In re D.S. CA4/1

Filed 8/26/26 In re D.S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re D.S. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH & D087680
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. J521436C)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniela A. Reali, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy M. DeSoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, R.S.
Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, A.R.
Damon M. Brown, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

R.S., father of D.S. (Father R.S.), and A.R., father of L.R. (Father A.R.),
appeal from the juvenile court’s February 6, 2026 orders following a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Their sole contention is that the San
Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to conduct
an adequate inquiry into the children’s potential Native American ancestry
as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.

§ 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code1 § 224 et seq.), by not inquiring of certain
extended relatives. They request conditional reversal and remand for
compliance with ICWA. We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
K.S. (Mother) had a prior dependency case in 2024 involving her three

children, D.S., L.R., and Z.K.,2 due to domestic violence between Mother and
her husband, Father R.S. In 2025, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction,
placed the children in Mother’s care, and entered exit orders addressing
visitation and legal custody with the respective fathers.
Less than one month after the juvenile court terminated dependency
proceedings, the children again came to the Agency’s attention due to

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2 Mother, Z.K., and Father of Z.K., are not parties to this appeal. Father
R.S. and Father A.R. do not challenge the court’s jurisdiction and disposition
findings. Because the only issues on appeal relate to ICWA compliance, we
limit the facts to issues relevant on appeal.

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domestic violence between Mother and Father R.S. On September 22, 2025,
the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), and obtained a
protective custody warrant for the children.
The Agency inquired of several relatives regarding Native American
ancestry. The form ICWA-010(A) for L.R. reflects the Agency inquired of
Mother, Father A.R., maternal aunt M.J., maternal uncle I.M., and L.R.’s
paternal grandmother M.F. Those relatives gave no reason to believe L.R.
was an Indian child.
The form ICWA-010(A) for D.S. reflects the Agency inquired of Mother,
Father R.S., maternal aunt M.J., and maternal uncle I.M. Likewise, those
individuals gave no reason to believe D.S. was an Indian child.
During the investigation and detention phase of proceedings, the
Agency documented additional inquiries with Mother, maternal aunt M.J.,
maternal uncle I.M., Father R.S., Father A.R., and L.R.’s paternal
grandmother M.F. These individuals denied having knowledge of any family
members who ever lived on a reservation, received tribal assistance, spoke a
Native American language, or were active in or a member of a tribe or tribal
activities.
At the detention hearing, Father A.R. and Father R.S. filed forms
ICWA-020 claiming no Indian status. Counsel for Mother informed the
juvenile court—the same judge from prior proceedings—that ICWA does not
apply and there was “no new ICWA information” since the previously filed
form ICWA-020. Counsel for Father R.S. stated the ICWA inquiry was
“consistent with what had been submitted in the past.” Counsel for Father
A.R. also informed the court the information on the form ICWA-020
“continues to indicate there is no Native American history.” The court

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ordered the parents to provide any new or different information regarding
ICWA to the Agency.
A relative search identified maternal stepgrandfather R.M., with whom
the Agency had contact and had briefly placed D.S. Mother denied having a
relationship with maternal grandparents.
As to D.S., the Agency sent relative notification letters to various
paternal relatives but received no responses from those individuals. Father
R.S. disclosed that paternal grandfather was deceased. D.S.’s paternal half
siblings K.S. and P.S. emailed the Agency inquiring about her well-being, but
the record does not reflect the Agency followed up with them about ICWA.
As to L.R., Father A.R. disclosed names of paternal grandparents and
paternal uncle T.J, who was in prison, and paternal aunt Kaila, who resided
with paternal grandmother M.F. At the contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the juvenile court inquired of several of L.R.’s relatives
who were present including paternal grandfather B.R., paternal grandmother
M.F., paternal stepgrandmother A.R., and paternal stepmother B.R. All of
these individuals denied having a reason to believe that they or the children
had any affiliation with a federally recognized tribe.
At the January 2026 contested adjudication and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court took judicial notice of the previously sustained petition and
minute orders from the prior dependency case.
At the February 2026 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court found, without prejudice, ICWA did not apply. Prior to
entering its ruling, the court referenced the prior dependency case and the
“exit orders drafted by this court.” The court found the allegations in the
petition true, removed D.S. from both parents, and ordered reunification

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services. It also removed L.R. from Mother, found it was detrimental for L.R.
to be placed with Father A.R., and ordered reunification services.
DISCUSSION
Father R.S. challenges the sufficiency of the Agency’s initial inquiry
because it did not question three individuals about possible Native American
ancestry, specifically, D.S.’s maternal stepgrandfather with whom the Agency
had contact, and D.S.’s two paternal half siblings who emailed the Agency
asking about D.S.’s well-being. In addition to those individuals, Father A.R.
contends the Agency should have inquired of L.R.’s paternal grandfather,
paternal aunt, and paternal uncle, all of whom were identified during the
investigation. Both fathers join each other’s respective arguments.
California’s statutory scheme contains “three distinct duties regarding
ICWA in dependency proceedings.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052 (D.S.).) First, the juvenile court and the Agency have an “affirmative
and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This duty of inquiry requires asking parents,
legal guardians, extended family members and others who have an interest
in the child whether they have Native American ancestry. (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(2).) ICWA defines “ ‘extended family member’ ” by “the law or
custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such law or custom, as “a person
who has reached 18 years of age and who is the Indian child’s grandparent,
aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).)
Second, if the initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child has
Native American ancestry, the Agency is required to “make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child . . . as soon as practicable”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)) to “determine whether there is reason to know a child is

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an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)). “Third, if that further inquiry results
in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice
requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1052.)
Generally, we review ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).) When the facts are undisputed, we independently determine
ICWA compliance. (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the
Agency complied with its initial duty of inquiry and that ICWA was
inapplicable. All three parents denied Indian ancestry and represented to
the court that circumstances had not changed since they filed their previous
forms ICWA-010, in which they also denied Indian ancestry. As to D.S., the
Agency inquired of Mother, Father R.S., maternal aunt, and maternal uncle,
each of whom denied Native American ancestry.
In addition, the Agency attempted to contact D.S.’s paternal relatives
by mailing notification and information forms to them. Although the record
does not contain responses from these relatives, the court could reasonably
find that the Agency, by mailing the forms, made “a meaningful effort to
locate and interview” D.S.’s paternal relatives. (In re K.R. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709.) The duty of initial inquiry ‘ “does not require the
agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the
child, merely to make reasonable inquiries.” ’ (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1140 (Dezi C.).) Because the additional paternal relatives did not
respond to Agency, the court could conclude that these paternal relatives
were not “reasonably available” to help the Agency investigate whether D.S.
was possibly a Native American child. (Ibid.)

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As to D.S.’s paternal half siblings, the Agency did not have a duty to
contact and inquire of them because they had not reached 18 years of age and
therefore were not “extended family members.” ( § 224.1, subd. (c).) Given
their status as minors, the juvenile court could reasonably have found that
they were unlikely to possess greater knowledge of Native American ancestry
than their father, who unequivocally denied such ancestry.
Based on D.S.’s parents’ and extended relatives’ repeated denials of
Native American ancestry, coupled with the lack of responses from several
identified paternal relatives, the juvenile court had no “reason to believe”
that D.S. was an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
We are unpersuaded by Father R.S.’s argument that the Agency should
have inquired of maternal stepgrandfather R.M. with whom it was in contact.
The parties do not dispute that R.M. was asked about, and denied, possible
Native American ancestry in the prior dependency case that concluded
shortly before these proceedings. In assessing the adequacy of the Agency’s
ICWA inquiry, it would make little sense to disregard its prior inquiry of
R.M., particularly where the juvenile court—who presided over both
proceedings—took judicial notice of the prior petition and minute orders.
(See In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 (C.R.) [considering maternal
grandmother’s prior denial of Indian ancestry in a related case].) On our own
motion, therefore, we take judicial notice of the Agency’s prior interview with
R.M., which reflects that R.M. denied any reason to believe that Mother had
Native American ancestry. (Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 227, 235–236, fns. 2 & 3 [appellate court on its own motion
may take judicial notice of records of other cases].) Given that the same
judge presided over both proceedings, and the prior proceedings were recent,
the court could reasonably have considered R.M.’s prior denial of Indian

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ancestry. (See C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 801.) The Agency’s failure
to reinquire with R.M. “does not render the [Agency’s] otherwise diligent and
well-documented efforts unreliable.” (In re Bella L. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th
1284, 1290.)
As to L.R., substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings
that the Agency fulfilled its duty of inquiry. Both parents and several
additional extended relatives and other interested individuals, as described
in section 224.2, subdivision (b), denied Indian ancestry, including maternal
aunt and uncle, paternal stepmother, paternal grandparents, and paternal
stepgrandmother. In light of these unambiguous denials, the court had an
adequate basis on which to conclude the Agency fulfilled its duty of initial
inquiry and to find that ICWA did not apply.
We disagree with Father A.R.’s contention that the Agency’s inquiry
was deficient because it did not contact L.R.’s paternal aunt and uncle.
Because L.R.’s uncle was incarcerated and uninvolved with the case, he was
not “reasonably available” for questioning. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1140 [“The operative concept is those people who are reasonably available
to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any
potential Indian ancestry should be asked.”].) Although the Agency did not
contact L.R.’s paternal aunt, the Agency twice inquired of L.R.’s paternal
grandmother (the paternal aunt’s mother), with whom the paternal aunt
lived. Thus, questioning the paternal aunt would have been duplicative and,
therefore, unnecessary. (See C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 802.) The
Agency is not required to “pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (D.S.,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.)
Finally, Father A.R.’s claim that the Agency and the juvenile court did
not, but should have, questioned L.R.’s paternal grandfather B.R.

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mischaracterizes the record. While the record does not show that the Agency
contacted B.R., the juvenile court inquired of him and several other paternal
extended relatives of L.R. at the February 6, 2026 contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. There, B.R. denied having a reason to believe that he or
L.R. had any affiliation with a federally recognized tribe or that L.R. was an
Indian child.
The Agency was not obligated to pursue other extended relatives on a
fact-finding mission, because no one even suggested that L.R. or D.S. might
be Indian children. (See In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401,
1413 [“the obligation is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to
ascertain or refute Native American ancestry”].)
Accordingly, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support a
finding by the juvenile court that the Agency made a meaningful effort to
locate and interview those individuals who were reasonably available to help
it investigate whether D.S. or L.R. had any possible Indian ancestry.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential
standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141.) We thus conclude the court did not err
by finding ICWA did not apply.

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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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