Filed 10/8/26 In re E.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re E.C., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E088560
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J301645,
J301646 & J301647)
v.
OPINION
S.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Helena C. Rho, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
At a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing, the juvenile court
terminated the parental rights of defendant and appellant S.B. (mother) as to E.C. (born
May 2022), S.B. (born November 2020), and V.C. (born September 2017) (collectively,
minors). On appeal, mother contends the court erred in terminating mother’s parental
rights without conducting an analysis of mother’s relationship with minors under the
beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 31, 2024, personnel from plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County
Children and Family Services (the department), received an immediate response referral
alleging caretaker incapacity and general neglect. The report alleged that mother and her
boyfriend,2 against whom mother had a current restraining order, engaged in a domestic
dispute in the presence of minors. Officers informed the social worker that mother
reported someone had assaulted and robbed her, but she did not know the assailant. After
searching the premises, officers found the boyfriend hiding in a shed on the property. He
reported that mother and he had engaged in “a verbal altercation which led to him
running and chasing” mother.
Officers arrested the boyfriend for outstanding warrants and charged him with
child endangerment. Mother was taken to the hospital. The children were left without
supervision or support. V.C. was “developmentally delayed (Autistic) who requires 24-
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 After paternity testing, the court found the boyfriend a “nonparty” to the
proceedings. Minors’ fathers are not parties to the appeal.
2
hour protective care, as she self-injures and is non-verbal.” The social worker attempted
to interview minors; however, due to their developmental stages, they were unable to
communicate. Minors were released to a caretaker.3
The social worker interviewed mother, who reported that she had a restraining
order against the boyfriend but called him to come over and help her care for minors.
They then engaged in a domestic dispute in the presence of minors. The boyfriend had a
“criminal history and outstanding warrants for battery[,] assault, failure to appear, and
domestic violence . . . .”
Mother was on probation for convictions in April 2023, for willful cruelty to a
child and carrying a loaded firearm in public. Mother also had a child welfare history,
which included seven prior allegations including general neglect, physical abuse,
emotional abuse, and exploitation, all of which the department had deemed unfounded.
The social worker took minors into protective custody.
On August 2, 2024, the department filed section 300 juvenile dependency petitions
alleging, as pertinent here, that mother had a substance abuse problem (B.1), had mental
health issues (B.2),4 engaged in domestic violence with her significant other in the
3 It appears the caretaker was the maternal aunt, as later reports indicate the
department placed minors with her on July 31, 2024.
4 There was no evidence in the detention report regarding substance abuse or
mental health issues.
3
presence of minors (B.3), and had been hospitalized without leaving care for minors (G.6
& G.9).5 On August 7, 2024, the court detained minors.
In the August 23, 2024, jurisdiction and disposition report, the social worker
recommended the court find the allegations in the petitions true, remove minors from
mother’s custody, and grant mother reunification services. The department had placed
minors with their maternal aunt and uncle.
Mother reported that she had a history of engaging in domestic violence incidents
with the boyfriend. She said that in February 2024, he struck her in the face. Mother
called police, who arrested him. After the boyfriend was released, she allowed him back
into the home, where another incident occurred in April 2024. She said that during that
incident, the boyfriend fractured her eye socket and caused bruising to her face, chest,
and arms. The boyfriend was arrested and incarcerated.
After the boyfriend was again released, mother reached out to him despite having
obtained an active restraining order against him. On July 30, 2024, the boyfriend arrived
at mother’s home, wherein they engaged in a verbal altercation while minors were asleep.
Mother denied the altercation became physical despite her reported injuries. “The mother
stated that law enforcement arrived with the ambulance, and the [boyfriend] was found
hiding in a shed . . . . Once the [boyfriend] was discovered by law enforcement, he was
arrested. The mother stated that she was taken to the hospital where she suffered a
5 The department filed additional allegations with respect to minors’ fathers, some
of which the court later dismissed.
4
seizure due to being administered iodine.” She said she made no arrangements for
minors’ care due to her medical condition.
Mother denied having a substance abuse problem. She said she had only used
cocaine twice in her life, first in 2015, and the last time in March 2024. Mother denied
abusing her prescription medications.
The maternal aunt and uncle reported concerns of domestic violence incidents
with the boyfriend. They said that mother had a history of injuries after such incidents,
including bruising and being sent to the hospital. They reported incidents of domestic
violence between mother and the boyfriend had been ongoing for the previous two years.
When confronted, mother would make excuses for the boyfriend’s behavior.
The maternal aunt and uncle reported concerns that mother was abusing controlled
substances. When mother lived in their home, she would often appear to be under the
influence and unable to properly care for minors. They had never actually observed her
taking illegal drugs or abusing her prescriptions; however, mother would have “a
‘drugged out demeanor.’” On August 19, 2024, mother tested positive for opiates.
The boyfriend was in jail. The whereabouts of the fathers were unknown.
Supervised visitation between mother and minors was scheduled to occur once weekly;
mother visited with minors once during the reporting period; no problems were reported.
In the October 2, 2024, information for the court, the social worker reported that
mother tested positive for opiates on September 10, 2024. On September 18, 2024, she
5
failed to show for another drug test. Mother had supervised visitation with minors twice
weekly; mother engaged with minors appropriately, bringing food and activities to visits.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on October 2, 2024, the department
requested that the court dismiss the B.2 (mental health) and G allegations, which the
court granted. The court found the remaining allegations in the petitions true, adjudged
minors dependents of the court, removed them from parents’ custody, and ordered mother
to participate in reunification services.
In the six-month status review report filed March 20, 2025, the social worker
recommended mother receive an additional six months of services. As part of mother’s
case plan, “she was required to complete . . . general counseling, domestic violence,
parenting, substance abuse testing and a substance abuse program.”
Mother had completed eight sessions of individual therapy. The therapist
indicated mother was “open and willing to participate.” She “accepted responsibility for
exposing her children to unhealthy and dangerous situations.” Mother denied using illicit
drugs or abusing her prescription pain medication. She completed domestic violence and
parenting education.
The social worker referred mother to a substance abuse treatment program.
Mother informed the social worker that she had not enrolled because the program was
full. Mother later advised the social worker she did not qualify for the program because
she was not on drugs. The social worker informed her that the program was part of her
case plan. Mother provided the social worker with “a letter of attendance from No Drugs
6
America Association, Inc where she had completed ten out of twelve online sessions.”
Mother later indicated she enrolled in the outpatient treatment program and would begin
on March 14, 2025.
Mother failed to show for several drug tests. Mother “tested positive for cocaine,
amphetamines, and marijuana, as well as opiates.”6 Mother denied taking any illicit
drugs but indicated she consumed THC gummies for help sleeping, and “she should only
be testing positive for opiates due to her pain prescriptions.”
Mother had a total of 10 random drug tests for the reporting period. She tested
positive for opiates on October 7; negative for all substances on October 22; positive for
methadone and opiates on December 10; positive for opiates on December 26, 2024;
positive for opiates on January 2; positive for marijuana on January 22; positive for
amphetamines, methadone, cocaine, opiates, and marijuana on February 20; and positive
for cocaine, methadone, and opiates on February 28, 2025. Mother failed to show for
scheduled tests on November 21, 2024, and March 5, 2025. “All no shows are
considered positive.”
Mother had “been consistent and appropriate with the children during their weekly
supervised visits. The children and the mother have a strong bond. On March 9, 2025,
the [social worker] observed part of the visit at the monitoring agency and the children
were seen happy and engaged with the mother during their visit.” Mother had “been
6 Mother indicated she had a prescription for Norco.
7
observed with marks and bruises such as a black eye and being under the influence
during a visit in the month of December 2024.”
At the hearing on April 2, 2025, minors’ counsel submitted “on the
recommendation for continued services but, reluctantly, it’s a very generous
recommendation on the part of the Department. [¶] I note that this is a sibling set. All
these kids are placed together. The youngest one is under the age of two. These parents
are only entitled to six months of services.” “[T]he only reason that I’m submitting on
the recommendation is because it appears the kids are bonded to Mom and the concurrent
planning home is only willing to do guardianship at this point. If they’re willing to adopt,
I’d be asking the Court to terminate services today because the parents just really aren’t
getting it.” The court continued mother’s reunification services.
In the status review report filed September 15, 2025, the social worker
recommended the court terminate mother’s reunification services and set the section
366.26 hearing. The social worker was informed on May 21, 2025, that mother had a
severe drug abuse problem and that she was “constantly seen ‘nodding out 24/7 and
sniffing methadone and doing other drugs.’ It was further reported that the mother’s
current boyfriend is her trafficker, and he forces her to do ‘massages with happy
endings.’ Additionally, it was reported that the boyfriend . . . collect[s] the money from
the mother every evening, and she is physically assaulted by him when she fails to make
sufficient money, leaving her with severe bruising on her face and body. It was also
8
reported that the mother and her new boyfriend are gang affiliated, and the mother has
possession of firearms.”
On June 20, 2025, a program director reported that mother attempted to add her
new boyfriend as V.C.’s respite services provider. Mother denied doing so; however, she
said “that she encouraged her boyfriend to apply for the program so he can work for other
people.” Mother said she was “self-employed as a massage therapist and she is also a
content creator/social media influencer, and brand ambassador.” Mother denied
“engaging in sexual activities for payment or her current boyfriend being her trafficker.”
Mother completed eight additional sessions of individual therapy on July 8, 2025.
She completed a second round of domestic violence counseling on July 12, 2025. She
was participating “consistently” in outpatient substance abuse treatment. Within that
program, mother tested negative for substances on six occasions. She tested positive on
June 20, 2025, for “substances”7 and positive for alcohol on July 31, 2025. Outside the
program, mother tested negative for all substances on nine dates.
Mother visited with minors for two hours twice weekly. She was observed to be
“attentive and affectionate” with minors. Mother missed two visits during the reporting
period. The social worker opined that mother “has not benefitted from her court ordered
services as she continues to place herself in unhealthy relationships despite completing
two rounds of domestic violence and individual therapy.”
7 The report does not indicate for what “substances” mother tested positive.
9
At the hearing on September 18, 2025, the court ordered mother to drug test.
Mother tested on September 18, and 19, 2025. Both tests were negative for all
substances.
At the hearing on October 2, 2025, mother testified she had completed her case
plan. Her bruises were the result of the prescription medications she was taking. Mother
was a massage therapist. She had never been sexually trafficked.
Mother’s new boyfriend had applied to take care of special needs children, but she
did not attempt to arrange a job for him caring for her daughter. The last time she was
involved in a domestic violence altercation with someone was with her previous
boyfriend in April 2024. If she believed her current boyfriend would put her safety at
risk, she would call law enforcement and terminate the relationship.
The court found noncredible mother’s testimony that she had not engaged in any
physical domestic disputes since April 2024. The court terminated mother’s reunification
services and set the section 366.26 hearing.
In the section 366.26 report filed January 21, 2026, the social worker
recommended the court find minors adoptable and terminate parents’ parental rights. The
social worker noted that minors had been placed with the prospective adoptive parents on
July 31, 2024, upon removal from their parents. They had provided adequate care and
supervision to minors, particularly V.C., who had special needs. Minors appeared to be
comfortable and bonded with the prospective adoptive parents. The maternal aunt had
10
known all three minors all their lives. The maternal uncle had known the youngest two
all their lives.
They described their relationship with minors as “‘loving,’” “‘tight knit and
caring’.” Minors would come to them when something was wrong, or they needed
something. The social worker had observed minors seeking comfort from them. The
prospective adoptive parents were dedicated to raising minors to adulthood.8
In a February 2, 2026, information for the court, the social worker reported that
mother was appropriate with minors during her weekly supervised visits with minors.
At the section 366.26 hearing on April 7, 2026, the department requested the court
accept the reports into evidence;9 the court did so. Mother’s counsel objected to
termination of mother’s parental rights but offered no affirmative evidence or argument.
Minors’ counsel requested the court terminate parents’ parental rights: “In this
case, Your Honor, the minors have all been placed in the same placement for the entirety
of the case. They are well-cared for, they are supervised. Minor [V.C.] has special needs
and the caregivers take great care of the minors. The minors appear to have a significant
8 The report contained no information on any visitation between mother and
minors.
9 The department requested the court “accept into evidence the following reports
and their attachments: The February 2nd, 2026, .26[;] the January 6, 2026[,] 6.7 report[;]
the November 1[7]th, 2025, 6.7 report[;] the February 2nd, 2026[,] 6.7 report[;] and the
6.7 report of today’s date.” The November 17, 2025, and April 6, 2026, reports
contained information only regarding the social worker’s inquiries regarding minors’
potential Indian heritage; they did not reflect on mother and minors’ visitation. There
was only one report dated February 2, 2026. The department filed the section 366.26
report on January 21, 2026.
11
and strong bond with the caregivers and it would be in the best interest of the minors to
have a level of permanency in this case. Minors are all generally and specifically
adoptable.”
Minors’ counsel further argued, “Parents may meet the first factor of Caden C.,[10]
but outside of that, again, it doesn’t seem like the other two prongs are met. Again, it
doesn’t . . . appear there is a significant bond between the minors and the parents and if
parental rights were terminated I do not believe pursuant to the reports that the minors
would have any type of detrimental behaviors or it would be a detriment to their well-
being, . . .”
The department requested the court find V.C. specifically adoptable and the other
two minors both generally and specifically adoptable. The court found V.C. specifically
adoptable and the other two minors both generally and specifically adoptable.
The court indicated it had read and considered “the report.” It took judicial notice
of all prior findings and orders. The court mentioned Caden C. and found no exception
applied to termination of parental rights. Thus, the court terminated parents’ parental
rights to minors.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights without
conducting an analysis of mother’s relationship with minors under the beneficial parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights. Specifically, mother maintains
10 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.)
12
the reports contained inadequate information with respect to the relationship between
mother and minors, and, therefore, any analysis of the issue was inherently flawed.
Mother also appeared to argue in her opening brief that the court erred in failing to
specify the bases for its ruling.11 We disagree.
A. Adequacy of Reports
Mother complains the reports contained insufficient information with respect to
the relationship between mother and minors to permit the court to conduct a proper
analysis of the issue. Although we share mother’s concern about the paucity of
information regarding visitation in the reports, or even absence thereof in at least some of
the reports, we hold that mother forfeited any issue with respect to the adequacy of the
reports by failing to object on that basis below.
Where “no objection to the sufficiency of the assessment reports was made at time
of trial, [we] refer to the familiar principle that failure to object to the admission of
improper or inadequate evidence [forfeits] the right to raise the issue on appeal.
[Citation.] If the complaint on appeal be deemed not the admissibility . . . of inadequate
11 Mother asserted, “the court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights
without first conducting an analysis of the parent-child relationship under the beneficial
relationship exception.” “The Juvenile Court Failed to Analyze the Nature of Mother’s
relationship to her Children Prior to Terminating Parental Rights.” “[T]he juvenile court
could not, and should not, have terminated Mother’s parental rights unless and until it had
conducted an exacting review of the nature and quality of each child’s relationship with
Mother.” “Only after evaluating the nature and quality of the attachment can the court
proceed to” evaluate the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental
rights. Thus, in their brief, the department expressly responded to the issue. However, in
her reply brief, mother agrees that the juvenile court was not required to make express
findings. Regardless, we hold the issue was raised and address it accordingly.
13
assessment reports, but substantive insufficien[c]y to establish requisite findings, this
complaint, too, [is] [forfeited] by failure to raise it at the trial level. [Citation.]” (In re
Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412, fn. omitted; accord, In re Urayna L.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [failure to raise adequacy of report below forfeited issue
on appeal]; In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 [by failing to object in the
juvenile court to specific defects in the reports, parents forfeit any challenge to them on
appeal].) “‘The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention
of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Daniel B.
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672.)
Here, mother never objected to the content of the reports at any of the hearings,
including the section 366.26 hearing, on any basis, let alone the specific basis that the
reports lacked sufficient information on visitation. She did not request a continuance to
permit the department to provide reports that would reflect more fully on her visitation
with minors. Mother did not request that the department provide the delivered service
logs.
Moreover, mother did not object to the admission of the reports. In fact, the court
specifically asked mother’s counsel if he had received the section 366.26 report; mother’s
counsel responded that he had, but he interspersed no concern or objection to that report.
Furthermore, there were other ways mother could have made up for the dearth of
information in the reports on visitation, such as requesting a bonding study, (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, fn. 4 [“Trial courts should seriously consider, where
14
requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other relevant expert
testimony”]), testifying herself, having the social worker testify, and/or having the
maternal aunt and uncle testify. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1345
[“To help make his or her case, the parent may need to request the court’s assistance in,
for example, securing the presence of witnesses at the section 366.26 hearing or ordering,
for good cause shown, a bonding study”]; In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1179
[However, “‘[t]here is no requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a
bonding study as a condition precedent to’ terminating parental rights . . . .”].)
Finally, mother did not argue or even raise the issue of the beneficial relationship
exception to termination of her parental rights.12 A parent who fails to raise an exception
to adoption in the juvenile court forfeits the issue on appeal. (See In re Rachel M. (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295; see also In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292; In
re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243,
1252 [The court has no sua sponte duty to raise the beneficial relationship exception to
termination of parental rights].) Mother’s failure to do any of these forfeited any
objection to the lack of information on visitation in the reports.
Mother argues that In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616 (Brian P.) stands for
the proposition that although defects in the content of an assessment may be forfeited, an
objection to failure of proof may not. (Id. at p. 623.) Thus, mother asserts that the
12 It appears the court only mentioned the issue because minor’s counsel referred
to it: “Parents may meet the first factor of Caden C., but outside of that, again, it doesn’t
seem like the other two prongs are met.”
15
juvenile court terminated her parental rights “without having sufficient reported evidence
from the Department’s social studies to determine whether the children had a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to her . . . .”
However, Brian P. addressed an adoption assessment and the department’s burden
of proof on the issue of adoptability. (Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 622-623.)
Here, as mother concedes, unlike adoptability, mother, not the department, bore the
burden of proof on the issue of whether the beneficial relationship exception to
termination of parental rights applied. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; In re
Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1343-1344 [There is no obligation on the part of
the department to introduce evidence supporting a parent’s contention that the beneficial
relationship exception to termination of parental rights should apply].) Thus, Brian P. is
distinguishable.
Although we hold that mother forfeited any objection to the adequacy of the
reports, we do not hold that mother has forfeited an objection to the court’s ruling on the
exception, which we address post.
B. Juvenile Court’s Failure to Exposit Reasons to Deny Application of the
Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
In her opening brief, mother appeared to complain that the court’s failure to
exposit its reasons for denying application of the beneficial parental relationship
exception required reversal: the court “made no finding on Mother’s regular visitation—
16
which the record affirmatively established . . . and no evaluation of the nature or quality
of the children’s attachment to her . . . .” We disagree.
“[W]e are aware of no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in finding the
parental-benefit exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its
conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception. To the contrary,
we infer from section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the juvenile court is
required to ‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ when it makes a finding that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child—that the court is not
required to make findings when it concludes that parental rights termination would not be
detrimental. [Citations.]” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156, italics added.)
“Indeed, this subdivision’s silence on this issue is both deafening and dispositive
when contrasted with other subdivisions and statutes explicitly requiring juvenile courts
to make specific findings to support other rulings in dependency proceedings.” (In re
Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1270, fn. 6 [“specific findings are not required
absent a statute so requiring”].) Thus, we presume the court understood the applicable
law and correctly applied it in the absence of evidence to the contrary. (People v. Tilley
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 780 [“As a general rule ‘“a trial court is presumed to have
been aware of and followed the applicable law.”’ [Citation.]”].)
Here, although an exposition of findings on each of the prongs by the juvenile
court would certainly have made review of the ruling easier, no such exposition is
required. So long as this court holds the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and/or
17
that sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s ultimate ruling (see post), the
court’s reasons for its ruling are irrelevant. (Anderson v. Davidson (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 [“‘“[W]e will affirm a judgment correct on any legal basis, even
if that basis was not invoked by the trial court. [Citation.] There can be no prejudicial
error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct.”’”].)
Moreover, mother never even raised the issue of application of the beneficial
relationship exception below. Furthermore, mother failed to object to the court’s ruling
without an exposition of its reasons. Finally, the juvenile court expressly cited Caden C.
in its ruling. Thus, we presume the court properly applied the law.
C. Consideration of Reports not Expressly Admitted into Evidence
Mother contends this court cannot consider information contained in the reports
the parties did not move into evidence. The department did not respond to this
argument.13 We hold that mother forfeits or invites any error with respect to our reliance
on reports the juvenile court did not expressly consider by explicitly inviting us to
consider such reports.
Reports not introduced into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing cannot be
considered by the juvenile court or the court on appeal. (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73
13 Mother did not raise the issue under a clearly identifiable separate heading,
which may be why the department did not respond to it. (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 172, 179 [“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be
discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.”].) However, because
mother’s contention on this issue is subsumed within the issue of whether the court had
sufficient evidence to deny application of the beneficial relationship exception, we hold
that mother did not forfeit the issue on this basis.
18
Cal.App.5th 197, 202 (L.A.-O).) A juvenile court cannot be held to have examined
evidence “it was never asked to consider.” (Id. at p. 207.) “[T]he juvenile court cannot
consider any evidence unless it ‘receive[s]’ it from a party and ‘state[s] on the record’
that it has considered it.” (Ibid.) “If the juvenile court were to base its decision, without
any warning, on a fact that it just happened to remember from a report filed years earlier,
no doubt the parties would cry foul. [Citation.] By the same token, we cannot reverse an
order simply because some fact unearthed from some report filed months or years earlier
might tend to undercut it.” (Id. at p. 208, italics added.)
“‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the
commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed
because of that error.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12
Cal.5th 719, 821-822.)
On one hand, mother asserts that this court cannot consider the reports not moved
into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing. On the other hand, mother expressly invites
our consideration of reports that were not moved into evidence to support her argument
that any error the court made was not harmless. Mother argues that information
contained in the September 15, and March 25, 2025, reports, neither of which was moved
into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing, supports application of the beneficial
relationship exception. We accept her invitation to rely on those reports.
Moreover, unlike in L.A.-O, we do not use the information contained in those
reports to reverse the juvenile court’s orders. (L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 208.)
19
Finally, our use of those reports inures only to mother’s benefit. Thus, mother has
forfeited or invited our use of unadmitted reports in our analysis.
D. Application of the Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
Mother effectually contends insufficient evidence supported the court’s order
declining to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of her
parental rights. We disagree.
“[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically . . . to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child.’ [Citations.] To guide the court in selecting
the most suitable permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of preference and
provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them. [Citation.] According to that
procedure, the court must first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the
child is likely to be adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court finds that there has been a
previous determination that reunification services be terminated, then the court shall
terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that
termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated
reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent
plan. [Citation.] As we have previously explained, ‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely
permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than
the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631.)
“The exception at issue in this case is limited in scope. It applies where ‘[t]he
court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to
20
the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] From the statute, we readily discern three
elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and
contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) It is the parent who must prove all three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence; the parent must “show a ‘compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child . . . .’” (Id. at p. 635.)
Here, the department “does not dispute that Mother regularly visited” minors. Mother
asserts that she “consistently participated in weekly supervised visitation . . . .” We
agree. The reports reflect that mother consistently visited minors, missing only two
visits. Thus, we address only the second and third prongs, beneficial relationship and
detriment.
1. Beneficial Relationship.
The department contends that mother failed to show that minors had a beneficial
relationship with mother. It is difficult, if not impossible, to review a finding that the
court never expressly made.14 Since the juvenile court did not indicate whether it found a
beneficial relationship existed, we give any benefit of doubt to mother. Thus, we hold
14 Here, because the court did not exposit the reasons for its ruling, it is possible
that it found that mother failed her burden on only the third prong, detriment.
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that substantial evidence would have supported a finding that mother and minors shared a
beneficial relationship.
On the second element, “the parent must show that the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Courts “assess whether ‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.’ [Citation.] Again here, the focus is the child. And the relationship may be
shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life
spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632.) “[C]ourts often
consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.
[Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, . . .” (Ibid.)
We review whether there is a beneficial relationship for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) “[I]n assessing visitation and the relationship
between parent and child, the court must make a series of factual determinations. These
may range from the specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the
harm that would come from losing those specific features to a higher-level conclusion of
how harmful in total that loss would be. The court must also determine, for the particular
child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those
harms. In so doing, it may make explicit or implicit findings ranging from specific
benefits related to the child’s specific characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion
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about the benefit of adoption all told. All these factual determinations are properly
reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Id. at p. 640.)
As noted ante, mother visited consistently, apparently missing only two visits over the
entirety of proceedings. The social worker reported that mother had engaged with minors
appropriately during visitation, bringing food and activities to visits. The social worker
noted, “The children and the mother have a strong bond.” Minors “were seen happy and
engaged with the mother during [a] visit.” Minors’ counsel observed that minors were
“bonded to Mom.” Substantial evidence would support a finding mother had a beneficial
relationship with minors.
2. Detriment
In finding the exception inapplicable, the juvenile court implicitly found that
terminating mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to any relationship mother
and minors shared. Mother effectually contends insufficient evidence supported the
court’s order finding the exception inapplicable. We disagree.
“[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must
decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs
the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.] By making this
decision, the trial court determines whether terminating parental rights serves the child’s
best interests.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “Because terminating parental
rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts
must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.]
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What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing
the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive
home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) “[T]he question is just
whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent not
outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
“[W]hether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to
the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) “A court abuses its discretion
only when ‘“‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’”’ [Citation.] But ‘“‘[w]hen two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’”’” (Id. at p. 641.)
The court acted within its discretion in implicitly finding that termination of
mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to minors. Here, the department placed
all three minors together with the prospective adoptive parents on July 31, 2024; thus,
minors had been in their care and custody for over a year and a half, the entirety of the
proceedings below.
The prospective adoptive parents were relatives. The maternal aunt had known all
three minors all their lives. The maternal uncle had known the youngest two all their
lives. They had provided adequate care and supervision to all three minors, particularly
V.C., who had special needs. Minors appeared to be comfortable and bonded with the
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prospective adoptive parents. That the prospective adoptive parents were relatives, who
agreed to adopt all three siblings together, and particularly one who had special needs,
and was therefore deemed only specifically adoptable, was profoundly auspicious.
The prospective adoptive parents described their relationship with minors as
“‘loving,’” “‘tight knit and caring’.” Minors would come to them when something was
wrong, or they needed something. The social worker observed minors seeking comfort
from them. They were dedicated to raising minors to adulthood.
Minors’ counsel observed that minors “appear to have a significant and strong
bond with the caregivers and it would be in the best interest of the minors to have a level
of permanency in this case.”
Mother failed her burden to make a compelling showing that the loss of the
minors’ relationship with her would harm minors to an extent not outweighed, on
balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home with the maternal aunt and uncle. Thus,
the court acted within its discretion in determining the circumstances were not
exceptional, such that the termination of mother’s parental rights would not be
detrimental to minors.
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III. DISPOSITION
The court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
RAPHAEL
J.
LEE
J.
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