Filed 7/8/26 In re E.C. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re E.C., a Person Coming Under
B353427
the Juvenile Court Law.
J.W., (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP02017A)
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent;
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate.
George A. Turner, Jr., Judge. Petition denied.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent
W. Davis for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services.
Children’s Law Center, Liz Lopez, and Lindsay Ruth
Joanou for Real Party in Interest E.C., a Minor.
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INTRODUCTION
In this juvenile dependency matter, J.W. (father) seeks
extraordinary writ relief from the court’s order terminating his
family reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 to consider the
implementation of a permanent plan of adoption for his son, E.C.
(the minor). Father argues that no substantial evidence supports
the court’s detriment finding. He further argues that as a
nonoffending noncustodial parent, he should have been given
custody of E.C. under section 361.2, subdivision (a). Next, father
claims the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) failed to make a reasonable services
finding, and in the alternative, substantial evidence does not
support the reasonable services finding. Lastly, father argues he
should have been awarded custody of E.C. under Family Code
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.
2
section 3044. We reject father’s arguments and deny the petition
for an extraordinary writ.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Petition (§ 300)
We set forth only those facts necessary to resolve this writ
proceeding. As mother is not a party to this proceeding, we focus
almost exclusively on father’s circumstances.
E.C. was born in May 2023. Father is E.C.’s biological
father, though at the time dependency proceedings began, his
paternity was not yet established. On May 24, 2024, DCFS
received an immediate response referral alleging emotional
abuse, general neglect, and caretaker absence/incapacity of E.C.
by mother. Mother provided the DCFS social worker with two
different identities for E.C.’s father. She also said that she was
fleeing domestic abuse from father.
On May 27, 2024, a new five-day referral was generated for
the family. The reporting party alleged that during a phone
intake, mother claimed she and father got into an argument two
weeks prior and father physically assaulted her in the presence of
“the children.” Mother told the reporting party that father
continued to harass her via phone, and she had a difficult time
getting away from him.
On May 28, 2024, the DCFS social worker obtained copies
of court documents for a paternity case filed by father and
subsequently attempted to contact him. On May 31, 2024, father
called the social worker and affirmed that he believed he was
E.C.’s biological father. He said he was in a relationship with
mother when she became pregnant, but mother did not inform
him when she went to the hospital to give birth, and did not come
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home after giving birth to E.C. Although mother informed father
that she had given birth, she refused to provide father with any
information about their son, including his name or his
whereabouts, and refused to allow father to see him. Father told
DCFS that he had never met E.C. but wanted to be a father to
him. He claimed mother was abusive to him and he denied
physically abusing her.
On June 20, 2024, the social worker contacted father and
explained that DCFS might be proceeding with a court case for
E.C. The social worker asked father if he was willing and able to
care for E.C. if he were to be considered unsafe in mother’s care.
Father responded that he wanted to care for him but was not
sure if his current housing situation and work schedule would
prevent him from doing so. A few days later, the social worker
assessed father’s studio apartment located in a Veteran’s
Administration (VA) housing project and found no safety
concerns. The social worker explained to father that he had not
yet been confirmed as the biological father, but DCFS could
potentially provide him with resources for determining paternity
via dependency court. Father informed the social worker that if
E.C. were ever released into his care, he would need advanced
notice since his current housing program did not allow children,
and he would need to move.
On July 1, 2024, DCFS filed a petition under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) on behalf of E.C. alleging the child was at
substantial risk of serious physical harm as a result of mother
failing to meet the child’s needs and having a history of mental
and emotional problems. At a hearing on July 2, 2024, the
juvenile court made prima facie findings that E.C. was described
by section 300 and ordered him detained from mother. The court
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declined to make any detention or release findings as to father
since he was only the alleged father at the time, pending a DNA
test. On August 1, 2024, E.C. was removed from mother’s
custody and was placed in foster care in the home of caregiver
Ms. S.
Father told DCFS that he joined the Navy in 2002 but
received a general discharge in 2005 due to misconduct. As a
result, he had limited eligibility for post-military benefits, with
the exception of housing. Father reported having a formal
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder and Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD), and also experienced symptoms of
anxiety. He said he used Zoloft when he was on active duty but
had not taken it in years. Father reported drinking alcohol
approximately once a week. He previously smoked marijuana
but had not smoked for a year. He also used methamphetamine,
cocaine, and ecstasy recreationally, but his last use was “ ‘a few
months ago.’ ” He had never participated in a formal drug and
alcohol program. Father had a history of arrests including
possession of a knife and a concealed weapon. His convictions
were misdemeanors, and he was no longer on probation. Father
said if the paternity testing determined he was E.C.’s biological
father, he wanted to be involved with the child and considered for
custody.
DCFS filed a first amended section 300 petition on
September 19, 2024, in which it added count b-3, alleging that
the violent conduct on the part of father against mother
endangered E.C.’s physical health and safety and placed him at
risk of serious harm, damage, and danger. DCFS reported
father’s criminal history included an arrest for battery on July
21, 2022, and mother and father confirmed this occurred after a
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verbal and physical altercation between them. Father said the
charges against him were later dismissed. DCFS also reported it
had received a suspected child abuse report on May 2, 2023, one
day after E.C.’s birth, in which the reporting party expressed
concern about domestic violence between mother and father. The
caller stated mother reported the child’s father elbowed her in the
belly. The caller expressed concern that mother left her domestic
violence shelter and ultimately returned to father’s residence.
Father’s first supervised visit with E.C. occurred on
September 24, 2024. The social worker reported that father
showed “extremely minimal parenting skills” and asked
rudimentary questions about whether E.C. had teeth, whether
his diaper should be changed once a day, whether he liked water,
whether he could fall, and whether he slept at night. The social
worker also reported that during the visit, E.C. ran quickly
towards the parking lot, and father did not stop him. The social
worker and human services aide (HSA) were forced to run after
E.C.
After father’s second supervised visit with E.C., the social
worker reported “[t]he visit went a little better, but [father] still
needs guidance and prompting EVERY STEP of the way.” The
social worker reported that father wanted to have in-person visits
only once per month because he said he was looking for
employment and this was better for his schedule. The social
worker encouraged father to visit every other Tuesday. Father
informed the social worker that mother contacted him a few days
ago and asked him to visit her.
In September 2024, father tested negative for controlled
substances. On October 3, 2024, DCFS reported: “A DNA [test]
determined that [father] is [E.C.’s] biological father, but coupled
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with concerns of domestic violence between him and [mother],
there are concerns regarding his parenting knowledge, natural
support system, mental health, substance abuse history and
protective capacities.” The juvenile court deemed father to be
E.C.’s biological father.
Mother denied having contact with father but reported
father continued to harass her by texting her pictures of him
conducting family time with E.C. Father did not deny contact
with mother and said they would initiate contact with each other,
and that he wanted to reconcile with her.
II. Adjudication and Disposition
A contested adjudication and disposition hearing was held
on October 18, 2024. The juvenile court sustained the amended
section 300 petition.2 The court declared E.C. a dependent of the
juvenile court and ordered reunification services for both parents.
The court ordered monitored visitation for father for a minimum
of six hours per week. The court also ordered father to attend
individual counseling to address “intimate partner violence, child
protection and safety,” as well as parenting instruction. Since
the court deemed father to be the child’s biological father but not
yet a presumed father, it found he was not entitled to placement.3
2 The petition was again amended to state: the “violent
conduct on the part of the mother and the father endangers the
children’s [sic] physical health and safety, creates a detrimental
home environment, and places the children [sic] at risk of serious
harm, damage, and danger.”
3 Mother appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings,
and on March 16, 2026, this court concluded that the evidence
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III. Family reunification
A. Six-month review period
The juvenile court set a section 366.21, subdivision (e) six-
month review hearing for April 22, 2025, which was continued at
father’s request. On March 28, 2025, DCFS filed a status review
report. DCFS reported that father was residing in veterans’
housing and was unemployed but looking for work. He was in
partial compliance with the court-ordered case plan and was
enrolled in a four-hour online parenting class, instead of the 10-
week program the social worker recommended. Father also
enrolled in an individual therapy program, which he decided to
end after five sessions. Father’s therapist stated that although
they covered some case issues, father preferred to focus on
talking about oppression, social injustices, and wealthy
celebrities. Father’s therapist had concerns regarding father’s
mental health and his diagnoses of PTSD and depression and
reported to DCFS that father might have a psychiatric diagnosis
or developmental delay.
During the reporting period, father had monitored, in-
person visitation with E.C. once per month at his request. The
social worker encouraged father to have more frequent visitation
with E.C., especially if his goal was to reunify with him and form
a parent/child bond. The social worker created a visitation
schedule that allowed for twice-per-month visits. Father visited
E.C. twice per month from October 2024 until January 2025 and
then requested to return to once-a-month visits. The social
supported the jurisdictional finding under count b-1, and
affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
orders. (In re E.C. (Mar. 16, 2026, B342905) [nonpub. opn.].)
8
worker re-wrote father’s visitation schedule to allow once-per-
month visits.
During in-person visits, the social worker observed that
father had “very limited parenting skills” and needed “consistent
guidance and prompting.” Nevertheless, father showed up on
time, brought E.C. snacks, toys, and clothing, and had good
intentions of wanting to be a father figure to E.C. Father
reported wanting to be present in E.C.’s life, however, he
appeared to be indecisive about having him in his care full-time.
Father would ask, “ ‘Is it [okay] if [E.C.] stays with caregiver for a
couple more years?’ ” Throughout the period of supervision,
father acknowledged that he was not in a stable position to care
for E.C. full-time. He also acknowledged that he had a very
limited support system and did not feel that anyone in his family
would be a good source of support for him and E.C.
DCFS reported concerns that father wanted to be in a
relationship with mother. During monitored visits father
questioned why mother did not call him and stated that if given
the opportunity he would want to get back together with her. He
also asked the social worker to give him mother’s phone number
or give mother his phone number. The social worker informed
father about the “importance of maintaining clear boundaries
with mother” given her accusations against him of domestic
violence and stalking. Father nevertheless appeared willing to
reunite with mother and stated he would like to co-parent with
her. Father claimed that mother was lying about her domestic
violence claims against him. Mother said she had to change her
phone number because father had been calling her from different
numbers. Mother also reported that father was her “abuser” and
she feared for her own safety and the safety of E.C.
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A VA social worker who worked with father spoke with
DCFS on March 12, 2025. The VA social worker said that he did
not have any concerns about father or any violent behavior.
However, he had some concerns for father’s mental health. He
further stated that he would not be able to approve E.C. living
with father at his current residence, as it was not appropriate for
children. He would also be concerned about E.C. living with
father. Although father had good intentions, he did not feel that
father was prepared to independently care for E.C. at that time.
Father tested negative for drug use on September 18, 2024.
However, during an in-person visit on January 14, 2024, father
exhibited atypical behavior. He was observed standing close to
the wall and gazing at it, rocking back and forth, and mumbling
and laughing quietly to himself. During this visit, E.C. was not
feeling well and began to cry, reaching out his arms signaling for
father to pick him up. Father did not pick up on E.C.’s cues and
just looked at E.C. and then back at the wall while he continued
to laugh quietly to himself. The HSA had to guide father to pick
up and rock the child to sleep. Father disclosed that he had
smoked marijuana a few days earlier, but subsequently tested
negative for substances.
In March 2025, father asked DCFS if it would be alright for
E.C. to remain with his caregiver for a couple of more years until
father’s situation stabilized. Father completed a 10-week
parenting course in March 2025. During a monitored visit, father
asked the social worker for mother’s phone number, which the
social worker declined to provide. Father asked the social worker
to give mother his phone number, but the social worker declined
due to mother’s allegations of domestic violence and stalking.
Father stated he had tried to call mother on her cell phone but
10
could not get through. Father asked to have unmonitored visits
with E.C., but DCFS expressed concern about him allowing
mother access to the child during his visits. DCFS explained to
father that allowing mother to have access to E.C. could have a
detrimental impact on E.C. and may also negatively impact his
DCFS case.
On April 16, 2025, father told the social worker that he was
concerned about not being able to be a part of E.C.’s life and did
not want him to be adopted. He also told the social worker, “ ‘I’m
[okay] with [E.C.] staying where he is.’ ” Father stated he did not
feel he was in a good place to care for E.C. full-time, his housing
was not appropriate for a child, and he would “ ‘need about a year
or two to get everything together’ ” before he could take care of
E.C. He also expressed that he did not want E.C. to be adopted
by his caregiver because she is Black. Father said that he would
prefer for E.C. to be placed with a White or Latina woman
because “ ‘they are more caring and have their finances
together.’ ” He added, “ ‘I was raised by Black parents and I
didn’t like it. I’m Black and I’m telling you this.’ ” Father asked
for unmonitored visits with E.C., but the social worker expressed
concern about father’s ability to be alone with the child, as he
struggled to recognize cues. The social worker was also
concerned that father would allow mother access to E.C., which
posed a risk to the child. Father told DCFS, “ ‘I don’t see her as a
bad person, she just didn’t have her life together and she ran off
with [E.C.] . . . I never wanted to stop talking to her, she never
did anything wrong to me, she made a false accusation against
me, but that’s just how some people are.’ ” Father stated he was
trying to help the mother out. DCFS continued to recommend
termination of family reunification services and the scheduling of
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a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. DCFS stated
that although father had good intentions and wanted to be a part
of E.C.’s life, he minimized the seriousness of the allegations
made against him by mother and continued to state that he
wanted a relationship with her, which would place the child at
risk of further abuse and neglect. DCFS also noted that father
only had visitations with E.C. once per month, which was not
substantial to justify a safe return to his care.
B. Interim review report
On May 7, 2025, DCFS submitted an interim review report.
DCFS reported that father continued to have in-person,
monitored visits with E.C. once per month, along with
inconsistent virtual phone calls. Father reconnected with his
adoptive sibling, E.C.’s paternal aunt, who he had not spoken
with in over 10 years. The paternal aunt stated that she was
unable to care for E.C., but she attended two visits with father
and supported him by providing guidance and parenting advice.
Although father was working to rebuild his relationship with the
paternal aunt, he told DCFS, “ ‘[It has] been so long that I’ve
talked to her, I really don’t know what she is all about, and I
don’t want her all up in my business.’ ” Father continued to
express his desire to have unmonitored overnight visits with
E.C., however, DCFS continued to have concerns regarding
father’s ability to provide proper care and supervision.
At a monitored visit on May 6, 2025, the social worker
observed that E.C. ran up to father for the first time and gave
him a hug. The social worker reported that father showed
initiative to learn, but he continued to require frequent
prompting and guidance. The social worker reported that father
was easily distracted during visits and did not recognize when
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E.C. was approaching a hazardous situation. Father denied
wanting to get back together with mother, but said he wanted to
co-parent and raise E.C. together with her. Father informed
DCFS that he was being evicted from his housing and would be
living in a temporary VA shelter. Father did not request to
increase the frequency of his visitations with E.C. and stated that
he wanted his next visit to be on June 3, 2025. On multiple
occasions, father stated that although he wanted custody of E.C.,
his situation was unstable and his focus was on finding a job and
a new place to live. He stated that if E.C. remained with his
caregiver, he wanted to continue visiting him and be a part of his
life. Father admitted that he had tried calling mother in May
2025. The social worker cautioned father against calling mother
if she did not want to talk to him as it could negatively impact his
case. He responded, “ ‘It’s just a bunch of stupidity. I didn’t do
anything to her, it’s just weird. I have my attorney if there’s any
issues. She’s not even doing anything. I’m the one that’s doing
something for the case.’ ” Father stated that mother had tried
reaching out to him on Facebook. The report recommended
termination of family reunification services for both mother and
father.
Mother filed for a temporary restraining order against
father, which was granted on May 8, 2025.4 On May 27, 2025,
DCFS filed a section 388 petition to request a psychological
evaluation for father.
4 The temporary restraining order was reissued several
times. A hearing on the temporary restraining order was
eventually scheduled for September 16, 2025.
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C. Six-month review hearing
On June 24, 2025, DCFS submitted a last minute
information to the court. DCFS reported that father was not
currently participating in any parenting classes or individual
therapy services. On June 3, 2025, the social worker provided
father with a resource for a fatherhood conference. Father
stated, however, that he was not interested and did not feel the
need to attend as he had already attended a similar conference.
Father continued to have monitored visits with E.C. once
per month. On June 3, 2025, father attended a monitored visit
with E.C. at a park, along with the paternal aunt and her infant
son. DCFS observed that father did well with E.C., however he
continued to need prompting, guidance, and reminders about
supervising E.C. at all times. The social worker reported that at
times father appeared to lose track of what E.C. was doing. The
social worker had to remind father to follow E.C. when he
wandered off. Father was in the beginning stages of learning to
recognize E.C.’s cues, assess for safety, and provide proper
supervision, but needed guidance when working through E.C.’s
temper tantrums and behaviors. Father was also beginning to
learn that he needed to supervise E.C. at all times. DCFS noted
that father required ongoing education on providing E.C. with a
healthy, well-balanced diet and more education on basic
parenting skills, age-appropriate discipline, and ensuring proper
supervision/safety. Father informed the social worker that his
housing situation remained unstable. The social worker observed
that the paternal aunt appeared to be knowledgeable and helpful
and that father appeared to be receptive to her. Based on this
information, DCFS recommended continuing family reunification
services for father.
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On July 1, 2025, the juvenile court held a six-month review
hearing pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e).5 The juvenile
court ordered a continuation of father’s reunification services,
ordered a psychological evaluation, ordered father to continue
participating in individual therapy, and set the matter for a
section 366.21, subdivision (f) hearing.
On September 16, 2025, the court granted a permanent
restraining order protecting mother from father, set to expire on
September 16, 2026.
On September 25, 2025, DCFS submitted an interim review
report. DCFS reported that father continued to have visits with
E.C. twice a month. On September 4, 2025, DCFS encouraged
father to increase his visitation time to once per week with
additional Facetime visits. Father responded, “ ‘I’ll increase my
visits if that’s what the Court wants me to do.’ ” The social
worker told father his decision should not be based on what the
court wanted him to do, but rather his desire to strengthen his
bond with E.C. and build his parenting skills. Father responded,
“ ‘I mean, I’ll have more visits with [E.C.], if that’s what you guys
want me to do, and if that’s what looks good for the Court.’ ”
Father agreed to increase his visits to once per week, along with
the occasional FaceTime visits.
On September 16, 2025, father informed the social worker
that he wanted to return to visits twice per month. Nevertheless,
father maintained that he did not want E.C. to be adopted and
5 At this hearing, the court concluded that returning E.C. to
mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
child, and that there was no substantial probability that E.C.
may be returned to mother within six months. Accordingly, the
court terminated reunification services for mother.
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wanted custody of him. The social worker reported that E.C. had
formed a bond with father, and that father had shown progress
with E.C. However, DCFS expressed concern about father’s
ability to provide ongoing 24-hour parental care and supervision,
considering he had stated on multiple occasions that he only
wanted to visit E.C. twice per month. Although father had made
some improvements, he continued to require frequent re-direction
and prompting from the social worker and HSA. Father asked
multiple times for overnight and unsupervised visits with E.C.,
however DCFS did not liberalize father’s visits due to these
concerns. Father’s DCFS parent partner and therapist also
indicated that father should continue having monitored visits
with E.C.
Father was enrolled in individual therapy with a Substance
Use Disorder Certified Counselor, who was not a licensed
therapist. The counselor told DCFS that father had made it seem
like it was the caregiver’s decision to only have two visits per
month with E.C. The counselor informed DCFS that father
appeared hesitant to increase his visits with E.C. because he said
he needed to find a job. The counselor noted that DCFS had
assisted father with job searches and even provided him with
multiple job opportunities, but father turned them down. The
counselor informed father that if he accepted a job, DCFS could
assist with childcare, but father continued to refuse and turn
down jobs. The counselor expressed concern that father did not
recognize the importance of developing a solid, concrete plan to
care for and provide for his son. The counselor also voiced
concern regarding father’s protective capacity and his ability to
care for E.C. full-time. Lastly, the counselor mentioned that
father tended to avoid the issues of accountability and primarily
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blamed mother for the DCFS case. When the counselor asked
father if he still cared for mother, he deflected.
On December 15, 2025, DCFS submitted a status review
report. DCFS reported that father was residing in veteran’s
housing in Los Angeles. DCFS conducted a home assessment and
found no immediate concerns or visible safety hazards, but noted
that the apartment was not child-proofed. The social worker told
father that he needed to child-proof his apartment properly to
ensure E.C.’s safety prior to exploring the possibility of having
home visitations. Father strongly advocated for overnight and
unsupervised visits with E.C. On multiple occasions, father
discussed his goals for reunification with the social worker.
Father was forthcoming stating that he wanted to regain custody
of E.C. But he was not sure he was in the right place to provide
full-time care. He asked several times if E.C. could remain in his
placement for “ ‘[two] more years or until his situation
stabilized.’ ” Since October 7, 2025, father had weekly visits with
E.C. for two hours a week. DCFS reported that although father
was making progress building an emotional bond with E.C., he
continued to require prompting and guidance throughout his
visits. Because father’s visits were primarily used for playtime,
DCFS noted there was very little time for him to demonstrate his
ability to provide day-to-day parenting skills and manage
stressful situations.
Father was participating in court-ordered individual
therapy, though there were concerns that he was only requesting
to have sessions once a month for 30 minutes. As of September
2025, father had only attended two sessions, in which he focused
on finding employment. The therapist told DCFS that father did
not mention E.C. or any custody issues during the sessions. The
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social worker had multiple conversations with father regarding
his need to participate in more frequent sessions to discuss case
issues such as domestic violence, maintaining appropriate
boundaries with mother, and his own childhood trauma. The
social worker also encouraged father to participate in additional
parenting programs, since he had limited experience caring for a
child E.C.’s age. Father felt he did not need to participate in
additional individual therapy or parenting programs.
On October 7, 2025, the social worker spoke with father
about the restraining order issued by the juvenile court and
reminded him that he and mother were not to have contact with
one another. Father indicated he could contact mother in a year,
once the restraining order ended. The social worker observed
that father failed to consider how contact with mother would
impact him or E.C. On November 19, 2025, the social worker
discussed with father his responsibility to be protective towards
E.C., as well as father’s previous statements about wanting to co-
parent with mother. Father stated, “ ‘I mean I did want to co-
parent with her, but if you guys don’t want me [to,] I won’t.’ ” On
December 9, 2025, father told DCFS, “if the mother wants to be
with her son, it’s [okay] I have no problem with it.” The paternal
aunt expressed that because father is very forgiving, she was
worried he would allow mother to have full access to E.C., which
would present a safety risk to E.C.
Father’s court-ordered psychological evaluation indicated
that father had no current psychiatric symptoms and did not
present with any overt current mental illness. The evaluation
noted that father needed continued mental health monitoring.
The evaluation stated: “ ‘Given [father’s] demonstrated
commitment to his child, completion of required services, and
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apparent mental health stability, he appears to be an appropriate
candidate for reunification services.’ ” DCFS noted that although
the evaluation indicated no overt current mental illness, the
doctor documented concerns regarding father’s judgment and
unrealistic expectations of parenting and added that father’s
previous history of PTSD and depression would need ongoing
mental health services. Yet father only wanted one 30-minute
therapy session a month in which he focused on finding a job.
DCFS expressed continued concerns regarding father’s
ability to properly parent E.C. since he only focused on meeting
the court requirements, minimized the need for ongoing
education, and did not discuss case issues in therapy. Father
also appeared to continue to minimize the seriousness of allowing
mother unlimited access to E.C. and implied that he would
contact mother after the restraining order expired, and had no
issue with allowing mother to be with E.C. DCFS emphasized
that the social worker spoke with multiple service providers who
had concerns regarding father’s ability to independently care for
E.C. DCFS recommended an additional six months of family
reunification services for father.
On December 22, 2025, DCFS filed a last minute
information with the court. DCFS reported that on December 16,
2025, the social worker supervised a visit between father and
E.C. at a local shopping mall. The social worker observed that
father was focusing his attention on another man at the food
court. The social worker asked if father was okay, and father
stated that he felt like the man was staring at him and trying to
start trouble. In front of E.C., father told the social worker, “ ‘I
don’t like Black people and I don’t like Hispanic people, they
always want to start trouble with me.’ ” Father also told the
19
social worker, “ ‘I really don’t want my son with a Black
caregiver, I know she takes good care of him, but I would much
rather have him be with a White caregiver.’ ” The social worker
observed that father was more anxious than usual.
At the shopping mall playground, father sat down and
allowed E.C. to play, and approximately 10 minutes later, father
had a verbal altercation with another man who was supervising
his own child. The social worker and HSA quickly walked over as
father and the other man were arguing and moving in closer
towards each other. The DCFS staff members attempted to
deescalate the situation and father accused the man of trying to
attack him. The other man said he was minding his own
business and watching his grandchild. The social worker and
HSA did not observe the man try to attack father at any point.
The social worker and HSA had to re-direct father multiple times
and encourage him to put E.C. in the stroller and walk away from
the situation, but father continued to be upset and tried to make
eye contact with the other man from afar. Father became upset
when the DCFS staff members addressed him by his name
because he did not want anyone to know his identity. Father
explained to the social worker that he felt the other man was
being racist because he was wearing a Bob Marley t-shirt. The
DCFS staff members continued to try to de-escalate father and
reminded him that E.C. was present and encouraged him to re-
direct his attention to his visit.
At the end of the visit, father inquired about mother and
the restraining order, stating, “ ‘[I]t’s already been a few months,
so the year is almost up.’ ” The social worker had another
discussion with father about ensuring that E.C. is around people
who are safe and asked father how he would know whether
20
mother was being safe. Father replied, “ ‘I’m not going to hold a
grudge against her forever, I’d have to see her interactions with
[E.C.] first.’ ” The social worker encouraged father to discuss the
incident that occurred on the playground with his therapist.
DCFS expressed concern “regarding father’s ability to regulate
his emotions and manage external stressors in a public setting,
while providing care for [E.C.]” DCFS also expressed concern
that father and mother might be in communication as father
expressed interest in moving to the same location where mother
reported residing.
In a March 16, 2026 interim review report, DCFS reported
additional concerns regarding father’s observed behaviors during
recent monitored visits. At a visit on January 9, 2026, father
brought a female companion who he introduced as his “ ‘[c]ousin,
Jamie Hill,’ ” and asked if she could participate in the visit. Ms.
Hill told the HSA, “ ‘I just ran into dad here. I’m not even part of
the visit. I didn’t come with him.’ ” The HSA informed Ms. Hill
that she could not participate in the visit since she had not
received prior approval.
During this visit, father became involved in an altercation
with two children on the playground. Father told the HSA, “ ‘Oh
I told that little Chinese boy to leave me alone, he was following
me around telling me I was scary and he was just following me
around.’ ” The HSA had to deescalate father as he continued to
look in the direction of the children and their family. Father
continued to struggle during the visit and stated on multiple
occasions that the “ ‘Chinese boy was following him.’ ” The HSA
reported that she did not observe the children talking to father at
any point during the visit and informed father that his behavior
was inappropriate, especially in the presence of E.C. Father
21
asked to end the visit early, adding “ ‘this park is full of
Hispanics. I do not like this place.’ ”
On January 12, 2026, father provided the social worker
with a letter of enrollment indicating he had started therapy
services.
On a visit on January 13, 2026, father was twice observed
taking other children’s toys at the playground, with the intention
of keeping them for E.C. Father asked the social worker
questions about mother’s employment, and the social worker
informed him that this was confidential information that she
could not share with him.
On January 27, 2026, a substitute HSA monitored father’s
visit with E.C. at a local park. The HSA reported that father
made inappropriate comments regarding her appearance that
made her feel uncomfortable. The HSA re-directed father and
reminded him that she was there to do her job. The following
day, the HSA observed father at a location in Montebello,
California that she had mentioned to him the previous day.
DCFS reported it was not a location father frequented prior to
her mentioning it. A special incident report was filed, and the
HSA no longer monitored father’s visits.
During the next visit on February 3, 2026, father asked if
the substitute HSA could monitor his future visits. Father asked,
“ ‘[W]hy can’t she monitor, I really liked her, she is pretty.’ ”
Father also asked if they could change the location of the visit
because there was a “ ‘Hispanic woman who walks around the
library area that makes him feel uncomfortable and looks at him
funny.’ ” Father said he wanted future visits to take place in
Montebello, although DCFS noted he previously said he disliked
Montebello because there were too many Hispanics.
22
During a visit at a local park on February 24, 2026, E.C.
jumped off a rock and fell. The HSA reported that father stood
there looking at the child, without asking if he was hurt or
assessing for injuries. The HSA encouraged father to pick E.C.
up to make sure he was ok, and father said he “ ‘liked the way
[E.C.] did not cry and got back up without crying.’ ” Father
informed the HSA that he was planning to enroll in trucking
school.
At a visit on March 10, 2026, father asked the social worker
if there was a way he could have “part-time” custody of E.C. The
social worker informed father that in the event he was unable to
successfully reunify with E.C., the caregiver had expressed
willingness to allow father to continue having visits with the
child. Father again mentioned that he would soon be starting
trucking school, and stated that he understood that this career
would require him to travel, but he did not mention any plans for
childcare if E.C. were returned to his care.
On March 11, 2026, the social worker had a scheduled
meeting with father’s therapist to discuss father’s progress and
participation in individual therapy. The therapist informed the
social worker that father did not have a consent to release on file,
and therefore, she could not discuss his case.
At a monitored visit on March 17, 2026, at a local park,
father played with E.C. on the playground, pushed him on the
swings, and fed him a lunch he brought from Burger King. The
HSA reported that father appeared to be focused on having
conversations with her for the duration of the visit and required
prompting and re-directing to return to where E.C. was playing,
since father was watching him from a distance while talking to
the HSA.
23
D. Contested 12-month review hearing
On March 25, 2026, the juvenile court conducted a 12-
month review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (f).
DCFS asked the court to terminate reunification services for
father and schedule a permanency planning hearing. DCFS
believed that returning E.C. to father’s care would present a
substantial risk of harm. DCFS noted that it was clear that
father cared about E.C., and that he was addressing some of his
problems. However, he had not sufficiently resolved them to
safely have a young child in his care full-time or even
unmonitored. DCFS was also concerned that father had a
restraining order against him and did not demonstrate insight
into the domestic violence issues in the case.
Counsel for father requested that the court return E.C. to
father’s care, arguing that father completed and benefited from
his case plan, and there was no risk of harm to E.C.
Counsel for E.C. joined DCFS’s argument in full and asked
for termination of father’s family reunification services.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the return of E.C. to father’s care would create a substantial
risk of detriment to the child. The court noted that it was “not
close at all with regard to the question of return” and found that
it would be “very unsafe at this point to return the minor to the
father.” The court said it based its decision on the reports and on
father’s testimony. The court noted father’s testimony that he
was previously diagnosed with major depressive episodes and
PTSD based on his experiences as a veteran and experienced
trauma in his youth. Father admitted that his mental health
issues at times impacted the way he perceived people. The court
further noted father’s paranoia in public and the “myriad of
24
examples of conflicts he [had] during monitored visits.” The court
added that father had conflicts with the paternal aunt and with
mother, which led to domestic violence.
The court was concerned about father’s lack of insight into
his domestic violence issues with mother, and expressed concerns
about father’s testimony that his “triggers” for aggression were
“disagreements, body language, and eyeballing.” The court found
that father would inevitably have future conflicts with others,
given these triggers. The court also found that father did not
express sufficient coping mechanisms to address or avoid such
conflicts.
The court recognized, as did DCFS, that father’s parenting
was improving. However, the court expressed concern about
father’s request to be a part-time parent, and noted that father
did not have any specific plans in place to care for E.C. For these
reasons, the court terminated family reunification services and
set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent
plan for E.C. The court also found that DCFS complied with the
case plan and made reasonable efforts to return the child to a
safe home.
E. Writ petition
Father filed a petition for writ of mandamus on May 13,
2026.6 We issued an order to show cause staying the hearing
under section 366.26. We also invited responsive briefs and
received briefs from DCFS and from the minor.
6 Mother also filed a notice of intent to file a petition for
extraordinary writ, but her attorney filed a no-issue letter on
April 24, 2026, and this Court declared her writ non-operative on
May 13, 2026.
25
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency.
[Citations.] At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile
court determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the
court because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering,
significant harm. [(§ 300.)] At the dispositional stage, the court
decides if the child can be returned to, or must be removed from,
a parent’s custody. [(§§ 315, 319.)] During the reunification
stage, qualifying parents are offered services to address the
causes that led to the loss of custody. [(§ 361.5, subd. (a).)]
Finally, if the child cannot be safely returned to the parent
within a statutorily specified timeframe, the juvenile court
proceeds to the permanency stage, where it either terminates
parental rights and places the child up for adoption or it selects
another permanent plan, such as placement with a guardian or in
long-term foster care. (§ 366.26.) Throughout the proceedings,
the juvenile court is instructed to pay careful attention to the
well-being of the child, the efforts of the parent, and the services
provided by the state to ensure that cases proceed to this final
stage only when necessary. [Citation.]” (Michael G. v. Superior
Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 624 (Michael G.).)
This proceeding concerns the reunification stage. When a
child is removed from a parent’s custody, the court must
ordinarily order child welfare services for the purpose of
facilitating reunification of the family. (Michael G., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 624.) When the child is under three years old at the
time of initial removal, as E.C. was, the parent is presumptively
eligible for at least six months of reunification services. (See id.
26
at p. 625; § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), (C).) During this stage of
dependency proceedings, the court holds periodic review hearings
to evaluate reunification efforts and appropriate next steps,
including the adequacy of the reunification services offered or
provided and the parent’s progress. (Michael G., at p. 625; see
§ 366.21.)
At the 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court
“shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their
parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to
their parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-
being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).) “That standard, while
vaguely worded to be sure, must be construed as a fairly high
one. It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less
than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as
much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an
available foster parent or other family member.” (David B. v.
Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789.) DCFS bears
the burden of proving detriment. (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for
substantial evidence by considering whether the evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s
determination. (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 856, 864–865 (Georgeanne G.); In re B.S. (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 246, 252.) “We resolve all conflicts in support of the
determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the
findings and may not substitute our deductions for those of the
juvenile court. [Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is
not synonymous with any evidence. [Citation.] To be
27
substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance
and must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’
[Citations.]” (Georgeanne G., at pp. 864–865.)
II. Analysis
A. Father’s failure to discuss all material evidence
A party who contends that a particular finding is not
supported by substantial evidence is obligated to set forth in his
brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely his
own evidence. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 1640, 1657–1659.) “When a party challenges on
appeal the sufficiency of evidence, the party must discuss all the
evidence supporting the court’s ruling or the party waives the
point.” (Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1374.)
Father’s petition is deficient since he presents only the
evidence favorable to himself, rather than discussing the entire
record, and ignores all evidence supporting the court’s order. For
example, father’s arguments focus only on the steps he took
towards completing his case plan and bonding with E.C. He does
not address any of the factors that the juvenile court relied on for
its substantial risk finding, such as those addressed in the
DCFS’s reports; his history of domestic violence against mother
and the recent restraining order against him; his lack of
awareness into the domestic violence issues in the case and his
lack of accountability; his mental health history; his paranoid
and hypervigilant behavior and observed altercations during
monitored visits with E.C.; or his limited parenting skills. In
short, father fails to adhere to basic principles of appellate
procedure and therefore waives his claim of insufficient evidence.
28
This deficiency notwithstanding, we briefly address father’s
arguments on the merits.
B. Substantial evidence supports the detriment
finding
Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding that it
would be detrimental to return E.C. to his custody. We disagree.
The record contains ample evidence to support the juvenile
court’s finding that placing E.C. in father’s care would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child.
Father testified that he was previously diagnosed with
depression and PTSD and experienced childhood trauma, and
that these issues impacted his social interactions and sometimes
led to anger and paranoia. Father was easily triggered, and
DCFS described several recent incidents where father displayed
paranoid, hypervigilant, and disruptive behavior while caring for
E.C. For instance, at a monitored visit on December 16, 2025,
father had a verbal altercation at a mall playground with another
man whom he accused of being racist. This incident required
DCFS staff to intervene and deescalate the situation, but father
continued to be upset and tried to make eye contact with the man
from afar. At a monitored visit on January 9, 2026, father got
into a verbal altercation with children at a park playground, after
accusing one child of following him. This incident also required
DCFS staff to intervene. At the contested review hearing, the
social worker recommended that father continue to attend
counseling because of his “increase in paranoia behaviors.”
Father’s history of domestic violence and his lack of insight
and accountability for his role in the case also support the court’s
finding. The court sustained jurisdiction in part based on its
findings that mother and father had a history of engaging in
29
verbal and physical altercations, including an incident in 2022
leading to father’s arrest for battery and an incident in 2023
resulting in mother going to the emergency room. Additionally,
mother had a restraining order against father, and accused
father of harassing her, stalking her, and calling her multiple
times from different phone numbers, leading her to change her
phone number. Father failed to accept responsibility for these
actions or his role in the case and minimized the seriousness of
the allegations mother made against him. Furthermore, despite
the restraining order, father continued to inquire about mother
and repeatedly asked the social worker for personal details about
her.
Father’s interest in resuming a parenting relationship with
mother and allowing mother access to E.C., despite her abusive
behavior towards E.C., further supports the court’s detriment
finding. Father repeatedly told DCFS that he was open to co-
parenting with mother once her restraining order against him
expired. Father said this even after the court concluded that
returning E.C. to mother’s care would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the child. Given mother’s previously documented
reports of erratic behavior, her neglect and abuse of E.C., and her
history of violating custody orders and kidnapping E.C.’s older
half-sister, father’s willingness to allow mother access to E.C.
presented a safety risk to the child.
Although father’s arguments with respect to detriment
focus on his compliance with the case plan, “simply complying
with the reunification plan by attending the required therapy
sessions and visiting the children . . . is not determinative. The
court must also consider the parents’ progress and their capacity
to meet the objectives of the plan.” (Georgeanne G., supra, 53
30
Cal.App.5th at p. 857.) Here, father had never cared for E.C. for
more than a few hours at a time, once a week. He displayed
limited parenting abilities, repeatedly asked for his visitations
with E.C. to be reduced, was offered and refused additional
parenting classes, and frequently expressed his desire for only
part-time custody. Additionally, at the time of the 12-month
review hearing, E.C. was under the age of three and required a
substantial degree of care and supervision. (See In re N.R. (2023)
15 Cal.5th 520, 559 [“a child’s youth and maturity level can bear
upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s
[conduct] . . . places the child at substantial risk of serious
physical harm”].) Considering the totality of these
circumstances, the juvenile court’s finding that E.C. would be at
substantial risk of detriment if returned to father’s care was
supported by substantial evidence.
C. Section 361.2 was not applicable to this case
Father argues that he was a nonoffending noncustodial
parent, and therefore, under section 361.2, subdivision (a)7, E.C.
7 Section 361.2, subdivision (a), provides in part that when a
court orders removal of a child pursuant to section 361, the court
shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with
whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or
conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. The
section provides that if that parent requests custody, the court
shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that
placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.
(§ 361.2, subd. (a).) “ ‘[I]n a few decisions, reviewing courts have
used the phrase “nonoffending noncustodial parent” as shorthand
31
should have been placed with him and jurisdiction should have
been terminated. However, at the time of disposition on October
18, 2024, father was found to be the biological father but had not
achieved presumed father status. In Zacharia D., the Supreme
Court held that section 361.2, subdivision (a) does not apply to a
mere biological father, and thus section 361.2, subdivision (a) was
not applicable to this case. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th
435, 451.)8
D. Reasonable services
Father contends that the court failed to make a reasonable
services finding, and in the alternative, that substantial evidence
does not support the reasonable services finding.9 We disagree.
for “a parent . . . with whom the child was not residing at the
time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child
within the provisions of Section 300.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re
D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 299.)
8 DCFS contacted father prior to disposition and father was
represented at the disposition hearing. Father did not request
custody at that time and told DCFS he was unsure whether he
could care for E.C. because of his housing situation. Thus, even if
father had been deemed presumed at the disposition hearing,
which he was not, it is not apparent that section 361.2 would
have applied.
9 DCFS contends father forfeited the reasonable services
issue by failing to raise it below. We disagree. “Generally, issues
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. ‘The
contention that a judgment is not supported by substantial
evidence, however, is an obvious exception to the rule.’
[Citation.] In other words, when the merits of a case are
32
First, the juvenile court did not fail to make a reasonable
services finding. Although the court may not have used the
precise wording of section 366.21, subdivision (e)(8), when it
found by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS had “complied
with the case plan by making reasonable efforts to return the
child to a safe home,” this statement is the equivalent of a finding
that DCFS provided father with reasonable reunification
services. Reasonable efforts to return E.C. to a safe home with
father necessarily includes the provision of reasonable services
designed to resolve the problems that led to E.C.’s detention in
the first instance.
“The [D]epartment must make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ to
provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of
each family.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
996, 1010.) We judge the adequacy of a reunification plan and
the reasonableness of DCFS’s efforts based on the circumstances
of each case. (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.) The standard is whether the services
provided were reasonable under the circumstances, not whether
they were the best that might have been provided. (Elijah R. v.
Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
contested, a parent is not required to object to the agency’s failure
to carry its burden of proof. [Citations.]” (In re Javier G. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 453, 464 [parent did not forfeit issue of whether
the department failed to establish reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the minors].)
Here, the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding is
reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re T.G. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 687, 697.) Thus, father may raise the reasonable
services issue on appeal even though he did not object at the 12-
month review hearing.
33
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that father was provided with reasonable services. Throughout
the case, DCFS maintained communication with father and his
service providers, and provided father with numerous services
including: monitored visits with E.C.; parenting classes to help
father gain the skills and knowledge necessary to properly care
for a young child; a Child and Family Team meeting that
included father’s parent partner; a bus pass to assist father with
transportation for his court-ordered services and visits; and two
in-home assessments. DCFS also encouraged father to: have
more frequent visits with E.C.; participate more frequently in
individual therapy sessions; and participate in ongoing and
additional parenting education programs. DCFS provided father
with parenting program referrals.
Father argues that DCFS failed to provide reasonable
reunification services because even after he completed his court-
ordered classes, DCFS “demanded” that he attend more classes,
yet failed to properly set up referrals for him. Father misstates
the record. DCFS did not “demand” that father take additional
classes. Rather, DCFS encouraged father to take additional
parenting courses based on his “limited experience in caring for a
child [E.C.’s] age” and his “very limited hands-on experience in
assuming a parental role and being involved with managing
[E.C.’s] daily needs.” DCFS explained to father that ongoing
parental education would “help him strengthen his parenting
skills in order to be a better father to [E.C.].” Furthermore,
DCFS repeatedly offered father referrals for additional parenting
programs. Father’s allegation that DCFS’s efforts were an “act of
vindictiveness” is not supported by the record.
34
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that DCFS provided father with adequate
and reasonable reunification services.
E. Family Code section 3044 does not apply
Father argues that he should have been awarded custody
under Family Code section 3044, which contains a rebuttable
presumption against awarding sole or joint custody of a child to
certain perpetrators of domestic violence. (Fam. Code, § 3044,
subd. (a).) Family Code section 3044 is inapplicable to the
instant case. Family Code section 3044 does not apply to juvenile
court proceedings, and there is no indication in the record that
the juvenile court relied on the presumption in terminating
father’s family reunification services and setting a section 326.26
hearing. (See In re C.M. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 101, 108–109 [the
Family Code’s rebuttable presumption against awarding sole or
joint custody of a child to certain perpetrators of domestic
violence does not apply in dependency proceedings].)
35
DISPOSITION
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. This
opinion is final forthwith upon the date of its filing. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
36