Filed 7/15/26 In re D.M. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re D.M., a Person Coming Under H053659
the Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 23JU00167)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D.M. was born in November 2005. In August 2023, the Santa Cruz
County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 § 602, subd. (a)) alleging that D.M., aged 17, committed murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)). In December 2023, the district attorney moved to
transfer D.M. to criminal court for prosecution as an adult (§ 707, subd.
(a)(1)). More than a year later, the juvenile court held a hearing on the
district attorney’s motion and granted it.
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
D.M. appeals the juvenile court’s transfer order. D.M. contends the
court misapplied the law and lacked sufficient evidence in finding that he is
not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court. He also contends the
court violated his constitutional rights by requiring him to admit and explain
his guilt. Additionally, D.M claims that the prosecutor and court used
racially discriminatory language in violation of the California Racial Justice
Act (hereafter RJA) and all the alleged errors were cumulatively prejudicial.
For the reasons explained below, we reverse the juvenile court’s
transfer order and remand for a new hearing and ruling on the district
attorney’s transfer motion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Offense and Police Investigation2
At approximately 10:01 a.m. on August 4, 2023,3 Watsonville police
officers responded to a report of a shooting. The officers found 23-year-old
Michael Van Turner4 lying on a street in a pool of blood. Turner had suffered
three gunshot wounds—one to the right side of his face, another to his right
lateral chest, and a third to his right thigh and pelvis. Officers also found at
least six spent nine-millimeter shell casings spread out on the street.
2 We derive the facts of the offense and police investigation principally
from a probation officer’s transfer hearing report and a Watsonville Police
Department report, both of which were considered by the trial court in ruling
on the transfer motion. (See People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18
Cal.4th 667, 682 [explaining that “the criteria used to determine fitness are
based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the offense”]; see
also Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189 (Kevin P.).)
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2023.
4 The police report and juvenile wardship petition identify the victim as
“Michael Van Turner.” However, the record on appeal includes references to
Turner as “Van Michael Turner.” Without any disrespect to Turner and his
family, we state Turner’s name as it appears in the juvenile wardship
petition.
2
A witness who was working with Turner at the scene that morning told
the police that he saw a male wearing a black ski mask, black jacket, and
blue pants point what appeared to be a firearm at Turner. The male was
“standing over Turner moments after the shooting” and then fled. The
witness also said that “a similar built male [] wearing similar clothing [] was
seen about an hour or two prior to the shooting walking on” the street. A
different witness reported hearing gunshots and seeing a similarly dressed
man running away.
The police located and searched a car they believed was used by the
perpetrator to flee from the area of the shooting. Officers found D.M.’s
identification inside the car. D.M. was nearly 17 years and nine months old
on the date of the offense.
Police officers interviewed the person who drove D.M. away from the
crime scene. The driver stated that he used to be friends with D.M. and knew
him from high school. D.M. had called the driver on the morning of the
shooting asking if he could stop by the driver’s house. The driver told the
police that when he gave D.M. a ride that morning, he did not know that
D.M. had just killed someone. During the ride, D.M. took off his sweatshirt
and pants; underneath he was wearing shorts and a white T-shirt. The
driver further told the police that D.M. used the driver’s phone (rather than
his own) to call D.M.’s uncle O.M., but O.M. did not answer.5 Eventually,
arrangements were made to meet with O.M. at a cemetery. After the driver
5 The police collected call data records for the driver’s phone and D.M.’s
phone. The driver’s call data records showed a phone call was made to O.M.
at 9:57 a.m. (lasting 48 seconds), a call came from O.M. at 10:09 a.m. (lasting
0 seconds), and a call was made to O.M. at 10:20 a.m. (lasting 13 seconds).
D.M.’s call data records showed phone calls made from D.M.’s phone to O.M.
at 10:01 a.m. and 10:04 a.m.
3
dropped D.M. off at the cemetery, the driver learned about the shooting and
began to suspect that D.M. had been involved.
The driver told the police that he, D.M., O.M., and others are part of a
group that calls itself EBK, which “stands for ‘Every Body Killers’, but they[]
also refer to it as ‘Every Body Kounts.’ ” The driver explained that the group
was started by Adrian Ayala, who was a “dropout” from a Norteño street
gang in Watsonville called the “North Side Watson Chicos (NSWC).” The
driver believed that in 2022, Ayala was killed by members of NSWC. The
driver further explained that the killing caused “tension between” EBK and
NSWC. Turner “escalated” the tension by posting images of himself on social
media holding a red bandanna and taunting EBK. The driver reported that
he previously “had seen various members of EBK with firearms,” including
D.M. “in April or May,” O.M. “in late April or May,” another member “in
February,” and Ayala “before he was killed.”
Surveillance video footage depicting the area outside of D.M.’s
residence showed that D.M. and O.M. were both there for a time on the
morning of the shooting.
The police searched D.M.’s residence and found, inter alia, several
photos of Ayala in various locations in the house, a black sweatshirt in D.M.’s
bedroom, and, in another bedroom, a gun holster, a spent nine-millimeter
shell casing, and a nine-millimeter bullet.6
The police collected social media messages showing that D.M. had
sought to buy a gun and ammunition in June 2023. Additionally, in
November 2022, D.M. stated in a message that he was no longer “claiming
wvn” and instead is “claiming ebk.”
6 The police did not locate the firearm used to shoot Turner.
4
On August 16, D.M. surrendered himself to Watsonville police; D.M.
was accompanied by his parents and his attorney.7
B. Wardship Petition
On August 18, the district attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition
alleging that 17-year-old D.M. murdered Turner (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);
count 1). The petition further alleged that D.M. personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun which proximately caused great bodily injury and
death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)).
C. District Attorney’s Request to Transfer
In December 2023, the district attorney moved the juvenile court for an
order transferring D.M. to adult criminal court (transfer motion).
1. Probation Officer’s Transfer Hearing Report
In February 2024, Deputy Probation Officer Karla Wade (Officer Wade)
submitted a transfer hearing report (see § 707, subd. (a)(2)) recommending
that the juvenile court find D.M. “amenable to rehabilitation and treatment
under the [j]uvenile [c]ourt [j]urisdiction.” In addition, the probation
department concurrently submitted D.M.’s preoffense school records,8 five
victim impact statements, and more than 30 positive character reference
letters concerning D.M.
In the transfer hearing report, Officer Wade reported that D.M. had
“respectfully declined” to talk to Wade about the offense. D.M., however,
shared that he was in counseling in juvenile hall and “found counseling to be
very helpful for him to process and talk about his feelings.” D.M. explained
that “he refused to engage in counseling in the past” because “he was not
7 D.M. remained in custody at the Santa Cruz County Juvenile Hall
throughout the proceedings discussed in this appeal.
8 The school records indicate that D.M. graduated from high school in
June 2023, with a GPA of 2.376.
5
receptive to being open with someone about his feelings.” D.M. further
“shared that he used sports and music to manage any stressors he had. [He]
plans to continue his education as his career goal is to become a [t]attoo
[a]rtist. He plans to participate in an apprenticeship program to further
learn this trade, with the goal of opening his own [t]attoo [s]hop.” He also
plans to leave Santa Cruz County in the future and “wants to avoid the
drama so he will not get in trouble again.” Additionally, D.M. “self-reported
to [Wade] that he does not use any drugs or alcohol,” and D.M.’s parents “did
not express any concerns about [D.M.] abusing any substances.”
Officer Wade reported that D.M. had no prior juvenile justice record.
Before the offense, D.M. lived in a home with both his parents, his older
brother, his grandmother, and his aunt. He also has an older half-sister and
a large extended family that spends a lot of time together. While in high
school, D.M. received his lowest grades during the 10th grade (i.e., the 2020–
2021 school year), but his grades improved somewhat during the 11th and
12th grades. D.M. was suspended for four days during the 12th grade for a
physical altercation (on September 13, 2022) with a fellow student, that
involved three other students. Before the offense, D.M. worked part-time
with his uncle doing construction work. While in juvenile hall, D.M. was
enrolled in remote college courses and other classes.
D.M.’s parents described D.M. as having “ ‘young thinking.’ ” They
expressed “great concerns about [D.M.] associating with an adult population
and are concerned about how that may negatively influence or effect” D.M.
They described D.M. as “sensitive, quiet, and very respectful.” “They
expressed that [D.M.] likes to help people and is always looking out for the
best interest of his family and friends.” They said that D.M. is a “gifted
6
athlete” (who had sustained “a few concussions” while playing football) and a
“gifted artist.”
D.M.’s parents further reported that while D.M. was in high school, two
of his close friends died within 18 months.9 This affected D.M. “deeply and he
became withdrawn” and lost interest in activities that used to give him joy.
D.M. was offered but refused counseling services during this period.
While in juvenile hall, D.M. met regularly with a psychotherapist. The
therapist described D.M. as “a very active and an engaged client” who “is
open to learning new tools/skills and has shown strong effort using them, not
just in sessions, but outside of sessions for his own personal growth and
within his relationships.” D.M. also met periodically with a pastor. The
pastor noted that D.M. “has attended our one-on-one sessions voluntarily and
with enthusiasm” and “engages in discussion, is honest in his self-reflections,
and open to change and character growth.” Additionally, juvenile hall staff
reported that D.M. “participates and engages in all (mandatory and
voluntary) programming” at juvenile hall and is mature, quiet, respectful,
easygoing, self-disciplined, self-motivated, and a leader among his peers.
D.M. had no negative behavioral incidents while at juvenile hall.10
Regarding D.M.’s rehabilitation needs, the transfer hearing report
stated: “While at [the Sonoma County Secure Youth Treatment Facility]
([Sonoma County] SYTF), [D.M.] would receive rehabilitative treatment that
would address personal, social, physical, mental health, educational, career
9 A defense psychologist’s evaluation states that one friend died from a
heart condition and the other (Ayala) was shot and killed in what was
believed to be a gang-related incident.
10 According to one of the juvenile hall incident reports provided to the
juvenile court, on August 17 (the day after D.M.’s arrest for the instant
offense), a juvenile hall staff member overheard another juvenile detainee
ask D.M., “Do you bang?” D.M. responded, “ ‘Nah.’ ”
7
technical education, and an independent living skill set that would prepare
him for re-entry into the community. In addition, [D.M.] would be offered
drug and alcohol services, mental health support, Aggression Replacement
Training, trauma focused, gender responsive, culturally competent, spiritual
advising among other services. Transitional services are also offered such as
career education programs and the Intensive Case Management [] Program.
Family engagement opportunities are also offered. [D.M.] would have an
opportunity to continue with college courses . . .. Specific programs listed
that would most likely benefit [D.M.] are the following: Aggression
Replacement Training, My Strength, Healthy Relationships, Individual
Trauma Counseling, Drug and Alcohol Education (Individual and Group),
Narcotics Anonymous, Interactive Journaling Group, Boys Council,
Mindfulness, The Beat Within, Department of Rehabilitation, Functional
Family Therapy, Art Program, Sonoma County Library Book Club, Arts and
Crafts, and Spiritual Advisors.”
Regarding the transfer criteria set forth in section 707, Officer Wade
stated, “There have been no identifiable reasons or motives as to why this
offense was committed and there are a lot of unanswered questions as to why
this incident occurred.” Wade acknowledged the “gravity and seriousness” of
D.M.’s offense and noted her concern based on the “degree of sophistication
exhibited” by D.M. in obtaining a firearm and knowing how to use it.
Considering the factors relevant to the transfer determination, Wade opined
that D.M. “has been making substantive progress since being held in juvenile
hall in all areas of emotional maturity, mental health, and education. H[e]
has showed a strong likelihood that he would be rehabilitated within the
juvenile setting rather than under a court of adult criminal jurisdiction.”
8
More than one year later, in a memo dated April 25, 2025, Officer Wade
updated her original transfer hearing report. Wade informed the juvenile
court that D.M. was still taking college courses and was on track to graduate
with an associate of arts degree in the fall of 2026 or spring of 2027. D.M.
additionally had continued to participate in other juvenile hall programs,
meet on a weekly basis with his psychotherapist, and meet routinely with the
pastor. D.M. also completed over 80 hours of community service.
During the 15 months preceding the update, D.M. “received a total of
six incident reports” that all acknowledged “his positive behavior.” According
to the juvenile hall staff, D.M. exhibited a “maturity level” appropriate for his
age, “maintained his focus on college and is dedicated to his educational
goals.” The staff reported that D.M. “has done well with the structure and
program opportunities available [] at the [j]uvenile [h]all and shown the
desire to make the best choices with those that are under his control.” In
addition, D.M.’s psychotherapist reported that D.M.’s work on his mental
wellness “ ‘has helped address goals related to unresolved
grief/bereavement/depression, resolving issues resulting from attachment
disruption/adjustment challenges, developing and building on healthy
relationships with others and self, cultivating more empathy, and growing on
his skills/tools to manage distress/potential triggers. The vulnerable work he
has chosen to do is not something that can be forced, but an individual
decision and commitment.’ ” (Italics omitted.) The psychotherapist also
“ ‘continue[d] to observe growth in all these areas in [D.M.’s] interactions
with his family, peers, staff, natural supports, and with himself.’ ” (Italics
omitted.)
D.M. told Officer Wade that “he did not want to submit anything” for
purposes of Wade’s update to the original transfer hearing report.
9
2. Defense Psychological Evaluation
In June 2024, D.M.’s expert, clinical psychologist Dr. Carolyn Murphy,
evaluated D.M. and authored a confidential psychological evaluation
(evaluation). Similarly to Officer Wade, Dr. Murphy concluded that D.M. “is
exhibiting the capacity to be rehabilitated and is amenable to treatment
services, and is therefore eligible for services to be provided to him within the
context of the juvenile court.”
To reach her conclusion, Dr. Murphy reviewed the transfer hearing
report and police reports, conducted a clinical interview and mental status
examination of D.M., and administered an intelligence test.11 The
intelligence testing showed D.M. was “in the average range of intellectual
functioning overall,” with a verbal reasoning score that was significantly
lower than his nonverbal reasoning score.
In her evaluation, Dr. Murphy stated that “[w]hile [D.M.] could not
discuss the offense itself because he is pre-plea, he acknowledged that he was
‘devastated’ by the loss of his friend, whom he had known since the sixth
grade, and that prior to this offense he had been angry because some people
had been talking unfavorably about his deceased friend and mocking him (he
noted that comments were made about his friend crawling away after being
shot in the legs and back, before expiring from his wounds).” D.M. “indicated
that he believes gangs are ‘stupid’ but did concede that some of his friends
are gang members or associates, and that his friend [Ayala] was a Norte[ñ]o
gang member who was leaving the gang when his former associates ‘turned
on him.’ ” D.M. also “indicated that when his friend died, he was very upset,
would visit the grave frequently, and had a difficult time watching others
11 Dr. Murphy provided reasons in her evaluation for not administering
“tests of personality” and “[r]isk assessments” in this context.
10
seemingly move on from the loss, whereas he could not, although eventually
this ended up helping him come to terms with his loss.”
D.M. admitted to being suspended twice from high school—once in
junior year for leaving campus during class time and again in senior year for
fighting. D.M. further admitted that he had “tried alcohol but does not like
it” and had used cannabis “somewhat regularly” since age 13 or 14 “but never
daily.” D.M. explained that his “general pattern was to smoke every other
day when he was able to” (except while he was playing sports), and “he was
using the day before the offense date and then the day after, but not on the
actual date of the offense.”
D.M. stated that during his detention in juvenile hall, he was taking
college courses and “considering pursuing his education in art.” He also was
meeting regularly with a pastor and a therapist. D.M. admitted that he “had
some minor write-ups while in custody and has lost points (for being
disruptive in class and for talking in the shower) for minor rules violations
only.”
Dr. Murphy reported that D.M. “has no chronic or acute medical
conditions that would otherwise affect his cognitive or emotional functioning.”
He, however, does suffer “migraine headaches on occasion” and “had a
concussion in the past while playing football, but no significant loss of
consciousness and no seizures.”
Dr. Murphy noted that D.M. “has no prior mental health issues,
developmental disability, or prior delinquency referrals to the juvenile court.”
D.M. “denied any childhood abuse or neglect, or exposure to [a]dverse
[c]hildhood [e]xperiences, and described himself as having had a happy
childhood.” Dr. Murphy opined that D.M. “does not present with any mental
health issues, behavioral disturbance (but for the current offense), or
11
cognitive impairment.” Dr. Murphy added that the “only mental health
diagnosis” presently applicable to D.M. is Cannabis Use Disorder.
In her evaluation, Dr. Murphy discussed the criteria applicable to the
transfer determination (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E)). Regarding D.M.’s degree
of criminal sophistication, Dr. Murphy acknowledged that “some planning
likely went into the offense.” Dr. Murphy, nevertheless, opined that “there is
nothing to suggest this is a criminogenically sophisticated youth” and the
homicide was “perpetrated by an otherwise angry, emotionally upset youth,
secondary to a recent loss of significance (as there is reference in the law
enforcement reports to retaliation being a possible motive, and there is no
other explanation being put forth at this time).”
Regarding the prospect of D.M.’s rehabilitation prior to the expiration
of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Murphy explained that “it does appear
as though [D.M.] has the potential to benefit from treatment services that
could in fact reverse his impulsive behavior at the time of the crime, uncover
and address the underlying reasons for the crime, and assist him in
developing more effective coping skills moving forward. [¶] Substance abuse
treatment, coping skills and emotional self-regulation strategies, anger
management, vocational skills training, and completing his education are all
services that he could benefit from.”
Regarding the circumstances and gravity of the offense, Dr. Murphy
wrote: “The circumstances and gravity of the offense is not something that a
psychologist can weigh in on, other than to comment on the fact that his
actions led to the death of the victim. However, the fact remains that [D.M.]
is not highly criminogenic, based upon the totality of his behavior, but rather
an emotionally dysregulated and impulsive individual when specifically
triggered, as is seen here. Identifying those triggers and developing a
12
detailed treatment plan will be the next steps in providing this young man
rehabilitative care.”
As for D.M.’s amenability to rehabilitation while under the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Murphy explained that D.M. “is open to talking about
himself and his life, he does not have developmental delays or severe mental
illness that would either slow treatment or need to be stabilized first before
he can benefit from such, and he has expressed a desire to learn new skills so
that he can eventually move away from this area, as he recognizes that a
fresh start will be very important to him.”
3. Transfer Hearing Testimony
Between May and August 2025, the juvenile court conducted a hearing
on the transfer motion (transfer hearing).
a. Officer Wade
The district attorney called one witness at the transfer hearing, Officer
Wade. Wade had recently retired after serving as a probation officer for more
than 24 years. During her career, Wade prepared two transfer hearing
reports and worked in both the juvenile division and the adult division of the
Santa Cruz County Probation Department.
When preparing the transfer hearing report for D.M.’s case, Officer
Wade had access to the district attorney’s entire file, including all the reports
on the matter. Wade acknowledged that she did not “consider any
preplanning that went into the commission of this offense” when drafting the
report and that preplanning could be “an important indication of the degree
of criminal sophistication.” Wade explained that she “referred to the degree
of sophistication” in her report when noting that D.M. “had access to the
firearm and has the ability to use the firearm.” Wade further acknowledged
that she failed to mention in her report that D.M. had changed his
13
appearance after the shooting. Wade agreed that her ability to judge D.M.’s
degree of sophistication (including his “level of remorse”) was limited by his
refusal to discuss the facts and circumstances of the offense.
When Officer Wade spoke to D.M., he told her that he was not involved
in any gang. Although Wade was not familiar with EBK, she agreed that the
term “claiming” was one used by gang members. Wade testified that she had
heard of “WVN, Watsonville Valley Norte” before. Wade agreed that D.M.
and other males depicted in a photo (which was admitted into evidence) were
“holding up what could be interpreted as gang signs.”
Officer Wade opined that looking at the circumstances and gravity of
the offense alone, that factor “would warrant a potential for [D.M.] to go to
the adult system.” Similarly, looking at D.M.’s degree of criminal
sophistication alone, that factor could support either outcome regarding
transfer, but “it could . . . be heavily on the adult side.”
Officer Wade agreed that “specific information about the motivation
and the intent behind this murder” “would be important to [her] in
developing a rehabilitative plan” and that she is “[p]otentially” “hamstrung
without having that information.” Wade stated that she did not and could
not “find . . . the root causes of this crime or this criminality.”
Officer Wade explained that inaccurate information about a person’s
substance abuse “challenges” would be “problematic” for developing a
rehabilitative plan, because inaccurate information “does not give a full
snapshot.” Wade admitted that although she had no information regarding
D.M.’s substance use, she wrote in her report that D.M. would benefit from
drug and alcohol education and Narcotics Anonymous.
Officer Wade admitted that while she was preparing the transfer
hearing report and “before the case went through the management review
14
process,” she “was weighing heavily on the case going to the adult
jurisdiction.” After the management review process, the probation
department’s “ultimate opinion” was that the case should stay in the juvenile
court.
On cross-examination, Officer Wade stated that she had not heard of
EBK before she worked on this case and was not aware of any police report
documenting any crime committed by EBK or any field interview card
relating to EBK. Wade explained that a red bandanna can be associated with
the Norteño criminal street gang and NSWC. Wade acknowledged that
Ayala’s death could be “the root cause of this homicide” and that there was no
“other explanation anywhere,” but “we didn’t have all the information.”
Officer Wade agreed that, in her experience, “the primary factor on
whether a youth is going to be able to be rehabilitated is how engaged and
committed they are to the program.” Wade acknowledged that during D.M.’s
detention in juvenile hall, he was “extremely engaged in all programs.” Wade
also acknowledged that nothing in D.M.’s records regarding his therapy and
counseling “stipulates that” he is not amenable to rehabilitation in the
juvenile system. Wade agreed that the same was true based on D.M.’s
educational records, Wade’s interview of D.M.’s parents, and D.M.’s positive
character reference letters. Wade admitted that there was no evidence from
D.M.’s time in juvenile hall that he is not amenable to treatment.12
12 At the conclusion of Officer Wade’s testimony, the juvenile court
directed the probation department to submit information about Santa Cruz
County’s SYTF (in addition to the information the department had already
provided about the Sonoma County SYTF), because the Santa Cruz County
SYTF would likely become operational before D.M. turns 25. The probation
department subsequently filed a document describing the operations of and
programs that would be available to youths at the Santa Cruz County SYTF.
15
b. Dr. Murphy
D.M. called Dr. Murphy as a witness at the transfer hearing. Dr.
Murphy testified that she had evaluated approximately 1,000 juveniles over
the preceding 20 years and had conducted approximately 110 evaluations
related to a transfer hearing.
Dr. Murphy explained that in conducting a transfer hearing evaluation,
she “cannot ask the youth about their actual conduct on” the day of the
offense and she “just assume[s]” the youth committed the offense. Dr.
Murphy acknowledged “there is planning” and some attempt by D.M. to cover
up his involvement in the present offense, but she explained that D.M. does
not have a “criminogenic personality” or a pattern of delinquent conduct. Dr.
Murphy relatedly opined that D.M. does not meet the diagnostic “criteria for
conduct disorder, [and] as a result he can never be diagnosed with antisocial
personality disorder, as an adult.” Dr. Murphy further explained that
psychologists do not have any “scales, science, literature, [or] anything that
would allow [them] to say that” a juvenile who commits homicide “can never
be rehabilitated because of the crime.” Likewise, research shows that the
commission of homicide in adolescence is not a predictor of future violent or
nonviolent criminality.
Dr. Murphy explained that the lack of a specific proposed treatment
plan did not cause her “concerns” about whether D.M. is amenable to
treatment. Dr. Murphy believed that the development of an appropriate
treatment plan was the responsibility of the entities charged with providing
treatment to the youth, and the youth is responsible for “demonstrat[ing]
they are open to change, willing to take direction, that they don’t have any
underlying deficits that would absolutely prevent them from learning.”
16
Based on the material that Dr. Murphy reviewed, it appeared to her
that the instant offense was driven by emotion, retaliation, and revenge. Dr.
Murphy explained that “[y]outh are particularly sensitive to the value and
opinion of their peers” and “many times their decisionmaking and their
perception is irrational[;] they are overvaluing and placing too much stock in
the opinion of other peers when making decisions, when having emotions and
experiencing their world and making decisions.” Dr. Murphy believed that
this phenomenon “played a role here.”
Dr. Murphy explained that the prefrontal cortex is “underdeveloped in
individuals who are still in their teens and twenties.” Individuals in that age
group “are more likely to make rash, impulsive, emotionally driven choices
with a significantly decreased ability to tap the brakes, weigh pros and cons
and think in a reasonably mature manner, particularly when they are
emotionally aroused or upset.” People will show gains in their judgment,
maturity, and impulse control over time, “[p]roviding there is no brain
trauma or insult that would impair those specific areas of the brain from
developing.” Research has shown that adolescents have greater potential for
rehabilitation than adults. This is due to an adolescent’s continuing brain
development, social development, and brain plasticity.
Regarding D.M.’s cannabis use, Dr. Murphy explained that the
treatment of “cannabis disorders [is] a little easier than other substance use
disorders,” because the treatment can target the “underlying reasons for the
use” and “it’s just not as physiologically addictive” as other drugs.
Additionally, the impediments to development of the prefrontal cortex caused
by cannabis use are not “permanent damage” and “the brain has a chance to
rebound” once the person stops using cannabis.
17
Dr. Murphy opined that with treatment and rehabilitation, D.M. would
become more mature, less impulsive and emotionally reactive, and make
better decisions. The treatment to rehabilitate D.M. should address the
“anger, shame, guilt,[ and] grief[ that] were not effectively managed[ and]
became overwhelming to the point that he committed something very
egregious.” The treatment also should include assistance in developing “more
positive goal-directed” skills in the areas of education, employment, and
hobbies. Dr. Murphy opined that there is no evidence that D.M. is not
amenable to rehabilitation while in the juvenile system.
On cross-examination, Dr. Murphy agreed there was no law prohibiting
her from asking D.M. questions about the offense, but she explained that
“there is also an ethical consideration that . . . certain statements could be
used against an individual.” Dr. Murphy agreed that this constraint limited
her “ability to understand the root cause of why these crimes happen,” but
she added that her assessment for the purposes of amenability to
rehabilitation would “not necessarily” be better if she were able to talk to
D.M. about the offense. Dr. Murphy explained that she is confident in her
assessment “because the evaluation and assessment is about the youth and
whether there are qualities or conditions . . . or intractable behavioral
patterns, that would suggest an individual cannot benefit from treatment,
will not engage in treatment.”
Dr. Murphy acknowledged that “[n]o two human beings are ever
identical,” and she could not state precisely where D.M. is in the process of
the development of his prefrontal cortex.
Dr. Murphy was not provided and did not review for her evaluation the
social media messages that the police had collected. Dr. Murphy also did not
18
review “a video of [D.M.] crossing out ‘WVN’ and writing ‘EBK,’ ” and she
“cannot say” that that video “wouldn’t be” significant to her.13
Dr. Murphy opined that D.M.’s attempts to obtain a weapon prior to the
instant offense would not be “helpful in evaluating his criminogenics” because
D.M. only used a gun in connection with a single offense, not in a pattern of
misconduct. Similarly, regarding D.M.’s fight in high school, Dr. Murphy
explained: “It doesn’t matter what he said about the fight, the fight still
counts as a data point in that analysis. Now, if one were doing a treatment
assessment, then, yes, it would be important to understand why did you get
into this fight, what were the factors, that will inform treatment but that’s
not the assessment that was being done here.”
In response to questions by the juvenile court, Dr. Murphy stated that
there is no available risk assessment that could be used in this case where
“you have a 17-year-old committed a murder and now they are an adult.” Dr.
Murphy explained that “a juvenile risk assessment done when he is a
juvenile would expire as soon as he turned 18, irrespective when it was done.
An adult risk assessment can be done but it has nothing to do with their
juvenile offense.”
4. Juvenile Court’s Ruling
The parties provided oral closing arguments to the juvenile court.
13 On re-direct examination, Dr. Murphy confirmed that the fact D.M.
sought to buy marijuana or a gun over social media and wrote that he was
not claiming WVN “ ‘no more’ ” does not change her opinion regarding D.M.’s
amenability to rehabilitation.
19
On August 29, 2025, the juvenile court granted the district attorney’s
transfer motion. In a written order (which was read in open court), the court
discussed each of the five criteria set forth in section 707, subdivision (a)(3).14
Regarding the first criterion (i.e., “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i))), the juvenile
court concluded that the district attorney “[h]as met [his] burden on this
factor.” In reaching its conclusion, the court noted, inter alia, the following
pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii)15: (1) D.M. was 17 years and
nine months old at the time of the instant offense; (2) regarding maturity,
D.M. had no prior juvenile justice involvement, was disciplined by his high
14 Section 707, subdivision (a)(3) provides in relevant part: “Following
submission and consideration of the [probation officer’s] report, and of any
other relevant evidence that the petitioner or the minor may wish to submit,
the juvenile court shall decide whether the minor should be transferred to a
court of criminal jurisdiction. In order to find that the minor should be
transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear
and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In making its decision, the
court shall consider the criteria specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E),
inclusive. If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall recite
the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall
include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
15 Section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii) provides: “When evaluating the
criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity,
intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks
and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer
pressure on the minor's actions; the effect of the minor's family and
community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor's
involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the
minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the
minor’s criminal sophistication.”
20
school for a physical altercation, and was seen as mature and valuable in
juvenile hall; (3) regarding intellectual capacity, D.M. graduated from high
school, was working full time, had the ability to plan and coordinate the
crime, a disguise, and an escape, and possessed average intelligence without
impairments; (4) regarding physical, mental, and emotional health, D.M. was
depressed due to his friends’ deaths but graduated from high school on time,
appeared able to interact and maintain relationships, and refused counseling;
(5) regarding impetuosity or failure to appreciate the risk and consequences
of criminal behavior, D.M. “did not appreciate consequences to the degree to
deter him in this instant shooting”; (6) regarding the effect of familial, adult,
or peer pressure on the minor’s actions, D.M.’s family remains supportive,
D.M. “did not appear to be a follower” of his peers, and he “call[ed] and
coordinat[ed] others to assist him in obtain[ing] a weapon and getting rides to
and from the shooting and escape”; (7) D.M.’s family and community
environment had a positive effect on him; (8) D.M. denied experiencing
childhood trauma but “[h]aving two friends die is trauma”; and (9) there was
no foster care, human trafficking, or sexual abuse in D.M.’s history.
The juvenile court stated additional findings on the first criterion,
including, inter alia: (1) D.M.’s “Instagram reveals he and his friends were to
some degree engaged in group or gang association in 2022 when he states
that he ‘is not claiming WVN anymore’ (Watsonville Varrio Norte which is a
Norte[ñ]o subset) and is ‘claiming ebk.’ EBK is the common identity and
connection between he and his friends. [Citation.] The EBK group [that
D.M.] was a part of understands the name to be for Every Body Killers, or
Every Body Kounts. This group was started by Adrian Ayala, a Norte[ñ]o
gang member who was a drop out of North Side Watson Chicos (a Norte[ñ]o
subset) who was shot in Watsonville by his own Norte[ñ]o gang members in
21
2022. [D.M.] is believed to be a member of this EBK group. Members had
been seen with guns in the months in 2023 before this shooting.” (2) D.M.
“was seen walking around the neighborhood prior to the shooting to check out
what Mr. Turner was doing before he was approached and shot” at “close
range” “by the shooter who was wearing a black ski mask to hide his face and
identity.” (3) “Some shots were [fired] while Mr. Turner was on the ground
and was being stood over. [Six] shell casings were found in the street.”
(4) D.M. “arranged a getaway car ride,” “called others and arranged a pick up
while he changed his clothing in the car,” “intended to escape and not be held
accountable,” and “discarded the gun and his cell phone so that there would
not be evidence linking him to the murder.” (5) D.M. “denied alcohol or
marijuana use” to Officer Wade and “also said that gangs were dumb as a
way to distance himself from the lifestyle he was leading.” (6) D.M.’s
Instagram showed him seeking to obtain guns and ammunition, and he “said
he needed [five] or [six] rounds, which is the amount of shots he intended and
did fire at Mr. Turner.” (7) D.M. turned himself in accompanied by his father
and an attorney.
Regarding the second criterion (i.e., “[w]hether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i))), the juvenile court concluded that the district
attorney “has not met the burden on this factor.”16 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted, inter alia: (1) The juvenile court’s jurisdiction
would last until D.M.’s 25th birthday in November 2030, and supervision by
adult probation would occur only “if the court decides to release him from
16 Section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(B)(ii) provides: “When evaluating the
criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow
and mature.”
22
Secure Youth Treatment before he turns 25 in a step down process.”17 (2)
D.M. has “positive reports” from juvenile hall and “the [c]ourt would
anticipate that he would continue in this fashion.” (3) The instant offense
“was unexpected and out of what anyone who knew [D.M.] would have
thought he was capable of. There was no awareness of [the] people closest to
him that he harbored malice toward the victim or that he would act as he
did.” (4) “What lifestyle [D.M.] would take up upon release at age 25 is
unknown. Gang affiliation, bonds among the EBK youth[,] and loyalty are all
issues in this case. Although [D.M.] was not an active member of a known
criminal street gang[,] but was instead part of a fringe spin off independent
clique formed by his gang entrenched friend, [Ayala], gang issues must be
addressed since he and his friends grew up and were exposed to gang ways of
thinking in some respects, to what degree, we do not know.” (5) “Since grief
was part of [D.M.’s] motivation mindset for this crime, grief is individualized
and for the loss of important people in a person’s life and ones in formative
years, working through those issues takes years of unknown duration.”
Regarding the third criterion (i.e., “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent
history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i))), the juvenile court concluded that the
district attorney “has not met the burden on this factor.”18 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted, inter alia: (1) D.M. had no prior juvenile court
involvement, but he received a disciplinary suspension in high school for a
17 When reading its ruling in court, the juvenile court added that once
D.M. reached age 25, “there is no jurisdiction or supervision by anyone.”
18 Section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii) provides: “When evaluating the
criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the minor’s
previous delinquent history and the effect of the minor’s family and
community environment and childhood trauma on the minor’s previous
delinquent behavior.”
23
physical altercation. (2) D.M. told Dr. Murphy “that he smoked marijuana
every other day, and there are multiple videos of him vaping/smoking, and in
one of the videos [he] is vaping in a classroom during school, all of which
corroborates this illegal activity.” (3) The evidence includes “photos and
videos of [D.M.] engaging in teen as well as a gang group lifestyle of drinking
beer and chugging hard alcohol, using hand signs for letters and mimicking
pulling a trigger or holding a gun in videos/photographs, tagging, and a video
of the tagging while he or one of his associates says ‘Fuck the Chicos’ (the
Norte[ñ]o street gang subset).” (4) “While there were delinquent behaviors
and unlawfulness, there was not an escalating pattern of violent criminal
conduct.”
Regarding the fourth criterion (i.e., “[s]uccess of previous attempt by
the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i))), the
juvenile court noted D.M.’s lack of prior juvenile court history and concluded
that the district attorney “has not met the burden on this factor.”19
Regarding the fifth criterion (i.e., “[t]he circumstances and gravity of
the offense alleged in the [p]etition” to have been committed by the minor
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i))), the juvenile court concluded that the district
attorney “has met their burden on this factor.”20 In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted, inter alia: (1) The considerations stated for the first criterion
19 Section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(D)(ii) provides: “When evaluating the
criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the services
previously provided to address the minor’s needs.”
20 Section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(E)(ii) provides: “When evaluating the
criterion specified in clause (i), the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual behavior of the
person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement in
the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s
mental and emotional development.”
24
are applicable to this criterion as well. (2) “For the mental state, we have a
youth who was affected by the death of two friends when he was
approx[imately] 16. At the time of this offense, he was mature, 17 years
[nine] months, and was employed. He played team sports throughout his life,
volunteered in the community, and served as a leader at times throughout
[his] high school years. In juvenile hall, he [is] described as ‘appropriate for
his age[]’ and is a college student and engages in projects to improve the
juvenile hall and has completed 85 service hours as of April 2025. He
exhibits positive behavior, shows great coping skills, being trustworthy, and
forms relationships and socializes. He has goals of graduating from a four-
year college and becoming a business owner.” (3) D.M. “was intellectually
sound at the time of this offense just having [two] months previously []
graduated from high school, was working full time for his uncle’s construction
company.” (3) “The irreparable harm to the deceased, his family and this
community is apparent by the charge. Another person was intentionally
killed with malice aforethought, which is evident when someone lies in wait
to shoot another person at close range, in the face and multiple times, it was
personal.”
The juvenile court added the following in the “Conclusion” section of its
written order:
“This court does not merely count the factors and go with the larger
number of factors in support o[f] either position. The court has to address
amenability in all of these factors but also ask[] what a rehabilitation plan
would look like. The changes in the law as of January 1, 2023, favor juvenile
rehabilitation and increased the burden on the [p]etitioner [district attorney]
to clear and convincing evidence to show that the youth is not amenable to
rehabilitation.
25
“So we are still left with, why did this youth take the extreme
retaliatory action based on his grief and kill another human being with
malice as was evident in this crime? The planning was apparent from the
months before, right after high school graduation that he was seeking a gun
and sufficient ammunition. The planning took time and effort. He conducted
his crime in the morning when he was presumably not under the influence,
nor was there any direct provocation by anyone that day. The record is vague
as to when there had been provocation. Was it something he heard through
hearsay? Was any of it direct from Mr. Turner? Was it close in time to the
killing? In Dr. Murphy’s report there is mention of his perceived taunts by
Mr. Turner, but when? There is absolutely no time frame attached to these
events or feelings. [Ayala] was killed some time the year before. There was
no peer pressure, nor gang expectation that he retaliate or put in any ‘work’
for the gang. There were no adult leaders of his EBK group calling the shots
or giving orders to do so.
“The cold and callous actions of [D.M.] are a stark contrast to how the
people closest to him see him among his friends and family before and as he
is today in his juvenile hall setting. We have no understanding of why this
retaliatory killing was right in his mind, why he felt justified in taking
another young person’s life and as a person who was not responsible for the
deaths of either of his friends. Because we do not know, we do not know how
to rehabilitate him.[21] The degree of his dangerousness is unknown.
Treatment for dangerousness and violence to this degree is not part of the
rehabilitation programs proposed and available in the [p]robation [r]eports.”
(Italics added.)
21 The italicized sentence appears in the juvenile court’s written order
but was not read in open court.
26
The juvenile court additionally cited two cases that discuss the
requisite analysis under section 707, subdivision (a)(3)—In re E.P. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 409 (E.P.) and In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152
(Miguel R.)—and found that, in this case, “factors 1 and 5 are predominate.”
The court decided that D.M.—who “was 90 days away from turning 18 at the
time of the alleged criminal offense”—should be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the adult criminal court.
II. DISCUSSION
D.M. raises four claims of error: (1) the juvenile court misapplied the
law and lacked sufficient evidence to find that D.M. is not amenable to
rehabilitation in the juvenile court; (2) the court violated D.M.’s
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process by
requiring D.M. to admit and explain his guilt; (3) the prosecutor and the
court used racially discriminatory language at the transfer hearing in
violation of the RJA; and (4) the alleged errors were cumulatively prejudicial.
A. Alleged Legal Error and Factual Insufficiency in Transfer Ruling
1. Legal Principles
“The ultimate question for the juvenile court in a transfer petition is
whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction expires. [Citations.] To order a minor’s transfer to a court of
criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must ‘find by clear and convincing
evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ” (In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205,
212 (J.S.), citing § 707, subd. (a)(3) & E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 416;
see also Cal. Rules of Court,22 rule 5.770(a), (b).)
22 All further unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.
27
“In making that determination, the juvenile court must consider five
specific [criteria]: (1) ‘[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
minor’ [citation]; (2) ‘[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction’ [citation]; (3) ‘[t]he minor’s
previous delinquent history’ [citation]; (4) ‘[s]uccess of previous attempts by
the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor’ [citation]; and (5) ‘[t]he
circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been
committed by the minor.’ ” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) “The
statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the juvenile
court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria.” (Ibid., citing § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)
“[T]he allegation that a minor committed a serious offense, including
murder, does not ‘automatically require a finding of unfitness.’ [Citations.]
Rather, in evaluating this criterion, a juvenile court may rely on evidence
that, ‘while not justifying or excusing the crime, tends to lessen its
magnitude.’ ” (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 189.)
“A juvenile court can retain jurisdiction over a minor as described in
section 602 for the offense of murder until he or she attains 25 years of age,
or upon the expiration of a two-year period of control, whichever occurs later.
[Citations.] In determining whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, ‘the juvenile court shall give
weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s
potential to grow and mature.’ [Citation.] ‘Expert witnesses may testify on
the issue of the availability of treatment programs in the juvenile court
system and the amenability of the minor to those programs.’ ” (J.S., supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 213.)
28
“ ‘ “[C]ognitive science has proven that children and youth who commit
crimes are very capable of change.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Rehabilitation is the way
forward, and that includes giving juveniles who have made a mistake the
opportunity to create a new future as they prepare to reenter our society as
adults.’ [Citation.] Thus, a minor’s amenability to rehabilitation is the
central and ‘dispositive’ question in proceedings under section 707 [citation],
and the juvenile court’s analysis of the section 707 criteria must be ‘focused
through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.’ ” (In re O.F. (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 133, 161–162 (O.F.); see also In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
1277, 1288, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re J.M.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 745, 751–753.)
“Section 707 and rule 5.770 do not define the term ‘amenable to
rehabilitation.’ Given this omission, ‘we look to the plain language’ of the
phrase ‘as understood by the ordinary person, which would typically be a
dictionary definition.’ [Citation.] Amenability is defined as ‘having or
showing willingness to agree or to accept something that is wanted or asked
for,’ while rehabilitation is defined as ‘the process of restoring someone (such
as a criminal) to a useful and constructive place in society.’ Thus, the
ultimate question presented in this case is whether clear and convincing
evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that [the minor], while
under the court’s jurisdiction, is not willing to accept treatment that would
restore him to a constructive place in society.” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th
at p. 162, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse
of discretion.’ [Citation.] The lower court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law de novo, and its application of the
law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious. [Citation.] The
29
court’s ultimate finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under its jurisdiction is also reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] ‘In conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings.’ ” (O.F., supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) Moreover, a “trial court abuses its discretion when its
factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on
an incorrect legal standard.” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433.)
“ ‘When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
The clear and convincing evidence standard ‘ “requires a finding of high
probability.” ’ [Citation.] The evidence must be ‘ “ ‘ “so clear as to leave no
substantial doubt”; “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent
of every reasonable mind.” ’ ” ’ ” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160–
161.)
2. Analysis
D.M. asserts the juvenile court misapplied the law and lacked
substantial evidence in resting its decision on questions about “ ‘what a
rehabilitation plan would look like’ ” for D.M. and “ ‘why did this youth take
the extreme retaliatory action based on his grief and kill another human
being?’ ” D.M. argues that “these two considerations, more so than the
section 707 factors themselves, compelled the court to issue the transfer
order. Yet in both instances, the prosecution had no substantial evidence,
and the court instead placed the burden on [D.M.] to prove that there was a
specific rehabilitation plan that would help him and to explain why he
committed murder.”
30
The Attorney General responds that the juvenile court’s ruling
indicates it was aware of and properly applied the requisite burden of proof
as well as the criteria stated in section 707, subdivision (a)(3). The Attorney
General asserts that the complained of statements are “isolated comments”
by the court that “came at the end of the court’s remarks, after it had
thoroughly examined all the required factors, correctly stating the burden of
proof before making a finding on each.” The Attorney General maintains that
“[i]t is understandable that when reflecting on the dissonance between the
portrait of [D.M.] painted by his friends and family and the gruesome and
calculated nature of the crime, the court would be curious about what had
motivated his actions, and what kind of treatment would address those
impulses.”
Considering the juvenile court’s statements in the context of the
complete record, we agree with D.M. that the court committed a legal error
by shifting the burden to D.M. to show his amenability to rehabilitation.
Under section 707, subdivision (a)(1), it is the district attorney who
brings the motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of
criminal jurisdiction. It is the district attorney, therefore, who bears the
burden of proving to the juvenile court “by clear and convincing evidence that
the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) Under the statutory scheme, the default
presumption is that the juvenile should remain in juvenile court and is
amenable to rehabilitation there.
The question whether a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
“concerns a global assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation
within the juvenile court system.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
31
p. 167.) That analysis “must be ‘focused through the lens of amenability to
rehabilitation.’ ” (O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)
We agree with the Attorney General that the juvenile court in its ruling
correctly stated the burden of proof and the statutory factors. In addition,
the court detailed the positive reports on D.M. from juvenile hall staff.
However, in reaching its ultimate conclusion, the juvenile court did not focus
on D.M.’s actual rehabilitative efforts and prospects but instead stressed the
lack of a deeper explanation for the crime. This information could only come
(directly or indirectly) from D.M. himself. The juvenile court centered its
discussion on an apparent absence of information about “how to rehabilitate”
D.M. and treat his “dangerousness and violence,” as well as a lack of
knowledge regarding the “degree of [D.M.’s] dangerousness,” because D.M.
had not explained why he decided to kill Turner.
By focusing on the absence of information about the way D.M. could be
rehabilitated and “why this retaliatory killing was right in [D.M.’s] mind,”
the juvenile court effectively shifted the burden of proof (and persuasion) to
D.M. The court’s explanation stresses the absence of explanation from D.M.
about why he committed the killing and, inferentially, to show that the cause
of his conduct was treatable. This burden shifting is especially problematic
when viewed against the statutory mandate that the district attorney prove
by clear and convincing evidence that D.M. was not amenable to
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.
The district attorney offered no affirmative evidence that D.M.’s
rehabilitation needs were too complex or beyond the capability of the juvenile
justice system. Rather the district attorney principally questioned whether
the proposed list of rehabilitative programs provided by the probation
32
department was sufficiently tailored to D.M.’s needs and asserted in closing
argument “that nobody has identified what the rehabilitative needs are.”
The district attorney also argued that there was a lack of evidence
about the treatment that “will make [D.M.] no longer a danger to the public;
that he would be rehabilitated and then he will be safe to be out in public.”
While an assessment of the treatment available in the juvenile justice system
is relevant to the amenability determination, the “ultimate question” of
amenability to rehabilitation turns on whether D.M. “is not willing to accept
treatment that would restore him to a constructive place in society.” (O.F.,
supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)
Likewise, the juvenile court’s focus on its lack of understanding of why
the “killing was right in [D.M.’s] mind” and “why he felt justified in taking
another young person’s life” evinces its imposition of a preliminary burden on
D.M. to explain the reason he committed the offense to avoid a transfer to the
adult criminal court. Although D.M.’s “mental state” in committing the
offense is a relevant factor that shall be given weight in the amenability
determination (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii)), the court used its uncertainty about
D.M.’s motivation to burden him with proving that he is not dangerous and
otherwise find that the “degree of his dangerousness is unknown.” In other
words, the court turned the absence of evidence about a rehabilitation plan
and D.M.’s motivation for the offense into evidence showing that D.M. is not
willing to accept treatment and is unamenable to rehabilitation.
We appreciate that it may be difficult to prove a negative like
unamenability to rehabilitation. We also appreciate the difficulty faced here
by the juvenile court in the section 707 inquiry. But section 707, subdivision
(a)(3)’s focus on the minor’s amenability to rehabilitation requires the court to
consider the “reasons why the minor might or might not be responsive to the
33
available rehabilitative services.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
p. 167.) We decide that the court’s reliance on uncertainty born out of the
district attorney’s limited proof about why D.M. would not accept or respond
to the available treatment that the probation department believed “would
prepare [D.M.] for re-entry into the community” resulted in an improper shift
of the burden from the district attorney to show D.M.’s unamenability to
D.M. to show his amenability to rehabilitation.
This shift amounts to an abuse of discretion based on the application of
an incorrect legal standard. (See J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 706, 722 [holding there was an abuse of discretion where “[t]here
was no evidence that demonstrated existing programs were unlikely to result
in [minor]’s rehabilitation, why they were unlikely to work in this case, or
that they would take more than three years to accomplish the task of
rehabilitating [minor]”]; cf. People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 673 [“The
prosecution cannot suggest that deficiencies in the defense case can make up
for shortcomings in its own.”].)
Given that the juvenile court improperly applied the burden of proof in
deciding that D.M. is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the court’s
jurisdiction, we agree with D.M. that the court’s order granting the transfer
motion must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new transfer
hearing.
Because we reverse the juvenile court’s order, we need not address
D.M.’s additional arguments that there was insufficient evidence to support
the findings regarding his criminal sophistication and unamenability to
rehabilitation. We also need not address D.M.’s claims that the court
violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the district
attorney and court violated the RJA, and the alleged errors are cumulatively
34
prejudicial. We leave it to the parties and court on remand to consider, as
necessary, whether the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the
court from using a minor’s silence against him in deciding a transfer motion.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order, dated August 29, 2025, granting the Santa
Cruz County District Attorney’s motion to transfer D.M. from juvenile court
to a court of criminal jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707) is reversed and
the matter remanded for a new hearing and ruling on that motion.
35
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H053659
People v. D.M.