Filed 9/28/26 In re E.D. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re E.D., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
DANIELLE D.,
Petitioner,
v. A176849
MENDOCINO COUNTY
(Mendocino County
SUPERIOR COURT,
Super. Ct. No.
Respondent, 25JV0029902 )
MENDOCINO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Real Party In Interest.
Danielle D. (mother) filed this writ petition after the
juvenile court terminated family maintenance and reunification
services for Michael D. (father) and set a permanency planning
1
hearing under Welfare & Institutions Code1 section 366.26. She
requests that we reverse the juvenile court’s orders reducing her
visitation with minors C.D.2 and E.D., and transferring her
educational rights for these children. We reverse the juvenile
court’s order reducing her visitation and remand for further
proceedings on visitation consistent with this opinion. We
otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
Alameda County Dependency Proceedings
A petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j)
was filed in Alameda County in September 2023 on behalf of
minors C.D., E.D., and their brother, A.D.3 The children were
returned to mother’s care in February 2024 and placed with
mother at the June 2024 disposition hearing with family
maintenance services.
The children were detained from mother’s care pursuant to
a section 387 petition filed on November 12, 2024. At the
contested April 2025 adjudication and disposition hearing on the
section 387 petition, the court ordered family reunification
services for mother and father and supervised visits for mother at
least once per week for up to four hours each visit. The court also
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Consistent with the parties’ briefing, we refer to mother’s
eldest child using the first initial of the child’s preferred name,
C.D., rather than the first initial of the child’s given name.
3 The court’s orders with respect to A.D. are not at issue in
this writ petition.
2
ordered the parents to submit to hair follicle testing. On
September 29, 2025, the children began a trial visit with father in
Mendocino County.
At the six-month review hearing on October 30, 2025, the
court adopted the social service agency’s recommendations,
placed the children with father with family maintenance services,
and terminated mother’s reunification services after finding she
made no progress on her case plan. The social service agency’s
report for this hearing stated that mother had not been in contact
since August 2025, she had not engaged in services, and she had
not engaged in regular or consistent visits with the children. The
court ordered mother to have visitation “as frequently as possible,
consistent with the children’s well-being and consistent with the
last orders of this Court.”4 The court determined that father
resided in Mendocino County and transferred the case.5
Mendocino County Dependency Proceedings
The juvenile court held a transfer hearing on November 13,
2025, and appointed counsel for mother, father, and the children,
and set a review date the following week. At the November 20,
2025, hearing, mother told the court that she had not seen her
children in five months, and the court ordered the Mendocino
County Department of Social Services (the Department) to
4 The minute order omits the phrase “consistent with the
last orders of this [c]ourt,” but the reporter’s transcript controls.
(In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 800.)
5 Mother appealed this order, and her appointed counsel
submitted a brief under In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835,
and In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952. This court dismissed the
appeal.
3
comply with the last Alameda County visitation order. The court
set a hearing for December 16, 2025, for receipt of the case plan.
At the December 16, 2025, hearing, the Department
informed the court that a social worker had just been assigned
and the case plan was not ready. Mother’s counsel raised
visitation, stating that she had hoped the case plan would be
ready with a plan for visitation. Mother’s counsel argued that
the prior order allowed visitation but did not specify a frequency,
however, a four-hour minimum was normal; mother’s counsel
requested that mother meet with the Department to be assessed
to start visitation. The court expressed concern that it had not
received notice of a request to change a visitation order and
stated that the prior order had been for visitation as frequently
as possible consistent with the children’s well-being with a hair
follicle test. The Department’s counsel stated that, should
mother reach out to the Department, the Department would “be
requesting testing and arranging for a visit as ordered.” The
minors’ counsel asked that the Department assess mother for
visitation with testing and requested that the children not be
forced to visit. Father’s counsel also agreed that the prior order
included an order for a hair follicle test and requested the
Department verify mother’s sobriety before visitation.
The court stated that the Alameda County visitation order
would stand, but ordered the Department to work with mother
and mother to present herself to the Department for a visitation
assessment. The court stated it would not order a hair follicle
test (those were not provided in Mendocino County) but granted
4
the Department’s request for a urine analysis test. The court
also stated that it would consider mother to have requested to
change the visitation to order some type of minimum, which the
court would address at the next hearing. The court concluded the
hearing by ordering mother to get in touch with the Department
and said that the court would like to see some visitation before
the next hearing.
On January 6, 2026, counsel for the Department
represented that the social worker was still working on a case
plan, father had recently allowed mother to visit the children
unsupervised, and father had an emergent housing issue and was
staying in a hotel. The court inquired whether anyone wanted to
be heard, and mother’s counsel requested that the court modify
mother’s restraining order against father to allow her to co-
parent the children peacefully. The court granted the request to
amend the restraining order and set another hearing for January
20, 2026.
For the January 20, 2026, hearing, the Department
submitted a case plan. For mother, the Department
recommended that the children have in-person or online (Zoom)
visits with mother for a minimum of four hours per week. The
case plan did not mention drug testing for mother and proposed
that mother would be responsible for getting to visitation.
Visitation frequency could change if mother entered a
rehabilitation program, and visits could become unsupervised
and expanded at the discretion of the social worker, not to exceed
three overnight visits per week without a further court order.
5
At the hearing, the court stated that it had reviewed the
case plan and received it into evidence. The Department
informed the court that it was investigating father’s recent arrest
for drunk driving. Mother’s counsel stated that mother was
concerned about the situation and the fact that the children were
currently residing with a paternal aunt. Counsel stated that
mother had not had visits with the children since the case was
transferred, mother had only one phone call with the social
worker, and mother wanted therapeutic visitation with the
children. Mother’s counsel represented that mother did not think
that she had a substance abuse problem, but mother was willing
to test for the Department.
The court ordered that a substance abuse assessment and
services be added to the case plan for father and ordered the
Department to file a detention petition if appropriate. Regarding
visitation, the court said, “Mother’s visitation has been ordered.
It’s a matter of both sides meeting. So the [D]epartment needs to
set a date and time for visitation, and supply a bus pass or some
way for mother to get there. But both sides need to work to make
sure that visitation is happening.” The court adopted the
Department’s proposed case plan “with the modifications stated.”
The Section 387 Petition
A. Detention and Jurisdiction
The Department filed a section 387 petition on February 9,
2026, alleging that father was unable to provide regular care for
the children due to his ongoing alcohol abuse; the children were
suffering from and/or were at substantial risk of suffering serious
6
emotional damage as a result of father’s conduct; and family
reunification services had been terminated for mother, mother
was only allowed supervised visits with the children, but father
was allowing mother unauthorized access to the children. The
Department’s detention report stated, among other things, that
father had been arrested for drunk driving on January 9, 2026,
and he violated a court order by transporting the children to visit
with mother and allowing mother to stay in his home. The
children told the social worker that they did not wish to visit with
mother, but father continued to allow mother to see the children.
At the February 10, 2026, detention hearing, mother’s
counsel requested that the children be placed in mother’s care
and said mother was clean and sober. Regarding visitation,
mother’s counsel asked that formal visitation be scheduled with
mother and the children. Counsel argued that mother had seen
the children unintentionally, and she had been trying to contact
the Department to set up visitation, but visitation had not been
arranged. Further, if C.D. did not want visitation with mother,
mother requested that conjoint therapy be ordered.
Counsel for the Department responded that the
Department had been trying to set up visitation. She continued,
“There was some difficulty with the social worker and not calling
back, refusing to test. Mom’s services were previously
terminated in Alameda before the transfer. We would like to set
up visits, but there needs to be some cooperation.” Mother’s
counsel responded, “The thing about this is that was exactly what
was set up the last court hearing about the visits. I do have some
7
text messages that she provided and there’s some disconnect. We
are asking that at least Zoom visits be set up. And I would like
an email sent to myself as well because I don’t know exactly what
is going on, but I did get a text from the mother that the social
worker, that she had a lot of concerns about what was going on
with the father. So if I can be part of that conversation to help,
please.” Counsel for the children agreed that the Department
needed to facilitate visits and conjoint therapy for C.D., who
adamantly did not want to see mother.
The court ordered the children detained. The court ordered
supervised visitation for father at a minimum of two hours a
week and said mother’s visitation “remains the same.” The court
ordered the Department to schedule a Zoom visit for mother and
include mother’s counsel in the discussion about setting up visits
within a week.
The court continued the jurisdiction hearing from March 5,
2026, to March 17, 2026, because the Department did not file a
jurisdiction report. At the March 5, 2026, hearing, Mother said
she was having “strong difficulty” communicating with the social
worker and the Department had not set up a meeting that
mother had been requesting since the case transfer. Mother’s
counsel stated that mother had just started visitation, but
counsel had to get the Department’s director involved to ensure it
happened. Counsel represented that the social worker had not
had a “one-on-one” with mother and requested that the court
order the social worker to speak to mother. Father’s counsel
added that she had the “same issues.” The court ordered the
8
social worker to communicate with mother directly one-on-one in
advance of the next child family team meeting (CFTM).
In its jurisdiction report, the Department recommended
that the court find that prior placement with father had not been
effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the children. The
Department reported that father allowed mother to see the
children, he was observed to be under the influence on more than
one occasion, he had alcohol in the home, he had dropped off C.D.
at a friend’s house in San Francisco and had not returned to pick
her up, he failed to provide for C.D.’s medication and therapy,
and fought with C.D. in front of the other children. The children
were in placements in different locations.
The Department’s service logs stated that the social worker
attempted to contact mother numerous times on December 17,
2025, but she could not reach mother. The next day, mother told
the social worker that her children were taken because of her
medication, and the social worker requested a medication list.
The social worker requested the medication list again on January
7, 2026, and told mother she needed to complete testing before
visitation. Mother provided an undated pharmacy screenshot
and said she would provide more information later. Also on
January 7, 2026, the social worker emailed the attorneys stating
that mother had not provided her medication list, mother had
informed the social worker that she could not provide a urine
analysis test in December 2025 because of prior “ false positives,”
and mother indicated in December 2025 that she did not plan to
test because Mendocino would not provide a hair follicle test. A
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February 10, 2026, entry stated that the social worker “will be
communicating” with mother regarding visitation.
An early March 2026 entry indicated C.D. refused to visit
with mother on March 3, 2026, and March 5, 2026. Supervised
Zoom visitation was scheduled for two hours every Tuesday and
Thursday. C.D. said she would like to have visits with mother
“when she feels ready.” The social worker and resource parents
intended to coordinate with C.D.’s therapist so the therapist
could participate in a future visit. The social worker contacted
mother about visitation on March 13, 2026. Another entry on
March 17, 2026, stated that the social workers were working to
schedule in-person visitation, but it had been challenging because
of the children’s schedules and mother’s delayed responses. That
same day, mother told the social worker she was going to send
her negative urine analysis tests from out of county, and she
provided one dated March 13, 2026.
The service logs also showed that the Department and
mother met on March 11, 2026. After 40 minutes, mother logged
off but said she would log back on; the social workers waited for
10 minutes, but mother did not return. The social worker sent
mother a text, but mother did not respond.
At the March 17, 2026 jurisdiction hearing, mother
submitted an offer of proof that she was having Zoom visits with
the children, she was testing of her own accord, she had an
Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor, and had engaged in services and
therapy. Mother’s counsel informed the court that mother
wanted in-person visitation and had requested it at a March 12,
10
2026 CFTM; counsel requested that in-person visitation be set up
at the court hearing and raised the issue of mother receiving gas
vouchers for visitation. Mother’s counsel stated that she
understood that this matter had exceeded statutory timelines,
but the parents were doing their best and the Department needed
to fairly evaluate mother.
The Department’s counsel stated that she had invited
mother to submit dates for an in-person visit, and the social
worker was trying to coordinate a date during spring break in a
couple of weeks so that the visit with the children could take
place at the same time for four hours. Mother’s counsel argued
that mother should be receiving weekly in-person visitation, not
just a visit over spring break. The children’s counsel objected to
forcing visits on C.D. because she needed the Department to
investigate a recent report that C.D. made to police about
mother, but counsel had no objection regarding the other
children.
The court sustained the jurisdictional allegations and set a
disposition hearing for April 21, 2026. The court said, “I think
visitation with both parents is important and should be
facilitated and encouraged by the Department, with the caveat
that [C.D.] is of an age where her opinions should be taken into
account.” Mother requested therapy with C.D., and the court
indicated that it would consider this to be an option at the
disposition hearing.
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B. Disposition
On April 21, 2026, the court continued the disposition
hearing because the Department did not file a disposition report.
Mother’s counsel requested on the record that the Department
get back to her regarding in-person visitation and said those
visits had not been set up.
On April 30, 2026, the disposition report was not ready and
the court continued the matter again.
On May 28, 2026, the disposition report again was not
ready, and the court continued the matter. At that hearing, the
court addressed a request for psychotropic medication for C.D.
and A.D., and mother’s counsel objected to the late disposition
report and stated the Department had not been keeping mother
informed about medical appointments or the children’s education.
Mother requested that the court order the Department to comply
with its obligations to notify mother of medical appointments,
treatments, educational meetings, school issues, and related
issues. The social worker informed the court that mother was not
always responsive, and the court ordered the Department to keep
mother involved in all medical and educational issues. Father’s
counsel reported that father was also having some difficulty
communicating with the social worker.
In the June 2026 disposition report, the Department
recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing. The Department
learned that mother had been arrested for driving under the
influence in November 2025. Neither parent had demonstrated
the ability to safely reunify with the children. C.D.’s current
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placement was considering permanent placement for C.D. and
E.D. The report recommended minimum visitation with mother
for one hour a month and minimum visitation with father for two
hours a month, with the parents being responsible for getting to
visitation.
Delivered services logs submitted along with the
disposition report stated that, on March 17, 2026, the social
worker learned that mother had recorded a Zoom visit. On
March 18, 2026, the social worker began coordinating an in-
person visit for mother during the children’s spring break. On
March 19, 2026, the social worker emailed mother that the
Department was still waiting to hear back from her to confirm
the visit. The children had an in-person visit with mother on
April 6, 2026. During the visit, C.D. was upset that mother had
changed the password to her email. C.D. and E.D. had weekly
visits with mother, but C.D. did not attend every visit.
At the disposition hearing on June 25, 2026, father’s
counsel announced that father reached an agreement with the
Department and father was “conceding today.” As part of the
agreement, father would receive visitation for three hours per
week for each child. Mother requested family maintenance or
additional reunification services. Mother also opposed the
recommendation to reduce visitation, requested therapeutic visits
with C.D., and requested no change in her educational rights.
The social worker testified that mother had one in-person
visit in April 2026, and the Department scheduled another in
May 2026, but mother could not attend because she did not have
13
transportation. The social worker knew mother had trouble
getting to Mendocino County for visitation, but the Department
did not provide transportation assistance because mother did not
have services. The social worker testified that the Department
did not provide mother with in-person visitation in January,
February and March because “for a certain time period we were
trying to get them scheduled, and then we had the holidays, and
then we didn’t have the staff.” The Department made no attempt
to schedule in-person visitation in June 2026, but mother
received two hours of Zoom visits per week. The social worker
testified that E.D. wanted to visit with mother.
Mother was asked to drug test to support visitation, but
mother did not drug test for the Department until April 2026.
Mother provided out-of-county drug tests, but the social worker
testified that she did not know if the tests were random.
The social worker recommended reducing visits because
C.D. did not want to visit with mother in general, and mother did
not always attend visits. The Department had not started
therapeutic visitation for C.D. because C.D.’s service provider
was going to let the social worker know when such visitation with
mother would be appropriate. Mother’s visits were supervised
because mother vaped sometimes and brought unauthorized
people into the visits.
The social worker recommended limiting mother’s
educational rights because mother did not attend a February
2026 IEP meeting for C.D., and mother was not always available.
The social worker testified that she texted mother about the IEP
14
meeting about a week in advance, but mother never responded or
followed up. The social worker admitted that she primarily spoke
to father about educational issues.
Mother testified that she did not have issues with
substances and she had not used methamphetamine in the last
year. Mother was in substance abuse treatment programs, she
was drug testing, and her tests were negative. She also
participated in parenting education, anger management,
domestic violence classes, and relapse prevention.
Mother confirmed that the Department had said she
needed to drug test before in-person visitation. She had not
refused to drug test, but she expressed concerns because she was
taking medication and wanted to ensure the testing was
accurate. Mother requested information about drug testing but
never heard back from the Department. Mother’s doctor set up a
series of urine analysis tests for her starting in February 2026,
but the tests were not random. Regarding the April 2026 drug
test that she did with the Department, mother went into the
Department requesting to test. Mother testified that she had
visitation three days a week on Zoom for about an hour. Visits
with E.D. went great, and C.D. had “been coming around more
and more.” Mother testified she visited consistently, but she had
missed a few visits due to a prior appointment and, on one
occasion, a lack of cell service.
Mother was interested in her children’s education, and she
did not recall the social worker inviting her to the IEP meeting.
Mother contacted the school a “few times” about the children, but
15
she mostly caught up with the visitation supervisor and did not
call because father had been told he needed to stop calling the
school.
The court took judicial notice of “all prior findings and
orders” after reviewing the complete case file, and found mother’s
testimony to be “not credible,” especially her denial of ever having
a substance abuse problem, which was interwoven throughout
the proceedings. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the children
if they were returned to father or mother and there was not a
substantial probability that the children would be returned
within the initial 18-month period from removal. The court found
the parents had histories of extensive or chronic use of drugs or
alcohol and resisted treatment during the three-year period
before the filing of this latest petition. As to C.D. and E.D., the
court found that a permanent plan of placement with specific
people and a goal of adoption or legal guardianship was necessary
and appropriate.
The court found that visitation with mother would not be
detrimental to the children. The court stated, “I will order two
hours monthly in person, telephone, or video chat, supervised by
the Department or its designee. With at least one-week advance
notice, one of these visits can be in person if mother travels to
Mendocino County.” The court gave the Department discretion to
expand visitation if mother remained in her treatment program
and engaged in visitation. Father received three hours per week
of visitation with each child.
16
The court transferred education rights for C.D. and E.D.
from both parents. The court found evidence that both parents
had missed regularly participating in the children’s ongoing daily
needs as to education.
Mother’s counsel asked for the court’s reasoning regarding
the reduction in mother’s visitation but not father’s visitation.
The court asked the Department to put its reasons for the
recommendation on the record. The Department’s counsel stated
that the reason for father was the bond he had with the children
and he had consistent in-person visits; for mother, C.D. usually
did not want to visit, and E.D. “seem[ed] not to care too much one
way or another.” Counsel continued that mother “tends to not
always attend visits and is not appropriate sometimes. She has
been observed vaping during a Zoom visit. She had recorded a
Zoom visit. Mom brings random people into visits without
approval.” The court concluded that its “orders remain.”
A section 366.26 hearing was set for October 22, 2026.
Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file writ petition (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.450) as to C.D. and E.D.
DISCUSSION
In this writ proceeding, mother argues that the juvenile
court erred by reducing her visitation and limiting her
educational rights, and she requests that we reverse those orders.
For the reasons explained herein, we agree that the court abused
its discretion when ordering the reduction in mother’s visitation,
but we affirm the court’s order transferring education rights.
17
I. Visitation
“Meaningful visitation is pivotal to the parent-child
relationship, even after reunification services are terminated.”
(In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504 (Hunter S.).)
“Courts have long recognized that, in the context of dependency
proceedings, a lack of visitation may ‘virtually assure[ ] the
erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship’
between mother and child. [Citation.] Even after family
reunification services are terminated, visitation must continue
unless the court finds it would be detrimental to the child.
(§ 366.21, subd. (h).)” (Hunter S., at p. 1504.)
The juvenile court, however, has the discretion to
determine the terms and conditions of visitation. (In re Julie M.
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48–49.) We will not reverse such an
order unless the record clearly shows that the trial court abused
its discretion. (See ibid.) Only if “the trial court has exceeded
the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination,” will we reverse such an order.
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) “ ‘The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason.’ ” (Id. at pp. 318–319.)
We start our analysis with a discussion of Hunter S., supra,
142 Cal.App.4th 1497 because we find it instructive. The mother
in Hunter S. appealed from orders terminating her parental
rights and denying a section 388 petition seeking reinstatement
of reunification services based on the juvenile court’s failure to
enforce a visitation order. (Id. at p. 1500.) The mother was
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incarcerated for much of the reunification period, and her
reunification services were terminated the month she was
released to a rehabilitation center. (Id. at pp. 1500–1501.) At
that time, the court ordered the social services agency to set up
“visitation for [the mother] as can be arranged through her
program.” (Id. at p. 1501.) The child thereafter persistently
refused to visit, and the court refused to order therapeutic
visitation or require the child to visit for over two years. (Id. at
pp. 1501–1503.) During that period, the permanent plan for the
child changed from guardianship to adoption, and the mother
filed a section 388 petition seeking to vacate the selection and
implementation hearing and reinstate reunification services. (Id.
at p. 1503.) The trial court found that the mother had shown a
substantial change of circumstances, but she failed to
demonstrate that it was in the child’s best interest to be returned
to her custody. (Id. at pp. 1503–1504.)
The appellate court reversed the denial of the section 388
petition. (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1509.) The
court concluded that the child had complete discretion to veto
visitation, and the court had failed to do anything to enforce its
visitation order. (Id. at p. 1505.) Next, the court found that the
juvenile court had relied on the child’s lack of bond with the
mother to conclude that granting the section 388 petition would
not be in the child’s best interest, which “stood section 388 on its
head.” (Id. at pp. 1506–1507.) “The juvenile court applied the
incorrect test. It focused on the absence of contact or current
bond between [the mother] and her son. But, it was unfair to
19
apply this standard when [the mother] had been denied any
chance to satisfy the contact requirement. The primary thrust of
the petition was that, by virtue of three years of error and judicial
inattention, she had been deprived of the opportunity to revive
her relationship with her son, even though, during that entire
period, a valid visitation order remained in effect and she had
repeatedly raised the issue with the court.” (Id. at p. 1507.)
Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 concluded that it
served the child’s bests interest to reverse the order denying the
section 388 petition and to remand for the juvenile court to
conduct a new hearing on the petition in light of the fact that
mother had been denied visitation. (Id. at p. 1508.) The court
continued, “We are cognizant of the difficulties posed in a case
such as this when a great deal of time has passed and a child
refuses to visit with a parent who sincerely — but belatedly —
wishes to maintain contact in an effort to rebuild a damaged
relationship. Even under such admittedly problematic
circumstances, absent a finding of detriment it is incumbent on
the juvenile court to discharge its duty to ensure the parent’s
right of visitation is preserved, under conditions consistent with
the child’s well-being. In conducting a new section 388 hearing,
given the passage of time and the consistent intensity of [the
child’s] resistance, it may be appropriate for the juvenile court to
further consider if, under the circumstances and in light of
current information, visits would be detrimental to [the child].”
(Hunter S., at p. 1508.)
20
Here, the Department erred by not providing in-person
visitation for most of the review period. The visitation order was
for visits “as frequently as possible consistent with the children’s
well-being” with a minimum of one visit a week for up to four
hours with drug testing (first hair follicle and then urine
analysis) until January 20, 2026.6 Thereafter, the order was for
visitation in-person or by Zoom with a minimum of four hours
weekly, with the court orally ordering the Department to provide
mother with assistance in getting to in-person visits.
The juvenile court accepted this case on November 13,
2025, but the Department did not assign a social worker until
shortly before the December 16, 2025, hearing. The Department
did not contact mother until December 17, 2025. The
Department thus undisputedly did nothing to set up visitation for
mother for over a month after the case transferred.
The Department’s evidence shows that the social worker
could not reach mother when she first called, but the two spoke
the next day. On December 18, 2025, mother told the social
worker that she would not drug test because the Department
could not do a hair follicle test. However, on January 20, 2026,
mother’s counsel represented that mother wanted visits set up
“as soon as possible,” and mother was willing to test for the
Department. The court said, “Mother’s visitation has been
6 Mother states in her petition that the visitation order
from Alameda County did not require drug testing. Mother,
however, never objected on this basis when the court discussed
drug testing and granted the Department’s request for a urine
analysis test.
21
ordered. It’s matter of both sides meeting. So the department
needs to set a date and time for visitation, and supply a bus pass
or some way for Mother to get there. But both sides need to work
to make sure that visitation is happening.”
It also appears that the Department was responsible for the
lack of visitation following the January 20, 2026, hearing. At the
February 10, 2026, hearing, mother again requested visitation,
and the Department’s counsel said there had been issues
contacting mother and with mother refusing to test. Mother’s
counsel responded that she was unsure “exactly what is going
on,” and there was some “disconnect.” Zoom visitation started in
early March 2026, but the court had to order the Department to
set up a meeting with mother’s counsel to start those visits, and
mother’s counsel informed the court that she had to involve the
Department’s director to get Zoom visitation started. And when
asked why the Department did not provide in-person visitation in
January, February, and March, the social worker testified, “So
for a certain time period we were trying to get them scheduled,
and then we had the holidays, and then we didn’t have the staff.”
(Italics added.)
Mother asked for in-person visitation, the court ordered the
Department to assist her in getting to visitation at the January
20, 2026, hearing, and the court ordered the Department to
encourage and facilitate visitation at the March 17, 2026,
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hearing.7 Mother had only one in-person visit with the children,
and the Department knew that mother could not make the only
other scheduled in-person visit in May 2026 because she did not
have transportation. The social worker also conceded that the
Department knew mother needed transportation assistance to
get to in-person visitation but the Department did not provide
this assistance.
In sum, the Department failed to provide mother with
visitation for the first month of the review period and thereafter
failed to provide court-ordered transportation assistance for in-
person visitation. This case differs from Hunter S. in that the
period of missed visitation at issue is shorter, mother had Zoom
visits staring in March 2026, and mother was responsible for
some of the missed visitation (in that she initially refused to drug
test).8 Mother had only one in-person visit in seven months,
however, and we cannot countenance the Department’s failure to
provide in-person visitation for a majority of the review period.
“Courts have long recognized that, in the context of dependency
proceedings, a lack of visitation may ‘virtually assure[ ] the
erosion (and termination) of any meaningful relationship’
between mother and child.” (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1504.) And video meetings are not an adequate substitute
7 The Department did not argue that the court did not have
the power to order it to provide transportation assistance to
mother.
8 Mother testified that she did not refuse drug testing, but
the court found that mother’s testimony at the disposition
hearing was not credible.
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for meeting in person, even for adults. (In re Serenity S. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 355, 377.)
The Department contends that any failure to provide
visitation bears no relation to the challenged order reducing
mother’s visitation, but we disagree. Mother asked the court to
maintain the status quo regarding the frequency of her visitation
as the Department intended to do for father, and she requested
that the court state its reasons for reducing visitation for her but
not father. The court asked the Department to state its reasons
for the record, and the Department’s first justification was that
father had consistently attended in-person visits with the
children during the review period and the children had a strong
bond with father but not mother. The court accepted the
Department’s explanation. Similar to Hunter S., the court’s
ruling here contained flawed logic in that a main reason for the
ruling was the absence of contact or current bond, but it was
unfair to apply this standard when the Department denied
mother the chance for meaningful in-person contact for most of
the review period.9 (See Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1506–1508.)
9 The Department argues that this court should uphold the
juvenile court’s order because of mother’s inappropriate conduct
during visitation. But much of the assertedly inappropriate
conduct occurred before the Alameda court’s April 2025
determination that mother should have visitation at least once
per week for up to four hours each visit. The Department further
contends that the trial court appropriately reduced visitation
based on the children’s lack of bond with mother. As stated,
remand is appropriate because it was unfair to rely on the
children’s lack of bond with their mother when the Department
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Furthermore, the evidence does not support the
Department’s justification that E.D. did not care “one way or
another” about visiting mother. Early in the review period, the
social worker reported that E.D. responded ambivalently when
asked about visitation with mother. However, at the disposition
hearing, the social worker testified that E.D. was visiting
consistently with mother and wanted to visit her, and E.D.’s
counsel agreed.
The Department urges us to disregard its failure to provide
in-person visitation, claiming that mother forfeited her claim and
her own violations of the visitation orders afforded her sufficient
visitation. We disagree on both fronts. At the disposition
hearing, mother specifically argued that it was unfair to reduce
her visitation based on the children’s different relationships with
their parents because father had been afforded in-person
visitation and mother did not have that opportunity.10 And
failed to provide appropriate visitation. (See Hunter S., supra,
142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.)
10 For the first time at oral argument, the Department cited
In re Sophia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046, for the
proposition that mother forfeited her claim by failing to file a
formal motion. We agree with Sophia M. that if a child refuses
visitation “it is the parent’s burden to request a specific type of
enforcement, or a specific change to the visitation order.” (Ibid.)
However, Sopia M. did not hold that a parent must file a formal,
written motion to seek the court’s assistance in enforcing a
visitation order, and Sophia M. approved of the juvenile court’s
grant of the parent’s oral request for a visitation enforcement
mechanism. (Id. at pp. 1043, 1047.) Mother raised the issue of
visitation and requested visitation below, and she orally
requested in-person visitation after Zoom visits commenced.
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mother’s violations of court orders could not excuse or cure the
Department’s error in failing to provide proper visitation where
the very purpose of court-ordered visitation is to promote a
healthy parent-child relationship. (See In re Hunter S., supra,
142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.)
Finally, we briefly address and reject mother’s remaining
contentions that the court erred by delegating complete discretion
to C.D. regarding visitation and not ordering conjoint therapy.
Mother’s first argument is forfeited due to her failure to
specifically raise the issue below, and it is also inaccurate. The
court stated that C.D.’s opinions “should be taken into account”
for purposes of visitation, not that C.D. had the power to
determine visitation. C.D. was angry at mother, expressed her
desire not to visit until she was ready, and refused to attend
some visits. However, the record also shows that mother did
have visitation with C.D. despite C.D.’s general reluctance;
hence, C.D. did not exercise complete discretion to refuse
visitation.11
We are similarly unpersuaded by mother’s claim that the
court erred by failing to order a form of conjoint therapy with
C.D. C.D. had mental health issues, including a history of
thoughts of self-harm, and her therapist was engaged and
apparently held the opinion that therapeutic meetings with
11 We need not address mother’s suggestion that the
Department erred in not making up for missed visitation (In re
S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 319), as we have already found
that the Department’s failure to provide meaningful in-person
visitation for mother constitutes reversible error.
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mother would not yet be beneficial. In the meantime, although
C.D. missed some visits, she was visiting with mother. On this
record, we cannot conclude that the failure to order conjoint
therapy exceeded all bounds of reason. (Cf. In re F.P. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 966, 973, 975 [parent has no legal right to
conjoint therapy even during reunification period and no abuse of
discretion to order such therapy when therapist deemed it
appropriate].)
Because the juvenile court erred for the reasons discussed
above, we conclude that this matter should be remanded for the
court to conduct a new hearing on the Department’s request to
reduce mother’s visitation in light of the fact that mother was
denied in-person visitation for much of the review period.
(Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) “[A]bsent a
finding of detriment it is incumbent on the juvenile court to
discharge its duty to ensure the parent’s right of visitation is
preserved, under conditions consistent with the child’s well-
being.” (Ibid.; see also § 366.21, subd. (h).) On remand, the court
shall consider the fact that mother was improperly denied in-
person visitation during much of the review period when
assessing the evidence and determining whether a reduction in
mother’s visitation is consistent with the children’s well-being.
(See Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) We
acknowledge that the Department advanced additional reasons in
support of its recommendation to reduce mother’s visitation, and
the court may consider those reasons and current information on
remand.
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II. Transfer of Educational Rights
With respect to educational rights, the court ruled: “At this
time, I am transferring educational rights of [C.D.] and [E.D.]
from both parents. I am making that finding that we are
proceeding to permanency as to both girls. They have been
removed for quite some time. There is evidence that both parents
have missed regularly participating in their ongoing daily needs
as to education.” Mother contends that the juvenile court abused
its discretion with this ruling. We disagree.
“Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in directing their children’s education. [Citations.] However,
when a child is a dependent child, a court may limit a parent’s
ability to make educational decisions on the child’s behalf by
appointing a responsible adult to make educational decisions.”
(In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276; § 361,
subd. (a)(1).) Any such limitation must be based on the best
interests of the child and may not exceed what is necessary to
protect the child. (§ 361, subds. (a)(1) & (6).) We review an order
limiting a parent’s educational rights for abuse of discretion,
“bearing in mind ‘[t]he focus of dependency proceedings is on the
child, not the parent.’ ” (In re R.W., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1277.) Under that standard, we may not substitute our
decision for that of the juvenile court and may reverse only if the
court’s order exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
The juvenile court’s order did not exceed the bounds of
reason. The court took judicial notice of the prior findings and
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orders in the case, and there had been a prior sustained
allegation that the children had poor school attendance while in
mother’s care, which was supported by the record evidence
despite mother’s denial. The social worker testified that she
invited mother to an IEP meeting in February 2026 for C.D.
during the review period, but mother never responded or followed
up. Mother made only “a few” efforts to contact the children’s
schools, and the children had missed school days during the
review period because they were impermissibly with mother in
Alameda County. Additionally, the delivered service logs and
reporter’s transcript reflect multiple instances where mother was
difficult to reach or delayed communications with the
Department about other issues, the social worker testified
mother is not always responsive, and mother also logged off of the
March 2026 meeting she requested and never followed up. On
this record, the court could reasonably have concluded that
transferring educational rights to a responsive adult was
necessary and in the children’s best interests.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s June 25, 2026, order reducing mother’s
visitation is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to
conduct a new hearing on the issue of visitation, assessing the
historical and current circumstances in a manner consistent with
this opinion. In all other respects, the court’s June 25, 2026,
order is affirmed. Mother’s request for a stay of the section
366.26 hearing is moot, and this decision is final as to this court
immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
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BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
GORDON, J.
In re E.D. (A176849)
Judge of the Superior Court of San Francisco County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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