Filed 11/10/26 In re David O. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re David O., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D087065
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. J245056)
v.
DAVID O.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
John Schneider, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Anne
Spitzberg, and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
David O. appeals from a disposition order adjudicating him a ward of
the juvenile court. Appellant argues the juvenile court lacked authority to
commit him to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) because the assault
that qualified him for an SYTF was not the most recent offense he
committed, which, he contends, the relevant statute requires. The People
agree with appellant’s position. We accept the People’s concession and
conclude that appellant’s commitment to an SYTF was unauthorized.
Consequently, we reverse and remand.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Between June 2023 and October 2024, the San Diego County District
Attorney filed three petitions against appellant under Welfare and
Institutions Code,2 section 602. Appellant admitted the violations alleged in
each petition. Some of the originally alleged violations were dismissed in
exchange for appellant’s admissions. One of the admitted violations, for
assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(4)), provided appellant’s potential eligibility for an SYTF
commitment because it is listed as an eligible offense in section 707,
subdivision (b)(14). (See § 875, subd. (a).)
1 Because the facts of the underlying offenses are not pertinent to this
appeal, we provide only a brief summary of the relevant procedural history.
2 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.
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A. The first petition, alleging that appellant possessed metal knuckles and
attempted to steal a vehicle
The first section 602 petition alleged against appellant was filed on
June 2, 2023, alleging appellant possessed metal knuckles (Pen. Code,
§ 21810), possessed a dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310), attempted the theft
of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 664/Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), vehicle
vandalism (Veh. Code, § 10852), resisted a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148,
subd. (a)(1)), possessed an alcoholic beverage as a minor (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25662, subd. (a)), committed vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)), and
possessed vandalism tools (Pen. Code, § 594.2, subd. (a)). The petition was
later amended to add an allegation of receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code,
§ 496d).
Later that month, on June 20, 2023, appellant admitted to the
allegations of possession of metal knuckles (Pen. Code, § 21810) and
attempted vehicle theft (Pen. Code § 664, Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The
People dismissed the balance of the petition. The date appellant committed
the two admitted violations was June 1, 2023.
B. The second petition, alleging that appellant resisted a peace officer
The second petition was filed on September 12, 2023, alleging appellant
resisted a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) on September 9, 2023.
On October 9, 2023, appellant admitted the violation.
C. The third petition, alleging that appellant committed assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury and possessed a concealed firearm
in a vehicle
The third petition was filed on October 16, 2024, which alleged that on
May 20, 2023—a date prior to the offenses alleged in the prior petitions—
appellant committed assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)), with
enhancements for personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd.
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(a)(1), infliction of great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)), and
commission of the crime in furtherance of a gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)).
On December 2, 2024, the prosecutor offered to amend the petition to
add allegations of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)) and possession of a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400,
subd. (a)(1)), to permit appellant to admit these offenses in exchange for
dismissal of the balance of the allegations. Later that day, appellant
admitted the two newly alleged offenses, and the remaining allegations were
dismissed. The assault is an offense for which there is eligibility for an SYTF
commitment. (§§ 707, subd. (b)(14), 875, subd. (a).)
After appellant admitted the amended allegations in the third petition,
the court committed him to Juvenile Hall and the San Diego County
Probation Department’s Healing Opportunities for Personal Empowerment
(HOPE) program for a term not to exceed 480 days.
D. Appellant admits violating the terms of his probation and the court
commits him to an SYTF for a two-year term
Appellant was released to his mother’s custody on June 16, 2025. Not
long thereafter, appellant committed multiple probation violations. He failed
to appear at a probation hearing set to occur in August 2025, and, as a result,
the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Appellant was arrested in
late September 2025 after fleeing from a vehicle that was wanted for felony
evading. He was booked into Juvenile Hall.
On October 14, 2025, appellant admitted he violated the terms of his
probation. The court then committed appellant to the Youth Development
Academy, an SYTF, for a term of two years, pursuant to section 875,
subdivision (a).
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III.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the juvenile court erred in committing him to an
SYTF because the court relied on an offense that was not his most recent
offense for the commitment. In appellant’s view, section 875 requires the
court to look at the date of the offense, not the date of adjudication of the
offense, to determine eligibility for an SYTF. The People concede the court
erred and that the error requires reversal and remand. As we explain, we
agree with the parties and therefore accept the People’s concession.
In 2020, “the Legislature passed ‘juvenile justice realignment’ through
Senate Bill No. 823 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).” (In re J.B. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 410, 413, fn. 3, citing Stats. 2020, ch. 337.) As part of that
realignment, Senate Bill No. 92 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective May 14,
2021, added section 875 to the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 18, § 12.) Section 875 authorizes the juvenile court to commit a ward who
is at least 14 years old to an SYTF if three criteria are satisfied: (1) the
juvenile must have been adjudicated and found to be a ward based on an
offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b), that was committed when the
juvenile was at least 14 years old; (2) the adjudication must concern “the
most recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated”; and (3) a
finding is made on the record that a less restrictive alternative disposition is
unsuitable. (§ 875, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
Significantly, section 875’s second criteria, which uses the “most recent
offense” phrasing, closely resembles language governing juvenile
commitments to the former Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). Specifically, section 733, subdivision (c),
precludes commitment to a DJF when “the most recent offense alleged in any
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petition and admitted or found to be true by the court” was not an offense
listed in section 707, subdivision (b), or Penal Code section 290.008,
subdivision (c). (§ 733, subd. (c).)
In 2014, the California Supreme Court construed the meaning of the
“most recent offense” language in section 733, subdivision (c), in In re D.B.
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 941 (D.B.). The minor in D.B. committed several offenses
on May 23, 2010, including robbery, an offense listed in section 707,
subdivision (b). (D.B., at pp. 944–945.) A week later, he resisted arrest and
falsely identified himself to a police officer, neither of which was a qualifying
offense. (Id. at p. 945.) A single petition alleged the offenses from both dates,
and the juvenile court found the allegations true, ultimately committing the
minor to a DJF. (Ibid.) An appellate court reversed, concluding that section
733, subdivision (c), prohibited the commitment because the minor’s most
recent offense was not a qualifying offense. (D.B, at p. 945.)
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s analysis, stating,
that the language of section 733, subdivision (c), was unambiguous and
“lends itself to only one reasonable interpretation.” (D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th
at p. 947.) In the Supreme Court’s view, the phrase “most recent offense”
refers to when the offense was committed, not when the petition was
adjudicated. (Id. at p. 947; see In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 648
[commitment is permitted only if the minor’s most recently committed offense
is a qualifying offense].)
Now, instead of a DJF commitment, eligible youth can be committed to
a SYTF under section 875 where they have been found to be a ward of the
court for an offense listed in subdivision(b) of section 707 that “is the most
recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated.” (§ 875,
subd. (a)(2).) Because the Legislature elected to use language in section 875
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that is substantially similar to the language the Supreme Court previously
interpreted in section 733, subdivision (c), courts can presume the Legislature
intended the same construction unless a contrary intent is clearly apparent.
(In re N.S. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 841, 845 (N.S.), citing Moran v. Murtaugh
Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785.) Thus, the court in
N.S., concluded that the “most recent offense for which the juvenile has been
adjudicated” as used in section 875, subdivision (a)(2), is referring to the
offense most recently committed. (N.S., at p. 845.)
We agree with the N.S. court’s analysis and adopt it here. We therefore
similarly conclude that a minor is not eligible for commitment to an SYTF
unless the offense he committed most recently is an offense listed in section
707, subdivision (b), regardless whether the petition alleging that offense was
the most recently adjudicated.
Here, appellant committed assault with force likely to produce great
bodily injury, an SYTF qualifying offense listed in section 707, subdivision
(b), on May 20,2023. On June 1, 2023, he possessed metal knuckles and
attempted a car theft. And finally, multiple months later, on September 9,
2023, appellant resisted a peace officer. This timeline reveals that the sole
offense appellant committed that is listed in section 707, subdivision (b), was
not his most recently committed offense. Thus, his commitment to an SYTF
was not authorized under section 875, subdivision (a). Remand is therefore
necessary to permit the juvenile court to conduct a new dispositional hearing.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order committing appellant to an SYTF is reversed,
and the matter is remanded for a new dispositional hearing.
*HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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