Filed 6/25/26 In re Dennis M. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re DENNIS M. III et al., Persons B349013
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
____________________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00210A-
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND C)
FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.M., Jr.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Dennis M., Jr. (father) appeals from a juvenile dependency
disposition order, urging that the juvenile court erred by denying
him reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) (section 361.5(b)(12)).
Section 361.5(b)(12) provides that reunification services shall not
be provided to a parent who has been convicted of a violent felony
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
reunification is in the child’s best interests. (§ 361.5,
subds. (b)(12), (c)(2).) Father concedes that he was convicted of a
violent felony within the meaning of the statute and currently is
in custody with an indeterminate release date, but he urges that
the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding that
reunifying with father was not in his children’s best interests.
We affirm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
because substantial evidence—including that father had been in
custody most of the children’s lives and did not have a
meaningful bond with them—supports the juvenile court’s best
interest finding. The juvenile court therefore did not err in
denying father reunification services.
1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
a. Dependency Petition.
Father and Pamela L. (mother) have three children
together: Dennis M. III (born in November 2011), Denim M.
(born in November 2012), and Denise M. (born in February 2014).
At the time of this appeal, the children are aged 14, 13, and 12
respectively. When this case began, father was serving a 16-
year-to-life sentence for kidnapping, corporal injury of a spouse,
assault with a firearm, and robbery. The children were living
with their maternal grandmother and seeing mother daily. They
had occasional telephone contact with father, who had been
incarcerated since 2015.
In January 2025, police officers stopped a stolen car driven
by mother, in which 12-year-old Denim was a passenger. Mother
had an outstanding arrest warrant for assault with a deadly
weapon, and during the stop, mother handed Denim a handbag
containing crack cocaine and phencyclidine (PCP). Mother was
arrested, and Denim was taken into protective custody.
In January 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency
petition alleging that the children were dependents pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The petition alleged that
mother kept cocaine and PCP within Denim’s reach and was
arrested for possession of controlled substances (counts b-1, j-1),
had a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of
cocaine and PCP (count b-2), and had been diagnosed with
anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder (count b-3). The
petition further alleged that father had a lengthy criminal history
and currently was incarcerated with an unknown release date
(count b-4).
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On January 23, 2025, the juvenile court ordered the
children detained from both parents and placed with their
maternal grandmother under DCFS supervision. On January 30,
2025, mother pleaded no contest to vehicle theft and drug
possession, and she was sentenced to four years in state prison.
b. DCFS Investigation and Reports.
The Jurisdiction/Disposition Report dated February 24,
2025 reflected DCFS’s assessment of the children’s needs and
corresponding service and placement options, including its
recommendations regarding family reunification. Reflected in
the report were mother’s family members’ statements that
mother has a drug problem, which mother alternated between
admitting and denying. Mother acknowledged diagnoses of
bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress
disorder. She also reported to DCFS that the incident for which
father was currently incarcerated involved him kidnapping and
trying to kill her and the children.
The report also disclosed that two of the children—Dennis
and Denise—have significant special needs that were discussed
in the report and that DCFS considered in its recommendations.
Dennis has a diagnosis of mild intellectual disability and autism
spectrum disorder. He needs help with bathing, dressing, and
toileting, has an individualized education plan, receives special
services through his school, and his maternal grandmother
reported that he “functioned at a 4-year-old mentality.” Denise
exhibited frequent explosive anger and aggression. She was
hospitalized on mental health holds several times before DCFS
became involved with the family, and then again in late February
2025 after an altercation with maternal grandmother. When
DCFS was last updated on Denise’s diagnosis, the record reflects
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that she was “receiving treatment to address symptoms related to
‘Disruptive Mood Disorder[,] . . . Attention-Deficit/hyperactivity
Disorder[,] . . . [and was being assessed to] rule out Borderline
Personality Disorder[,] . . . and rule out Autism Spectrum
Disorder.”
The report also reflected DCFS’s attempts to assess the
children’s current relationship with their father and their
interest in developing any further relationship. At twelve-year-
old Denise’s first interview in January 2025, she acknowledged
that her father made some efforts to contact her and expressed
that she was interested in having a relationship with father.
Thirteen-year-old Denim stated that she knew nothing about her
father except that “they had the same last name,” and that he
was in jail for “ ‘beating [ ] up’ ” mother. The report does not
reflect Denim’s preference regarding a relationship with father.
With respect to fourteen-year-old Dennis, the report indicates
that he was not engaged in answering the social worker’s
questions and did not provide any comment on his current or
desired relationship with father.
In an update report in advance of a hearing scheduled for
June 3, 2025, DCFS advised the court on the current status of the
children’s relationship with father. In April 2025, the court had
ordered DCFS to facilitate monitored telephone or video calls
between father and the children, however, both Denise and
Denim “refused to have contact with father.” At this time, Denise
forcefully expressed that she did not “ ‘want to have anything to
do with him’ ” and that she would not change her mind regarding
her desire not to have contact. Denise attributed her opposition
to having contact with father to his “name-call[ing]” mother and
because mother would not like Denise to speak with him—
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although she later retracted the latter rationale. Denise also
previously told the social worker that she understood, based on
her mother’s retelling, that her father was in prison because he
“put a gun to [her] mom’s head” and kidnapped her and her
siblings. Denim also refused contact with father, saying that she
did not know him, and it would feel like “ ‘talking to a stranger.’ ”
She firmly rejected the offers by DCFS to help her get to know
him in a safe and structured way. DCFS did not provide an
update regarding any attempts to discern Dennis’s wishes.
DCFS also provided an update in advance of the scheduled
July 14, 2025 hearing. It reported that Dennis and Denim were
doing well in maternal grandmother’s care, but Denise had again
been hospitalized on a psychiatric hold after threatening to kill
maternal grandmother. The children had not had virtual visits
with father because they refused to speak to him telephonically
or virtually. The social worker had encouraged the children to
have contact with father, but “they continue[d] to refuse.”
In the final update, provided in advance of the September
15, 2025 hearing, DCFS reported that Dennis and Denim
continued to do well in maternal grandmother’s care. Denim
regularly spoke to mother by phone but said their relationship
was “ ‘complicated,’ ” noting that phone calls often involved
mother cursing and blaming the children. Denim said she felt
safe with maternal grandmother and wanted to continue living
with her even if mother regained custody. Denim continued to
refuse phone calls with father. Denise was receiving treatment
for disruptive mood disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder. Denise spoke regularly with mother by telephone but
continued to refuse any contact with father.
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c. September 15, 2025 Hearing.
The juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction/disposition
hearing in September 2025. With regard to jurisdiction, mother’s
counsel asked that the entire petition be dismissed for lack of
evidence, and father’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the sole
allegation against him. The children’s counsel asked the court to
dismiss the allegation against father, strike as nonjurisdictional
the petition’s language regarding mother’s arrest, and otherwise
sustain the petition. The juvenile court sustained counts b-1 and
j-1 (mother’s drug possession) after striking the language
regarding mother’s arrest; sustained counts b-2 and b-3 (mother’s
substance abuse and mental and emotional problems); and
dismissed count b-4 (father’s criminal history).
With regard to disposition, DCFS requested that the court
remove the children from both parents, order reunification
services for mother, and bypass reunification services for father
pursuant to section 361.5(b)(12). Regarding reunification with
father, DCFS asserted that the children had repeatedly
expressed that they did not know father and did not wish to have
a relationship with him. DCFS noted father would still be
allowed telephonic visits and supervised in-person visits upon
release and would not be precluded from having a relationship
with the children in the future, but urged that he had not met his
burden to show that reunification services were in the children’s
best interests.
Father’s counsel conceded that the juvenile court could
bypass services pursuant to section 361.5(b)(12), but argued that
reunification was in the children’s best interests. Counsel noted
that father had been participating in services available to him in
prison, and said that father “wants nothing more than to be
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involved with his children and to have a relationship with his
children.” Further, since both mother and father were currently
incarcerated, counsel argued that it was in the children’s best
interests to repair and maintain relationships with both parents.
Minor’s counsel joined with father in requesting that father
be granted reunification services. Minor’s counsel acknowledged
that the juvenile court had discretion to bypass services for
father, but asserted that granting father reunification services
was in the children’s best interests because father appeared
motivated to rehabilitate himself and to build a relationship with
the children.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the factual predicate for section 361.5(b)(12) had been
established—that is, that father had been convicted of a violent
felony. The court further found that father had not established
by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services were
in the children’s best interests. The court explained: “The father
has been in custody for the majority of these children’s lives.
There hasn’t been any evidence submitted to indicate some
significant or substantial bond between these children and the
father. The father did submit some documentation regarding
services that he’s been doing, but it’s not very clear. . . . [I]t
doesn’t give . . . detailed information as to what actually occurred
during those services that he’s done while in custody. And
therefore, the court does not believe by clear and convincing
evidence that the father has established that it would be in the
best interests of the children for him to have reunification
service. So . . . on that basis, the court is bypassing the father
and denying reunification services as to the father.” The court
granted father phone calls and video visits with the children
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during his incarceration, and monitored visits with the children
upon his release.
With regard to mother, the court ordered the children
removed from her physical custody, and ordered mother to
complete a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare, a 12-
step program, a parenting program, and individual counseling.
Mother was permitted phone and video calls with the children
while she was incarcerated, and monitored visits weekly after her
release.
Father timely appealed from the September 15, 2025
disposition order.
II. DISCUSSION
Father contends that reunifying with his children is in
their best interests, and thus the juvenile court erred by denying
him reunification services. For the reasons that follow, the
contention lacks merit.
Reunification services are intended to “ ‘facilitate the
return of a dependent child to parental custody’ ” (In re Jaden E.
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281, quoting In re Jodi B. (1991)
227 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1326), and are statutorily required to be
offered to most parents whose children are removed from their
custody “ ‘in an effort to eliminate the conditions leading to loss of
custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This
furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.’ ”
(§ 361.5, subd. (a); In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106,
1112.) However, section 361.5, subdivision (b) “sets forth certain
exceptions—also called reunification bypass provisions—to this
‘general mandate of providing reunification services[.]’ (In re
Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470 (Joshua M.); see
Mardardo F. [v. Superior Court (2008)] 164 Cal.App.4th [481,]
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485.)” (Allison J., at p. 1112.) If a bypass provision applies, the
court “shall not” order reunification services unless it finds, “by
clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best
interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) “In sum, section
361.5, subdivision (a), provides that reunification services are
mandatory unless a bypass provision applies; section 361.5,
subdivision (b), lists the bypass provisions and provides that
reunification services are discretionary if any of them apply; but
section 361.5, subdivision (c), provides that denial of reunification
services is mandatory, not discretionary, with respect to nearly
all of the bypass provisions, unless the court makes certain
countervailing factual findings.” (In re A.E. (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141.)
DCFS bears the threshold burden of proving that a bypass
provision applies, and the parent bears the burden to show that
reunification would serve the children’s best interests. (In re T.R.
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1148; In re Jayden M. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1272; In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19,
24.) The juvenile court has broad discretion when determining
whether reunification services are in the children’s best interests,
and the reviewing court “ ‘ “will reverse that determination only
if the juvenile court abuses its discretion.” ’ ” (In re A.E., supra,
38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1141.) We will uphold the juvenile court’s
determination if it is supported by substantial evidence and does
not exceed the bounds of reason. (Ibid. [“If the juvenile court’s
finding that further services would be in the children’s best
interest is not supported by substantial evidence, then the order
for such services constitutes an abuse of discretion”]; In re
Jaden E., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288 [“As has been oft
repeated, when we review a juvenile court order for abuse of
10
discretion, the “ ‘appropriate test . . . is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason’ ”]; see also Jennifer S. v. Superior
Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121 (Jennifer S.); R.T. v.
Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.)
The juvenile court found father was not entitled to
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5(b)(12). That
section permits the juvenile court to bypass reunification services
where a parent has been convicted of a “violent felony” within the
meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). A violent
felony includes, among other things, any felony punishable by
“imprisonment in the state prison for life.” (Pen. Code, § 667.5,
subd. (c).) Here, it is undisputed that father was convicted of a
felony for which he is serving an indeterminate life sentence, and
thus section 361.5(b)(12) unquestionably applies. Father does not
challenge this finding by the juvenile court. The question before
us, therefore, is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion
in finding that reunifying with father is not in the children’s best
interests.
Because father bore the burden of proof on the best
interests issue in the juvenile court, we review the juvenile
court’s ruling under the standard articulated in In re I.W. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527–1528, overruled in part on other
grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010—
that is, we consider whether “the evidence compels a finding in
favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” Stated differently, we
consider whether the father’s evidence “was (1) ‘uncontradicted
and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to
leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient
to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528; accord; In re J.M.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 111.)
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The evidence before the juvenile court did not compel a
finding that reunifying with father was in the children’s best
interests. None of the children have a meaningful bond with
father. Father was incarcerated when Dennis was a toddler and
Denim and Denise were babies, and the children have not seen
him for many years. Father spoke with the children by telephone
only sporadically during his incarceration, and Denim described
him as “ ‘a stranger.’ ” Denise expressed fear of father, saying
that he had tried to kill mother and would try again if he were
released from prison. Further, none of the children currently
wished to reunify with father, or even to have telephone contact
with him.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, father urges that it is in the
children’s best interests to reunify with him because he strongly
desires to have a relationship with the children, has made
substantial efforts towards rehabilitation, and is eligible for
parole in 2026, thus removing a barrier for his relationship with
the children. Further, father maintains his innocence regarding
the incident with mother that led to his current incarceration and
is challenging this conviction with assistance of the Loyola
Innocence Project. Whatever the factual merit of father’s
argument that this demonstrates that facilitating a relationship
between him and the children is in their best interest, these
arguments are not “ ‘of such a character and weight’ ” (In re I.W.,
supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528) so as to compel this
conclusion.2 (See Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1123
[error was not prejudicial because the undisputed facts, including
2 Of course, if father is paroled during the reunification
period, he can seek modification of the disposition order based on
changed circumstances. (§ 388.)
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the father’s incarceration shortly after the child’s birth, his
scheduled release date after the maximum reunification period,
and the absence of a relationship between the father and child,
“preclude any realistic possibility that the court would have
found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification was in
[the child’s] best interests”].)
Father suggests that the children’s best interests should be
evaluated with reference to four factors, namely, “ ‘(1) the
parent’s current efforts, fitness, and history; (2) the seriousness of
the problem that led to the dependency; (3) the strength of the
parent-child and caretaker-child bonds; and (4) the child’s need
for stability and continuity.’ ” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1124.) While some courts have looked to these factors, many
courts have noted that a child’s best interests “ ‘ “is an elusive
guideline that belies rigid definition.” ’ ” (In re William B. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227; see also In re D.B. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 592, 608–609; Jennifer S., at p. 1124 [same].)
Nonetheless, even if we utilized father’s proposed rubric for
evaluating the children’s best interest we would not come to a
different result.
Father argues that he fairs “fairly well” under this analysis
and that the first factor weighs in his favor because while “father
had an extensive criminal history, . . . he wanted to better
himself . . . [by] participating in several prison services through
the EDOVO program to help better himself.” The trial court
considered father’s rehabilitative efforts—which consisted of
31 total learning hours—and found that the record provided was
insufficient to determine the nature and extent of self-
improvement work completed by father. Moreover, we could not
conclude that, as a matter of law, the 31 hours spent over the
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course of a decade is strong evidence that father’s “current
efforts, fitness, and history” clearly demonstrate that
reunification would be in the children’s best interests. Father
contends that the second factor is inapplicable to him because it
was solely mother’s conduct that resulted in the current
dependency case. Further, because father is not seeking to
remove the children from their maternal grandmother, he also
claims that the third and fourth factors that “compar[e] the
parents against the caretakers” are not applicable to him either,
although he notes that maternal family members are generally
supportive of his attempts to develop a relationship. Thus,
father’s best interest argument rests almost entirely on his
rehabilitative efforts. We cannot say that the court abused its
discretion by finding that father did not meet his burden on this
record.
We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order denying
father reunification services.
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DISPOSITION
The September 15, 2025 disposition order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
OCHOA, J.*
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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