Filed 8/31/26 In re D.H. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re D.H., et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH D087410
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. EJ5009A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Micheal P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
J.S. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order
denying him placement of S.S. S.S. is a dependent child who was removed
from his mother’s custody and Father is S.S.’s noncustodial parent. Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 361.2, subdivision (a), requires that when a
dependent child is removed from one parent, the court must place the child in
the care of the child’s noncustodial parent unless it finds that placement
would be detrimental to the child’s well-being. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) The
juvenile court found placement with Father would be detrimental to S.S. and
Father argues the court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
We disagree and affirm the court’s dispositional order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The San Diego County of Health and Human Services (Agency)
received multiple referrals of alleged emotional abuse, physical abuse, and
general neglect involving S.S., spanning from the time he was five months old
until the age of seven. In July 2025, when S.S. was seven years old, the
Agency investigated an allegation that S.S.’s mother (Mother) and stepfather
(Stepfather) were involved in a verbal and physical altercation involving
injury to Mother while S.S. was present. The Agency filed a juvenile
dependency petition alleging Mother and Stepfather exposed S.S. to multiple
violent confrontations, Stepfather physically harmed S.S. during an
altercation, and Mother and S.S. resumed living with Stepfather afterwards
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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while a temporary restraining order remained pending. At the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing that followed, the juvenile court sustained the
petition and removed S.S. from Mother’s custody. The court explained
removal was appropriate because Mother and Stepfather “exposed [S.S.] to
direct acts of violence” that placed him at risk of emotional and physical
harm. Father requested S.S. be placed with him.
S.S. is non-verbal and Mother reported that he was diagnosed with
autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and delayed speech. Family
members explained S.S. requires “high attention” and more recently, his
behavior became “a bit aggressive” and “unprovoked.”
Father is diagnosed with bipolar disorder. He discontinued both
medication and therapy and admitted he previously abused his prescription
medication.
Father also has a history of domestic violence. Mother first obtained a
restraining order protecting her and S.S. from Father in 2018 when S.S. was
five months old. When S.S. was a year old, Father put his left hand around
Mother’s neck while he punched her with his right hand in her torso and face.
In discussing that incident during the pendency of this case, Father stated he
“ ‘took the hit’ ” and participated in domestic violence class.
In 2022, Mother obtained a criminal protective order against Father
and in 2023, she obtained a temporary restraining order. In 2023, Father
was convicted of violating a restraining order. In 2024, Mother obtained a
domestic violence restraining order against Father. The domestic violence
restraining order required Father to have no contact with Mother and S.S.
Less than a month after this order was imposed, Mother reported Father
violated the order by knocking on Mother’s door, demanding custody of S.S,
texting Mother, and damaging Mother’s vehicle outside her home. Father
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took a tool, cracked Mother’s car’s mirror, broke off her mirror cover, and
scratched her car. The Agency noted when it investigated this incident that
Father had obtained a restraining order based on allegations that Stepfather
was physically abusing S.S. The Agency opined then that Father “continues
to violate restraining orders and protective orders seeking out the mother
and acting out towards her; [t]he father does not show that he is concerned
for the safety and/or well-being of the children and there are concerns that he
will continue to act out towards the mother regardless of the safety or well-
being of the children.” In 2025, the Superior Court issued a postconviction
criminal protective order, protecting Mother from Father.
While S.S. remained in Mother’s care, Father harbored concerns about
S.S.’s safety. Father believed Stepfather beat Mother in front of S.S.,
kidnapped her at knifepoint, sexually assaulted S.S.’s half-sibling, and
“beat[ ] and mistreat[ed]” S.S. Father explained Stepfather was “very
violent,” manipulative, and that he sent “disturbing videos” of S.S. Father
believed Mother knew about Stepfather’s mistreatment of S.S. and she did
not stop it. Although Father obtained temporary restraining orders against
Mother, he did not attend subsequent court proceedings, so the orders were
dismissed or expired.
As this dependency case progressed, Father stated to the social worker
that he would “happily do time, after I kill [Stepfather’s] ass.” This caused
the social worker to remind Father that he needed to leave his complications
with Mother and Stepfather aside. Despite the social worker’s advice, Father
taunted Stepfather by sending messages, including “you gonna go to jail scum
bag” and “I can [s]mell [t]he fear in you.” In November 2025, the domestic
violence restraining order that restricted Father from all contact with S.S.
was modified to allow Father supervised visitation with S.S.
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At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in January 2026, the
juvenile court acknowledged that visitation between Father and S.S. had
gone well. It also acknowledged Father had engaged in services, addressing
his mental health and substance abuse. But the court explained Father
needed parenting skills and it could not ignore the domestic violence findings
made regarding Father. The court explained the 2025 criminal protective
order was a postconviction order and the court issuing the 2024 domestic
violence restraining order found “no contact at all with [S.S.] was
appropriate.” The juvenile court continued that while the 2024 order had
recently been modified, it still allowed only supervised visitation. The court
deduced from this that “different judicial officers looking at the facts of this
family have come to the determination that there is domestic violence . . .
that requires protection.” The court noted, on “[t]he positive side,” that
Father was no longer in a relationship with Mother and the court did not
have evidence of any other domestic violence. But it reasoned, “I simply don’t
have evidence – while I do believe more is needed for parenting and mental
health stability and also domestic violence treatment, and all of the things
that he’s working on in order for [S.S.] to be full time in his care.” The court
concluded that placement with Father would be detrimental to S.S. but
“cautiously and optimistically” granted Father unsupervised visitation.
DISCUSSION
Father asserts there was insufficient evidence that placement with him
would be detrimental to S.S. We disagree.
A. Guiding Principles
When a court determines a dependent child would be at substantial
risk of physical or emotional harm if left in parental custody and there is a
noncustodial and nonoffending parent who is willing to assume custody, the
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juvenile court must place the child with the noncustodial parent unless it
finds that doing so would be “detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subds. (a) & (b)(1).) In
assessing whether placement would be detrimental, the court “may consider
a parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re A.T. (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 722, 736 (A.T.), internal quotation marks omitted.) In doing
so, the court may consider whether a history of domestic violence in the
child’s household presents an ongoing risk to the child’s physical and
emotional health. (See In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194,
disapproved on another ground in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628–629
[finding that failure to protect children from domestic violence exposes them
to substantial risk of encountering violence and suffering serious physical
harm or illness from it.].)
Before the juvenile court, “[t]he nonoffending parent does not have to
prove lack of detriment. Rather, the party opposing placement with a
nonoffending parent has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the child will be harmed if the nonoffending parent is given custody.”
(In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.) “Clear and convincing
evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to
leave no substantial doubt.” (In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254,
1262.)
On appeal, we review the court’s detriment finding for substantial
evidence, asking “whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true. We view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
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evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (A.T., supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 736 [cleaned up].) If there is evidence of reasonable,
credible and solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find as the
juvenile court did, we must affirm. (In re K.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972,
979.) It is the noncustodial parent’s burden to show there is no such
evidence. (In re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1087.)
B. Analysis
The record contains substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that placement with Father would be detrimental to S.S. At the time
of the disposition hearing, S.S. was seven years old, required high attention,
and his behavior had recently become difficult to handle at times. Because of
S.S.’s limited speech abilities and needs, the court could find that he needed
an understanding caregiver who could handle the stress involved in caring
for him with patience and self-control. However, Father had a history of
domestic violence spanning from the time S.S. was five months old and
continuing throughout his childhood. Father’s actions led Mother to obtain
several restraining orders including a domestic violence restraining order.
The issuance of the domestic violence restraining order signified the imposing
court found that Father had committed a past act or acts of domestic violence
abuse, either physical or emotional in nature. (See Hatley v. Southard (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 579, 592.) And the imposing court found it appropriate to
protect not only Mother, but S.S. too.
Despite the restraining orders against him, Father repeatedly
contacted Mother. Father was convicted of violating a restraining order
when S.S. was five years old. When S.S. was six years old, Father again
violated a domestic violence restraining order one month after the order was
imposed. In the latter instance, Father alleged Stepfather was physically
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abusing S.S. and rather than seeking the assistance of law enforcement or
social services to safeguard his son, he acted out violently outside S.S.’s
home, damaging Mother’s vehicle. His behavior risked S.S.’s physical and
emotional safety. Moreover, Father did not follow through with any
restraining order hearing against Mother that could have safeguarded S.S.
from harm. Father also allowed his frustrations to boil over during this case
when he chose to ignore the social worker’s advice and sent taunting
messages to Stepfather. Thus, the court had evidence of reasonable, credible
and solid value that in addition to Father’s history of domestic violence, he
demonstrated recent lack of self-control.
Father avers, however, the court improperly found that placement with
him would be detrimental to S.S. because there was not enough evidence to
afford Father custody. We are not persuaded. Viewed in context, the court’s
finding that Father needed more treatment and stability for S.S. to be placed
in his full time care was based on information the court did have regarding
Father’s issues, not a lack of information. (See In re John M. (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1564, 1568 [a lack of information does not constitute substantial
evidence].) Moreover, we review the juvenile court’s ruling, not its reasoning,
and may affirm if it is correct on any ground. (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 28, 38.) We conclude that based on the totality of the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the juvenile court
could reasonably find by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
detrimental to S.S.’s well-being if he was placed with Father.
Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err by denying
Father’s request for placement.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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