Filed 10/30/26 In re D.C. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
B352148
In re D.C., A Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP03492A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Daniel A. Vespi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie,
Assistant County Counsel, John Huh, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant J.C. (father) appeals from juvenile court
jurisdictional findings within dispositional orders sustaining a
petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1
We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 8, 2025, the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) received a report that father and mother
engaged in domestic violence in the presence of their child, D.C.
According to a Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department report
describing the incident, father pushed mother and hit her in the
mouth, causing her lip to bleed and swell. Father described the
incident as horseplay, and claimed that he accidentally hit
mother. Mother’s lip was red and swollen after the incident.
Mother also disclosed three or four unreported prior domestic
violence incidents. Shortly after the September 8 incident,
mother and D.C. moved to a new home. On September 10, 2025,
the court issued a temporary domestic violence restraining order
protecting mother and D.C. from father.
A DCFS social worker visited mother’s home on September
18, 2025. Mother said that she argued with father on September
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
7, 2025. The argument escalated and father pushed mother
against a closet and then intentionally hit her in the face with his
arm. Mother’s lip swelled and bled. D.C. was in the room during
this incident, but she was “playing on the phone” and was not
injured. D.C. was too young to provide a meaningful statement,
but the social worker observed no marks or bruises on the child.
Mother also described a July 4, 2025 incident during which father
choked her during an argument, and only stopped when paternal
aunt and paternal grandmother came into the room. In addition,
mother reported that father would bite her and D.C. so hard that
mother and child both cried. According to mother, father claimed
the bites were attempts at affection and playfulness. Mother
provided photographs of bite marks on her back and arm.
A DCFS social worker interviewed mother again in
October, November, and December 2025. Mother reported that
father would bite D.C. “close to every other week,” leaving marks
and causing the child to cry. Mother said that she took
photographs of the marks on D.C. with her phone, but father
deleted them. Mother stated that father would also pinch D.C. as
a form of discipline, and she described one incident during which
the child cried after being pinched. Mother also reported that
father had physically abused her multiple times. She described
one incident when father became jealous and slapped her after
she smiled at an old man at a store.
The social worker interviewed father in September and
December 2025. According to father, mother initiated the
physical fight on September 7, 2025, by pushing and slapping
father during an argument. Father said that he accidentally
“ ‘happened to turn around and [his] wrist happened to hit her
lip,’ ” causing her to bleed. Father denied that he had ever hit
3
mother and denied choking her on July 4, 2025. He also denied
biting mother or D.C. However, father said that “he gives them
‘hard kisses,’ ” and that “if he ever bit his daughter, it was
because he was playing shark baby . . . .” Father asserted that
there was no evidence he had bitten D.C., but he admitted that
he had access to mother’s phone on two occasions. Father also
denied pinching D.C., but “stated if he did pinch her, it was to
pull her away from harm.”
The social worker also interviewed several extended family
members. Maternal grandmother said that D.C. saw mother
crying one day, and D.C. said, “ ‘Father did boo-boo, father not
nice.’ ” Maternal grandmother did not mention any biting or
pinching. Paternal grandmother, paternal grandfather, and two
paternal aunts all denied witnessing father choke mother on July
4, 2025, and reported no concerns about domestic violence
between mother and father or D.C.’s safety.
In October 2025, father petitioned for dissolution of his
marriage to mother and sought joint custody over D.C.
In November 2025, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging that D.C. was at substantial risk of serious physical
harm based on father’s physical abuse of the child. The petition
further alleged that the child was at risk of harm based on father
and mother’s domestic violence and mother’s failure to protect
the child from father’s physical abuse.
At the December 2, 2025 initial hearing, the court detained
D.C. from father and released the child to mother’s custody. It
ordered services and monitored visitation for father.
At the January 27, 2026 adjudication and disposition
hearing, the juvenile court sustained allegations that D.C. had
suffered, or that there was a substantial risk that the child would
4
suffer, serious physical harm based on father’s domestic violence
against mother (the b-1 count). The court specifically sustained
allegations that father pushed and struck mother on September
7, 2025, choked mother on July 4, 2025, and bit mother on prior
occasions. The court also sustained allegations that D.C. was at
substantial risk of harm because father physically abused D.C. by
biting the child, causing marks and crying, and by pinching the
child; and because mother failed to protect the child from father’s
abuse (the b-2 count).2 The court declared D.C. a dependent of
the court and released her to mother’s home. At the end of the
hearing, the court also issued a two-year permanent restraining
order protecting mother, but not D.C., from father. It ordered
monitored visits for father. Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father argues that there is insubstantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s findings that he bit and pinched D.C.
Father also asserts that his domestic violence against mother
cannot support a finding that D.C. was at substantial risk of
harm. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Applicable law and standard of review
The juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child
when that child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness” resulting
from his or her parent’s failure to protect the child. (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1).)
2 The court struck the a-1 count, which alleged that D.C. was
at substantial risk of serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally based on father’s physical abuse.
5
We review jurisdictional findings “ ‘ “in the light of the
whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value . . . .’ ” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892 (I.C.).)
“ ‘In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 (R.T.).) “The appellant has the
burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently
substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
II. Substantial evidence supports a finding that D.C.
was at substantial risk of harm based on father’s
physical abuse of the child
Father first argues that the b-2 count is based on
insubstantial evidence. He specifically argues that mother’s
statements are insufficient to support findings that father bit and
pinched D.C.3 We do not agree.
In sustaining the b-2 count, the juvenile court found true
that father physically abused D.C. by biting her body so severely
that she cried and sustained bite marks, and by pinching the
child. A DCFS social worker interviewed mother in August,
October, November, and December 2025, and during each
3 Father argues only that the evidence does not support a
finding that father committed these acts. He does not assert that
the conduct described in the b-2 count is insufficient to establish
dependency jurisdiction over D.C.
6
interview mother reported that father bit D.C. so hard that the
child cried. (Cf. In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239
(Lucero L.) [“ ‘consistent repetition’ ” supports reliability of
statements].) During the November interview, mother said that
father bit the child this hard about every other week. In the
latter three interviews, mother said that father’s biting caused
marks. Mother also asserted that she took photographs of the
injuries, but father deleted these from mother’s phone. During
those same three interviews, mother stated that father pinched
the child as a form of discipline, and in December mother said
that the pinching sometimes caused D.C. to cry. Overall, the
evidence is “ ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value,’ ” and is
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s factual findings in the b-
2 count. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 892.)
Father argues that mother’s statements are insufficient to
support the findings. He notes that DCFS interviewed several
extended family members, but those relatives did not mention
any biting or pinching, nor did any relative describe any marks or
bruising on D.C. Father further observes that there is no other
evidence in the record to corroborate mother’s statements. Yet,
“[e]vidence from a single witness, even a party, can be sufficient
to support the trial court’s findings.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 438, 451 (Alexis E.).) Particularly since mother
described father’s conduct consistently over several separate
interviews, mother’s statements are sufficient to support the
challenged findings.
Relatedly, father cites In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
957, in which the court reversed a dispositional order because it
was based on a single “unsworn and uncorroborated allegation”
from the child’s mother, which the father “flatly denied.” (Id. at
7
p. 960.) The instant case is distinguishable from Sergio C.
Although mother’s statements to DCFS were unsworn, she
consistently described father’s treatment of D.C. in four
interviews over a four-month period, which supports their
reliability. (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1239.) And while
father sometimes claimed that he did not bite or pinch D.C., his
denials were vague and inconsistent. Specifically, father
admitted that he gave D.C. “ ‘hard kisses;’ ” stated that “if he ever
bit his daughter, it was because he was playing shark baby;” and
said that “if he did pinch her, it was to pull her away from harm.”
In short, unlike the appellant in Sergio C., father did not “flatly
den[y]” the accusations, but instead appeared to acknowledge his
conduct and minimize its severity. (Sergio C., at p. 960.)4 And
even if father had more clearly denied mother’s claims, the
juvenile court’s findings establish that it credited mother’s
statements over father’s denials, and “an appellate court does not
reassess the credibility of witnesses . . . .” (In re S.C. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 396, 415.)
4 For the first time in his reply brief, father asserts that the
juvenile court’s dismissal of the a-1 count suggests that the
allegations in the b-2 count are unsubstantiated, because the two
counts were based on the same factual allegations. We will
ordinarily not consider arguments raised for the first time in a
reply, because this prohibits the respondent from addressing the
issue. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
270, 277.) Father has not identified any reason why we should
depart from that rule in this case.
8
Considering the whole record, substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings in the b-2
count. (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 892.)5
III. We decline to consider father’s challenge to the b-1
count
Father also contends that the b-1 count must be reversed.
He correctly observes that the juvenile court may only exercise
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) if DCFS
establishes that “that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the
child is at a substantial risk of serious physical harm in the
future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past
physical harm will reoccur).” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394, abrogated on another ground by R.T.,
supra, 3 Cal.5th 622, 628.) Because the last domestic incident
between mother and father occurred five months prior to the
jurisdictional hearing, and because the parents had separated by
the time of that hearing, father contends that there was no risk of
further domestic violence between the parents and therefore no
substantial risk of future harm to D.C. on this basis.
We decline to address this aspect of father’s appeal. “When
a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a
reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of
jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
5 Father’s appeal does not mention the dispositional orders
that flowed from the jurisdictional findings. Because we affirm
the jurisdictional findings, we also affirm the dispositional
orders.
9
substantial evidence.” (Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at
p. 451.) As we have discussed, we affirm the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings in the b-2 count. Thus, even if father were
to prevail on his challenge to the jurisdictional findings in the b-1
count, we would not conclude that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283–284 (D.P.).)
Accordingly, we need not and do not consider father’s challenge to
the b-1 count.6
6 Appellate courts have inherent discretion to reach the
merits in this context, for example, “when ‘the case presents an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur . . . .’ ” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) However, father does not argue that
we should exercise our discretion to address his challenge to the
b-1 count.
10
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
DELGADO, J. *
* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
11