Filed 7/30/26 In re Delilah Z. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B349344
In re Delilah Z., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP01360A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RICARDO Z.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over
two-year-old Delilah Z., removed her from her mother’s custody,
and released her to Ricardo Z. (father), under the supervision of
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS). Father challenges the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional order to the extent it was based on his conduct. He
also challenges the court’s disposition orders requiring him to
engage in certain family maintenance services. He does not
argue that mother’s conduct was an insufficient basis for
dependency jurisdiction. Although father’s jurisdictional
argument is moot, we exercise our discretion to consider it.
However, we find no error in the court’s orders and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2025, DCFS received a referral about the family
and opened an investigation. Mother was reportedly behaving
oddly, speaking in gibberish, and had been missing from work for
two weeks. Friends, relatives, and Delilah’s former babysitter—a
paternal cousin—observed that mother appeared to have trouble
caring for Delilah. Mother was at times overwhelmed, anxious,
and impatient with Delilah. The former babysitter said mother
went days without giving Delilah a bath and may not have been
feeding her enough. Mother had recently called the babysitter
“crying and not making any sense.” When the babysitter arrived
to pick up Delilah at mother’s request, the house was strewn with
trash and food. Delilah was not wearing a diaper. Mother said
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she could not take care of Delilah and was afraid DCFS was
coming.
Father said mother generally could take care of Delilah,
but “at times, it is hard for mother to take care of herself and the
baby, and that is when he steps in.” Father denied using drugs
and said he drank alcohol only occasionally. He declined to drug
test.
While DCFS was investigating, the parents had an
altercation that resulted in father calling law enforcement.
Mother said father came home late and “tipsy.” He “[did] not get
tipsy easily.” Father was verbally aggressive with mother but
was not screaming. According to mother, law enforcement told
her to leave with Delilah so that father could sober up.
After this incident, a social worker asked father to submit
to an on-demand drug test. He did not show up for the test. He
later told a social worker he planned to enroll in a treatment
program for alcohol. A paternal cousin told DCFS that both
parents were formerly heavy drinkers, although they now drank
less. Mother told the cousin that father sometimes did not come
home, “which probably made mother’s anxiety worse.”
DCFS filed a petition alleging dependency jurisdiction was
warranted under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b), due to the parents’ altercation when
father was intoxicated and mother’s mental and emotional
problems.1 At the initial hearing, the juvenile court detained
Delilah from mother, but released her to father.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. Father challenged the section 300,
subdivision (a) count in a motion “akin to [a] demurrer.” DCFS
later moved to dismiss that count.
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In an interview with DCFS for the jurisdiction and
disposition report, father admitted that he sold cocaine in the
past and was arrested in or around 2015 for drug trafficking. He
said he had learned his lesson from the experience. However, in
early June 2025, he tested positive for cocaine. In late June, he
failed to submit to a drug test, explaining that he was sick.
DCFS received the positive drug test results in early July
2025. Father denied intentionally using cocaine. He said he had
gone to Bakersfield to visit the paternal grandparents. While
there, he left Delilah with his parents and met up with former
coworkers. He and the coworkers “were all vaping” what father
believed was nicotine. He denied knowing the substance was
cocaine. He acknowledged “it looks bad,” but claimed it was an
isolated incident that would not reoccur. He insisted the positive
test was an accident and he could not test in late June because he
was sick. Father asked the paternal grandparents to care for
Delilah and said he would immediately enroll in a substance
abuse program.
DCFS filed an amended petition and obtained an order
authorizing the agency to remove Delilah from father. The
amended petition added a count alleging that father had
unresolved substance abuse problems which rendered him
incapable of providing regular care for Delilah.
In a further interview, mother said she was not aware of
father using drugs. He did, however, have a problem with
alcohol. Father at times did not return home and stayed out
drinking with friends for up to two days. Other times, father
returned home drunk after work. Although this was not a daily
occurrence, it happened frequently enough that mother asked
father to stop drinking. Mother had not suspected father of using
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drugs, but she sometimes noticed that father had glassy eyes,
looked sick or like he had not slept for a while, or was skinny and
not eating properly. Father always denied drug use.
Father continued to insist that his positive drug test was
unintentional as he had not known his friend’s vape pen
contained cocaine. His drug trafficking case was over nine years
earlier. Father had enrolled in a substance abuse program and
was attending AA meetings once a week. He was willing to
submit to weekly and on-demand drug testing. DCFS confirmed
father’s participation in the program. He tested negative for
substances several times in July and the beginning of August.
Although DCFS remained concerned about father’s substance
abuse, the agency recommended that Delilah return to father’s
care since he had enrolled in a treatment program, moved in with
his parents in Bakersfield, and was testing negative for drugs
and alcohol.
The juvenile court sustained two counts of the amended
petition. The court dismissed a count based on the April 2025
altercation between the parents. It found true counts based on
mother’s mental and emotional problems and father’s substance
abuse.2 The court removed Delilah from mother’s custody and
2 The count as to father alleged that father “has a history of
substance abuse and is a user of Cocaine and Alcohol. Further,
[father] has a criminal history of conviction(s) of drug-related
offenses, including drug trafficking of cocaine. Further, [father’s]
substance abuse problems remain unresolved which render
father . . . incapable of providing regular care, protection and
support for [Delilah]. [Father’s] use of illicit drugs endangers the
[child’s] physical and emotional health and safety and creates a
detrimental home environment, placing the [child] at risk of
physical and emotional harm and damage.”
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released her to father. The court ordered family maintenance
services for father, including individual counseling to address
substance abuse issues. Father was also ordered to submit to
random drug and alcohol testing for 90 days. If, after 90 days, he
had no positive, unexcused, or missed tests, he would not have to
test unless DCFS suspected he was under the influence and
asked him to test on demand.
The court subsequently transferred the case to Kern
County. Father timely appealed the jurisdiction and disposition
orders.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
Jurisdictional Order as it Relates to Father
A. Mootness
The juvenile court found Delilah to be a person described
by section 300 based on mother’s conduct as well as father’s. On
appeal, father does not challenge the jurisdictional findings
related to mother’s conduct. DCFS thus contends that father’s
appeal of the jurisdictional findings is not justiciable.
It is well established that the juvenile court may assert
dependency jurisdiction over a child based on the conduct of only
one parent. (In re J.C. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1, 3.) We
therefore agree with DCFS that even if the juvenile court erred in
finding true the allegations about father, we would not reverse
the jurisdictional order. In addition, Delilah was placed in
father’s custody at disposition and, with or without sustained
jurisdictional findings as to father, the juvenile court was
authorized to order father to participate in any services necessary
to ensure Delilah’s safety. (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
1142, 1148 (D.L.).) Father has not identified any relief this court
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can provide that will have a practical, tangible impact on his
legal status. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277 (D.P.).)
Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to consider the
merits of father’s appeal of the jurisdictional order. Father was
only named in the count of the petition related to him. Had the
court not found the count true, it may have considered other
orders at disposition, such as immediately terminating
dependency jurisdiction with a juvenile custody order.
Additionally, the challenged dispositional orders are related to
the jurisdictional findings, even though the court could have
issued the orders without the findings. We therefore find it
appropriate to exercise our discretion in this case. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
B. Discussion
Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes dependency
jurisdiction when a parent’s substance abuse—the excessive use
of drugs or alcohol—renders the parent unable to regularly care
for a child. (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 540.) “The finding
of dependency cannot be based on substance abuse alone;
jurisdiction requires a substantial risk of harm to the child
arising from the substance abuse.” (In re J.A. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046.) We review a juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017)
3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
Here, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
findings that father’s substance abuse was unresolved and that it
created a substantial risk of harm to Delilah. Father initially
denied any drug use and asserted he drank alcohol only
occasionally. Later events demonstrated these statements to be
untrue. Despite the ongoing investigation, father tested positive
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for cocaine while Delilah was released to him. While father
contended this was an accident, the juvenile court could
disbelieve father based on other evidence in the record. Father
admitted he had previously sold cocaine. He met up with “former
coworkers” and vaped with them. The juvenile court could
reasonably find it unlikely that father accidentally or
unknowingly used cocaine in the situation he described.
Although the paternal grandparents were babysitting
Delilah while father was with his former coworkers, they
returned her to father on June 8. Father tested positive for
cocaine on June 9, suggesting he was under the influence while
Delilah was in his care. Father then missed his next drug test.
Mother described father’s appearance as at times suggesting drug
use, although she never found substances in his clothing. These
circumstances created an inference that father’s use of
substances was not limited to alcohol.
However, even if father’s drug use alone was not sufficient
to support a jurisdictional finding, father’s alcohol abuse was.
Mother and relatives described father’s heavy drinking. Mother
indicated father sometimes did not return home for two days
when he was out drinking, and he returned home drunk
frequently enough that she asked him to stop drinking. Father
continued drinking heavily even after DCFS had opened an
investigation. Father admitted that one night in April 2025, he
came home, drank six to eight beers, and began berating mother,
all while Delilah was in the home. Mother later explained that
father was “cursing her out in front of Delilah.” Although father
was not physically aggressive, “throughout the argument
[mother] never reached out to get Delilah from his arms to avoid
escalating [him].” While the juvenile court found the allegations
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of violence arising out of this incident were an insufficient basis
for jurisdiction, the court credited the evidence that father drank
to excess that night, that he was impaired while Delilah was in
his custody, and that his impairment negatively impacted his
conduct with the family. The court could reasonably conclude
that this uncontrolled drinking posed a substantial risk of harm
to two-year-old Delilah should she be in father’s care alone.
Father’s enrollment in services following the positive drug
test did not demonstrate a lack of risk. Father had repeatedly
denied drug use or more than occasional alcohol use, thus calling
into question the extent of his actual use and undermining any
later claim that his use of substances did not pose a risk of harm
to Delilah. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is
a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely
to modify their behavior in the future without court
supervision’ ”].) Further, his conduct before the positive drug test
demonstrated that DCFS and court intervention motivated his
enrollment in services, not an acknowledgement that he needed
such services to be able to provide sufficient care to Delilah. He
initially refused to drug test. He began testing only after the
incident with mother and, even then, said he had told DCFS he
drank so he did not understand why he should test. He stopped
receiving services after he said his attorney advised him that he
only needed to submit to testing. Under these circumstances, the
juvenile court was not compelled to find that father’s “voluntary
participation” in services in advance of the jurisdiction hearing
indicated that his substance abuse no longer posed a risk of harm
to Delilah.
“To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the
hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere speculation to
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believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(D.L., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.) However, “the court
need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the
child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) Here,
father had not been Delilah’s primary caregiver prior to DCFS
intervention. He told DCFS he only stepped in when mother
seemed unable to provide adequate care. Because of mother’s
mental and emotional problems, the juvenile court was required
to evaluate whether father’s conduct, as Delilah’s primary
caregiver and sole custodial parent, would place her at
substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. The evidence
that father had a longstanding history of heavy drinking; that he
continued to drink heavily after the DCFS investigation opened,
leading to an angry altercation with mother while he held toddler
Delilah in his arms; that he previously did not come home for one
or more nights while out drinking; that he used cocaine while the
DCFS investigation was pending; and that he denied any
problem with his use of substances, together constituted
substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that
dependency jurisdiction was necessary due to father’s substance
abuse.
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Ordering Services for Father
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering him to submit to drug testing and participate in
individual counseling. He argues that since he submitted several
negative drug tests before and after the positive test for cocaine,
there was no evidence that testing was necessary to ensure
Delilah’s safety in his care. He further asserts that individual
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counseling was not necessary since he and mother had separated
and did not plan to resume their relationship.
We disagree. “ ‘When the court orders a parent to
participate in a program—such as parent education, counseling,
parenting programs, etc.—the program must be “designed to
eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the
child is a person described by Section 300.” ’ [Citation.] ‘In other
words, the court cannot arbitrarily order services that are “not
reasonably designed” to eliminate the behavior or circumstances
that led to the court taking jurisdiction of the child.’ [Citation.]”
(In re M.C. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 137, 155.)
The juvenile court’s orders here were limited and
specifically targeted at eliminating the circumstances related to
father that led to the court asserting dependency jurisdiction over
Delilah. As detailed above, father’s substance abuse placed
Delilah at substantial risk of harm. The court’s order directing
father to submit to drug testing for a limited time was reasonably
designed to ensure that father was remaining sober. Since he
had only recently begun receiving substance abuse treatment
before the disposition hearing, a limited period of testing was
appropriate.
Father’s argument regarding individual counseling is also
unavailing. The court’s order for individual counseling did not
appear to have anything to do with father’s relationship with
mother. The case plan indicated father’s individual counseling
was to address “the effects of substance use on the family.” The
“family” would reasonably be interpreted as including, most
importantly, the family unit of father and Delilah. Moreover,
that the parents had separated did not mean they would never
need to interact again. The order was not for marital counseling.
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The juvenile court could reasonably order services to facilitate the
rehabilitation of the family, whatever form that family would
take while the proceedings are pending.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, Acting P. J.
We concur:
HANASONO, J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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