the minor has seemingly failed to express any remorse for his
actions or sympathy for the victims or victims’ next of kin.”
With regard to rehabilitation prior to expiration of jurisdiction, probation opined
that if the allegations are admitted or found true, E.P. could be committed to a long-term
secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) such as Pathways to Success (Pathways) or
ARISE where multiple programs and services are available. Based on his age, a four to
seven year commitment to a SYTF would allow more than seven years of rehabilitation
before E.P. turns 25 years old when juvenile court jurisdiction expires.
Probation later revised its recommendation after reviewing additional information.
It determined that because E.P.’s most recent offense of attempted robbery as alleged in
the third allegation of the petition is not a section 707, subdivision (b) offense, he was
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ineligible for SYTF commitment pursuant to section 875, subdivision (a)(2). As such,
juvenile court jurisdiction would expire when E.P. turns 21 years old, leaving the Youth
Treatment Education Center (YTEC), a six-month to one-year commitment generally
geared toward less serious offenders, as the only service available for E.P. Based on
E.P.’s age and treatment needs, probation believed a commitment of no more than one
year at the YTEC would not be suitable. Further, due to the egregious nature of his
offenses as well as E.P.’s gang involvement, YTEC was not an appropriate option. After
reconsidering this criterion, probation determined it was appropriate to transfer E.P. to
criminal court.
C. Dr. Caddell’s Evaluation
Defense counsel opposed the transfer motion primarily relying on an evaluation
report by Dr. Tonneka Caddell, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Caddell was retained by the
defense, and her report was submitted for the court’s consideration as an attachment to
defense counsel’s brief.
Dr. Caddell’s evaluation primarily relied on information from court records
including detention and probation reports, school records, and one interview with E.P. in
juvenile hall at which time various psychological test measures were administered. In
evaluating E.P. under the five statutory criteria, Dr. Caddell concluded that none of the
criteria weighed in favor of transferring E.P. to criminal court as E.P. is “suitable for
juvenile court proceedings.”
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Regarding criminal sophistication, Dr. Caddell provided her clinical opinion that
E.P. “did not display substantial criminal sophistication” related to the victim’s death
because his intent was not related to death as he was “shocked when he initially learned
that the victim died.” Rather, E.P. felt a “dire need” to help his family financially — not
to benefit a criminal street gang as probation opined — which clouded his judgment and
“contributed to his tolerance of criminal activity as a means to gain resources.”
Disagreeing with probation’s assessment, Dr. Caddell also noted that “simply being a part
of a gang does not equate to one’s level of sophistication, but it does highlight an
increased risk of exposure to drugs, weapons, and acceptance of criminal activity.”
Dr. Caddell further opined that E.P. lacked adequate social judgment, as evidenced
by his struggle to consider or weigh the risks and consequences associated with his
delinquent behaviors and his naivete toward antisocial peers. E.P. is also
developmentally immature, possibly attributed to “chronic stress, neglect, lack of
exposure to an enriched learning environment, and substance use.” These all moderated
the idea that E.P.’s behaviors involved a high degree of criminal sophistication.
Addressing whether E.P. can be rehabilitated prior to expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Caddell opined that E.P. “is capable of making positive changes
when he is in a safe environment that is highly structured, with adequate supervision and
a focus on rehabilitation,” noting that “treatments that are longer in duration with more
contact hours are associated with better outcomes.” Dr. Caddell reasoned that E.P.’s good
behavior in juvenile hall shows he can comply with supervision requirements. She found
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E.P. meets the criteria for an adjustment disorder. He also meets the criteria for cannabis
use disorder and opined ongoing rehabilitation can help ensure long-term abstinence. In
addition, E.P.’s “offending behaviors and delinquency will likely diminish” with
participation in various programs such as those addressing gang intervention, victim
awareness, and development of life and prosocial skills. Dr. Caddell recommended
facilities such as Pathways or ARISE, both SYTF, where many of the services and
programs E.P. needs are available.
As for circumstances and gravity of the offenses, Dr. Caddell recognized that the
robberies were serious and showed a lack of awareness and empathy for the victim being
robbed or for potential victims in the community by driving at a high rate of speed. She
also recognized that while it is “possible” that E.P.’s actions could lead to injury, “it is
likely that [he] never intended to injure anyone . . . .” She noted that a victim died “due
to [her] hanging onto the vehicle” that sped away. She opined that although E.P.
continued to commit robberies after the victim was dragged alongside the vehicle, any
suggestion of callousness was unwarranted because E.P. was unaware of the victim’s
death when he committed subsequent robberies. She further opined that E.P. did not
express any remorse after learning of the victim’s death due to his developmental
immaturity which caused him to have “trouble thinking abstractly and understanding that
his actions led to the victim’s death” and “difficulty understanding how or why he should
be accountable.”
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In sum, Dr. Caddell concluded that E.P. required “an extensive amount of support
to be able to develop resiliency, coping skills (cognitive, behavioral, and emotional),
prosocial involvement, and necessary protective factors to become a productive member
of society.” She further concluded that E.P. is amenable to such intervention and support
as part of a long-term treatment program and that juvenile court has the proper programs
in place to facilitate E.P.’s rehabilitation process.
D. Transfer Hearing and Ruling
In January 2025, the court heard the transfer motion. Neither probation nor Dr.
Caddell testified at the hearing. The court reviewed and considered the petition, the
initial detention hearing report, probation’s transfer report and addendum memorandum,
the People’s brief, the defense brief, and Dr. Caddell’s psychological evaluation. The
court admitted into evidence a video from a surveillance camera that the People described
as capturing “the moment [E.P.] is holding on to that cell phone, and the Cadillac is
racing down [the] street at a high rate of speed . . . [and J.S.] being hurled at a high
velocity along the street, which ultimately cost her her life.” The court heard arguments
including defense counsel’s suggestion that the attempted robbery offense could be
dismissed to make E.P. eligible for detention in a SYTF. The court then took the matter
under submission.
In February 2025, the court issued a detailed ruling finding “that the People have
met their burden by clear and convincing evidence to have this court order transfer to a
court of criminal jurisdiction” and that “[t]he court does believe that this minor is not
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amenable to rehabilitative efforts or services.” The court stated that it weighed all the
evidence in its totality and reviewed each criterion, both individually and as a whole, to
arrive at its decision.
With respect to criminal sophistication, the court found that the evidence supports
that E.P. “knew what he was doing, participated willingly, had knowledge of the plan and
implementation of the plan.” The court stated, “[i]t stretches the imagination to conclude
that the minor would not expect for the victim to be severely injured, or worse killed,
after tumbling from a car traveling at a high rate of speed. The minor certainly knew the
victim was hanging onto the minor and/or her phone — or both — and that she
subsequently was dislodged and tumbled alongside the car.” Further, the court found “the
minor made a choice to continue to hold onto the phone despite the danger it presented.”
As for whether E.P. could be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of juvenile court
jurisdiction, the court found its jurisdiction would expire between the age of 23 or 25,
based on the maximum confinement time at disposition. Given the most recent offense
of attempted robbery was a “non-707(b) offense,” E.P. would not be eligible for a SYTF.
The only option for treatment would be the YTEC program. The court noted that
dismissing the attempted robbery offense to obtain a longer jurisdictional limit as defense
counsel suggested “would be an affront to the quest for justice for all parties concerned.”
The court found there was not sufficient time to provide E.P. with successful
rehabilitation services and that transfer to criminal court is warranted.
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Finally, the court found the gravity of the offenses supported transfer. E.P. and his
coparticipant engaged in a “premeditated assault” and calculated plan to rob numerous
victims of their iPhones “regardless of the consequences to the victim or any injuries they
might sustain.” The court stated that E.P.’s actions were “callous” because he lured
victims into a vulnerable position by way of a trap. The court found the victim being
dragged by the car and tumbling onto the pavement did not cause E.P. or his coparticipant
to rethink their actions or cease their unlawful and dangerous activity. The court found
“[t]he circumstances and gravity of these offenses were egregious and horrific” stating
that, “[b]ecause of the greed of the minor, an innocent life was lost.” The court noted that
Dr. Caddell’s report showed no psychological deficits or issues with the minor that may
have contributed to his actions. The court considered E.P.’s argument that he was stealing
to obtain money to help his family, but found this logic to be unfounded, noting many
youths earn lawful income and do not resort to criminal activity.
DISCUSSION
E.P. argues the transfer order should be reversed because (1) the juvenile court
abused its discretion in evaluating criminal sophistication because it ignored, overlooked
or misapplied evidence regarding statutorily enumerated factors, and (2) the evidence was
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings regarding three of the five statutory
criteria.
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A. Relevant Law
“Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a minor from juvenile court
to criminal court. It provides that whenever a minor aged 16 years or older is alleged to
have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move ‘to transfer the minor from juvenile
court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’ ” (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152,
164 (Miguel R.); § 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecutions bears the burden of proving that
the minor should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)
In determining whether to transfer a minor to criminal court, the juvenile court
must consider five criteria: (1) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
minor; (2) whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction; (3) the minor’s prior delinquent history; (4) the success of previous
attempts to rehabilitate the minor; and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the offense
alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
Section 707 also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the court to
consider with respect to each of the five criteria. (§ 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii),
(C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) “Nothing in section 707 indicates that the juvenile court [is]
required to give equal weight to each of the five criteria or that it would necessarily be an
abuse of discretion to find that one criterion outweighed the other criteria.” (C.S. v.
Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1035; accord, Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Indeed, the weight given to each of the criteria is within the
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court’s discretion. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186
(Kevin P.).)
“In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3).) “[T]he ultimate determination of whether ‘the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court’ (§ 707 [, subd.] (a)(3)) is
not the same as the second criterion, which calls for consideration of ‘[w]hether the
minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.’ ”
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) “In contrast, the ultimate finding that the
juvenile court must make under section 707 [, subd.] (a)(3) concerns a global assessment
of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation within the juvenile court system . . . .” (Id., at
p. 167.)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of
discretion.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; J.N. v. Superior Court (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 706, 714 (J.N.); People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667,
680.) “In reviewing the juvenile court’s decision, ‘[t]he … court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its
application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ”
(J.N., supra, at p. 714.) “The juvenile court’s findings with respect to each of section
707’s five criteria are findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Miguel R., at
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p. 165.) “In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the court’s findings.” (Ibid.) “[W]e do not reweigh the evidence and we do
not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the trial court.” (In re J.S.
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211 (J.S.).)
B. Criminal Sophistication
E.P. argues that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings
involving criminal sophistication. Specifically, he argues the court abused its discretion
when it misapplied the law by ignoring, overlooking, or misapplying the evidence in Dr.
Caddell’s evaluation regarding this criterion. We disagree.
“The criminal-sophistication criterion ‘requires a juvenile court . . . to consider the
whole picture, that is, all the evidence that might bear on the minor’s criminal
sophistication, including any criminal sophistication manifested in the present crime.’ ”
(Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192; Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 683-684.)
When evaluating the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor, “the
juvenile court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the
minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at
the time of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer pressure on the
minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and community environment; the
existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster care
system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or
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sexual battery on the minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) The
court can find criminal sophistication where “[t]he crimes were not spontaneous or
impulsive but were indicative of deliberation.” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 214.)
The court concluded that the People met their burden of proof as to the criminal
sophistication criterion and that transfer was appropriate, stating “the evidence is
compelling for such a finding.” The court relied on the fact that E.P.’s actions did not
constitute a crime of opportunity, but rather were actions involving preparation, planning,
and sophistication. The court found the evidence supported a finding that E.P. knew what
he was doing, participated willingly, had knowledge of the plan and implementation of
the plan. The court found it “stretches the imagination” that E.P. would not expect J.S. to
suffer severe injury or death after tumbling from the car and that he “certainly knew” she
was hanging onto the car and/or phone and was then dislodged at a high rate of speed. As
part of its consideration, the court admitted into evidence video surveillance showing the
victim falling from the car and tumbling across the asphalt while the vehicle sped away.
The court found “the minor’s intentional acts did not occur as a result of an accident or a
misunderstanding, but rather a calculated, planned, and orchestrated event.” Thus, the
juvenile court reasonably concluded based on the premeditated nature of the offenses that
E.P. exhibited criminal sophistication supporting transfer to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.
Contrary to E.P.’s argument, the court properly considered Dr. Caddell’s findings.
The court stated its decision was based on review of the psychological evaluation report.
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Dr. Caddell’s evaluation included information about E.P.’s developmental immaturity,
lack of adequate social judgment and failure to appreciate risks and consequences of his
behavior, naivete toward antisocial peers, susceptibility to negative peer influences, his
family and community environment, childhood trauma, borderline level of intellectual
functioning, and lack of prior criminal history. The court referenced Dr. Caddell’s
evaluation in its written ruling and noted her disagreement with probation’s conclusion of
criminal sophistication based on E.P.’s association with a gang. It also noted Dr.
Caddell’s conclusion that “it was not the minor’s intent for the victim to die, and that the
minor was shocked to learn of the victim’s death.” This shows the juvenile court did not
ignore, overlook, or misapply the evidence in Dr. Caddell’s evaluation, but that it simply
was not persuaded by it given the premeditated and sophisticated nature of the offenses.
E.P. argues there is insufficient evidence to support that he formulated, developed
and implemented the plan. He claims, “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, it is
far more reasonable to conclude that [E.J.] and other criminally oriented adolescents with
whom [E.P.] or [E.J.] associate developed and implemented the plan, and that [E.P.],
motivated by a sincere desire to help his family, financially, participated in the thefts.”
Rather, substantial evidence supports otherwise. Probation concluded that E.P. was the
individual using the Mathew account on OfferUp to research potential victims, contact
sellers posing as a potential buyer, obtain their addresses, arrange to meet the sellers at
their house, and then prepared a plan with E.J. to expedite multiple quick robberies. The
minors drove up to each victim’s home, refused to exit the vehicle, and asked to see the
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iPhones while they remained in the vehicle, which facilitated the acquisition of the
phones and their getaway. Probation concluded the minors used the vehicle as a weapon,
placing the victims in a vulnerable situation.
Next, with respect to his failure to appreciate risks and consequences, E.P. argues
the court either implicitly rejected Dr. Caddell’s opinion that “due to his developmental
age and intellectual deficits, . . . at the time of the offenses, [he] was unable to appreciate
the risk that a person could be seriously harmed or injured by his actions” or gave too
little weight to her opinion, thereby abusing its discretion. E.P. overstates Dr. Caddell’s
findings. Her opinion was that E.P. had “developmental immaturity.” In terms of his
alleged “intellectual deficits,” she found E.P.’s general cognitive ability fell within
borderline range of intellectual functioning. She opined he lacked adequate social
judgment “as evidenced by his struggle to consider or weigh the risks and consequences
associated with his delinquent behaviors.” (Italics added.) Dr. Caddell found these
factors “[m]itigated the possibility of considerable criminal sophistication.”
E.P. contends Dr. Caddell’s opinion as to these factors was uncontroverted.
Probation reported, however, that E.P. was an average student, he had no learning
disabilities, received no special education services, and no IEP. He had not been
diagnosed with any mental disorders or intellectual disabilities that would indicate a
lesser understanding of the seriousness of his participation in this offense. Probation
found E.P. displayed an appropriate level of maturity and appeared confident in his
demeanor and his responses.
20
E.P. fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court did not give due weight to Dr.
Caddell’s opinion. As discussed above, it is clear the juvenile court reviewed and
considered Dr. Caddell’s evaluation but disagreed with her assessment. “[T]he juvenile
court was not required to credit the testimony of the defense experts. As trier of fact, it
was free to discredit such testimony. Phrased otherwise, any trial court is not bound by
an expert’s testimony and opinion.” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 212-213.) We
find it was within the court’s discretion to weigh her opinions against countervailing
evidence.
E.P. contends the effect of his family and community environment and peer
pressure weighs against a finding of criminal sophistication, but the juvenile court
misapplied this factor by giving “great weight” to his alleged association with members
of the SSVF gang. In its written ruling, the court considered E.P.’s gang involvement as
one of many factors in assessing criminal sophistication but primarily focused on the
planning, preparation, and the implementation of the plan. The record simply does not
support that “great weight” was given to his association with gang members when
assessing criminal sophistication.
E.P. also contends the fact that his criminal acts were “influenced by criminally
sophisticated gang-involved peers or relatives cuts against a finding that [he] is criminally
sophisticated.” (Italics omitted.) E.P. fails to cite to any legal authority or factual basis to
support that contention and it is contradicted by his expert’s opinion. Dr. Caddell’s
opinion was that “simply being a part of a gang does not equate to one’s level of
21
[criminal] sophistication.” Gang affiliation itself does not demonstrate a higher or lesser
degree of criminal sophistication. (See Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 193 [“the
gang involvement of a minor with poor cognitive functioning might demonstrate a lesser
degree of criminal sophistication than the gang involvement of a minor with normal
cognitive functioning”].)
Finally, E.P. contends the juvenile court overlooked or ignored evidence regarding
E.P.’s childhood trauma including abandonment by his biological father, physical and
emotional abuse by Stepfather toward Mother, witnessing domestic violence in his home
from an early age and later realizing the severity of the violence. E.P. also experienced
financial strain throughout his childhood and was living in poverty at the time of the
offenses. As previously stated, the court considered Dr. Caddell’s report including
concerns regarding family dynamics, including his relationship with his parents and the
family’s financial struggles. Dr. Caddell did not address his familial relationships or the
domestic violence incident in her assessment of the criminal sophistication criterion. The
court considered and agreed with probation’s assessment of this criterion which included
a discussion of the family’s financial stress and family dynamics. The court also
considered contradictory evidence including E.P.’s statement that his biological father’s
absence had no impact on him and Mother’s report that E.P. did not witness domestic
violence in the home. Based on the record, we find no evidence to support E.P.’s
contention the juvenile court did not consider evidence of childhood trauma.
22
Accordingly, we find that juvenile court’s finding as to the first criterion is
supported by substantial evidence.
C. Rehabilitation Within Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
E.P. also contends there was no substantial evidence supporting the finding that he
could not be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Specifically, E.P. takes issue with the court basing its finding on “the substantial needs
and the enormous amount of rehabilitative services that would [need to] be provided”
even though neither probation nor Dr. Caddell identified the “substantial needs” and the
“enormous amount” of rehabilitative services necessary before the expiration of juvenile
court jurisdiction. This contention is not supported by the record.
“[T]he focus of the second criterion is whether there is enough time to rehabilitate
the minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.”
(Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) When evaluating this criterion, “the
juvenile court shall give weight to . . . the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) “Expert witnesses may testify on the issue of the availability of
treatment programs in the juvenile court system and the amenability of the minor to those
programs.” (J.N., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 721.) “In those cases where the juvenile
court might decide treatment as a juvenile would be in the minor’s best interest, the court
could still find the minor ‘unfit if those experts testified that rehabilitation might require
treatment beyond the date of his mandatory discharge.’ ” (Id., at pp. 721-722.)
23
In evaluating the support necessary for E.P.’s rehabilitation, Dr. Caddell stated,
“[o]verall, [E.P.] is in need of an extensive amount of support to be able to develop
resiliency, coping skills (cognitive, behavioral, and emotional), prosocial involvement,
and the necessary protective factors to become a productive member of society.” (Italics
added.) It was her clinical opinion that E.P. was amenable to such intervention and
support as part of the long-term treatment program. Dr. Caddell opined that E.P. required
a safe environment that is highly structured, with adequate supervision and a focus on
rehabilitation with multiple treatment programs, noting that treatments that are longer in
duration with more contact hours are associated with better outcomes. Dr. Caddell’s
evaluation outlined several interventions and programs that would benefit E.P. and based
on his needs, recommended placement in a SYTF. Although Dr. Caddell did not state
that E.P. had “substantial needs” and that an “enormous amount” of rehabilitative services
was required, her opinion that E.P. required “an extensive amount of support” and
placement in a SYTF supports the court’s finding that E.P. cannot be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
The court’s findings are also supported by probation’s recommendations.
Probation reported the only option for E.P. is six-months to one-year commitment to the
YTEC, however, given E.P.’s age and treatment needs it determined the YTEC would not
be suitable. Further, probation did not think a commitment to YTEC was appropriate
given the nature of the offenses and the minor’s gang involvement.
24
E.P. also appears to take issue with probation’s revised assessment in its addendum
transfer report regarding his ineligibility for SYTF which decreased the “time remaining”
under juvenile court jurisdiction by four years. E.P. suggests there was no basis for this
change. Probation noted, however, that this change was due to identification of “the most
recent offense” as the attempted robbery charge which does not qualify as a section 707,
subdivision (b) offense.
Thus, we find that Dr. Caddell’s opinion and probation’s recommendations
constitute substantial evidence to support the court’s findings that due to the substantial
needs and rehabilitative services required, E.P. could not be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction. We find the juvenile court was well within its
discretion to find that E.P. cannot be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction.
D. Circumstances and Gravity of the Offenses
Finally, E.P. agues there was no substantial evidence to support some of the court’s
findings regarding the circumstances and gravity of the offenses. E.P. acknowledges that
some factors weighed in favor of transfer including the person’s actual behavior, degree
of involvement, and level of harm, but factors such as the person’s mental state and
mental and emotional development weighed against transfer.
When evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the person, the mental
state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in the crime, the level of harm
25
actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and emotional development.”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).) “The gravity criterion focuses on the offense ‘ “alleged in the
petition” ’ [citation], and like the other statutory criteria, it is ‘based on the premise that
the minor did, in fact, commit the offense.’ ” (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189,
quoting Jones, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 682.) The juvenile court may consider evidence
that, “ ‘while not justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its magnitude . . . .’ ”
(Kevin P., at p. 189.)
To minimize the circumstances and gravity of the offenses, E.P. argues that both
probation and Dr. Caddell recognized E.P. did not intend to harm or injure anyone in the
commission of the robberies. Regardless of the intent, the court reasonably found the
offenses were “egregious and horrific.” As discussed above, the court found that E.P. was
involved in the planning and implementation of the plan without consideration of the
consequences to the victims. E.P. orchestrated the offenses using the Mathew account.
E.P.’s actions were “callous” as he lured each victim into a vulnerable position and he
failed to rethink his actions or cease his unlawful and dangerous activity after J.S. was
dragged and thrown from the car.
Probation acknowledged that E.P.’s initial intent may not have been to injure
anyone but given the circumstances injury to a victim was probable. Similarly, Dr.
Cadell reported that E.P. never intended to injure anyone but injury was still possible
based on his actions. These statements by probation and Dr. Caddell support the court’s
finding that E.P. executed a plan without consideration of potential injury to the victims.
26
Moreover, the court clearly considered E.P.’s intent in reaching its findings but did not
agree that his lack of intent to commit murder minimized the circumstances or gravity of
the offenses. E.P. also argues that he committed the crimes to help his family financially.
The juvenile court considered and rejected this argument.
Further, E.P. argues that he can only be prosecuted for J.S.’s murder as a major
participant who acted with reckless disregard under a felony-murder theory. The People
argue in response that it is “conceivable that E.P. could be prosecuted for felony murder
as the actual killer or under an implied malice theory,” however, even assuming the facts
support a theory of felony murder as an aider and abettor, the offense was still “incredibly
serious, and E.P.’s actions demonstrate extreme callousness.” We agree with the People.
Regardless of the theory of murder pursued by the prosecution at trial, the offenses were
incredibly serious, aptly described by the juvenile court as horrific and egregious, and
E.P.’s actions demonstrate callousness, as set forth below.
Finally, E.P. argues that the juvenile court’s findings of “callousness” and “lack of
remorse” were not supported by substantial evidence. As previously stated, E.P. was
involved in a string of premeditated robberies utilizing a vehicle, which posed a
significant risk of injury to potential victims. E.J. and E.P. fled the scene after J.S. fell
from the car and there is no evidence that E.J. or E.P. made any effort to check on her
well-being. Based on the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably found that E.P.’s actions
were “callous” because he lured each victim into a vulnerable position.
27
E.P. contends that the juvenile court finding that he lacked remorse regarding the
death of J.S. was not supported by substantial evidence. The record demonstrates that
probation reported that E.P. had not expressed remorse. Although E.P. told Mother he did
not intend to hurt anyone, she did not report any expression of remorse by her son and
instead reported no change in the minor’s behavior or attitude in the days following the
incident. Dr. Caddell expressed her opinion about E.P.’s lack of “express remorse” about
J.S.’s death finding that due to his developmental immaturity E.P. has trouble thinking
abstractly and connecting his action to the victim’s death. Even assuming E.P.’s
immaturity kept him from understanding why his actions led to J.S.’s death, the court’s
finding that E.P. had not expressed remorse for his actions is supported by substantial
evidence. Absent from the record is any statement by E.P. or a statement attributed to
E.P. expressing remorse for his actions or sympathy for the victims or their families.
Based on the record, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the circumstances and gravity of the offenses supported E.P.’s transfer to a
court of criminal jurisdiction.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order transferring E.P. to a court of criminal jurisdiction is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
LEE
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
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