Filed 6/30/26 In re E.C. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re E.C., a Person Coming Under B347426
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP02017A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, George A. Turner, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant S.C. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order
at the six-month review hearing that terminated her family
reunification services. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prior appeal
On August 1, 2024, one-year-old E.C. was removed from
mother’s custody and was placed in foster care in the home of
caregiver Ms. S. A contested adjudication and disposition
hearing was held on October 18, 2024. The juvenile court
sustained the amended Welfare and Institutions Code
section 3001 petition as follows:
“(B-1)[:] [¶] The child, [E.C.’s] mother, . . . is failing to
meet the child’s needs and to provide appropriately
[sic] care for the child despite ongoing support
services. On prior occasions, the child could be heard
yelling, screaming, and crying for extended periods of
time while mother refused assistance to care for the
child. On prior occasions, the mother failed to
appropriately feed the child. The mother’s failure to
address the child’s needs endangers the child’s
health, safety and well-being, and places the child at
risk of serious physical harm and damage.”
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
The court declared E.C. a dependent of the juvenile court,
ordered reunification services for both parents, and ordered
mother to participate in the following services: parenting classes;
individual therapy (to include the topics of intimate partner
violence and child protection and safety); transportation
assistance; housing assistance; monitored visitation with E.C. for
a minimum of nine hours per week; and an Evidence Code
section 730 psychological evaluation.
Mother appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings,
and on March 16, 2026, this court concluded that the evidence
supported the jurisdictional finding under count b-1, and
affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
orders.2
II. Current appeal
On November 6, 2024, the juvenile court issued an order
appointing Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd to conduct an Evidence Code,
section 730 psychological evaluation, including psychological
testing to determine “[w]hether [mother] has any mental health
issues [and] [i]f so, whether she is capable of safely having the
minor in her care and any recommended services or interventions
that may assist [mother] in providing appropriate care for the
child.” Mother was scheduled for an evaluation on March 14,
2025, and case social worker Pavon sent her text messages to
inform her and remind her of this appointment. The
appointment was rescheduled at Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s request, and
mother complained about the rescheduling and did not appear for
her appointment. Mother subsequently rescheduled her
2 Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services v. S.C. (Mar. 16, 2026, No. B342905) (nonpub. opn.).
3
appointment twice. On April 21, 2025, mother attended a
psychological evaluation with Dr. Kaser-Boyd. The evaluation
was held virtually, per mother’s request.
A. Six-month review period
The juvenile court set a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.21, subdivision (e) six-month review hearing for April
22, 2025, which was continued at father’s request. On March 28,
2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a status review report. DCFS
reported that almost two-year-old E.C. was doing well and had
made positive progress in caregiver Ms. S.’s home. He was
bonded to his foster siblings and was observed to be affectionate
and comfortable with Ms. S. Pavon observed that E.C. was
making better eye contact with others and was learning how to
receive and reciprocate affection towards others. E.C. was
attending daycare, where he was adjusted and comfortable. He
also was receiving speech therapy and occupational therapy
through the Regional Center based on developmental delay. The
report expressed concern that E.C. might be presenting with
possible Autism Spectrum Disorder.
Father was residing in veterans’ housing and was
unemployed but looking for work. He was in partial compliance
with the court-ordered case plan and was enrolled in a parenting
class and an individual therapy program, which he decided to end
after five sessions. Father had monitored, in-person visitation
with E.C. once per month, per his request.
Throughout the period of supervision, mother had not been
compliant with her case plan, had not provided any
documentation of her participation in any programs or individual
therapy sessions, and had made only minimum effort to meet
4
with her case worker. Mother’s case was transferred to Pavon
shortly after E.C. was detained from mother’s custody, since
mother had made racist and demeaning remarks towards the
previous social worker and would not interact with her due to the
social worker’s race. Pavon tried to speak with mother about her
case, but mother continued to display the same behavior to
Pavon, leading Pavon to file a Special Incident Report due to
mother’s threats. Pavon reported difficulty discussing with
mother her goals to reunify with E.C. or progress in her
programs. In November 2024, Pavon called mother but was
unable to reach her. In December 2024, Pavon made efforts to
contact mother and provide her with her court-ordered case plan,
however mother refused to speak with Pavon and told her to
“ ‘speak to my attorney.’ ”
On January 6, 2025, mother texted Pavon to ask about the
case plan, since Pavon had been trying to contact her. Mother
said she had to change her phone number because father had
been calling her from different numbers. Mother also falsely
accused Ms. S. of “sneaking around with the father” after
receiving a photo of father holding E.C. Pavon asked mother for
an e-mail address to send her a copy of the court-ordered case
plan. Pavon sent the case plan to the e-mail address mother
provided, but mother continued to text Pavon with different e-
mail addresses, then claimed she did not receive anything.
Mother told Pavon she “ ‘didn’t have time for CSW’s little mind
games and she would report CSW to the supervisor because she
was not receiving the e-mail and it was time for CSW to consider
herself without a job.’ ”
Pavon e-mailed mother at the second e-mail address she
provided and added that mother should contact her attorney if
5
she had any questions, since mother was “being manipulative”
and was threatening Pavon. Mother responded via text: “You
will definitely hear from my attorney. I am aware that you are
not a very smart person. It might have something to do with
your race. Make an attempt additionally. Make an additional
attempt to send the legal file before I take appropriate measures
to end your sorry attempt at a career. Thanks.” Pavon proceeded
to send mother a screenshot of her case plan by text message.
Mother did not make any efforts to visit E.C. since he was
detained in August, even though the court ordered monitored
visitation. Instead, mother requested FaceTime visits with her
son. On multiple occasions during these calls, Ms. S. reported
that she saw mother exhibiting behaviors consistent with a
mental health diagnosis, like talking to herself and rolling her
eyes back. Ms. S. had to get mother’s attention and re-direct her
to continue with her visit and engage with E.C. On one occasion,
mother kept telling E.C. that his half sibling V.W. was present
with her, however Ms. S. did not see the sibling or anyone else in
the room, and previous reports indicated that mother had not
seen or spoken to V.W. for several years.
Ms. S. stated on March 10, 2025, that mother’s last
FaceTime visit with E.C. was on February 18, 2025. Since
mother had not seen E.C. in person since August 2024, DCFS
was unable to assess the interaction between them or mother’s
ability to care for the child.
The report indicated that there were continued concerns
regarding mother’s mental health and her documented history
and patterns of aggression toward DCFS staff members, as well
as toward previous shelter staff. Pavon made efforts to arrange
in-person, monitored visits for mother and E.C. at the DCFS
6
office, however, mother did not follow through with the visits or
request a different schedule. Pavon also attempted to arrange for
E.C. to visit with mother at the shelter where she was residing,
however mother stated that she wanted to keep her location
confidential. When Ms. S. tried to encourage mother to visit E.C.
in person, her efforts were also unsuccessful.
The report indicated concerns that mother was making
numerous calls to the DCFS child protection hotline to make false
accusations against Ms. S., and to make disparaging remarks
about Ms. S.’s race and ability to properly care for E.C. When
E.C. was first placed in Ms. S.’s home, mother called and texted
her numerous times a day. Ms. S. created a set visitation
schedule for mother’s FaceTime visits, but mother did not adhere
to the schedule. Ms. S. reported that mother had gone as long as
a month without calling E.C.
On March 6, 2025, mother called the supervising case social
worker (SCSW) and demanded that E.C. be returned to her
immediately, stating there had been “ ‘no basis’ ” to detain him.
The SCSW asked mother if she had been communicating with
Pavon, and she replied that Pavon does not call her and was
incompetent. The SCSW asked mother how she was taking
responsibility for her case plan to reunify with her son. Mother
became upset and stated that Pavon should do her job and
provide her with housing. The SCSW reminded mother that she
was also responsible for ensuring she followed her case plan and
connected with her social worker. Mother became agitated and
stated that DCFS needed to do their job, as she was not aware of
what she had to do. The SCSW told mother that she was
informed at her court hearing about what she had to do, and
explained to mother that she was not in compliance with her case
7
plan or visitations. The SCSW asked mother why she was not
seeing her son in person to bond and connect with him. Mother
avoided the question and stated that DCFS was incompetent.
The SCSW reminded mother that she had to follow her case plan,
and if she was not working on her court-ordered services and
visiting her child it would be hard to get to her goal of
reunification. The SCSW emphasized to mother that she should
connect with her social worker and work on her case.
Mother continued to allege domestic violence between
herself and father and claimed she was being stalked by father.
Father denied this, and alleged that mother was the abuser.
On March 27, 2025, Ms. S. reported to Pavon that mother
sent her multiple text messages regarding visits with E.C.
Mother texted, “ ‘I’m supposed to be having visits every week
with [E.C.],’ ” to which Ms. S. replied, “ ‘you have not called him
in over a month.’ ” Mother responded, “ ‘I have been calling him
every day,’ ” which was not accurate. That same day, Pavon
reached out to mother to obtain her mailing address to send her
court notices. Mother was unwilling to provide her address.
Pavon again asked for mother’s mailing address and explained
the importance of receiving court notices. Mother was unwilling
to provide her address and asked Pavon to text the notices to her
phone. Mother continued to text Pavon that she was “ ‘not doing
her job,’ ” and spoke about her domestic violence claims against
father. Pavon texted mother a photo of her court notices and e-
mailed an electronic copy to her two e-mail addresses on file.
DCFS concluded that the risk of returning E.C. to the care
of mother was high. The report found that mother had not taken
accountability for her actions, had not made efforts to meet with
Pavon to discuss her case, and had not made efforts to have in-
8
person visits with E.C. The report further found that mother
exhibited strong patterns of making verbal and physical threats
towards staff members, relatives, and others who tried to support
her. Family members also stated that mother had strong
patterns of making false allegations to law enforcement. The
report concluded that mother continued to exhibit behaviors that
were consistent with a mental health diagnosis and had not
provided DCFS with any documentation that she was making
efforts to seek appropriate treatment or medical care, which
posed a safety risk to E.C. She had a documented history of
mistreatment of E.C., including being neglectful of his needs, and
she had not been forthcoming with where she was currently
residing. Moreover, there were concerns that she continued to
have contact with father, with whom she claimed she had a
history of domestic violence. She had not made efforts to make
positive behavioral changes which would justify a safe return of
E.C. to her care, and she continued to exhibit delusional
behaviors that were consistent with a diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia, but had not provided any proof of treatment or a
mental health diagnosis.
B. Interim review report
On May 7, 2025, DCFS submitted an interim review report.
DCFS reported that on April 22, 2025, Pavon once again e-mailed
mother a copy of her court-ordered case plan with a detailed
explanation about the court-ordered services. Pavon also
provided mother with a copy of the DCFS resource handbook,
encouraged her to look through the resources for individual
therapy services, and reminded her that she was required to
meet with a licensed therapist and attend monthly social worker
meetings in person. On April 25, 2025, mother replied to Pavon’s
9
e-mail asking for information on therapists that address intimate
partner violence. On April 28, 2025, Pavon responded and
informed mother that she could select a provider from the
referral packet, and said that once mother selected a provider,
Pavon would help her call the agencies. Mother requested that
Pavon send her an additional e-mail “ ‘with just a packet of
providers.’ ” Pavon provided mother with the page number that
listed the providers, and mother did not respond. Pavon again
encouraged mother to provide her with some information about
where she was currently living so Pavon could assist mother in
finding a provider close to her. Mother responded that her
address was confidential, but that she was living in the Los
Angeles/North Hollywood area. Mother claimed that Pavon had
not reached out to her in six months, and that she did not have
access to the court order until March 2025. Pavon noted that this
was inaccurate, and that she had made efforts to contact mother,
but mother would either quickly escalate, refer Pavon to her
attorney, or refuse to engage at all.
On May 5, 2025, Dr. Kaser-Boyd informed Pavon that
mother provided incomplete information and responses during
the psychological evaluation, and as a result, one of the three
required tests was found to be invalid. Because of the
inconsistencies and gaps in mother’s psychological evaluation,
Dr. Kaser-Boyd believed that mother needed to redo her
evaluation in person. Dr. Kaser-Boyd contacted mother to inform
her that she would need to retest. Dr. Kaser-Boyd reported that
mother responded “ ‘with weird text messages, questioning the
validity of the assessments and questions.’ ” On May 5, 2025,
Pavon asked mother to at least provide a zip code to indicate her
general vicinity so Pavon could assist with referrals. Mother
10
responded she was in the 90013-90019 zip code areas. DCFS
noted that as of the writing of the report, mother had not enrolled
in any court-ordered services. DCFS expressed continued
concern that mother had not taken accountability and struggled
to realize the importance of taking the initiative to participate in
court-ordered services to assist with the reunification process.
Pavon noted that mother did not discuss any services that
pertained to E.C. like parenting classes or in-person visitation,
and did not inquire about E.C.’s services. DCFS also noted that
mother had not had any in-person visits with E.C., and did not
call him at her scheduled dates and times. Ms. S. stated that she
talked to mother about starting in-person visits with E.C.,
however mother continued to make excuses about why she could
not have in-person visits and indicated that she had more
important things to do and was busy with work. Pavon asked
mother when she would start visiting E.C. in person, and mother
avoided the question and stated, “ ‘you’ll have to consult with my
attorney, I can’t answer questions besides that.’ ” On May 5,
2025, mother texted Pavon, “ ‘I’m not going to in-person visits
release my son right away where’s the document I need to sign.’ ”
Pavon expressed concern that mother continued to place
her focus on the father and her claims of domestic violence
instead of reunification with E.C. Pavon opined that it appeared
mother was deflecting and avoiding accountability by suggesting
that the reason E.C. was removed from her care was due to the
domestic violence incident between her and father that occurred
in July 2022, prior to E.C.’s birth. Pavon stated that mother
appeared to be under the impression that if she filed a
restraining order against father, E.C. would be returned to her
care, however she did not take accountability for her own actions
11
and how they contributed to E.C.’s removal. The report
recommended termination of family reunification services for
mother.
At a hearing on May 12, 2025, the juvenile court ordered
mother to complete her Evidence Code section 730 psychological
evaluation hearing in person. Immediately following the hearing,
Pavon e-mailed mother a copy of the minute order to both e-mail
addresses she provided, and informed mother that the court
ordered her to re-do her evaluation. Pavon also sent mother a
follow-up text message with this information. Mother did not
respond to either the e-mail or text message.
Mother filed for a temporary restraining order against
father, which was granted on May 8, 2025.3 On May 27, 2025,
DCFS filed a section 388 petition to request an Evidence Code
section 730 psychological evaluation for father.
On June 3, 2025, Pavon called and texted mother to ask if
she had started participating in any court-ordered services or
attended her in-person psychological evaluation. Mother did not
respond. As of June 24, 2025, Mother had not made any efforts to
complete her in-person psychological evaluation. She also had
not had any in-person visits with E.C. since August 2024, when
E.C. was initially detained.
C. Six-month review hearing
On July 1, 2025, the juvenile court held a six-month review
hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e). Mother
appeared virtually and was represented by counsel. DCFS
3 The temporary restraining order was reissued several
times. A hearing on the temporary restraining order was
eventually scheduled for July 8, 2025.
12
recommended that the court terminate family reunification
services for mother and extend father’s reunification services an
additional three months to await the results of his Evidence Code
section 730 psychological evaluation. Mother’s counsel asked the
court to continue reunification services for mother, or, in the
alternative, for the opportunity to reinstate services in the future.
Mother’s counsel informed the court that mother would be willing
to testify that she now has transportation, and would be able to
have in-person visits with E.C. Counsel for E.C. agreed with the
extension of services for father, and recommended termination of
services for mother.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that DCFS provided mother with reasonable services, and that
mother failed to participate or make substantive progress in the
court-ordered programs. The court found that mother did not
show she had gained insight into the reasons the family was
brought before the juvenile court. The court further found that it
did not appear that further reunification services would be
helpful, or that mother would even participate. The court
concluded that returning E.C. to mother’s care would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child, and there was no
substantial probability that E.C. may be returned to mother
within six months. Accordingly, the court terminated
reunification services for mother.
As to father, the juvenile court ordered a continuation of
his reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.21,
subdivision (f), hearing. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
13
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory scheme
“When a child has been removed from a parent’s custody,
the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to
facilitate the reunification of the family. [Citations.] Such
services may, depending on the case, include evaluations and
assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse
treatment and testing, and other forms of assistance.” (Michael
G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624, fn. omitted.)
Under section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(B), “[p]arents of
children under three [years of age] are presumptively eligible for
at least six months of reunification services.” (Michael G., at
p. 625.)
At the six-month status review hearing, the juvenile court
evaluates whether DCFS has proven, “by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to their parent . . . would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)(1).) Where, as here, the child is under the age of three,
the juvenile court may, at the six-month review hearing, schedule
a section 366.26 hearing if it “finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make
substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.”
(§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3).) “If, however, the court finds there is a
substantial probability that the child . . . may be returned to their
parent . . . within 6 months . . . , the court shall continue the case
to the 12-month permanency hearing.” (Ibid.)
14
II. Standard of review
“ ‘We review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial
evidence, and the juvenile court’s decisionmaking process based
on those findings for abuse of discretion.’ ” (B.D. v. Superior
Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1132, 1150 (B.D.); see also Patricia
W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 419 [reasonable
services finding]; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 758, 763 [substantial risk-of-detriment finding].)
Under this standard, we do not reweigh evidence or exercise
independent judgment but review the record “in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations and draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders.”
(Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688–
689.) “ ‘[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved
by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ ” (B.D., at
p. 1150, quoting Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
995–996.)
III. Reasonableness of reunification services
“The [D]epartment must make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ to
provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of
each family.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
996, 1010 (Mark N.).) “The effort must be made to provide
reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in doing so
or the prospects of success. [Citations.] The adequacy of the
reunification plan and of the [D]epartment’s efforts to provide
suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the
15
particular case. [Citations.] . . . ‘[T]he record should show that
the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss
of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the
course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist
the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’ ” (Id.
at p. 1011.) Reunification services do not need to be perfect or
“ ‘the best that might be provided in an ideal world’ ”—only
reasonable under the circumstances of the case. (In re A.G.
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001.)
IV. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that DCFS offered mother reasonable
services
Mother contends DCFS did not provide her with reasonable
services before the July 1, 2025 six-month review hearing. We
disagree. Substantial evidence shows that DCFS “ma[d]e a
‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ to provide reasonable services responsive
to the unique needs of [the] family” in this case. (Mark N., supra,
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.) Specifically, the record shows that
DCFS: (1) frequently called, texted, or e-mailed mother,
beginning in November 2024, in an attempt to provide her with
her case plan and discuss court-ordered services; (2) continued its
attempts to contact mother, even after she changed her e-mail
address and cell phone number; (3) reached out to mother several
times to obtain her mailing address to mail her court notices;
(4) attempted to help mother locate local service providers, and
offered to help mother contact a provider once she chose one that
met her needs; (5) attempted to facilitate in-person visitations
between mother and E.C. at the DCFS office and at mother’s
shelter; and (6) attempted to help mother schedule an Evidence
16
Code section 730 psychological evaluation, and sent her several
text message reminders about her appointments. DCFS made
these efforts even as mother exhibited hostility and racism
toward its social workers throughout the case. That DCFS could
have potentially done more does not show unreasonableness. “In
almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been
provided more frequently and that the services provided were
imperfect. The standard is not . . . the best that might be
provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were
reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2
Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
Mother contends that DCFS nonetheless failed to provide
reasonable reunification services because, she claims, DCFS:
(1) did not tailor services to her particular needs, especially her
mental illness; (2) placed the onus on her to initiate contact with
DCFS rather than on DCFS to maintain contact with her; and
(3) failed to work closely with her to make sure she understood
the court orders, had housing assistance, and had reliable
transportation to attend appointments and visits. We disagree.
Throughout the case, the social worker kept in reasonable
contact with mother and made reasonable efforts to provide her
with her case plan and assist and encourage her to comply with
her plan. DCFS presented evidence of the social worker’s
frequent attempts to contact mother through phone calls, text
messages, and e-mails, despite mother changing her phone
number and e-mail address, insulting the social worker, and
making false accusations. Mother often did not reply to DCFS’s
communications or refused to engage in any discussion of her
case plan participation. Even after mother insulted and
threatened the social worker, the social worker continued her
efforts to contact mother and attempted to assist her in
17
scheduling the Evidence Code section 730 evaluation and
contacting a service provider. “While it is true the social worker
is charged with maintaining reasonable contact with the parents
during the course of the reunification plan, he or she cannot do so
without some degree of cooperation from the parent.” (In re
T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 698.) Mother’s cooperation in
this case was minimal.
Mother argues that DCFS failed to provide reasonable
services because they failed to offer her housing assistance.
However, DCFS asked mother several times about her living
situation and mother refused to provide this information. Mother
fails to identify what further actions DCFS should have taken to
assist her with housing when she refused to provide any
information about her housing situation or needs. In any event,
there is no evidence in the record that housing issues prevented
mother from complying with her case plan.
Mother also contends that DCFS failed to provide
reasonable services because they failed to provide transportation
assistance. In an e-mail dated January 6, 2025, the social worker
informed mother that transportation assistance was available
and that DCFS could provide her with a monthly bus pass to
assist her with completing her court-ordered services. There is
no indication in the record that mother requested transportation
assistance or raised this issue with the department before the
six-month review hearing when the reasonable services finding
was made. Instead, when Pavon asked mother when she would
start visiting E.C. in person, mother avoided the question and
told the Pavon to consult her attorney. Mother later told Pavon,
“ ‘I’m not going to in-person visits release my son right away
where’s the document I need to sign.’ ” Because there is no
reason to believe DCFS was aware of mother’s transportation
18
concerns before the six-month review hearing, mother may not
rely on it in arguing that the services provided were
unreasonable. (See In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404,
416 [“If Mother felt during the reunification period that the
services offered her were inadequate, she had the assistance of
counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a
better plan: ‘ “The law casts upon the party the duty of looking
after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any
infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party
would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections
until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be
that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.”
[Citation.]’ ”].)
Mother further claims there was an unreasonable delay in
providing her with a case plan and referrals for mental health
services. She asserts DCFS waited more than two months to
send her a copy of her case plan and more than six months to
provide referrals for mental health services. The record reflects
that DCFS attempted to contact mother in November 2024, one
month after the October disposition hearing, and that call went
unanswered. The social worker called mother in December 2024,
and eventually was able to communicate with mother via text
message, but mother did not want to discuss the case plan.
Mother did not appear for her psychological evaluation on March
31, 2025, which would have determined what further services or
interventions were necessary to assist her in providing
appropriate care for E.C. She then delayed the evaluation
further by rescheduling her appointment twice. After she was
told that the evaluation results were invalid and she would need
to retest in person, mother did not respond to multiple phone
calls, messages, or e-mails from the social worker and Dr. Kaser-
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Boyd, and did not make any efforts to complete her in-person
psychological evaluation. Under these circumstances, the record
shows that the department made reasonable efforts to provide
mother with her case plan and referrals for mental health
services.
This case is readily distinguishable from T.J. v. Superior
Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, upon which mother relies. In
T.J., the agency placed mother on a 6- to 12-month waiting list
for individual therapy and then waited four more months before
making an alternate appropriate referral. (Id. at p. 1244.) The
reviewing court concluded that substantial evidence did not
support the reasonable services finding based on this delay in
initiating therapy. (Id. at p. 1248.)
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that DCFS provided mother with
adequate and reasonable reunification services.
V. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
termination of services
Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in
terminating her reunification services because, she claims, there
was a substantial probability that E.C. “may” have been returned
to her by the 12-month review hearing. We disagree.
Mother concedes she did not make substantive progress in
her individual counseling and parenting classes, since she failed
to enroll in or attend any court-ordered programs or services.
(B.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140 [substantive progress
assesses “whether a parent has demonstrated meaningful
engagement and improvement in the various educational,
therapeutic, and assistive components of the case plan”].) The
evidence further reflects that she also failed to substantially
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comply with her case plan. Mother’s participation in her case
plan was minimal: she failed to visit E.C. in person during the
entirety of the dependency proceedings, her FaceTime visits with
him were sporadic, and she did not schedule or attend her court-
ordered in-person psychological evaluation. Moreover, mother
was unable or unwilling to address the problems that led to E.C.’s
out-of-home placement. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283,
293 [“[i]n light of mother’s failure to recognize the risks to which
she was exposing the minor, there was no reason to believe the
conditions would not persist should the minor remain in her
home”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One
cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”].)
The evidence does not compel a finding of a substantial
probability that E.C. would be returned to mother by the 12-
month review hearing if services were continued. (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)(3).) Although the challenged order stems from the six-
month review hearing, due to the actual elapse of time in this
case, the 12-month review hearing was only three months away.4
Thus, there would have been only three months available to
4 Under section 366.21, subdivision (f)(1), the outer time
limit for the 12-month review hearing is 12 months “after the
date the child entered foster care, as that date is determined
pursuant to Section 361.49.” Section 361.49, subdivision (a),
provides that a child is deemed to have entered foster care “on
the earlier of the date of the jurisdictional hearing . . . or the date
that is 60 days after the date on which the child was initially
removed from the physical custody of their parent or guardian.”
Here, the earlier of those two dates was September 30, 2024, 60
days after E.C. was removed from mother’s care. Thus, the outer
time limit for the 12-month review hearing was September 30,
2025, almost three months after the six-month review hearing.
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mother to show that E.C. would be safely returned to her care if
services were continued. Considering mother had yet to
participate in any court-ordered services, had not scheduled or
attended her in-person psychological evaluation, had not visited
E.C. in person for 11 months, had not acknowledged or taken any
responsibility for the circumstances that led to E.C.’s removal,
and had not made any progress in resolving her parenting
failures, the trial court could reasonably find there was no
substantial probability that mother would have sufficiently
addressed the problems that led to E.C.’s removal. Indeed, in
terminating reunification services the court noted that it was
unclear “whether or not mother would participate in further
reunification services at this point.” The record supports the
juvenile court’s finding that there was no substantial probability
that E.C. would be returned to mother’s care.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
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